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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explain why the European Union ratcheted up restrictive 
measures on Myanmar from 1991 until 2010, despite divergent interests of EU 
member states and the apparent inability of sanctions to quickly achieve the 
primary objectives of EU policy. This empirical puzzle applies the ‘sanctions 
paradox’ to the issue of joint action in the EU. It also connects the assessment of 
policy effectiveness to EU foreign policy-making. The investigation unravels this 
conundrum through competitive theory testing.  
The study discovers that EU foreign policy was essentially decided by the largest 
member states. Since 1996, the UK has fostered a consensus among EU policy-
makers on a principled common policy, which would induce political reform in 
Myanmar mainly via the implementation of punitive measures. Hence, non-
compliance by the target with EU demands offers a credible, but insufficient 
explanation of why the EU tightened its sanctions regime. US pressure on EU 
policy was marginal. 
The dissertation argues that a ‘normative’ interpretation of liberal 
intergovernmentalism best solves this puzzle. The EU met domestic pressures 
for action, although the measures adopted were clearly too inadequate to be 
effective. Feedback on policy effectiveness did not play a significant role in EU 
decision-making.  
EU policy was driven by a consensus to treat Myanmar as a ‘pariah’ state. 
Ideological motivations have largely outweighed material interests. Normative 
arguments were necessary to put proposals on the common agenda; yet, 
decisions ultimately involved ‘cooperative bargaining’ among the largest states. 
Consensus building was therefore a dynamic process. The policy entrepreneur 
defined its interests domestically; member states with lower preference intensity 
generally refrained from opposing its leadership.  
This thesis thus contributes to the liberal intergovernmental scholarship by 
proposing a more comprehensive explanation for the drivers and constraints that 
influence the making of European sanctions.  
3
Table of Contents 
Part I/ Introduction 
Chapter 1                    
Introduction: The Paradox of EU Sanctions on Myanmar         14 
   
Chapter 2                  
Explaining EU Foreign Policy-making:  
The Special Case of EU Sanctions Regimes           56 
    
Part II/ Case Study 
Chapter 3                  
The Context of EU Foreign Policy towards Myanmar          99 
    
Chapter 4               
The EU and Myanmar until 1995:  
From a Non-existent Relation to ‘Critical Engagement’       135 
 
Chapter 5               
The EU and Myanmar between 1996 and 2003:  
UK Norm Entrepreneurship and European Consensus       175 
 
Chapter 6               
The EU and Myanmar between 2004 and 2010:  
Strengthening the Consensus in an Intergovernmental Framework     238 
 
Part III/ Conclusions 
Chapter 7               
Conclusions: Explaining the Consensus on Tougher Sanctions      301 
 
Annexes              349 
Bibliography             364 
List of Persons Interviewed           454 
4
Acknowledgements 
Writing a PhD thesis is a difficult enterprise, which I would not have been able to 
accomplish without the help of many persons. My supervisors, Professor Karen 
E. Smith and Dr. Jürgen Haacke, unwaveringly guided my research project 
despite its tumultuous route. Among many things, I am immensely grateful for 
their impeccable intellectual rigor.  
My examiners, Dr. David Camroux and Dr. Spyros Economides, engaged with 
my dissertation in its finest details and made constructive comments. Dr. Joe 
Hoover deserves special thanks for proofreading this thesis painstakingly. The 
members of my research panel, Dr. John Kent and Dr. Ulrich Sedelmeier, 
graciously shared helpful comments on original chapters.  
I thank the Department of International Relations for awarding me a four years 
research studentship, as well as grants for my fieldwork, which provided me with 
essential financial support. Thanks also to the Student Union for a grant for 
student parents facing financial difficulties. Moreover, the Department generously 
allowed me to suspend my studies to take part in the UN peace-keeping mission 
in Côte d’Ivoire. 
I am thankful to the 80 anonymous interviewees who kindly shared their 
experiences with me. I can credit in person: the Head of the EU Office in Yangon 
Dr. Andreas List, former Ambassador to Burma Vicky Bowman, and the former 
ambassador and chairman of Network Myanmar Derek Tonkin. I enjoyed Bert 
Morsbach’s open-hearted hospitality during my field research in Yangon. My 
heartfelt memories go to my friend late Dr. Nay Win Maung, founder of Myanmar 
Egress, for his generous inputs and frank discussions.  
The London School of Economics is a unique place to grow intellectually. This 
thesis benefits from multiple seminars organised at the school and enriching 
interactions with members of the faculty. Fellow students and friends gave me 
much feedback on my thesis as we shared many pains and joys. Teaching 
several courses at the school proved one of the most stimulating experiences – I 
hope my students learned as much from me as I did from them. My gratitude also 
5
goes to Professor Brigitte Young, Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, and Dr. Willem van der 
Geest who encouraged me to apply to this PhD programme. 
Last, but certainly not least, I could not have completed this thesis without the 
love of my wife Sandy and my daughter Dewy, who inspired me and 
courageously put up with my prolonged absences from home. During these 
challenging years, scarce were the moments we spent together. My parents, 
Gérard and Françoise, and my brother Hugo trusted me wholeheartedly.   
6
List of Acronyms 
 
3DF  Three Diseases Fund 
AA  Auswärtiges Amt 
ABC  Atomic, Bacteriological, and Chemical 
ABSDF All Burma Students’ Democratic Front 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEM  Asia-Europe Meeting 
ASSK  Aung San Suu Kyi 
BC UK Burma Campaign UK 
BGR  Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 
BMZ Bundesministerium für Zusammenarbeit (Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany) 
BSPP  Burmese Socialist Programme Party 
CDU  Christlich Demokratische Union (Germany) 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
COFACE Compagnie Française d’Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur 
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CRDB  Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma 
CSR  Corporate and Social Responsibilities  
DAB  Democratic Alliance of Burma 
DCI  Development Cooperation Instrument 
DFID  UK Department for International Development 
DPNS  Democratic Party for a New Society (Myanmar) 
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
DS  Democrazia Sinistra (Italy) 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry (UK) 
DVB  Democratic Voice of Burma 
EBA  Everything But Arms 
EBO  Euro Burma Office 
ECGD Export Credit Guarantees Department 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office (i.e. the Commission’s 
Directorate General for humanitarian aid) 
EFP European foreign policy 
ETUC  European Trade Union Confederation 
EEAS  European External Action Service 
EEPA  Europe External Policy Advisor 
EESC  European Economic and Social Committee 
EIAS  European Institute for Asian Studies 
ENC   Ethnic Nationalities Council 
EU  European Union 
FAC  Foreign Affairs Council 
FCO  UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
7
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei (Germany) 
FLEGT Forestry Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis 
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany  
FTUB  Federation of the Trade Unions of Burma 
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council 
GDP (PPP) Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing-power-parity 
GDR  German Democratic Republic 
GFATM Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German 
Society for International Cooperation) 
GmbH  Gesellschaft mit begrentzter Haftung (Germany) 
GNA  ECHO’s Global Needs Assessment 
GNI  Gross National Income 
GONGOs Government-organised Non-Governmental Organisations  
GSP  Generalised System of Preferences 
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German 
Society for International Cooperation) 
HRVP High Representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy and Vice 
President of the Commission 
ICG  International Crisis Group 
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions  
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDOs  International Development Organisations 
IFIs  International Financial Institutions 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IQR   Interquartile range 
IR  International Relations 
JCC  Joint Cooperation Committee 
KNU  Karen National Union 
KPF  Karen Peace Front 
LCD  Lowest Common Denominator 
LDC  Least Developed Country 
LI  Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
LIFT  Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (EU) 
MDG  Millennium Development Goals 
MIC  Monitoring Information Centre (EU) 
MFA  Multi-Fibre Agreement 
MFN  Most Favoured Nation 
MOGE Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières  
NC  National Convention 
NCGUB National Coalition of the Union of Burma 
NCUB  National Council of the Union of Burma 
8
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NLD  National League for Democracy (Myanmar) 
NUP  National Unity Party (Myanmar) 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
OPIC  Overseas Private Investment Corporation (USA) 
PM  Prime Minister 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
PS  Parti Socialiste (France) 
QMV  Qualified Majority Vote 
RtoP  Responsibility to Protect 
SLORC State Law and Order Reconciliation Council (Myanmar) 
SPD  Social-Democratic Party (Germany) 
SPDC  State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar) 
TBBC  Thai-Burma Border Consortium 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNCTAD  United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General 
US  United States of America 
USDA  Union State and Development Association (Myanmar) 
USDP  Union Solidarity and Development Party (Myanmar) 
UWSA United Wa State Army (Myanmar) 
WB  World Bank 
WDI  World Development Indicators 
WTTC  World Travel and Tourism Council 
 
  
9
List of Tables  
Table 1: List of Statutory and Non-Statutory Sanctions Adopted by the EU       43 
Table 2: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 1993/1994-1999/2000      161 
Table 3: Cumulative Foreign Investment in Myanmar,  
1988 - End May 2009             189 
Table 4: Effective Utilisation of GSP as Share of Myanmar’s Exports, 
1994-1995              200 
Table 5: Size of Tourism in Southeast Asia, 2010 data       205 
Table 6: Myanmar and China as Top 10 Performers in Annual GNI Growth, 
  1999; 2001-2010                245 
Table 7: Funds Pledged by ECHO, 2001-2004         248 
Table 8: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 2000/2001-2004/2005      248 
Table 9: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 2005/2006-2009/2010      254 
Table 10: German Assistance to Myanmar, 2002-2005                           262 
Table 11: German Assistance to Myanmar, 2005-2011       263 
 
  
10
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Trade Myanmar-UK, 1980-2010         121 
Figure 2: Trade Myanmar-Germany, 1980-2010        127 
Figure 3: Trade Myanmar-France, 1980-2010         129 
Figure 4: Trade Burma-UK, 1948-1988          137 
Figure 5: Trade Burma-Germany, 1948-1988         140 
Figure 6: Myanmar’s GDP Growth Rates, 1961-2006        142 
Figure 7: International tourism, number of arrivals in Myanmar and Laos, 
1995-2009                 206 
Figure 8: Myanmar’s Trade with the US, 1980-2010        226 
Figure 9: Inward and outward foreign direct investment stock, annual,   
1980-2010                  241 
Figure 10: Myanmar’s Trade with the EU, 1980-2010         242 
Figure 11: Myanmar’s Trade with the APEC, 1980-2010       242 
Figure 12: Myanmar-EU trade as a share of Myanmar’s total trade, 
1980-2011             243 
  
11
List of Annexes 
Annex 1: Chronology of Relations between the EU, Myanmar, and the US     349 
Annex 2: Dataset of EU Sanctions Regimes                   359 
Annex 3: Average Duration of EU Sanctions Regimes        361 
Annex 4: UN and Autonomous EU Sanctions                   362 
Annex 5: EU Sanctions on Targets of US Sanctions                  362 
Annex 6: Frequency of Sanctions Related to the Duration of Treaties              363 
Annex 7: Sanctions on European Neighbours and Former Colonies                363 
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I/ Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
Chapter I 
Chapter I 
Introduction: 
The Paradox of EU Sanctions on Myanmar 
 
Since 1991, the European Union (EU) has sought to compel Myanmar to work 
together with the democratic opposition led by the Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Aung San Suu Kyi. European policy-makers were thus tempted to claim victory, 
when, on 1 April 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi and 42 other fellow representatives of 
her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), were elected as members 
of parliament in a landslide victory and what appeared to be a free by-election. 
As a favourable response to this landmark, on 23 April 2012, the EU suspended 
all sanctions except its arms embargo. This paradigmatic change of EU policy 
seemed to be justified by the achievement of the main objectives it had 
consistently promoted in Myanmar: the release of prisoners of opinion, in 
particular of Aung San Suu Kyi; the holding of free and fair elections; and 
national reconciliation between the government, the political opposition embodied 
by the NLD, and insurgent ethnic minorities. Domestic reforms, accompanied 
with Myanmar’s re-integration into the international community, would herald a 
new era in Myanmar’s history, as well as in EU-Myanmar relations. Democracy, 
human rights, and economic prosperity would finally flourish in this least 
developed country where the EU has contributed to the transformation of one of 
the world’s most autocratic and repressive regimes into a vibrant democracy. 
The ‘success story’ of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar, however, has been 
more contestable than European politicians would conveniently pretend. In fact, 
democratic reforms remained limited when the EU suspended its sanctions 
regime in April 2012. The NLD held only 8.4 percent of the seats in the Pyithu 
Hluttaw (the Lower House), and 1.8 percent of the seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw 
(the Upper House). The houses of parliament were still dominated by the military 
establishment and the NLD had not participated in the 2010 general elections. As 
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a parliamentary minority, the NLD could hardly act on its own as an agent of 
change. These limitations were borne out when, a few days after the NLD’s 
victory in the by-elections, Aung San Suu Kyi announced she would not join the 
Parliament’s opening ceremony. Elected NLD representatives initially refused to 
take the oath to safeguard the constitution, as they disagreed with constitutional 
provisions enshrining the military establishment, notably a proviso of 25 percent 
of seats automatically reserved for Defence Services personnel.1 Moreover, the 
government nominated in April 2011 was composed of former members of the 
establishment who had taken off their military uniforms. Democratic reforms were 
also limited because hundreds of prisoners of opinion allegedly remained in 
prison. 
The EU had been notoriously unable to influence Myanmar’s military junta 
during some twenty years of ostracism. Since EU policy needed more than two 
decades to yield tangible effects, it could hardly be described as an unmitigated 
success. Furthermore, while sanctions may have (whether by luck or design) 
promoted the reforms decided by the new government ruling since April 2011, it 
is only under the conditions and at the pace set by Myanmar, not by the EU, and 
in a top down orchestrated process. Most reforms implemented by the nominally 
civilian government had been planned ahead by the old military command 
preparing its safe retirement.2 It is paradoxical that the EU welcomed democratic 
reforms that have served to consolidate and legitimise the military establishment 
thriving under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military 
Council ruling Myanmar until 30 March 2011. To avoid a partial analysis of 
ongoing events, this thesis only investigates EU foreign policy-making towards 
military-ruled Myanmar.  
*** 
Through 2011, the EU has shown a great deal of consistency in its policy 
towards Myanmar since it first imposed formal sanctions in 1991. It consistently 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008, sections 109 (b) and 141 (b).  
2 Interview 27. 
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scaled up punitive measures owing to the military regime’s persistently poor 
treatment of human rights. During twenty years, restrictions were suspended only 
in exceptional cases, such as waiving the visa ban when targeted Myanma 
officials participated in international summits in EU territory. EU member states 
seemed to unanimously agree on the use of sanctions as an instrument of 
democracy promotion.  
While human rights activists may applaud the EU for its commitment to a 
punitive policy towards Myanmar’s military government, this consistency is 
puzzling for students of EU foreign policy-making. The expectation that sanctions 
on the military government would be more effective if more stringent is indeed 
striking, for Myanmar used to offset Western restrictions by tapping economic 
relations with neighbouring and other influential states that could provide political 
protection (e.g. ASEAN member states, China, India, or Russia).3 Authoritative 
independent analysts had therefore questioned the ability of restrictive measures 
to coerce the SPDC to implement the reforms called upon by Western 
governments.4 Since their imposition, numerous foreign governments, some 
Myanma opposition parties, public intellectuals, and activists called for the repeal 
of sanctions.5 The EU, however, consistently reinforced penalties to punish 
human rights violations, although such measures seemed unable to bear fruit for 
more than two decades − at least as long as the SPDC retained its firm grip on 
power. 
Despite its ethical merits, the sanctions policy was highly controversial. 
Scaling up sanctions that carried little likelihood of success was denounced as a 
doomed policy.6 The EU escalated negative measures, while the SPDC 
                                                 
3 Egreteau and Jagan 2009. 
4 Stiglitz, 6 March 2012; Thant Myint-U 2011; Pederson 2008; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004; R. Taylor 
2004; Steinberg, 1 April 2003; Steinberg 2001a. 
5 Stiglitz, 6 March 2012; Abour, March 2012; ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, 16-17 January 
2011; International Crisis Group (ICG), March 2011; Chin Progressive Party, 21 January 2011; 
Shan Nationalities Democracy Party, 15 January 2011; Aung Naing Oo 2011; Tonkin, 25 
September 2011; Thant Myint-U 2010;  ICG, April 2004. 
6 Tonkin, 29 November 2007. 
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continued to blatantly ignore its demands. The achievement of the policy’s 
primary objectives seemed ever more remote with Myanmar’s increased isolation 
from the West. This dogged approach is all the more intriguing if one considers 
that secondary effects of sanctions may be counterproductive. Over twenty years 
of ostracism arguably strengthened the junta’s stranglehold on power.7 Sanctions 
have also deprived ordinary citizens of livelihoods, thus hindering the growth of a 
middle class, which is generally considered an indispensable driver of 
democratisation by transition theorists.8  
The conundrum of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar relates to a much-
debated puzzle in Foreign Policy Analysis, which Daniel Drezner coined the 
‘sanctions paradox’. This paradox asks the question why policy-makers tend to 
impose restrictions even in cases where scholars predict their ineffectiveness as 
tools of foreign policy.9 This puzzle is applicable to the case of Myanmar, where 
renowned country experts have predicted that Western sanctions were unlikely to 
bear fruit. 
The sanctions paradox is all the more intriguing when applied to EU foreign 
policy. The main thread that pervades the literature on EU policy-making is the 
question of joint action by national member states.10 This question is tantalising 
in the case of a long and controversial sanctions regime like the one imposed on 
Myanmar’s SPDC. It seems difficult to understand why all EU member states 
persisted in a policy of ostracism despite their potentially divergent national 
interests.   
Some senior European officials criticised EU sanctions policy on Myanmar, 
claiming it had failed on all fronts.11 Twenty years of ostracism did not alter the 
SPDC’s behaviour as hoped by the EU, making the human rights situation even 
                                                 
7 Pedersen 2008; Zarni and Oo 2004. 
8 Saw Myat 2008: 49ff. and 150; Stefan and Linz 1996; Huntington 1993. 
9 Drezner 1999: 5.  
10 Hoffmann 1966; Ginsberg 1989; K. Smith 1996; Moravcsik 1998; Meunier 2000: 103-135. 
11 Interview 7; Hauswedell 2008; Hauswedell 2006: Keynote Speech. 
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worse, while EU member states were progressively losing market shares and 
political contacts in a country located in a geostrategic region between rising 
powers China and India. Besides, the EU effectively scaled up restrictions only 
after Myanmar had already joined ASEAN in 1997, when its membership of the 
regional organisation made European penalties less likely to bear fruit.  
Military-ruled Myanmar is an exceptional case among all EU sanctions 
regimes. In most other instances of sanctions, EU foreign policy was less 
consistent and the EU decided to soften its policy at some point. Hence, the EU 
quickly revised its initial measures on China, which have been limited to an arms 
embargo since 1990.12 The EU scaled down diplomatic restrictions on Belarus on 
several occasions in 1999, 2008 and 2009 until it ratcheted them up again owing 
to Minsk’s adamant lack of compliance with EU demands.13 In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the suspension of development aid under the Cotonou agreement did 
not hinder the EU from continuing to deliver relatively important amounts of 
humanitarian aid even after this ban was imposed.14 No statutory EU restrictions 
on trade have been enforced. The EU allowed Robert Mugabe to take part in the 
EU-Africa summit held in Lisbon on 8-9 December 2007.15 Hence, despite the 
obvious moral high ground of a punitive policy towards Myanmar, one may 
retrospectively ask: why did the EU scale up sanctions on military-ruled 
Myanmar? 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into four parts. The first 
section presents the research agenda. The second section defines key terms 
and concepts encountered throughout the thesis. The third section examines its 
main contributions. The final section outlines the structure of this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
12 Council of the EU: Declaration of 27 June 1989. 
13 Council of the EU: Decision 99/156/CFSP of 22 February 1999; ibid.: Conclusions on Belarus 
of 13 October 2008; ibid.: Decision 2009/969/CFSP of 15 December 2009; Stewart 2004: 34. 
14 Council of the EU: Common Position 2002/145/CFSP of 18 February 2002; ibid.: Council 
Common Position 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004; European Commission, March 2011: 
Atlas. 
15 Economist, 6 December 2007. 
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1. Scope of the Research 
This study covers EU foreign policy from the coup staged by the State Law 
and Reconciliation Council (SLORC) on 18 September 1988 until the dissolution 
of the military council SPDC on 30 March 2011. During this period, the EU 
progressively adopted sanctions. Members of the European Community applied 
non-statutory restrictions on development aid towards the end of 1988.16 An arms 
embargo was officially enforced on 29 July 1991.17 EU restrictions were regularly 
ratcheted up and never officially scaled down until the end of this study in April 
2011.	
This twenty-three years period is characterised by the rule of successive 
military governments in Myanmar. SLORC seized power in 1988, and organised 
elections in 1990 but did not honour their results. Twenty years later, its 
successor SPDC held new elections, as foreseen in the fifth point of Myanmar’s 
seven-step roadmap to ‘discipline flourishing democracy’. This election led to the 
dissolution of the SPDC and the swearing in of a President on 30 March 2011, 
who gathered a nominally civilian government in April. The transition from a 
military dictatorship to authoritarian civilian rule marks the end of an important 
era in EU-Myanmar relations. This dissertation does not cover the recent post-
military period, in order to avoid an incomplete study of an ongoing event.  
 
1.1. Research Question 
The thesis seeks to answer the overarching research question: why did the EU 
scale up sanctions on Myanmar between 1991 and 2010, despite the apparent 
inability of EU sanctions to quickly reach the primary objectives of the policy 
during that period, and potential disagreements among EU member states on the 
common policy? 
                                                 
16 Frittin and Swanström 2010a: 1; Soe Myint Aung 2003. 
17 Council of the EU: Declaration of 29 July 1991. 
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The lack of effectiveness of sanctions is defined as their inability to attain the 
primary objectives of the policy during a defined period of time. The typical time 
span to assess policy effectiveness is the period of a legislature. The 
effectiveness of restrictive measures can be ascertained by examining their 
impact on the SPDC’s behaviour over a five years period after they have been 
enforced. 
This study investigates the rationale for making EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar as sanctions were being decided. Time-bound policy effectiveness is 
therefore an important part of the research question. It is not directly relevant to 
this thesis whether EU sanctions have, more than twenty years after their initial 
imposition, eventually contributed to the reform process engaged in post-military 
Myanmar.  
Scholars have highlighted the fluctuating and vague character of the varied 
purposes of sanctions.18 It seems challenging to evaluate the success of 
sanctions regimes.19 However, it would seem preposterous to completely 
disconnect policy instruments from the actual achievement of their primary 
objectives.20 The most common yardstick to measure an effective sanctions 
regime is an ‘observable change in behaviour’ of the target.21 Consequently, the 
SPDC’s compliance with EU demands remains the main criterion to assess the 
effectiveness of EU foreign policy towards that country.  
Primary objectives are stated in official documents, such as common 
positions, statements or press communiqués and interviews of key policy-makers 
representing the EU or one of its member states (e.g. the EU High 
Representative, the President of the Council, the President of the European 
Commission, the head of a member state or a foreign minister). As a rule of 
                                                 
18 Cohen and Harris 1975: 5-20; Hufbauer et al. 1985/1990: 31; Jørgensen 1998; K. Elliott 1998; 
Mack and Khan 2000: 279-292; Baldwin 1999/2000; Economides and Wilson 2001: 143-153; 
Portela 2010: 13-4. 
19 Baldwin 1999/2000. 
20 Pape 1997: 98. 
21 Jonge Oudraat 2001: 235; Portela 2010: 13. 
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thumb, the assessments of historians and officials involved in policy-making are 
used as a supplementary indicator to clarify the formulation of policy objectives.22  
Drawing on Margaret Doxey, this thesis defines sanctions as: statutory or non-
statutory penalties threatened or imposed by the EU and its member states, as a 
consequence of the target’s failure to observe standards or obligations viewed by 
the EU as internationally valid.23 Sanctions are used as a synonym for: penalties; 
restrictions; punitive, restrictive, negative, or coercive measures. 
Notwithstanding, the EU avoids the politically sensitive term ‘sanctions’. It 
privileges the expression ‘restrictive measures’ (mesures restrictives) in its legal 
acts.24 The Council of the EU underlined that it adopts restrictive measures in 
order to achieve external objectives, namely ‘to bring about a change in policy or 
activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities, or individual.’25  
The terms extend, scale up, ratchet up, escalate, increase, and strengthen 
sanctions are used here in a generic fashion. The EU could scale up negative 
measures by intensifying them within one specific policy area (for example, 
including more members of a targeted regime on an EU visa ban or asset freeze 
list), as well as by extending restrictions to new policy areas. Penalties may 
target different sectors, such as the military (e.g. defence cooperation); the 
political (e.g. diplomacy); the economic (e.g. trade and investment); the societal 
or socio-cultural (e.g. assistance in the fields of education and health); or the 
environmental sector (e.g. assistance in the field of environmental protection).26 
Spillover into new policy areas implies that sanctions may exert lasting 
constraints on the strategy towards the target. Opting for restrictive measures 
may narrow down the gamut of instruments on offer. Other components of the 
foreign policy armoury, such as incentives in the form of aid or diplomatic 
                                                 
22 Hufbauer et al. 1985/1990: 2. 
23 Doxey 1996: 9. 
24 Portela 2010: 21. 
25 Council of the EU, 3 December 2003: Guidelines: 5. 
26 This classification is adapted from Buzan and Little’s definition of various fields of social 
sciences (Buzan and Little 2000: 73ff).  
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recognition, may be definitely jettisoned from the political agenda. Cooperation 
with a state stigmatised by economic and diplomatic sanctions – a ‘pariah’ state – 
may be considered anathema. Making foreign policy towards a target of 
sanctions is a challenge because other policy instruments that were once 
available may become irretrievably lost.  
 
1.2. Policy Evaluation and Policy Change 
Scaling up sanctions begs the theoretical question of policy change and 
continuity: why is a policy not changed despite its apparent lack of effectiveness? 
Not revising an unavailing policy contradicts Hugh Heclo’s model of policy-
making as a learning process. Heclo contended that policy-makers attempt to 
streamline policy impact in a given set of constraints.27  
 
1.2.1. Evaluation of Policy Impact 
In his Framework for Political Analysis, David Easton originally designed a 
theory of ‘feedback loops’. Policy outputs go out of the political system into the 
external environment, metamorphosing into new policy inputs.28 The historical 
institutional literature presented feedback as an important driver of policy 
change.29 Kjell Goldmann developed the related concept of ‘negative feedback’. 
He identified ‘negative feedback’ and ‘adaptation’ as sources of policy change. 
Negative feedback may generate policy learning; it changes the perceptions of 
policy-makers over time and thus motivates foreign policy changes: ‘A typical 
case [of negative feedback] would be the abandonment of a conciliatory policy 
because the response had been nonconciliatory.’30  
                                                 
27 Heclo 1974: 305-306; see also: Hall 1993: 275-281; Pacheco Pardo 2009. 
28 Easton 1965: 112. 
29 Pierson 1993: 596ff. 
30 Goldmann 1988: 6. 
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Roy Ginsberg thus classified the impact of EU foreign policy into four different 
levels: nil, marginal, considerable, and significant.31 He depicted policy feedback 
as the backbone that strengthens European foreign policy (EFP):  
[external feedback is] the critical link between targets and new sources of EFP 
action. Without internal and external feedback, which generates new (and possibly 
improved) sources of EFP inputs, the EFP decision-making system would not be 
sustained. [...] If the EU ignores feedback, it risks damaging or destroying over time 
the EFP decision-making system.32  
John Kingdon identified three channels of feedback: ‘systematic monitoring’, 
‘complaints and casework’, and ‘bureaucratic experience’.33 Evaluations may take 
place via formal (e.g. policy proposals, audits of programmes) or informal 
channels (e.g. academic reports, conferences). The evaluation of a foreign policy 
usually follows its implementation.34 In the EU, policy feedback may originate 
from multifarious sources: it can be produced by member states; the European 
Commission and its delegations; the Council Secretariat; the European 
Parliament; and representatives of civil society (including lobbyists).  
 
1.2.2. The Question of Policy Change 
The continuation of an apparently ineffective policy could invalidate the claim 
that policy feedbacks influence policy-making. Maintaining a sanctions policy 
despite its apparent inability to quickly reach its objectives could be interpreted 
as an absence of policy change, whereas revoking restrictions or giving 
                                                 
31 Ginsberg 2001: 53, table 3.2.  
32 Ginsberg 2001: 277. David A. Welch (2005: 46) formulated a similar hypothesis that policy 
failure tends to trigger policy change. His study concluded that this hypothesis is disconfirmed in 
one case, undecidable in one case, and confirmed in six other case studies (ibid.: 217-223). 
33 Kingdon 2003: 102. It is noteworthy that in his theories of ‘primeval soup’, Kingdon (2003) 
attributed only a minor role to policy evaluations. Jeremy Richardson (2006: 6) did not include 
policy feedback when differentiating the main stages of the EU policy-making process: ‘agenda-
setting, policy formulation, policy decision, and policy implementation’. Such perspectives are 
opposed to Goldmann’s generic theory of negative feedback, which Ginsberg (2001) applied to 
EU policy-making. Political science textbooks usually present feedback as constitutive of policy-
making (Patzelt 2007). 
34 S.M. Smith 1987: 190-191. 
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incentives could be decrypted as policy change. Against this backdrop, Charles 
Hermann’s definition of four different dimensions of foreign policy change 
enables us to conceptualise how the EU could change (or not change) its foreign 
policy towards Myanmar:35 
(1) ‘Adjustment change’ represents minor changes taking place in the level of 
effort put into a policy in order to enhance it;  
(2) ‘Programme change’ implies a change in means and methods while the 
basic goals remain unaltered;  
(3) ‘Problem/goal change’ refers to a change in goals and objectives. 
According to Peter Hall, the third level mirrors a radical shift of policy 
paradigm, which entails: 
[…] simultaneous changes in all three components of policy: the instruments 
settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind the policy.36  
(4) ‘International orientation change’ indicates a fundamental change in a 
state’s entire orientation towards world affairs.37 
Furthermore, Hermann distinguishes between four sources of foreign policy 
change: leaders, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external 
shocks.38  
An often-neglected dimension of foreign policy change is the absence of 
change. Inaction could be related to three different factors, namely to the fact that 
the EU decides not to act, that it is unable to act, or that certain policy options are 
                                                 
35 C. Hermann 1990: 5-6. 
36 Hall 1993: 279. In a fashion similar to Hermann, Hall (1993: 280) identified three levels of policy 
change: a change in the policy setting, in the techniques, and in the paradigm. In contrast, 
Federica Bicchi (2007: 3-4) did not include the notion of foreign policy objectives in her theory of 
paradigmatic EU foreign policy change. According to her, paradigmatic policy changes require the 
concurrence of three different factors: the opening of a policy window (or ‘windows of 
opportunity’); the presence of a policy entrepreneur who will act on these opportunities; an 
interaction among member states and European institutions.  
37 For a detailed discussion of foreign policy restructuring, see: Volgy and Schwarz 1994: 25; 
Holsti 1982: 2; Srivardhana 2003: 8; Holsti 1982: 2; Srivardhana 2003: 8-9; Rosati et al. 1994: 
267; Oldfield 1998: 5. 
38 C. Hermann 1990. 
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excluded from the policy agenda.39 According to Joseph Frankel, two types of 
situations may be distinguished in which decisions to do nothing are taken 
deliberately:  
In the one, the issue is considered of too little importance to warrant action, or the 
cost anticipated is too high in relation to the need felt. […] In the other, the issue is 
important but incapable of a satisfactory solution […].40 
Some scholars went further and characterised the lack of change to an 
ineffective policy as ‘policy paralysis’,41 or as a ‘path dependent policy’.42  
Chapter II will define these two concepts in the context of theories of EU policy-
making. 
 
1.3. Variables 
Three dependent variables thus define this research on the making of EU 
sanctions policy: the decisions to implement instruments that increase the 
isolation of a targeted state on the one hand; the decision to implement 
instruments that decrease the isolation of a targeted state on the other hand; and 
finally, the decision to maintain the measures in place without altering them. 
These three dependent variables shall be examined whenever relevant 
throughout the case study, although the research question explicitly focuses on 
scaling up sanctions. Indeed, the factors that lead the EU to impose tougher 
penalties may ultimately differ from the reasons that lead the EU to scale down, 
or simply maintain restrictions.  
Four main independent variables could account for a change in EU foreign 
policy towards Myanmar: 1) the behaviour of the state targeted by EU sanctions 
(i.e. compliance or no compliance with EU demands); 2) United States influence 
                                                 
39 Hill 2003: 107; see also: Schattschneider 1975: 69. The analysis of policy inaction can be 
traced back to the works of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970), as well as Matthew A. 
Crenson (1971), which have been later applied to International Relations. 
40 J. Frankel 1963: 197. 
41 Zielonka 1998; Bernanke 2000. 
42 Paul 2001: 15-40. 
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on EU foreign policy decisions; 3) the interests of domestic constituencies within 
EU member states; and 4) policy-makers’ search for a consensus when making 
EU foreign policy. Chapter Two develops four competing hypotheses, which are 
based on these independent variables. 
 
1.4. Methodological Strategies  
1.4.1. Case Study Selection 
This thesis seeks to untangle an empirical puzzle. It therefore deals with a 
single case study. Yet, single case studies have been criticised for not being 
generalizable.43 Why conduct a single, rather than a comparative case study? 
A single case study enables us to ascertain which theory best explains an 
outlying phenomenon.44 It can thus fulfil a ‘theory-testing role’45 by generating 
and testing new hypotheses.46 Moreover, a single case can better throw light on 
non-events, thanks to process tracing.47 Non-events are expected events that do 
not occur. It seems necessary to pay attention to non-events in order to 
understand why the EU may react to specific issues and not to others – i.e. why 
the EU reinforces sanctions in certain circumstances and not in others.48 
In a nutshell, there are three relevant justifications for selecting EU foreign 
policy towards Myanmar rather than another case study: it features a deviant 
case, it is recognised in the literature as an important case in the panoply of EU 
sanctions regimes, and it represents an extended sanctions episode.  
                                                 
43 Collier 1993: 105-119. 
44 Alison 1971; Maoz 2004: 172.  
45 Ruffa 2011: 563. 
46 Maoz 2004: 7; Odell 2001: 171-2. 
47 J. Levy 2002: 145; Maoz 2002: 163. 
48 Hill 2003: 107-8. 
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Outlying cases have ‘outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by 
existing theories.’49 They focus on ‘empirical anomalies in established theoretical 
generalisations in order to explain them and refine existing [theories]’.50 EU 
foreign policy towards Myanmar features an ideal case study to test the validity of 
approaches that perceive EU member states as actors driven by self-interest. 
Given the scope and duration of EU sanctions on Myanmar, explanations relying 
on economic utility or competition for power seem most likely to be refuted. 
Rationalist theories seem unable to explain why all EU member states would 
share the same goal to restrict bilateral relations with a third state during twenty-
three years, thus squandering the benefits of economic and other interactions 
with the target and, potentially, its allies. It is also a paradox that EU member 
states continued to unanimously reinforce sanctions although they seemed 
unable to quickly alter the SPDC’s behaviour. 
On the other hand, theories that emphasise the role of norms and ideas in EU 
foreign policy do not explain why Myanmar was treated differently from 
comparable human rights offenders (e.g. Sudan; or North Korea, with whom the 
EU engaged diplomatically between 2001 and 2004). Human rights violations 
occur in numerous other countries, but the EU does not always impose the same 
intensity of sanctions. Finally, Myanmar also corresponds to the statistical 
definition of an outlier since the duration of sanctions on Myanmar falls more than 
1.5 interquartile range (IQR) above the upper quartile.51 This dissertation thus 
explores the specificity of the Myanmar case in much greater depth.  
Another motivation to select this case study resides in its high relevance in EU 
sanctions regimes. It appears favourable to select one of the longest sanctions 
episodes. Myanmar is among the states that have been effectively censured for 
                                                 
49 George and Bennett 2005: 215. 
50 J. Levy 2002: 137. See also: Odell 2001: 166. 
51 See: Annexes 2 and 3, which present the total and average durations of all EU sanctions 
regimes. For a statistical definition of outliers, see: Agresti and Finlay 2000: 54. 
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the longest period of time, from 1988 until 2012 (twenty-three years altogether).52 
Annex 3 shows that, between 1956 and 2011, EU sanctions were adopted for 8.5 
years on average and autonomous EU restrictions for 6.4 years on average. The 
duration of the EU’s sanctions regime on Myanmar exceeds these averages by 
far. Focusing the analysis on a short period of time may impact on research 
outcomes. For instance, Clara Portela characterised EU sanctions policy on 
Belarus as a ‘partial success’ in 2009.53 This assessment could be questioned 
with the hindsight of the flawed 2010 elections, which led to a resumption of EU 
sanctions on Minsk.54 Therefore, the historical suspension of most EU sanctions 
on Myanmar in 2012 also makes our choice pertinent. 
Additionally, Myanmar was one of the most intensively sanctioned states. The 
EU imposed the following statutory measures: the suspension of development 
aid and corresponding trade benefits, diplomatic sanctions (e.g. withdrawal of 
embassy personnel, visa ban, and moratorium on high-level visits), an arms 
embargo, the freezing of assets, a ban on loans to state-owned companies and a 
trade and investment ban in targeted sectors.55 The EU also wielded a wide array 
of non-statutory measures, such as the discouragement of trade, investment, or 
tourism, the deferment of a cooperation agreement since 1988, boycotts of 
multilateral meetings where Myanmar was a party, and a veto on International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs)’s cooperation with Myanmar. In spite of this large 
range of penalties, these measures have not tangibly achieved their objectives 
within a timeframe of five years after their imposition. There is a widespread 
assessment among scholars that EU sanctions on Myanmar featured an ‘ideal 
type of CFSP sanctions failure’,56 a case of ‘perfect failure’,57 or ‘a long line of 
failures’.58  
                                                 
52 Eriksson 2005: 199; Hill and K. Smith 2000: 437-440; Kreutz 2005; Hristov 2009; Portela 2010: 
56ff. and 62. 
53 Portela 2010: 48. 
54 Council of the EU: Decision 2010/639/CFSP of 25 October 2010; ibid.: Decision 2011/69/CFSP 
of 31 January 2011.  
55 Portela 2010: 56. 
56 Ibid.: 30. 
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The method used throughout this detailed case study is based on hypothesis 
testing. Karl Popper developed the concept of falsification to assess the 
explanatory power of a given theory, illustrated by his seminal ‘black swan’ 
example.59 While it may be impossible to prove that an hypothesis is correct, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate its falsehood in specific cases – in other words, to falsify 
it. If an hypothesis is shown to be false, then the theory from which it is 
developed could be seriously undermined.60 An hypothesis shall be considered 
indeterminate if it can be neither falsified nor validated.  
 
1.4.2. Sources  
The research is based on primary sources, which are EU official records. 
These documents are supported by secondary sources, such as reports, articles, 
books, PhD and master theses, and interviews. These sources are presented in 
the bibliography, which differentiates between official documents and speeches, 
books, articles and websites, interviews, and email exchanges.  
Interviewees were selected among diplomats from European institutions, EU 
member states, states external to the EU (including Myanmar and its economic 
partners), representatives of European and Myanma political parties, non-
governmental and international organisations, the think tank and academic 
community, and retired officials. Interviews were conducted in Brussels, Berlin, 
London, Paris, Yangon, and Bangkok between 2004 and 2011. Most interviews 
were carried out during field research and on the condition of anonymity. 
Nevertheless, the identity of interviewees is revealed in the bibliography for the 
sole purpose of the oral examination.61 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Ibid.: 15. 
58 Frittin and Swanström 2010a: 1. 
59 Popper 1959.  
60 Collier 1993. 
61 Gubrium and Holstein 2002. 
29
Chapter I 
In order to buttress the information gathered from first and secondary 
sources, some 60 interviews were conducted with individuals involved with EU 
foreign policy-making towards Myanmar and other pariah states. 47 interviews 
are quoted throughout the thesis and referenced in the bibliography. Interviews 
were pursued as qualitative and semi-structured open discussions. To ensure 
neutrality of the data gathered during interview research, the privileged, the 
activists and the bureaucrats influencing EU foreign policy from both within and 
outside the institutional framework of EU decision-making were equally pursued. 
Due to unequal access to information and the varying willingness of interviewees 
to disclose confidential information, strategic information holders were 
interviewed more intensively. Any analysis of elites also depends on broader 
interpretations of hegemony and society, and on an understanding of the 
intersection of respective environments. Discourse analysis has thus been used 
to decrypt interviews and official declarations.  
 
2. Defining EU Foreign Policy and Sanctions 
Before going more in-depth into the research, it is necessary to explain 
important terms used throughout the study. The following section presents key 
terms and abbreviations used in this thesis. It then defines EU foreign policy, as 
well as the concepts of sanctions and pariah states.  
 
2.1. Explanation of Terms, Usages, and Abbreviations 
The current official name ‘Myanmar’ in the English language is used for 
‘Burma’ throughout this thesis. The adjectival ‘Myanma’ is a direct transliteration 
from the Myanma language. It has been used officially since Myanmar enacted 
the Adaptation of Expression Law in 1989. ‘Myanma’ was the official name of the 
country in the Burmese language versions of the Constitutions of 1947, 1974, 
and 2008. The same transliteration is used for other geographic locations, such 
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as the former capital Yangon instead of Rangoon. ‘Burma’ is used to refer to the 
country before 1988.  
When the period from 1988 until the time of writing is covered, the acronym 
SPDC (designating the State Peace and Development Council, which is 
Myanmar’s military government) is used as a short-hand to SLORC/SPDC. The 
SLORC refers to the State Law and Order Restoration Council that was changed 
into the SPDC on 15 November 1997. The thesis does not use the Myanma 
adjectives U (for Mr.) and Daw (for Ms.), usually employed with Myanma names 
(e.g. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi).62 The acronym ASSK is used for Aung San Suu 
Kyi. 
EU foreign policy designates the policy carried out from the creation of the EU 
in 1993 onwards. The period prior to the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
refers to the European Communities (EC). The acronym ‘EU’ is used as a short-
hand for EC/EU when both periods before and after Maastricht are covered. With 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) has replaced the rotating Presidency in the EU 
Council working groups. 
 
2.2. EU Foreign Policy  
Foreign policy implies the existence of an actor (usually a state) defined by its 
geographical borders (a territory) who implements a policy in an external 
environment (outside its borders). In doing so, this actor interacts with others who 
equally strive to promote their own interests and values in the external 
environment. The essential goal of foreign policy is to influence the behaviour of 
other actors, most particularly states. Foreign policy is generally an attribute of a 
state but may also be characteristic of other entities acting at the international 
level.  
                                                 
62 Steinberg 2001a. 
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Although the EU is not a state stricto sensu, it can be conceived as 
comparable to a state. At least since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993, it is commonly agreed that the EU possesses the qualities of 
separateness and distinctiveness that define actors in international relations.63 
First of all, the EU is distinct from its member states. It has identifiable institutions 
- most prominently: the Council of the EU, which takes decisions on matters of 
common foreign policy; and the European Commission, which conducted 
external relations under the mandate of the Treaties, until it was superseded by 
the EEAS following the reforms enforced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
Furthermore, the EU can be distinguished from the environment it evolves in. 
It is represented on the international stage by both the Council of the EU and the 
European Commission. Finally, the EU has proven its ability to exert leverage on 
the behaviour of other actors, most conspicuously on neighbouring countries via 
its enlargement policy.64 Taking stock of this debate, Hazel Smith defines EU 
foreign policy as ‘the capacity to make and implement policies abroad which 
promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question’.65 
Hence, while sanctions aim at altering the targeted state’s behaviour, they 
simultaneously promote the domestic interests of the sender.  
By EU foreign policy, this thesis refers to the foreign policy decided by the 
Council of the EU and implemented by the European Commission and the 
member states. The national foreign policies of the diverse member states will be 
treated insofar as it influences the common foreign policy as a whole. EU foreign 
policy differs from the wider concept of ‘European foreign policy’, which 
encapsulates ‘Community foreign policy’, ‘Union foreign policy’ and ‘National 
(member state) foreign policy’.66 The semantic distinction between European and 
                                                 
63 The concept of international actorness has been initially developed by Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977: 
13). He showed that the unit under discussion must have two distinct particularities, namely ‘a 
minimum degree of separateness’ and be ‘discernable from the external environment’.  
64 Sedelmeier 2003; K. Smith 1995; 1999.  
65 H. Smith 2002: 7. 
66 Bonvicini 1998: 74; White 2001: 24 and 165.  
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EU foreign policy also reflects an ontological debate on the ‘nature of the 
beast’.67 This dissertation therefore picks out the term EU foreign policy in order 
to embed the study in an intergovernmental school of thought. 
 
2.3. Sanctions 
Sanctions need to be accurately defined because they have become deeply 
embedded in International Relations. The term carries various – and at times 
contradictory – meanings. It has been used with so much terminological 
imprecision that mainstream scholar David Baldwin even suggested to avoid 
using the expression altogether.68 Similarly, no authoritative legal source 
contains a universally accepted definition.69 The ensuing paragraphs distil how 
this thesis distinguishes sanctions from related concepts.  
Sanctions are broadly defined as ‘value-depriving’ actions by a nation or a 
group of nations (the sender) against a target (the receiver). Senders and targets 
are usually states but could also consist of non-state actors.70 To draw a first 
distinction, Baldwin differentiated sanctions in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) from 
a ‘narrowly legalistic’ definition, which refers to ‘the use of economic measures to 
enforce international law’.71 Multilateral sanctions are not only used to enforce 
international law, but also attempt to impose the values of a specific group of 
countries72 such as EU member states.73  
Second, sanctions are often used to describe restrictions on economic 
relations with a targeted state.74 Nevertheless, the concept may encapsulate 
                                                 
67 White 2001. 
68 B. Taylor 2009: 11. 
69 United Nations Security Council, 17 April 2000: Remarks; Portela 2010: 21. 
70 Wallensteen 1968: 248-9; Coker 1986: Chapter III. 
71 Baldwin 1985: 36. For a legal definition, see: Combacau 1974: 313. 
72 Baldwin 1985: 35-36; Doxey 1996: 7-8. 
73 Vries and Hazelzet 2005: 98; Eriksson 2005: 109. 
74 Hufbauer et al 1985/1990. 
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penalties in more diverse policy areas. In her seminal work International 
Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, Doxey’s definition of sanctions 
overhauls their popular meaning as an element of ‘Economic Statecraft’.75 She 
delineates a wide range of negative measures: diplomatic bans and political 
opprobrium; restrictions on communications and cultural exchanges; as well as a 
broad range of restrictive economic measures of financial, commercial, and 
technical nature.76 In this thesis, the term sanction is used to denote specific 
restrictive measures, as well as a sanctions regime. The combination of 
restrictions on a target is usually defined as ‘sanctions regime’. Embargoes (or 
bans on exports) are distinguished from boycotts (or bans on imports).77 
Third, sanctions do not imply the use of force to change the target’s 
behaviour.78 They contrast with ‘coercive diplomacy’, which consists in an 
attempt to change the target’s behaviour through ‘either the threat to use force or 
the actual use of limited force’.79 Coercive diplomacy represents a higher level of 
intensity in the escalation of policy instruments towards a specific target.80 
Fourth, the adoption of sanctions is opposed to the use of incentives. 
Incentives are positive measures that contradict the coercive spirit of sanctions.81 
They entice the target to do something it may not do without the prospect of 
reward. By contrast, sanctions are intrinsically negative: they punish the target for 
its reprehensible behaviour.  
                                                 
75 Baldwin 1985. 
76 Doxey 1996: 11 and 14; Hufbauer et al. 1985/1990: 11; Davis and Engerman 2003: 187.  
77 K.Smith 2003a: 60. 
78 Doxey (1996: 11) pinpointed that although in conventional parlance, sanctions mean nonviolent 
measures, ‘military sanctions’ can be recommended by the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. ‘If Security Council is not forthcoming, Art. 51 of the Charter permits members to 
use force in individual or collective self-defence and governments typically justify military action 
either in those terms or as humanitarian intervention.’ This thesis nonetheless considers that 
military action is a foreign policy instrument that differs from sanctions. 
79 Art and Cronin 2003. 
80 Hill 2003: 129ff. Christopher Hill identified the following foreign policy instruments, which could 
be ranked along a continuum from ‘soft’ power to ‘hard’ power: culture, diplomacy, propaganda, 
sanctions, subversion, coercive diplomacy, deterrence, blackmail, and physical coercion.  
81 Ibid.: 130ff. 
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Sanctions and incentives, however, can hardly be dissociated from each other. 
Repealing sanctions is often interpreted as a reward for a commendable 
behaviour. Conversely, denying incentives may be perceived as a penalty to 
punish an objectionable policy. Studies dedicated to EU sanctions therefore 
contain elaborated analyses of EU aid policies.82 Sanctions and incentives are 
two complementary and intertwined foreign policy tools.  
As a consequence, this thesis shall not only focus on the process of deciding 
EU sanctions on Myanmar, but also take into account the various instruments 
decided by the EU. Analysing a foreign policy by focusing only on diplomatic and 
economic restrictions would deliver an incomplete assessment of the policy-
making process. Diverse policy instruments, including incentives, may effectively 
contribute to achieving a policy’s objectives. Gauging the effectiveness of 
sanctions without taking wider factors into consideration would limit the 
analysis.83  
 
2.3.1. Incentives 
Drawing upon the utilisation of incentives and conditionality, some scholars 
argued that cautious engagement with authoritarian regimes is more likely to 
bear fruit than a punitive strategy.84 Engagement may be defined as a mixed 
strategy of inducements and sanctions, which is encapsulated in the colloquial 
designation of ‘carrots and sticks’.85 Engagement strategies rely on the extension 
or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of the targeted state.86 
Engagement hence represents a strategic change in the instruments 
implemented towards a pariah state.  
                                                 
82 Wilde d’Estmael 1998; Hazelzet 2001. 
83 Baldwin 1999/2000: 80-107. 
84 Coker 1986; Lavin 1996; Dalacoura 2003. 
85 Hazelzet 2001: 20. 
86 Haas and O’Sullivan 2000: 2. 
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Engagement could take multifarious forms, which are enumerated below in 
order of magnitude: 
- Second-track diplomacy (or Track Two), which is defined as diplomacy by 
non-state actors that may precede official diplomacy by a state;87 
- Temporarily removing specific sanctions (e.g. lifting the visa ban on 
targeted persons); 
- Increasing development aid, granting debt relief, or encouraging direct 
investments by private companies for instance via public insurance 
schemes or trade delegations; 
- Engagement by mid-level diplomats (i.e. below political director level); 
- High-level diplomatic engagement (i.e. political director, minister level, and 
above).88 
Engagement reaches its climax when it takes place at a high diplomatic level 
(e.g. official meetings between heads of states or governments). High-level 
diplomatic engagement should be distinguished from engagement at a lower 
level, which can take unofficial forms in order to build trust and prepare high-level 
diplomacy. Such engagement was epitomised by the second-track ‘Ping-Pong 
diplomacy’ on 6-17 April 1971, when Beijing invited the American national table 
tennis team to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This invitation opened a 
window for engagement that ultimately made possible President Nixon’s visit to 
China in 1972.  
Other attempts at engagement, such as temporarily revoking sanctions, or a 
surge in assistance, are not necessarily accompanied by high-level diplomatic 
engagement. The latter has been proposed as a potentially more effective form 
of incentive, because of the generally hierarchical structure of authoritarian target 
                                                 
87 Ball et al. 2006: 174 – 188; Pasch 2008. Hybrid track-two missions may incorporate 
representatives of a state below the minister level (e.g. ambassador, political director, or lower 
level). 
88 The Council of the EU defined high-level visits as political director level and above (Council of 
the EU, 30 October 1998: Decision 98/612/CFSP). 
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regimes.89 It is striking that the EU has made little use of incentives when dealing 
with Myanmar’s SPDC. 
Baldwin used the term ‘positive sanctions’ to refer to incentives.90 Christopher 
Coker presented ‘positive sanctions’ as a conceptual underpinning to the strategy 
of ‘constructive engagement’ chartered by Nixon’s administration towards 
apartheid South Africa.91 Hadewych Hazelzet built upon Tanguy de Wilde 
d’Estmael’s early work to define sanctions as ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’:  
Sanctions constitute an act by a nation-state or coalition of nation-states, called the 
sender, to induce political change in another nation-state, called the target, either by 
disrupting political and/or economic exchange, or by offering incentives or mixed 
strategies.92  
The terminology of negative versus positive sanctions, however, has not been 
broadly adopted in the sanctions literature.93 This thesis uses the more 
widespread terms of sanctions versus incentives. Sanctions refer to the 
withdrawal of relations and related benefits in the military, economic, diplomatic, 
and cultural sectors, whereas incentives refer to the award of benefits in the 
same sectors (at least by establishing relations).  
 
2.3.2. Targeted Sanctions 
When dealing with Myanmar and other pariah states, the EU generally 
promotes the application of targeted, or ‘smart’, sanctions, rather than 
indiscriminate economic restrictions.94 As a consequence of the more frequent 
use of multilateral sanctions in the post-Cold War world order, members of the 
                                                 
89 Kramer 2009; Revel 2008.  
90 Baldwin 1985. 
91 Coker 1986: 29. 
92 Hazelzet 2001: 19; Drezner 1999: 2; Wilde d’Estmael 1998. 
93 Hufbauer et al 1990: 3, footnote 5. 
94 Council of the EU, 7 June 2004: Basic Principles: par. 6. 
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international community had launched reviews on sanctions to make them more 
efficient.95 Targeted sanctions are meant to:  
[…] focus their impact on leaders, political elites and segments of society believed 
responsible for objectionable behaviour, while reducing collateral damage to the 
general population and third countries.96 
Targeted restrictions are typically distinguished between personal measures, 
which target specific persons or legal entities (i.e. black-list based sanctions 
regimes such as an asset freeze or visa ban), and selective measures, which 
impose an embargo on a circumscribed sector (e.g. oil, diamonds, timber, 
freezing of state assets or flight bans).97 Proponents of targeted sanctions argue 
they are more effective than traditional economic sanctions, because they are 
more specific and inflict less unintended damage with possible humanitarian 
ramifications.98 The EU adopted both personal and selective restrictions on 
Myanmar. 
In addition to targeted sanctions, the EU follows an incremental approach. 
Typically, it initially adopts an arms embargo. This measure is usually 
accompanied by pressure circumscribed to the diplomatic arena. It is normally at 
a later stage that the EU would scale up negative measures, and eventually 
extend them to new policy areas. Hence, a student of EU sanctions policy could 
distinguish different levels of restrictions on a scale from diplomatic reprobation 
to all-out economic sanctions. The EU usually starts at the stage where no 
sanctions are levied before scaling them up to a phase of reprobation - e.g. 
diplomatic condemnation, suspension of development aid, or severing diplomatic 
ties. It then imposes strategic sanctions, such as an arms or oil embargo, which 
                                                 
95 Respectively the 1998 Interlaken process on targeted financial sanctions, the 2000 Berlin-Bonn 
process on arms embargoes and travel sanctions, and the 2002 Stockholm process on the 
implementation of targeted UN sanctions. These reviews were a consequence of Boutros Boutros 
Gali’s Agenda for Peace. The Secretary General professed cautiousness vis-à-vis the adverse 
impact of ‘blunt’ sanctions (UN Secretary General 1995: par. 66-76. See also: UN Secretary 
General 1992; IASC and UNOCHA 2004; Brzoska 2001).  
96 Hufbauer and Oegg 2000: 3. 
97 Portela 2010: 8; Brzoska 2003: 522. 
98 IASC and UNOCHA 2004. 
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generally aim at limiting the targeted regime’s capacity to carry out military 
operations. It may additionally wield personal sanctions by targeting individual 
members of the condemned government. At the highest level of intensity, the EU 
may finally impose economic sanctions. EU sanctions on Myanmar encompass 
all levels of sanctions. 
Portela dubbed the EU’s modus vivendi a ‘double-track’ approach to 
sanctions, which is also a general feature of EU policy towards Myanmar.99 The 
EU repeatedly points to its readiness to enter into a dialogue with the targeted 
leadership. In general, the EU tends to enact penalties when attempts at 
dialogue and engagement with the targeted leadership have not produced the 
expected results.100 The EU principally seeks to ‘keep the channels for that 
dialogue [on human rights] open as far as possible’.101 At least in theory, it 
attempts to craft measures that target those responsible for human rights 
violations, but spares the population enduring such abuses.  
This distinction between smart and blanket sanctions is sometimes disproven 
by practice. Even targeted sanctions may yield adverse socio-economic impact 
on the population at large, as the case of Myanmar will show. Furthermore, the 
EU has increasingly used blanket economic sanctions since the late 2000s. This 
latter development was showcased with Côte d’Ivoire from December 2010 until 
April 2011, a period during which the EU completely suspended trade relations 
with Laurent Gbagbo’s illegitimate government by imposing an embargo on the 
autonomous ports of Abidjan and San Pedro.102 This embargo had adverse 
humanitarian consequences, such as halting the supply of medicines to local 
hospitals.103 
 
                                                 
99 Portela 2010: 31. 
100 Council of the EU: Resolution of 28 November 1991; ibid.: 3 October 2005: Annual Report: 36; 
Portela 2010: 31. 
101 European Commission: Communication of 25 March 1991: 6. 
102 Council of EU: Regulation No. 25/2011 of 15 January 2011. 
103 Interview 45. 
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2.3.3. Autonomous EU Sanctions 
EU sanctions on Myanmar are independent from the UN. When the EU crafts 
its own measures in the absence of a UNSC Resolution, they are characterised 
as ‘autonomous’104 or ‘independent’.105 Contrasting UN with EU sanctions, Karel 
Kovanda, a political director of the External Relations Directorate of the 
European Commission, thus outlined the objectives of autonomous EU 
sanctions:  
If necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts 
to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction … and … to 
uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance.106 
By all accounts, the EU defined the application of sanctions in pursuit of the 
CFSP objectives set out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. 
The EU wields the majority of its own sanctions regimes towards countries that 
are not targeted by UN sanctions (43 out of 68 cases, or 63.2 percent according 
to the statistics exhibited in Annex Four). Furthermore, the EU may adopt 
additional autonomous penalties in supplement to those set out in UNSC 
Resolutions (e.g. additional EU sanctions on Iran107 or North Korea,108 which 
encompass sanctions on individuals, national companies, or economic sectors 
that are not targeted by the original UN legislation).  
                                                 
104 Koutrakos 2001. 
105 Wessels 1988. 
106 Council of the European Union, 7 June 2004: Basic Principles. See also: House of Lords, 
9 May 2007: Report, point 9. 
107 UNSC: Resolution 1737 (2006); UNSC: Resolution 1747 (2007); Council of the EU: Common 
Position 2007/246/CFSP of 23 April 2007; ibid.: Regulation No. 423/2007of 19 April 2007; UNSC: 
Resolution 1803 (2008); UNSC: Resolution 1929 (2010); Council of the EU: Decision 
2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010. 
108 UNSC: Resolution 1718 (2006); Council of the EU: Common Position 2006/795/CFSP of 20 
November 2006; ibid.: Decision 2009/599/CFSP of 4 August 2009; ibid.: Decision 
2010/800/CFSP of 22 December 2010. 
40
Chapter I 
Multilateral sanctions are normally activated by a ‘primary sender’: a state that 
initiates the sanctions implemented by the organisation it belongs to.109 In the 
case of the EU, such primary sender is often a member state that enjoys a 
common history with the targeted state, for instance a former colonial power.  
 
 
2.3.4. Non-statutory Sanctions 
It was mentioned that the EU adopted non-statutory sanctions on Myanmar, 
such as discouraging European trade, investment, or tourism. Statutory 
sanctions are formally enshrined in a text of law, which usually defines the target, 
the scope, and the length of the restriction. Nevertheless, punitive measures 
could be enforced without being formally enshrined in a text of law compelling EU 
member states to implement them. Non-statutory or informal EU sanctions are 
not legally binding; nonetheless, all EU member states may wield them with a 
tacit agreement. A political consensus among EU member states may bind 
together their national foreign policies, instead of official EU Law. Therefore, this 
thesis does not share Doxey’s contention that multilateral restrictions are 
formalised by an official decision.110 
Non-statutory restrictions may encompass the undeclared freezing of 
assistance donated to the target country. Hence, annual Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) per capita for comparatively poor Laos, Cambodia and 
Myanmar amounted in 2008 to US$60, $30, and $6 respectively.111 Such non-
statutory restrictions can yield more harm on the country than statutory penalties. 
In the diplomatic arena, representatives of the EU and its member states may 
shun contact with certain states. For example, high-level EU officials have long 
refrained from meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-Il, although the EU did not 
                                                 
109 Drezner 2000: 75; Martin 1993: 408; Hufbauer et al. 1985/1990.  
110 Doxey 1996: 9. 
111 Petrie 2008: 12. See also: UNDP Report 2007/8, Table 18; IRIN 2009; Weiss 2009. 
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explicitly impose diplomatic restrictions on the DPRK until 2006.112 Moreover, 
public statements can isolate a country by damaging its reputation. Tony Blair 
ostentatiously declared: ‘I will never set foot in this country [Myanmar]’, setting a 
principled example for British tourists and companies who would plan to visit or 
do business with Myanmar.113 
Non-statutory penalties and incentives also refer to the institutionalised use of 
positive and negative conditionality in EU external relations. Conditionality saw its 
expansion with the explicit link between the award of EU assistance and the 
respect of human rights and democratic standards, following the landmark 1991 
Luxembourg Declaration by the European Council:  
Positive conditionality is defined as the promise of benefits to a state in exchange for 
the fulfilment of certain conditions, while negative conditionality involves reducing, 
suspending or terminating those benefits if the state in question violates the 
conditions.114  
Non-statutory sanctions can be identified by delivering proof that a specific 
penalty towards a third state is enforced by EU states and European institutions, 
although this restrictive measure is not enshrined in a common position or other 
legally binding texts of EU law. The use of secondary sources, including 
interviews, may buttress such claims. Table 1 distinguishes between statutory 
and non-statutory sanctions.  
 
  
                                                 
112 Council of the EU: Common Position 2006/795/CFSP of 20 November 2006; UNSC: 
Resolution 1718 (2006). 
113 Interview 6. 
114 Portela 2010: 26; K. Smith 1997.  
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Table 1: Statutory and Non-statutory Sanctions Adopted by the EU 
Non-statutory sanctions Statutory sanctions 
- Diplomatic reprobation  
- Shun high-level diplomatic 
contact 
- Cancel multilateral meetings 
- Deferment of signatures 
needed for the 
implementation of legal 
Agreements 
- Modification of programmes 
- Postponement of new 
projects 
- Suspension of bilateral 
assistance programmes 
- Denial of support by 
International Financial 
Institutions 
- Limiting the mandate of 
international organisations 
(e.g. UN agencies) operating 
in the target country  
- Reduction of cultural, 
scientific, and technical 
cooperation 
- Discouragement of trade, 
investment and tourism 
- Political pressures on 
multinational companies 
- Banking restrictions not 
mandated by law 
- Visa ban 
- Closing a Commission’s delegation 
or member states’ embassies 
- Suspension or cancellation of legal 
Agreements 
- Cancellation of assistance 
programmes 
- Restrictions on trade in cultural 
goods or activities 
- Assets freeze 
- Arms embargo (including 
enrichment related technologies) 
- Embargo on planes coming from, 
going to, or flying over the targeted 
state 
- Suspension of GSP or most-
favourable-nation treatment 
- Ban on oil or gas sector (ban on 
importation, delivery of material 
geared for refining, transportation, 
stocking) 
- Import ban on diamonds (e.g. 
Kimberley process) 
- Ban on imports of luxury goods, 
precious and semi-precious stones, 
and timber  
- Ban on investments or on entering 
financial arrangements with state-
owned enterprises 
Source: the author. 
 
2.3.5. Objectives of Sanctions 
Assessing the effectiveness of EU sanctions poses methodological 
challenges, because sanctions may entail multi-dimensional objectives. James 
Barber drew a widely-cited distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary 
objectives of sanctions, which refer to three different audiences.115 Primary 
                                                 
115 Barber 1979: 370-383; Barber and Spicer 1979: 387; K. Elliott 1996: 52; Lindsay 1986; 
Economides and Wilson 2001: 145-146. 
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objectives are concerned with changing the behaviour of the targeted state either 
at the domestic or international level. Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson 
pointed out that primary objectives tend to match the ‘formal, public, “official” 
objectives’.116 
Secondary objectives relate to the sender. A government may need to 
convince public opinion that ‘something is being done’. Sanctions may not alter 
the behaviour of the targeted state effectively. They show the sensitivity of the 
sender government to the predicament of foreign people, whose rights are 
encroached upon by a third state. Secondary objectives possess a highly 
symbolic function.117  
Tertiary objectives refer to the broader international sphere: they are neither 
related to the targeted state nor to the initiator. At this third level, sanctions signal 
to the international community that violations of the international order, or of an 
international code of conduct, will not be tolerated without tough action being 
taken against the offending state. Sanctions are ‘conformity-defending 
instruments’.118 Such signals may be intended to deter other potentially revisionist 
states from emulating undesirable acts. Besides, they could be directed at other 
important powers, in order to garner prestige and influence others ‘in the context 
of executing and advancing respective grand strategies.’119 
Doxey hence identified eight goals of sanctions, which are related to these 
three different audiences for sanctions. Deterrence, compliance, punishment, 
destabilisation, limitation of conflict are ‘exclusively target-related’ objectives. 
Solidarity ‘relates to allies and partners’. ‘[S]ymbolism and signalling can be 
directed at the target, domestic audiences and the world at large’.120 She 
concluded:  
                                                 
116 Economides and Wilson 2001: 145. 
117 Ibid.: 146. 
118 Doxey 1972. 
119 B. Taylor 2009: 10. 
120 Symbolism and targeting are in quotation marks in the original text (Doxey 1996: 55).  
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[…] the official target is not necessarily the only, or principal receptor: sanctions may 
serve as signals to the domestic constituencies of sender governments, as well as to 
third states.121  
This thesis addresses the challenge of measuring sanctions effectiveness by 
assessing whether the target complied with the demands expressed when 
sanctions were imposed. If this primary objective is not achieved, other functions 
of sanctions can be analysed to explore alternative explanations for the making 
of EU foreign policy. 
 
2.3.6. Pariah States 
This thesis embraces a broad definition of sanctions beyond their statutory use 
in the economic arena. Ostracism implies that the target could be assimilated 
with a pariah state. A pariah state is a generic synonym for a target of economic 
and diplomatic sanctions imposed by a group of other states for an extended 
period of time, five years or more. Myanmar has been characterised as a pariah 
by several scholars, because of its isolation by the international community to 
condemn its egregious treatment of human rights.122  
The EU does not explicitly use the term ‘pariah’ state in its common foreign 
policy statements. However, it seems legitimate to apply this concept even 
though the EU does not officially mention it. Not explicitly using this denomination 
does not imply that the EU does not treat Myanmar as a pariah.  
The appellation ‘international pariah’ usually refers to a member of the United 
Nations with whom the international community restricts relations, due to the 
adoption of multilateral sanctions on its government by the UNSC.123 The 
                                                 
121 Doxey 1996: 12. 
122 Babson 2001: 83-95; Kinley 2006; Camroux and Egreteau 2010: 277; Alden 2010; Horsey 
2011: 3 and 196-199. Myanmar was also characterised as a pariah state by international and 
Myanmar focused media (BBC News 2010; Aung Zaw, 31 March 2011). 
123 Niblock 2003. Nonetheless, this opprobrium is not universal per se. Other important countries 
may maintain benign relations with a pariah state. Otherwise, a pariah could effectively lose its de 
jure status as a sovereign state and its seat in the UN, as Taiwan experienced to its cost in 1971 
(after it was expelled from the United Nations by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 25 
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concept has been used in the FPA literature.124 When analysing Zimbabwe and 
Myanmar, which are not targeted by UN sanctions, Chris Alden used the phrase 
‘Western-designated pariah state’.125  
This dissertation extends this designation to the context of EU foreign policy. 
The EU is an international organisation that applies sanctions on other states. 
Composed of twenty-seven member states and usually followed in its foreign 
policy by countries aligning themselves with its decisions (e.g. candidate 
countries to EU membership, members of the European Economic Arena), the 
EU constitutes a cohesive block that has the power to ostracise third-party 
states. From an EU perspective, pariah states are typically ruled by an 
authoritarian regime that flouts international norms recognised as valid by the 
EU, such as human rights and democratic principles.  
The designation ‘pariah’ underlines that the EU severs relations with the 
target. It does not imply, however, that other states do not infringe human rights. 
It is commonplace that the EU does not treat all authoritarian regimes and human 
rights offenders with the same consistency.126  
Hence, the intensity of sanctions applied on different pariahs is not necessarily 
commensurate with the magnitude of their violation of international norms. The 
case of the Republic of the Sudan illustrates a lack of consistency in EU 
sanctions regimes, because EU sanctions did not proportionately reflect the 
grave intensity of human rights violations taking place in this country. The EU 
adopted only an arms embargo,127 a flight ban, an asset freeze and a visa ban on 
representatives of the government in Khartoum.128 By contrast, the European 
Parliament had decried the situation as ‘tantamount to genocide’129 and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
October 1971). Hence, some states are also ostracised by some groups of states but not by the 
EU (e.g. Israel by certain Muslim countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia). 
124 Hill 2003: 184. 
125 Alden 2010. 
126 K. Smith 2001. 
127 Council of the EU: Common Position 94/165/CFSP of 15 March 1994. 
128 UNSC: Resolution 1054 (1996), UNSC: Resolution 1070 (1996); Council of the EU: Common 
Position 2005/411/CFSP of 30 May 2005. 
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International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted President Omar al-Bashir. Such 
discrepancies evince some inconsistencies in EU foreign policy. 
It is obvious that not all targets of EU sanctions are treated as pariah states. 
European governments placed restrictions on China following the Tian’anmen 
crackdown (i.e., the suspension of military contracts and arms sales, the 
downgrading of diplomatic relations by withholding all ministerial-level visits, the 
freezing of all government-guaranteed loans and visa extensions offered to some 
10,000 Chinese students registered in European universities).130 After the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lifted martial law on 10 January 1990, European 
restrictions were removed with the exception of the arms embargo.131 It is evident 
that, with a total two-way trade amounting €428.465 billion in 2011, a share of 
17.3 percent in the EU’s total imports and a vivid diplomatic dialogue in bilateral 
and multilateral settings, China is not treated by the EU as a pariah state but as a 
major political and economic partner.132 
To conclude, a pariah state is the target of economic and diplomatic 
restrictions. The EU starts to treat a third-party state as a pariah when its policies 
are systematically condemned in EU statements. Consequently, the EU allocates 
a limited amount of economic or development assistance to this country, and 
may implement statutory sanctions against it. European heads of states and 
governments would normally not meet with their counterparts from pariah states, 
although contacts at a lower diplomatic level may take place. This severing of 
diplomatic relations spills over into different policy areas (military, political, 
economic, and cultural), hence impeding most interactions between EU member 
states and the pariah. This denial of cooperation can be named ostracism, which 
is a deliberate attempt to isolate a government by denying it the benefits of 
cooperation. This thesis does not use the notions of rogue state, state of 
concern, or undemocratic outlaw state, which other studies have more narrowly 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 EP: Resolution of 16 September 2004. 
130 Council of the EU: Declaration of 27 June 1989. 
131 Foot 2008: 313. 
132 Eurostat 2012. 
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defined.133 The scholarship sometimes uses the term human rights rogue state 
as a synonym for pariah state.134 
 
3. Contributions of the Thesis 
3.1. EU Foreign Policy towards Myanmar 
In essence, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to the literature on EU 
foreign policy towards Myanmar. Almost twenty studies and articles have been 
devoted to this topic.135 Nevertheless, the dynamics of EU foreign policy-making 
remain to a large extent unexplored. Country specialists stressed that general 
knowledge on Myanmar and its relations with the EU is often characterised by 
one-sided, if not empirically erroneous, statements.136 Academics and students 
have at times even ventured into political activism by expressing policy 
recommendations.137 
This thesis makes a distinct contribution from the one published in 2009 by 
Dobromir Hristov, which did not explore the connection between policy 
effectiveness and EU policy-making. The EU-Myanmar literature has almost 
exclusively focused on the issue of the lack of effectiveness of EU policy without 
investigating how policy feedbacks may have influenced EU policy-making.138 
                                                 
133 Harkavy 1981; Behrendt 1997; Niblock 2001; O’Reily 2007. On undemocratic outlaw states, 
see: Simpson 2004: 281-282. On rogue states, see: Litwak 2000.  
134 Caprioli and Trumbore 2006: 131. 
135 Portela 2011a; 2010; Frittin and Swanström 2010a; 2010b; Kramer 2009; Hristov 2009; 
Egreteau 2009; Revel 2008; Khaliq 2008; Andréasson 2008; R. Taylor and Pedersen 2005; K. 
Smith 2007: 155-171; ICG April 2004; Haacke 2006: Chapter IV; Wallensteen et al 2004; Soe 
Myint Aung 2003; Tamen 2003; Artuso 2001. 
136 Tonkin, 28 November 2011; Tonkin, 22 April 2010; Zöllner 2008. 
137 For policy recommendations, see: Frittin and Swanström 2010b; Hristov 2009; Wallensteen et 
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Urfan Khaliq confined his contribution to a legal analysis. Current compendia of 
studies have neglected the UK’s influence on EU foreign policy.139 
This thesis therefore brings back the focus on the policy-making process in the 
EU. It provides with a theoretically-informed explanation of why the EU scaled up 
sanctions on military-ruled Myanmar. It examines strengths and weaknesses of 
neo-realism, sanctions theories, liberal intergovernmentalism, and social 
constructivism in this case.  
 
3.2. The Making of EU Sanctions 
The Myanmar case study sheds new insights into the making of EU sanctions. 
Michael E. Smith and Wilde d’Estamel respectively mentioned that the 
achievement of political objectives via EU sanctions represents a paradox.140 
Targeting political objectives via economic penalties may run counter to the 
promotion of national commercial interests. Rationalist explanations of EU 
foreign policy are hence challenged by the imposition of a wide gamut of 
sanctions over an extended period of time, as in the case of Myanmar. Previous 
scholarship has not resolved the sanctions paradox in an EU context, or 
explained why EU member states pursued political objectives by restraining 
economic relations with a third state, despite potentially divergent national 
interests between EU member states, and despite the unlikely ability of sanctions 
to quickly achieve their objectives in a peculiar target like Myanmar.141 
 Carla Portela underscored the dearth of studies on EU sanctions, despite the 
mushrooming literature on the EU as an international actor.142 This scarce 
attention is all the more noteworthy, because the emergence of distinct EU 
                                                 
139 Email exchange 1. See also: Hristov 2009; Kramer 2009; Revel 2008; Khaliq 2008; Stewart 
2004; Soe Myint Aung 2003; Tamen 2002/2003; Artuso 2001. 
140 M. Smith 2004b: 97; Wilde d’Estmael 1998. 
141 Portela 2007. 
142 Portela 2010: 1. 
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sanctions regimes has been noticed at least since the late 1980s.143 (The EU 
applied its first autonomous penalties on the Soviet Union in 1982).144 
The foreign policy literature has mainly focused on the US and the UN as 
instigators of sanctions, but cast aside other actors, such as the EU.145 The early 
literature furnished an empirical analysis of sanctions hitherto wielded by the EU 
without suggesting a broader explanatory framework.146 Hazelzet compared EU 
with US sanctions by focusing on the reasons leading to their imposition.147 
Portela assessed the impact of EU sanctions.148 Jones briefly examined their 
autonomous imposition through the EU rather than other frameworks.149 Single 
case studies essentially focus on sanctions that had been decided before the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms.150 
Only Portela examined the sanctions paradox in the context of EU foreign 
policy.151 Yet, she concluded that EU sanctions are effective policy instruments 
generally.152 Her approach generally casts aside the very conundrum of imposing 
ostensibly unavailing penalties. It is unknown whether EU policy-makers take 
                                                 
143 Holland 1988; Ginsberg 1989; Hill 1996b; Wilde d'Estmael 1998. 
144 Kreutz 2005: 22. The first autonomous European sanctions were mandated against the Soviet 
Union and Poland in January 1982 to condemn the invasion of Poland and imposition of martial 
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policy feedbacks into account when deciding a foreign policy; and if so, how, and 
to what extent.153 
No study has ever related an assessment of sanctions effectiveness to the 
process of EU policy-making. Students of International Relations do not know 
whether mainstream theories can explain the making of EU foreign policy 
towards pariah states. Studies of EU sanctions do not examine how a sanctions 
regime affects EU policy-making in other policy areas, thus impinging on the 
entire policy towards the targeted state.  
 
3.3. Foreign Policy-Making towards Pariah States 
This thesis finally contributes to the literature on extended sanctions regimes, 
and, more particularly, on foreign policy-making towards pariah states, which are 
the targets of both economic and diplomatic restrictions over an extended period 
of time. Whether examining international organisations or sovereign states, the 
scholarship has paid little attention to the process of deciding sanctions after the 
first restrictions have already been imposed.154 Analyses of the sanctions 
paradox tend to focus on explaining how important milestones have been 
reached in the making of a sanctions policy, like the decision to impose a 
stringent penalty. Fewer studies cover the entire history of the policy-making 
process. The scholarship offers few comprehensive explanations for why 
sanctions are scaled up, maintained, or scaled down. Dorussen and Jongryn, 
who investigated why American policy-makers do not repeal ineffective penalties, 
concisely touch upon this conundrum.155 However, their article mainly examines 
rent-seeking behaviours of policy-makers, without looking at competing 
hypothetical explanations of sanctions decision-making.156  
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In conclusion, it can hardly be overemphasised that this thesis does not 
attempt to contribute to the scholarly debate whether sanctions are an effective 
instrument of foreign policy.157 Portela already found that EU sanctions may work 
– although the debate remains open to new contributions.158 This thesis explicitly 
focuses on a case study where EU sanctions demonstrated limited effectiveness 
in quickly altering the target’s behaviour. The methodological choice not to cover 
EU foreign policy in the post-SPDC era owes to the unavoidable limitations of an 
analysis of ongoing events. This approach does not attempt, in Pape’s words, to 
‘stack the deck against sanctions’.159 Nor does this thesis represent a normative 
attempt to defend or condemn the EU’s sanctions policy in general or towards 
Myanmar more specifically. EU policy-makers have their own grounds for 
increasing sanctions despite unlikely effectiveness – motivations that this study 
seeks to elucidate, not to confront. 
 
4. Conclusions  
4.1. Summary 
To conclude, this study of EU foreign policy towards military-ruled Myanmar 
seeks to answer the following questions: 
- What was the effectiveness of EU sanctions policy in attaining its primary 
objectives?  
- What were the objectives of EU sanctions (and how did they evolve)? 
- Who were the key actors making EU policy? 
- To which domestic developments in Myanmar did the EU react, why, and 
how? 
- What was the relevance of feedbacks in the policy-making process? 
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- How do theories of International Relations elucidate this empirical puzzle? 
- What could be learned from this puzzle about EU foreign policy-making in 
general? 
 
4.2. Thesis Outline 
The thesis is divided into three main parts: a theoretical explanation of 
concepts and theories; an in-depth case study of EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar; and a conclusion to the single case study. This opening chapter has 
presented the research agenda, and defined core concepts germane to the 
research puzzle. 
Chapter Two formulates theoretical answers to the research question. It first 
examines how the EU decides its common foreign policy, and sanctions in 
particular. In a second step, key concepts defined in the introductory chapter are 
connected to mainstream theories of International Relations. The section reviews 
explanations derived from neo-realism, conceptual approaches to sanctions, 
liberal intergovernmentalism, and social constructivism. Four competing 
hypotheses are deduced from these theories, which shall be tested out in the 
empirical investigation.  
The core of the thesis – the case study of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar 
– is divided into four chapters. Chapter Three delivers a contextual introduction to 
EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. This contextual analysis answers key 
background questions that should be clarified before conducting the 
chronological investigation of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. The three next 
chapters carry out a chronological investigation punctuated around ASSK’s 
repeated releases from house arrest and additional arrests in 1995, 2003, and 
2010 respectively. 
Chapter Four examines the chronological evolution of EU policy towards 
Myanmar from its Cold War premises until the EU’s reaction to ASSK’s first 
release from house arrest in 1995. This chapter first investigates how the end of 
the Cold War affected the EC’s relations with Myanmar. It then analyses the EU’s 
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reaction to the domestic events unfolding in Myanmar in 1988 and 1990 until 
1995.  
Chapter Five covers the period from the adoption of Common Position 
96/635/CFSP in 1996 until ASSK’s third arrest in 2003. The Common Position 
96/635/CFSP fostered a European consensus that would lay the basis for the 
making of future EU foreign policy. The chapter subsequently examines how this 
consensus was later deepened and redefined, leading to further restrictions in 
specific policy areas. ASSK’s renewed release from house arrest in 2002 
heralded a historical climax in a policy of relative conciliation by the SPDC with 
Western demands. This period was steeply brought to a close after ASSK was 
put under house arrest for the third time, barely a year after her second release. 
Chapter Six covers the period from 2004 until 2010. In 2004, Common 
Position 2004/730/CFSP signalled a landmark revision of EU foreign policy 
towards Myanmar, which allowed for an increase in assistance. The EU thus 
chartered a ‘double track’ approach, since it used incentives as well as tougher 
restrictions in its interactions with Myanmar. The European consensus was 
redefined as a result. Nonetheless, limits appeared in specific policy areas closer 
to the sovereignty of EU member states. The period elapsed with the holding of 
general elections in October 2010 and ASSK’s third release from house arrest in 
November. The ensuing dissolution of the SPDC on 30 March 2011 marks a new 
and ongoing era in EU-Myanmar relations, which is not analysed in this 
dissertation. 
Chapter Seven concludes this thesis in four steps. First, it reviews the main 
arguments put forward in the six preceding chapters. Second, it expounds the 
core empirical findings of the thesis that more generally contribute to the 
literature on EU foreign policy-making. The third section draws theoretical 
conclusions by analysing the four hypotheses tested throughout the empirical 
study. Finally, the ultimate section assesses how this thesis effectively 
contributed to the scholarship. It also examines new research potential to stem 
from this study.  
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Annex 1 draws a chronology of EU and US foreign policy towards Myanmar 
from 1988 until 30 March 2011. Annex 2 exhibits a dataset of 68 sanctions 
regimes adopted by the EU from 1956 until 2010. Annex 3 presents the average 
duration of EU sanctions regimes. Annex 4 indicates the frequency of 
autonomous EU sanctions in relation to those imposed in a UN framework. 
Annex 5 identifies EU sanctions imposed on the same targets as the US. Annex 
6 shows the frequency of EU sanctions in the context of each major EU Treaty. 
Annex 7 outlines sanctions imposed on neighbours of EU countries, former 
colonies of the largest EU member states, former colonies of the other EU 
member states, and nonmembership in these three categories. 
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Chapter II 
Explaining EU Foreign Policy-making:  
The Special Case of EU Sanctions Regimes  
 
After having defined the core concepts used in this thesis, the present chapter 
shall now explain why the EU would possibly scale up sanctions on a pariah 
state. This chapter has two objectives. First, it lays out how the EU decides its 
sanctions policy. Second, it develops a theoretical framework for competitive 
theory testing.  
Theories offer diverging answers to the research question: why did the EU 
scale up sanctions on military-ruled Myanmar? Four hypotheses are deduced 
from different schools of thought on the making of EU sanctions policy. These 
hypotheses shall be empirically tested during the four subsequent chapters 
devoted to the EU-Myanmar case study. Three mainstream theories of EU 
foreign policy (i.e., neo-realism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and social 
constructivism) and a generic approach to sanctions policies are outlined here to 
explain the making of sanctions by the EU. The sanctions approach produces the 
compliance hypothesis; neo-realism the bandwagoning hypothesis; liberal 
intergovernmentalism the large member states hypothesis; and social 
constructivism the consensus hypothesis. Beside their apparent ability to explain 
the conundrum of EU foreign policy towards a pariah state like Myanmar, these 
theoretical approaches have been picked out because of their prevalence in the 
discipline of International Relations and the field of EU foreign policy in particular. 
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter could, therefore, be 
tentatively applied to the making of EU foreign policy towards other pariah states, 
or states targeted by both economic and diplomatic sanctions.  
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines how EU 
foreign policy is made in the specific context of sanctions regimes. It defines EU 
sanctions policy, and examines who are the actors deciding EU sanctions. The 
ensuing section is dedicated to theories that could explain why the EU would 
scale up sanctions on pariah states in general, in order to formulate hypotheses 
that can be tested in the EU-Myanmar case study more specifically. Finally, the 
conclusion highlights core differences between the competing theoretical 
explanations that shall be assessed in the empirical part of this thesis.  
 
1. Deciding Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy 
1.1. EU Sanctions Policy  
EU member states have laid out a legal framework allowing the imposition of 
sanctions since the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (Treaty of Rome).1 This basis has been incrementally expanded ever 
since, following the enhanced institutionalisation of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) under the 1987 Single European Act;2 the creation of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which deepened EU foreign policy cooperation; and 
the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which abolished the legal separation between 
Community and CFSP pillars in EU foreign policy.  
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993, 
restrictive measures have been usually divided between those falling under the 
Community and CFSP framework.3 Portela delineated three modalities to decide 
restrictive measures from 1993 until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
First, sanctions can be decided and implemented by the Community. They 
encompass the withdrawal of Generalised Systems of Preference (GSP) 
                                                 
1 Rome Treaty, Art. 60 and Art. 301; Anthony 2002. 
2 Single European Act, Art. 30. 
3 Maastricht Treaty, Art. 113, renumbered Art. 133 in Amsterdam Treaty; Maastricht Treaty, Art. 
228(a), renumbered 301 in Amsterdam Treaty. 
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benefits, the interruption of financial and technical assistance, development aid 
cut-offs, suspension of trade and cooperation agreements under the Art. 300(2) 
EC, postponements of new projects, deferral of the signature on decisions to 
implement cooperation, and change of contents or channels of cooperation 
partners.4 
Community sanctions are usually decided by qualified majority voting (QMV) 
by the Council after a proposal by the European Commission.5 However, the 
Council acts unanimously when it is deciding whether to suspend trade and 
cooperation agreements.6 For measures falling under the Cotonou Convention, it 
decides by QMV for partial suspensions and by unanimity for full suspension. 
Some sanctions may be decided by the European Commission (without Council 
involvement). For instance, a letter from the Commission suspended aid to 
Equatorial Guinea in 1992 without formal approval by the Council.7 The 
European Parliament may delay the ratification of cooperation and other 
agreements. It blocked a new 5-year aid package to Syria between 1992 and 
1993 owing to human rights concerns.8 Consequently, this first category 
comprises statutory as well as informal restrictions.  
Second, sanctions may be agreed by the CFSP and implemented by the 
Community. Such measures typically encompass: trade embargoes (e.g. ban on 
imports of certain products and commodities), financial sanctions, and flight 
bans. Their imposition follows a two stage procedure. The first phase consists of 
a CFSP agreement decided in the Council by a unanimity vote, resulting in a 
legal act (a Common Position or a Joint Action) based on Art. 15 TEU. The 
second phase ensues when a Community Regulation is adopted to give effect to 
                                                 
4 Portela 2010: 27. 
5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006 Official Journal 
C 321 E/37 (hereinafter EC Treaty), Art. 301 and 60 (3); Eriksson 2005: 109. 
6 EC Treaty, Art. 300 (2). 
7 Hazelzet 2001: 71; Portela 2010: 27. 
8 Hazelzet 2001.  
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the CFSP act. For trade embargoes and financial sanctions, the Council decides 
the Community Regulation by QMV on the basis of a Commission proposal.9 
Alternatively, sanctions may be agreed under the CFSP framework and 
implemented by the member states through national legislation. These cases 
include arms embargoes, visa bans, diplomatic and cultural sanctions. Their 
imposition is decided by unanimity vote in the Council.10 These measures may be 
formal as well as non-statutory: the EU has imposed an arms embargo on China 
since 1989 on the simple basis of a Council Declaration.11 Although a Declaration 
does not carry the legal weight of a Common Position, it did not hinder the EU 
from maintaining this embargo for over two decades. 
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the unanimity requirement could 
make the repeal of sanctions as cumbersome as their imposition. Hence, due to 
the veto of the UK and the Netherlands, the EU flight ban and oil embargo on the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were maintained until February and 
October 2000 respectively, despite internal pressure to rescind them and 
although the UN had gradually lifted these restrictions between 1994 and 1996.12 
In the case of the arms embargo on Indonesia, EU sanctions automatically 
expired on 19 January 2000 despite continuing strife in East Timor. The 
regulation stipulated that unanimity among EU member states was necessary to 
extend the measures for another period, and Portugal could not secure unanimity 
before the Decision’s expiry date.13 This constraining decision-making 
mechanism underpins the assumption that divergences among member states 
may hinder possible changes to a multilateral sanctions regime. The Lisbon 
Treaty, ratified on 1 December 2009, moved the decision of sanctions towards a 
single-step procedure. The Council acts by a qualified majority on a joint 
                                                 
9 EC Treaty, Art. 301 and Art. 60 (3). 
10 Portela 2010: 27-30; S. Jones 2007: 115-6. 
11 European Council: Declaration of 27 June 1989. 
12 Hazelzet 2001: 100. 
13 Ibid. 
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proposal from the High Representative and the Commission. It informs the 
European Parliament thereof.14 
Its institutional development has therefore enabled the EU to streamline its 
sanctions policy. Treaties have strengthened the legal basis for the adoption of 
sanctions. While still occurring, the imposition of non-statutory sanctions has 
been less frequent since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, and even less 
so with the Lisbon Treaty. The latter has simplified decision-making procedures.  
 
1.2. Actors Making EU Sanctions Policy  
After having outlined the evolution of EU sanctions policy, the following section 
identifies the actors who are involved in decision-making. Decisions are taken by 
the EU member states within the Council. Three other actors can influence their 
decisions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, and lobby 
groups.15 
 
1.2.1. The Council 
The European Council constitutes the political apex of EU foreign policy. It is 
chaired by the President of the European Council and made up of heads of 
states and governments of the member states, the President of the European 
Commission, and the High Representative.16 It defines the broad directions of EU 
foreign policy and may take action in cases of significant crises.17 
Discussions of political technicalities and decisions on individual matters rarely 
take place therein. They are prepared beforehand at lower hierarchical levels.18 
                                                 
14 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 OJ C 
83/144 (hereinafter TFEU), Art. 215. See also: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, 2006 OJ C 321 E/5 (hereinafter TEU), Title V, Chapter 2. 
15 Bicchi 2002: 4. 
16 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 68. 
17 TEU, Art. 14; TEU, Art. 13.  
18 Peterson 1995: 69-93. 
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Nonetheless, preparation by lower administrative bodies does not exclude high-
level involvement. Ministers who have a vested interest in repealing or tightening 
up sanctions towards a third country may convey policy guidelines to their 
national representatives sitting in the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
of the EU (COREPER) or other bodies.  
To solve disagreements among member states, the Council may seize specific 
moot points. The regular discussions on the problem of apartheid in South Africa 
in the mid-eighties and in 1993 epitomise the European Council’s role in the 
development of a common foreign policy towards a pariah state.19 Council 
involvement does not necessarily imply that a common policy will ensue, as 
illustrated by the failure to find a common stance on the South African issue at 
the June 1986 Hague summit.20 
Secondly, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is the main decision-making body. 
It is permanently chaired by the High Representative/Vice President of the 
Commission (HRVP) and convenes the ministers of the member states 
responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and development. It is responsible for 
voting the EU’s Decisions under the CFSP. The FAC meets at least once a 
month, bringing together the ministers of foreign affairs. Before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was called the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC). It gathered the relevant ministers, the High 
Representative, and a member of the European Commission.21 
EU foreign policy decisions are thoroughly prepared by subsidiary actors: the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU (COREPER), the Political 
Security Committee (PSC), the working groups and the entities of the Council 
Secretariat. COREPER II is the most senior preparatory body of the Council. It is 
                                                 
19 Holland 1992a: 11; 1992b. 
20 Nuttall 1992. 
21 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 71; Peterson and Gomez 2001: 53-74. 
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composed of the member states permanent representatives to the EU at 
ambassador level and a representative from the Commission.22 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) handles the day-to-day running of 
external relations. With the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, it is permanently 
chaired by the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and composed of national 
representatives at the ambassador level from the member states missions to the 
EU, plus a representative of the Commission.23 The ‘geographical’ and ‘thematic’ 
working groups, such as the ‘sanctions working group’, are staffed by experts 
from national capitals and from the permanent missions in Brussels and a 
Commission representative. Most working groups are chaired by the EEAS. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the increased workload of national representatives 
induced an enhanced role for the Council’s ‘common actors’: the Presidency, the 
High Representative, and the Directorate General E (DG E).24 The Presidency of 
the Council represented the EU following a rotation between member states on a 
six-month basis. EU Troikas gathered a representative of the Commission, the 
country that held the Presidency, and the next incumbent.25 The power of the 
Presidency was nonetheless curbed by the ‘collective resistance’26 of the other 
member states: the UK’s reluctance to impose sanctions against South Africa, for 
example, could not prevent the other twelve members ‘insisting on sanctions 
being introduced under the auspices of the British presidency’ in September and 
October 1986.27 
The Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP (HR) was created in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam to assist the Council and enhance the representation of 
                                                 
22 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 73-76; see also: Nugent 2003: 156 - 158; Cameron 1999: 
33-38. 
23 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 73-76; see also: Nugent 2003: 157 – 158. 
24 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 74. 
25 Amsterdam Treaty, Art. J.8.  
26 Holland 1995a: 9. 
27 Ibid. See: Council of the EU: Decision 86/459/ECSC of 16 September 1986; ibid.: Decision 
86/517/EEC of 27 October 1986; ibid.: Regulation (EEC) No 3302/86 of 27 October 1986.  
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the Union.28 The Lisbon Treaty modified this setup to enhance the coherence of 
EU foreign policy. It transformed the HR into the HRVP, the ‘EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
Commission’, who exercises the functions that had so far fallen under the remit 
of the Presidency, the HR and the Commissioner for External Relations. The 
HRVP is therefore no longer an office responding exclusively to the member 
states in the Council, as the former pre-Lisbon HR did. It carries two hats, namely 
the ‘Council role’ of permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and 
the ‘Commission role’ as Vice President with a responsibility for budgets and 
programmes. 
The HRVP may appoint EU Special Representatives (EUSR) to represent the 
EU on the ground in crisis situations and strategic areas.29 The EU had a Special 
Envoy to Burma/Myanmar from 2007 until 2011. The EUSRs are at the 
crossroads between Brussels-based policy-making, national diplomatic 
initiatives, relations with third states and parties, and coordination with other 
international organisations.30 Such Representatives may eventually be phased 
out with the full functioning of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
1.2.2. The European Commission 
Until the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission had a decision-making 
remit in the field of external relations, as mandated by the Treaties.31 Until 
Lisbon, the Commission carried responsibility for the first pillar of the TEU 
(notably implementation of economic sanctions and assistance, humanitarian aid, 
negotiation of trade agreements), represented the EU internationally (together 
with the Council Presidency and the High Representative), and initiated foreign 
                                                 
28 Art 26 TEU. 
29 Amsterdam Treaty, Art. J.8. 
30 Grevi 2007: 10-11. 
31 Pre-Lisbon EU foreign policy was notionally divided into Council-led ‘foreign affairs’ and 
Commission-led ‘external relations’. 
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policies by making proposals to the COREPER. The Commission was the only 
European institution represented globally via its delegations in one hundred and 
thirty four countries.32 With the Lisbon Treaty, ‘Union delegations’ fell under the 
authority of the HRVP.33  
The Commission consists of a College of Commissioners, with each of them 
responsible for one or more Directorates General (DG). Until Lisbon, several 
DGs had competences in matters of external relations: DG Relex, DG Trade, DG 
Enlargement, DG Dev, DG Aid-Co, and DG ECHO. For the sake of 
methodological clarity, it is assumed that the Commission acts as a unitary actor, 
although this unity is sometimes belied by practice.34  
Under Lisbon, DG Relex and the departments from the General Secretariat of 
the Council dealing with foreign policy have been merged into the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Its personnel are drawn from these 
administrations and national diplomatic services of the member states. The 
EEAS took over the responsibility to prepare policy proposals and implement 
them, whereas trade and development policy remained under the responsibility 
of the relevant Commissioners.35 
Until Lisbon, the Commission had a vested interest in increasing its role in 
foreign policy issues. A policy of rapprochement with a state targeted by 
sanctions would enhance the role of the European Commission, leaving room for 
manoeuvre in the implementation of Community instruments. Moreover, the 
Commission – the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’ – is mandated to represent the 
common European interest, thus not responding to national policy objectives of 
                                                 
32 European Commission website 2010. 
33 Sola 2009: 1. In practical terms, the former ‘delegations of the European Commission’ were re-
named ‘delegations of the European Union’. 
34 Holland 1995a: 83-86. 
35 Council of the EU, November 2009: Background. 
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member states. Some may consider the Commission as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ 
that gives impetus for foreign policy change.36  
 
1.2.3. The European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) is the only institution that represents the 
European public. As such, the European Parliament has traditionally defended 
the cause of democracy, human rights and good governance in the EU’s external 
relations.37 The European Parliament recognised ‘Sanctions as part of an overall 
human rights strategy’, but ‘deplore[d] the fact that, to date, no evaluation or 
impact assessment has been carried out in respect of the EU's sanctions 
policy’.38 The European Parliament’s principled position often confronts the 
material interests of the member states, or the Commission’s propensity to 
engage with difficult countries, even under authoritarian regimes.39 Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) exert pressure on the Council and on the 
Commission to follow their resolutions. The main actors in the European 
Parliament are the Committee for Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittees on 
Human Rights and on Security and Defence.  
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament had a 
limited role in EU foreign policy-making.40 It mainly voted resolutions to proclaim 
its views, which the Council did not have to take into account. The Lisbon Treaty 
gave the European Parliament more substantial powers including decision 
powers on the entire EU budget; competence to ask the Commission to present 
legislative proposals to the Council; a formal agreement procedure to 
international agreements; and improved procedures for European Parliament 
                                                 
36 Bicchi 2008; Krause 2002; Caporaso and Keeler 1995; Nuttal 1993. See also: E. Haas 1964; 
1968. E. Haas later challenged his own theory of neo-functionalism (E. Haas 1975). 
37 Howitt 2006. 
38 EP: Resolution of 4 September 2008, par. 15 and par. 1. 
39 Hristov 2009. 
40 Viola 2000; K. Smith 2004c.  
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hearings and resolutions, which enhanced the Council’s accountability to the 
European Parliament.  
 
1.2.4. External Groups 
External groups are not directly involved in the EU decision-making system. 
They can be grouped together under the broad category of lobbyists − or 
activists.41 The European Parliament is often their first gateway to influencing 
foreign policy-making.42 Among the multifarious organisational units involved in 
EU policy-making, the Council and the Commission are independent from 
transnational organisations and thus more arduous to lobby effectively. 
External groups may encompass: political parties, NGOs (e.g. human rights, 
pro-democracy, and diaspora associations), think tanks, or private firms. Activists 
may strive to influence political decisions primarily by gaining access to national 
policy-makers (national governments and parliaments), and secondly to EU 
officials who can influence the Council’s political agenda and decisions (officials 
from the EEAS, MEPs, and from the Commission). Hence, EU lobbying could be 
viewed as a ‘transnational collective action’.43 By contrast, schools of thought 
emphasising domestic politics within member states consider that influential EU 
lobbying takes place at the national level, not at the supranational or 
transnational level.44 
Lobbyists may endeavour to convince policy-makers by demonstrating the 
legitimacy of their position for national and European politics.45 To this end, they 
may show a petition of citizens to national authorities (e.g. ministry of foreign 
affairs, prime minister’s office, national parliaments), but also to the European 
                                                 
41 Kingdon 1993: 115. 
42 Andersen and Eliassen 2001: 45. 
43 Ibid.: 44; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1997: 7. 
44 Moravcsik 1993b: 3-32; Moravcsik 1997: 513-553. 
45 Eberlie 1993.  
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Parliament, the Commission, or the Council secretariat.46 In the EU, lobbyists 
usually try to influence a policy proposal before it has passed to the Council.47 If 
lobbyists gain direct access to legislation, their influence on policy-making may 
be important.48 
Robert Putnam’s conception of international trade negotiations as a two-level 
game taking place at the domestic level with domestic constituencies and at the 
international level between foreign governments has been widely applied to EU 
policy-making.49 David Camroux emphasised that this metaphor could be 
widened to a three-level game, since policy-makers may negotiate not only with 
domestic constituencies and other EU members, but also at a third table with 
transnational institutions (e.g. the European Parliament, the Commission) and 
transnational organisations (e.g. international NGOs, multinational companies). 
Moreover, in the case of interregional cooperation, such as the EU-ASEAN 
process, a fourth level could be added. European representatives also negotiate 
at a fourth table with their interregional counterparts (in the present case, 
representatives of ASEAN member states).50 External groups may thus adopt 
different strategies to influence EU decisions at each of these four different levels 
of interaction.  
In the context of sanctions, active lobbying may lead to emphasising the 
achievement of secondary over primary objectives because policy-makers are 
keen to demonstrate domestic groups that ‘something is being done’ against 
tyrannical states. Lobbyists can therefore play the role of impeders of foreign 
policy change rather than its promoters, due to the difficulty to lobby all actors 
                                                 
46 Interview 30. The Lisbon Treaty allows widening such national practices to a transnational 
European polity. It introduced a ‘European citizens’ initiative’, which would allow European 
citizens to request the Commission to consider an initiative backed by at least one million citizens 
from a minimum of one-third of EU countries. 
47 Peterson 1995: 76. 
48 Andersen and Elliasen 1993: 30. 
49 Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1993b: 3-32; Moravcsik 1997: 513-553. 
50 Camroux 2010: 71-73. See also, on three-level games analyses of EU negotiations: Deutsch 
1999; Patterson 1997: 135–165. 
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involved in EU decision-making. To bring their political cause to the international 
limelight, diaspora activists can favour a policy of confrontation rather than 
engagement with their country of exile, like Iran, Libya, Myanmar, South Africa, 
or Zimbabwe. For instance, the weight of the Cuban exiled community in 
Floridian elections has contributed to heavily constrain American sanctions policy 
towards Cuba since 1959.51  
After having outlined the procedures for deciding sanctions and the main 
actors making the policy, the following section defines the theoretical framework 
of analysis that shall be tested in the empirical investigation of this thesis. 
 
2. Explaining why the EU Scales up Sanctions  
2.1. Neo-Realism 
The first hypothesis posits that US pressure leads the EU to reinforce 
sanctions on a state that lacks strategic effectiveness for the EU. This hypothesis 
is derived from an interpretation of the neo-realist school of thought.  
Adapting neo-realism, a state-centric theory, to unveil the drivers of the foreign 
policy of a non-state actor, may seem an unorthodox endeavour. However, the 
EU can be analysed as if it was a state, because it is generally recognised as an 
international actor sui generis.52 Previous studies have adapted classical realism 
as well as Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism to the EU context, notably in order to 
analyse European integration,53 and EU foreign policy.54 Although the end of the 
                                                 
51 Zebich-Knos and Nicol 2005. 
52 Hill and Wallace 1996: 1-15; K. Smith 1996: Chapter II-VII; K. Smith 2003c. The debate on the 
EU’s actorness has mushroomed with the growing juridical personality of the EU, notably against 
the backdrop of the Treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), and Lisbon (2007). See: 
Peterson 1998; Rosecrance 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Hazel Smith 2002: 7; K. Smith 
2003c; Cornish and Edwards 2005; Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2006; Elgström and M Smith 2006; 
Toje 2008b; Koehler 2010.  
53 Mearsheimer 1990; Grieco 1995; Loriaux 1999; Rosamond 2000: 131-135; Wivel 2004; 
Collard-Wexle 2006. 
54 J. Snyder 1990; van Evera 1990/1991; Pijpers 1991: 135-148; Krupnik 1996; Norris 2002; P. 
Gordon 2003; Jones 2003; Posen 2003; 2004; 2006; Hyde-Price 2006: 217-234; Rynning 2005; 
Farrel 2005: 263-283; Ruffa 2011. 
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Cold War raised challenges to its central assumptions, neo-realism has proven 
an incredibly resilient theory of International Relations.55 It is particularly useful to 
make sense of systemic influences on foreign policy in the context of states’ 
struggle for survival.56  
Neo-realism would expect that the tightening, or relaxing, of sanctions 
depends on how systemic dynamics affect the EU’s security. Neo-realists view 
international politics as determined by the anarchic structure of the international 
system, where no authority can dispel the threat of war. In order to ensure their 
survival, states seek to maximise their security in relation to others.57  
Structural realists view international politics as determined by the material 
structure of the international system around competing poles of power. Polarity 
leads states to adopt one of the main patterns of behaviour towards more 
powerful states: balance of power, bandwagoning, or buck-passing.58 Structure, 
however, constrains but does not determine action. 
Security threats posed by a third state could induce the EU to continue 
isolating a targeted state, in order to contain its revisionist agenda. Realists posit 
that sanctions are imposed on foes, while incentives are given to allies.59 
Isolation represents a cost effective strategy, although it may not eradicate 
security threats.60 Sanctions could thus serve as a deterrence to prevent other 
states from emulating revisionist policies. Brendan Taylor argued that EU 
                                                 
55 Peterson 2006: 26-27. 
56 In contrast, classical realism and neo-classic realism tend to take systemic and domestic inputs 
into account (Wohlforth 2008: 34ff.). The main advantage of using neo-realism is its exclusive 
emphasis on international constraints on state behaviour, in addition to developing a theory of 
power. Various studies have shown that neo-realism can be adapted to a FPA framework (Wolfe 
1986; Feigenblatt 2009). Rittberger (2001: Chapter III and Chapter X) labelled it ‘modified neo-
realism’. Waltz (1979) had originally distinguished neo-realism from other ramifications of the 
realist school of thought by pinpointing that neo-realism is a theory of IR, and not a middle-range 
theory of FPA. 
57 Waltz 2001: 202. 
58 Ruffa 2011: 568; Hyde-Price 2006: 224; Waltz 1979: 128.  
59 Drezner 1999: 3 and 33-4; Hazelzet 2001: 40-1. 
60 Coker 1986: 43. 
69
Chapter II 
sanctions are part of a grant strategy to ‘increase Europe’s global power and 
autonomy’ in a post-Cold War world order.61 
Bandwagoning with the hegemon could also justify why the EU continues a 
policy unlikely to bear fruit. Enjoying lucrative relations with a human rights 
offender could spoil the alliance with a hegemon promoting human rights. 
Confronted with a unipolar world order, Waltz reformulated his original affirmation 
that balance of power against the hegemon was the most likely outcome induced 
by polarity.62 He recognised that bandwagoning ‘may sometimes seem a less 
demanding and more rewarding strategy than balancing’.63 Maintaining the 
Transatlantic Alliance seems the least costly choice for European states, in order 
to further benefit from American protection in the post-Cold War order.64 Realist 
Stephen Walt showed that in addition to perception of relative aggregate power, 
perception of threat can explain why a state bandwagons with a more powerful 
(but relatively benign) ally.65 Quoting Hans Morgenthau, Walt also suggested that 
‘ideological solidarity’ could entice bandwagoning behaviour when it does not go 
against power politics.66 
According to Catherine Gegout, Washington yields a de facto veto power on 
EU policy initiatives that do not suit American interests.67 The US exerts its veto 
power by pressuring its closest allies in the EU. The US has the power to unite 
as well as divide EU member states.68 US pressure may lead the EU to invoke 
sanctions, for instance in order to temper America’s intentions to unleash war on 
a third state.69 This hypothesis of EU foreign policy gravitating around US 
                                                 
61 B. Taylor 2009: 98. 
62 Waltz 1979: 126. 
63 Waltz 2000: 38. 
64 Wivel 2005: 301; Kagan 2003. 
65 Walt 1987: viii. 
66 Walt 1985: 18ff.; Morgenthau 2006. 
67 Gegout 2005b.  
68 Pardalis 1987: 271–294; Peterson 1996; M. Smith 2004b: 98. 
69 Pardalis 1987: 284. 
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interests could be correlated to the empirical finding outlined in Annex 5, that 
83.6 percent of EU sanctions were also targeted by the USA (51 out of 61 
cases). 
US influence could be conveyed via two different channels:  
- The US would exert direct pressure on the EU and/or individual member 
states to scale up sanctions; 
- Within the Council, a close European ally of the US would promote a 
position that aligns EU policy with US interests. This European ally may 
defend such position in the name of European interests and without overt 
pressure from Washington. Among all EU member states, the UK has 
usually spurred the EU to follow the lead taken by the US. The UK does so 
in order to achieve influence on key US policies in return for its support.70 
However, the decision-making process within the EU may be paralysed, if 
EU member states do not agree to follow the UK’s leadership and thus 
bandwagon with the US.71 Policy paralysis during the Iraq war illustrated the 
possible consequences of US influences on the EU’s policy towards a 
pariah state.72 
While recognising that systemic pressures constitute one of the main 
constraints on state behaviour, neo-realists argue that the balance of power 
serves the purpose of preserving the autonomy of ‘independent states that wish 
to remain independent’.73 It is thus likely that international pressures determine 
EU foreign policy towards a targeted state, but not the entire policy and in all 
policy sectors. The EU is likely to prove more assertive in ‘harder’ issues related 
to economy and security. Power is fungible, so that economic and security 
                                                 
70 Posen 2006: 167. This argument could also be supported by theories of bandwagoning (Walt 
1987). 
71 Ruffa 2011: 568. 
72 Crowe 2003a: 533-546; 2003b; K. Smith 2004a; Youngs 2004b; Ham 2004; Gordon and 
Shapiro 2005; Stahl 2005; Honig 2005; Kasmeri 2007; Lewis 2011. 
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interests are complementary.74 ‘States use economic means for military and 
political ends; and military and political means for the achievement of economic 
interests’.75 Conversely, the EU would be prone to follow suit with its allies in 
‘softer’ domains of communication, culture, and diplomatic relations.  
Since the quest for autonomy can threaten security alliances, in which cases is 
the EU more likely to bandwagon with the US? This question can be best 
answered by including considerations of statesmen’s perceptions of power into 
our interpretation of neo-realism.76 Bandwagoning behaviour is more likely to 
occur when EU policy-makers perceive the targeted state as lacking in strategic 
weight. Relative lack of strategic interests minimises the potential costs of 
bandwagoning. 
Multiple elements could explain why certain states are perceived as not 
strategically important: they typically do not pose a direct threat to EU security; 
they are not allies of EU member states; they generate a relatively low Gross 
National Product (GNP):77 they maintain, from an EU perspective, fairly marginal 
trade relations with the EU; they are (usually) geographically remote from the 
EU;78 and, accessorily, they do not have strong cultural and historical links with 
EU member states. The EU has less incentives to achieve its primary policy 
objectives towards states that are perceived as carrying relatively little strategic 
weight, making balancing with the hegemon all the more attractive.  
The neo-realist definition of power enables us to assess whether a target of 
sanctions is perceived as an actor that is strategically relevant for the EU: 
                                                 
74 Peterson 2006: 26. 
75 Waltz 1979: 94. 
76 See: Walt 1987. 
77 The realist literature usually uses GNP, rather than GDP, as a measure of national wealth − 
and power (Mearsheimer 2001: 67; B. Schmidt 2005: 542, footnote 68). GNP allocates production 
based on ownership, whereas GDP defines production by geographical location. 
78 Walt 1987: 23-24. 
72
Chapter II 
Their states’ rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence.79  
The pariah’s strategic relevance can be assessed by analysing:   
- Whether it poses a direct threat to EU security. A threat can be defined by 
the amount of military expenditure and the number of armed forces, in 
combination with a revisionist – or bellicose – posture towards the EU and 
its allies;80 
- Its economic relations (e.g. trade and investment) with the EU as a whole, 
and with specific member states, in particular big member states like the 
UK, France, and Germany;81 
- The size of its GNP, territory and population in relation to the EU’s security; 
- The legacies of a close relationship with one of the EU member states;  
- Geographic proximity to the EU. 
The bandwagoning hypothesis thus predicts that the EU will align its foreign 
policy with the US, if the target of sanctions bears little strategic weight for the 
EU. The bandwagoning hypothesis posits that US policy could lead the EU to 
adopt three different policies towards a pariah state, hence reflecting the three 
dependent variables identified in the introductory chapter: scaling up restrictions; 
scaling them down; or continuing the same policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Waltz 1979: 131; B. Schmidt 2005; for a classical realist definition of power see: Morgenthau 
2006: Chapters 8-10. 
80 B. Schmidt 2008: 159-162. 
81 Borrowing from dependency theories (Wallerstein 2004), the EU tends to treat as pariah states 
those human rights offenders that are situated at the periphery of the world economy. Karen E. 
Smith (2001: 193) also noted that ‘poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance to the 
EU or one of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the 
cases where it is also easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights.’ 
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Bandwagoning hypothesis:  
1) The EU is likely to increase sanctions if the US scales up sanctions on a 
targeted state that bears little strategic weight for the EU.  
2) The EU is likely to decrease sanctions if the US scales down sanctions on a 
targeted state, ceteris paribus.82 
3) The EU is likely to be paralysed if some EU member states choose not to 
align with US policy. 
 
In the empirical investigation of this thesis, the bandwagoning hypothesis will 
be confirmed if evidence is found that US pressure led the EU to increase the 
isolation of Myanmar, regardless of the effectiveness of such policy for objectives 
achievement. Pressures could be traced back to official statements by US and 
European officials, notably the US President, the secretary of state, a European 
head of state, government or minister.83  
Congress or parliamentary resolutions within an EU member state could also 
establish evidence of nominal pressures that the EU should emulate US policy. 
However, parliamentary motions provide flimsier evidence because they do not 
constitute a proper foreign policy action that emanates from a sovereign state. 
They belong to the realm of domestic politics. Secondary sources (such as 
comments from interviews or press articles) could also indicate whether 
pressures stemmed from Washington.  
To demonstrate that an alignment with the US was not merely coincidental, 
empirical evidence should be given that EU policy-makers deliberately decided 
policies emulating the US. In the absence of empirical evidence of US pressure, 
the bandwagoning hypothesis could also be confirmed if the EU repeatedly 
adopted the same policy as the US towards the state targeted by sanctions. In 
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propositions that follow (Putnam 1988: 437, footnote 32). 
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such cases, an EU member state that is a close ally of the US would promote a 
policy aligning the EU with the US. This faithful American ally would defend the 
position serving both US and its national interests in the Council of the EU. 
Conversely, the bandwagoning hypothesis will be disconfirmed if: 
- The EU successfully resisted US pressure;  
- The EU’s policy contradicted US strategy (e.g. the EU scales down 
sanctions whereas the US scales them up, or vice-versa);  
- The EU did not follow suit to US foreign policy even in sectors deemed 
nonstrategic for EU security (e.g. the EU could conduct its humanitarian aid 
policy totally independently from the US); 
- The EU does not change its policy despite an upheaval in the international 
world order (such as the end of the Cold War).  
Simultaneity of action (or non-action) between the EU and US does not, on its 
own, constitute an empirical proof that US pressure led the EU to change its 
sanctions policy. This hypothesis would remain unverified if no empirical 
evidence can be found of US pressure or a deliberate bandwagoning policy by 
an EU member state.  
 
2.2. Sanctions Approaches 
The second hypothesis concentrates on the direct interactions between the 
EU and Myanmar at the unit level of analysis. It suggests that the EU scales up 
sanctions because the target does not comply with its demands. This hypothesis 
springs from the straightforward argument that sanctions aim at achieving their 
primary objectives. It is not based on an explicit theory of International Relations, 
but relates to goal-orientated approaches to foreign policy-making84 and 
sanctions in particular.85 Explanations of sanctions as correlated to the 
                                                 
84 J. Frankel 1970: 24-48. 
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achievement of primary objectives do not offer a formal system of logical rules 
that could be applied to different empirical scenarii − beyond cases of sanctions 
policies.  
Despite this lack of firm theoretical grounding, it is generally expected that the 
economic disruption caused by sanctions would translate into political pressure 
on the targeted government to mend its ways. Economic disintegration would 
either compel the beleaguered leadership to heed the sender’s demands, or lead 
to its overthrow.86 This explanation posits that penalties are likely to be scaled 
down if the receiver complies with the sender’s demands; per contra, coercive 
measures would be toughened if the target fails to comply. Sanctions are the 
product of issue-linkages.87 Compliance is traded off against withdrawal of 
punishment.  
This equation of sanctions objectives with the receiver’s compliance is fairly 
unambiguous, since official policy objectives are usually not changed 
frequently.88 When assessing the effectiveness of sanctions, scholars usually 
identify the demands of the sender on the target – the primary objectives of the 
policy – so that they can gauge whether these goals have been attained.89 
Hence, both the US and EU repealed sanctions on Libya in 2004, after Tripoli 
had agreed to dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme, 
renounce the use of terrorism, and paid indemnities to families of victims of the 
Lockerbie attack. 
If the overarching goal of EU foreign policy is to attain its primary objectives, 
then a change of common foreign policy could not be justified without compliance 
by the pariah state with EU demands. Only compliance by the pariah could elicit 
a change of foreign policy. If, on the contrary, the target persists in not heeding 
the sender’s demands, then tightening sanctions may help make the overall 
                                                 
86 Galtung 1967: 380ff.; K. Elliott 1996: 52; Portela 2010: 3; Mack and Khan 2000: 279-292. 
87 Lacy and Niou 2004: 25-42. 
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policy more effective. A sanctions policy follows a mechanistic cause-and-effect 
relationship between the target and sender’s behaviours. It follows that sanctions 
may be continued even if they have been previously ineffective.  
The compliance hypothesis understands foreign policy goals as one-
dimensional: the isolation policy only aims at changing the pariah state’s 
behaviour. It does not focus on the achievement of secondary and tertiary 
objectives by the EU. It aims at testing whether EU sanctions on Myanmar solely 
depended on the military regime’s behaviour. 
The compliance hypothesis disregards other goals of sanctions, which may 
co-exist with the policy’s primary objective of compliance by the targeted state.90 
It does not take into account the multiple functions of sanctions, or their costs 
and stakes for both the sender and the target, which could influence how a 
sanctions policy is decided.91 It is assumed sufficient to assess the connection 
between sanctions and the target’s behaviour. The compliance hypothesis 
suggests that the behaviour of the pariah state could induce the EU to behave in 
three different ways, hence reflecting the three dependent variables outlined in 
the introductory chapter: scaling up sanctions; scaling them down; or continuing 
the same policy. 
 
Compliance hypothesis:  
1) The EU is likely to increase sanctions towards a pariah state if this state 
does not comply with EU demands.  
2) The EU is likely to decrease sanctions if a pariah state complies with EU 
demands. 
3) The EU is likely to continue its sanctions policy if the status quo is 
maintained within the targeted state.  
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The compliance hypothesis will be confirmed if the EU changes its policy 
because the pariah state has met its demands. Evidence should be provided that 
the EU revised its policy as a result of compliance by the pariah state, and not 
owing to other policy inputs. Primary and secondary sources, as well as 
interviews, provide the data where such evidence could be found.  
Regime change would be a case of full compliance, as sanctions would be 
lifted because of the undemocratic government’s downfall. Full compliance by the 
pariah would trigger a paradigmatic foreign policy change, whereby the EU 
changes both its policy objectives and instruments.92 Partial compliance may be 
sufficient to engender partial (or temporary) policy change. 
The compliance hypothesis will be falsified if: 
- The EU does not change its policy despite compliance by the pariah state; 
- The EU changes its policy although the pariah state has not complied with 
EU demands. (Such policy change would be caused by factors that are not 
related to the pariah state’s behaviour, but reflected by other hypotheses); 
- Sanctions do not hit their target. If a penalty explicitly targets an entity that 
is not responsible for the behaviour it condemns, then it could be concluded 
that the policy was not primarily designed to change the targeted 
government’s behaviour. Achieving other objectives, such as symbolic 
recognition of a given issue in the targeted country, could explain why 
sanctions are set off the target. (Unintended and secondary effects of 
sanctions, such as unemployment induced by trade boycotts, are not the 
topic of the present discussion. They differ from off-target sanctions, whose 
primary effects are intended).  
The following section now turns to profit calculation by large member states as a 
competing explanation for why the EU scales up sanctions.  
                                                 
92 C. Hermann 1990: 5-6. 
78
Chapter II 
2.3. Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
According to the third hypothesis, the big EU member states calculate that 
scaling up EU sanctions best serves their domestic interests compared to other 
policy options. This hypothesis is underpinned by liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Championed by Andrew Moravcsik, liberal intergovernmentalism derives from 
classic intergovernmentalism. It was originally developed as a theory of 
European integration.93 Wolfgang Wagner later set out a framework to apply this 
theory to EU foreign policy.94 Derived from a Benthamite tradition of utilitarianism, 
liberal intergovernmentalism asserts that a material calculus of costs and benefits 
guides the decisions taken by utility-maximising member states within the 
Council.95 
The interests of EU member states are given. They are constituted at the 
domestic level after consultation with domestic constituencies.96 National 
interests of EU member states are not subject to change as an outcome of the 
interaction with other actors at the EU level.97 
Sharing this approach focused on domestic politics, Barber contended that the 
secondary objectives of sanctions can consist in deflecting domestic criticism.98 
Rent-seeking ‘enables governments to obtain political gain from the opportunities 
for side-payments provided by sanctions.’99 Maintaining sanctions can reflect 
policy-makers’ attempt to minimise political costs and seek reward from domestic 
constituencies.100 By contrast, repealing sanctions may translate into ‘audience 
                                                 
93 Moravcsik 1998; Hoffmann 1966; 1995; Milward 1992; Rosamond 2000: 75-81 and 135-141. 
94 W. Wagner 2003: 576-595. 
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costs’101 so that domestic constituencies with radical preferences could put a 
veto on such policy change, even if discussed at the EU level.102 Policy-makers 
defend globalised norms for the purpose of domestic consumption. This leverage 
takes effect ‘primarily through citizens punishing or rewarding politicians via 
elections’.103 
Drawing upon liberal theories, Moravcsik depicts EU foreign policy as a ‘two-
level game’.104 National preferences take roots in the functional demands of 
groups at the domestic level, mainly economic groups.105  
National preferences reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence 
the state apparatus.106 
While at the EU level, national representatives aim at approximating their 
preferred outcome as closely as possible. Possible side-payments and 
compromises could be struck on issues where member states do not share the 
same preference intensity.107 They are asymmetrically interdependent.108 Issue 
linkages occur: 
[…] when governments have varying preference intensities across different issues, 
with marginal gains in some issue-areas more important to some than to others.109  
Liberal intergovernmentalism perceives EU decision-making as a bargaining 
process over policy alternatives among individual member states.110 Bargains 
usually take the form of issue linkages and side-payments.111 Member states 
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have a tendency to build coalition alternatives, in order not to be excluded from 
policy-making.112 They agree to ratify Treaties in order to lock in the advantages 
they have secured.113 ‘Competitive bargaining’ (or ‘hard bargaining’) means that 
any member state may threaten to yield its veto if a proposal is further from the 
status quo than its own policy.114 
‘Cooperative bargaining’ (also known as ‘integrative bargaining’ or ‘problem-
solving’) is characterised by an intensive search for solutions that are acceptable 
for the greatest number of member states. Issue linkages may be either explicit 
or implicit.115 Such bargaining may generate ‘log-rolling’ whereby two politicians 
agree to support each other’s projects.116 Consultation reflexes and consensus 
norms are therefore an integrative part of the negotiation process.117 While the 
member states do not alter their national interest, they emphasise common ties, 
so that they tend to forget identities generating cleavages and conflicts.118 
Moravcsik conceded that negotiations between EU member states tend to 
approximate ‘positive sum games’, rather than a sheer ‘zero-sum game’.119 
EU policy-making is driven by the material interests of the three largest EU 
member states (i.e. Germany, France, and UK) because they yield the most 
power in the Council.120 Supranational institutions (e.g. the European 
Commission, the European Parliament) have ‘limited or no role to play’ in this 
sphere.121 Big member states tend to act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’.122 As a 
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consequence, policy feedback by supranational institutions is not a determining 
factor of European cooperation.123 
The twenty-seven member states wield a veto power in the CFSP area, so 
that each of them can potentially block attempts at changing a common foreign 
policy. Zielonka defined this sort of policy gridlocks, peculiar to the EU, as ‘Euro-
paralysis’.124 Zielonka, as well as Christopher Hill, has applied Stanley 
Hoffmann’s ‘logic of integration’ and ‘logic of diversity’, to EU foreign policy-
making.125 Hill clarified that EU policy-making is not only determined by a 
necessary ‘logic of convergence’ among member states who wish to act 
together, but by a ‘logic of divergence’ that triggers the very phenomenon of 
policy gridlock.126  
When the logic of diversity prevails, common decisions are the product of the 
lowest common denominator among the member states.127 Lowest common 
denominator policies correspond to the preferences of the ‘least willing member 
state(s)’.128 Such state(s) favour either the status quo (an agreement not to 
change an existing policy), the lowest degree of policy change, or a new policy 
that reflects the preferences of the veto player.129  
                                                                                                                                                 
122 Bicchi 2002: 4. 
123 Moravcsik 1998: 54. 
124 Zielonka 1998. See also: Hix 2008; Héritier 1999. Zielonka (1998: Chapter 1) gave five 
explanations for the general state of Euro-paralysis: a) power politics among major European 
states, b) a strategic confusion that blocked otherwise successful efforts towards a CFSP, c) the 
inability of EU states to cope with a new set of internal and external challenges, d) the misguided 
pattern of European integration, e) and the weakness of European institutions (see also: Whitman 
1999: 425-426). 
125 The concept ‘logic of diversity’ in the EU derives from Hoffmann’s work on European 
integration (Hoffmann 1966). It has been brought back into focus by Zielonka (1998; Hill 1998a: 
35).  
126 Hill 1993; 1997. 
127 Moravcsik 1998: 482. Schoutheete (1987: 62-67) forged the original expression of common 
policy reflecting the lowest common denominator among member states (See also: Zielonka 
1998; Meunier 2000: 103-135; Gordon 2003; Allen 1998; Asle 2004). 
128 Popescu 2011: 7.  
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National preferences can only be changed by shifting domestic pressures 
(such as an institutional crisis, the election of a new government in an EU 
member state, or an exogenous shock).130 Moravcsik advanced: 
[…] the foreign policy goals of national governments vary in response to shifting pressure 
from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political 
institutions.131  
According to classic intergovernmentalism, policy changes tend to occur when 
new elites arrive in power.132 New national governments tend to promote the 
interests of different domestic constituencies, including at the EU level. 
Therefore, EU policy change would presuppose the election of a new 
government within at least one of the three big member states. Moreover, the 
other big member states would ascertain that the benefits of policy change 
outweigh the costs. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism concurs with David Welch’s theory of foreign 
policy change. Welch contends that states are inclined to change a foreign policy 
course only when the costs of pursuing it are higher than the costs of change.133 
Conversely, it could be deduced that EU foreign policy is not changed until the 
costs of changing this policy are lower than the costs of pursuing it. Cost and 
benefit calculations are measurable because it is assumed that decision-makers 
have consistent and invariant preferences:  
[…] Decision-makers can rank preferences within a particular frame of gains and 
losses. In other words, if someone prefers A to B, and B to C, then she is irrational 
unless she also prefers A to C.134  
Moravcsik delineated five distinct dimensions of national preference formation:  
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variation in preferences across nations and issues, the timing of preference 
changes, consistency with broader foreign policy, salient domestic actors and 
cleavages, and major considerations mentioned in domestic deliberations.135  
The large member states hypothesis is deduced from liberal 
intergovernmentalism. It posits that interest calculation by the three largest EU 
member states will lead the EU to behave in three different ways, hence 
reflecting the three dependent variables: ratcheting up sanctions, scaling them 
down, or continuing the same policy. 
 
Large member states hypothesis:  
1) The EU is likely to scale up sanctions towards a targeted state if the three 
largest EU member states calculate that strengthening sanctions would 
entail more domestic benefits than continuing the same policy.  
2) The EU is likely to scale down sanctions towards a targeted state if the 
three largest EU member states calculate that loosening sanctions would 
entail more domestic benefits than continuing the same policy.  
3) The EU is likely not to change its policy if the three largest member states 
do not agree on the foreign policy to adopt. 
 
The large member states hypothesis will be confirmed if it is found that:  
- Intergovernmental divergences between big member states paralyse EU 
foreign policy, or if the policy reflected little more than the status quo. The 
common foreign policy would hence be the product of lowest common 
denominator preferences among the member states. 
- A big member state bargains with recalcitrant member states in order to 
enable the EU to scale up sanctions. This large EU state would have a 
vested interest in isolating a pariah. In exchange for side-payments, other 
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member states would agree to implement a common foreign policy in-line 
with the interests of the primary sender of sanctions. Since material gains of 
big member states prevail over ideational benefits, possible rewards for EU 
member states would entail:  
o Preserving or promoting national economic interests, such as 
business operations of private or public-owned companies that 
benefit from certain connections with a large EU member state;  
o Gaining popularity among domestic constituencies, in particular 
within national parliaments, by deciding a policy that is popular at 
home. In that case, EU foreign policy would be in-line with 
recommendations expressed by the national parliament of at least 
one big EU member state. It could follow the desires of influential 
domestic pressure groups, particularly in times of national elections. 
- Finally, the common foreign policy is chiefly decided by the three largest 
member states, and in accordance with their material interests. Other EU 
member states and European institutions would exert little influence on final 
policy decisions. 
 
Per contra, the hypothesis will be falsified if:  
- EU member states compromised with each other on their material benefits 
in order to attain the primary objectives of the policy, without making side-
payments or using issue linkages between one another;  
- National preferences were altered as a consequence of the interaction with 
other member states, which would reflect an ‘upgraded’ national interest.136 
In that case, a foreign policy decision would be the result of a commonality 
of purpose(s), instead of bargains between the three largest member 
states; 
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- The Council decided a policy that contradicts the main pleas of domestic 
pressure groups in big EU member states, notably core recommendations 
proclaimed by the national parliaments of large EU member states; 
- Other actors than the three largest member states determined EU foreign 
policy initiatives. The ensuing hypothesis will now appraise this possibility. 
 
2.4. Social Constructivism 
The fourth hypothesis proposes that scaling up sanctions on a pariah state 
strengthens a consensus among EU policy-makers on the identity of the EU as a 
liberal actor in its international relations. This hypothesis applies the social 
constructivist school of thought to the making of EU sanctions policy.137  
Social constructivism is generally recognised as a distinct school of thought in 
International Relations, although authoritative scholars do not consider it a theory 
per se.138 Ruggie, as well as Price and Reus-Smit, showed that hypotheses 
could be derived from it, a view that informs this thesis.139 Constructivism has 
been used to theorise EU foreign policy,140 foreign policy,141 and International 
Relations more broadly.142  
Social constructivism perceives EU policy-making as a process of social 
interaction among policy-makers.143 This interaction progressively defines their 
interests, identity, and policy decisions.144 Rationality is social, rather than 
                                                 
137 There is little place here to delve into the many ramifications of constructivism. In addition to 
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utilitarian.145 Foreign policy-making is understood as a social and learning 
process.146 
Where social rationality plays a role, ‘power’ is defined in terms of arguments, 
language and ideas oriented around collective values. Arguing147 and 
persuasion148 are therefore important in EU decision-making. Arguing implies 
that a consensus is built between ‘persuaders’ and ‘persuadees’.149 Persuasion 
implies ‘eliciting a favourable response without explicitly holding out the 
possibility of punishment.’150 Norm entrepreneurs are persuaders, defined as 
‘agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour’.151 Their 
aim is to convince other actors to embrace new norms.152 They may drive policy 
change. ‘Normative suasion’, or social influence, implies that arguing for norms 
rather than bargaining over interests resolves divergent preferences among EU 
policy-makers.153 
Leadership may stem from any legitimate actor in the EU (whether smaller or 
larger member state(s), or European institutions).154 Even transnational actors 
(e.g. lobbyists) may contribute to decisions taken by the Council. Yet, some 
constructivists underscore that member states do not wield an equal degree of 
influence in the Council due to different sizes and statuses.155 
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Some social constructivists emphasise the role of epistemic communities in 
policy-making.156 They are thus defined: 
[…] a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area.157 
The influence of epistemic communities can be related to the role of transnational 
elites.158 Epistemic communities159 and advocacy coalitions160 tend to argue at 
the EU level, thus constructing their ideas in the process. The ‘global 
governance’ literature draws attention to the role of policy advocates.161 
The national interest of each individual member state is shaped by the 
interaction with other states, European institutions, and their societal and 
international environments.162 Alexander Wendt noted that interests are not 
given, but ‘constructed by social structures’.163 Hill thus argued that EU 
membership has forced member states ‘to reformulate their national interests in 
the sphere of foreign policy’.164 The formation of member states’ preferences is 
‘endogenous to the process of identity and social role formation’ in the EU.165 
Recurrent social interaction between policy-makers produces an ‘upgraded 
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interest’ that reflects a commonality of purpose(s).166 ‘States define their interests 
in a different way as members of the EC [EU] than they would without it.’167  
Once an agreement has been reached on a foreign policy issue, policy-
makers strive to maintain this consensus – and eventually to strengthen it. 
Consensus is characterised as a group decision-making process that seeks not 
only the general agreement of most participants, but also the mitigation of 
objections thanks to solidarity of belief or sentiment. During the early working of 
the EPC, Simon Nuttall had already witnessed the unwillingness of national 
diplomats to be seen as holding back the collective action of the whole, so that 
national positions were altered in order to facilitate a median viewpoint 
acceptable to all.168 EU foreign policy cannot be reduced to a mere product of 
lowest common denominator preferences among member states.169  
This effort to maintain a consensus between policy-makers gives rise to ‘logics 
of appropriateness’ (i.e., adopting a behaviour by internalising it), which 
supersede ‘logics of consequences’ (i.e., adopting a behaviour without 
internalising it).170 The interaction process changes decision-makers’ perception 
of a given problem.171 Hence, the absence of policy change in an ineffective 
foreign policy could be explained by the intention to maintain a consensus based 
on shared values. Even an ineffective policy is preferable to no common policy at 
all. 
Maintaining a consensus to preserve a European identity could be considered 
a path dependent policy, which builds upon the acquis politique.172 A path 
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dependent policy is a ‘self-reinforcing’, ‘non-reversible’ and dynamic process, 
which lengthens in time.173 
Once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very 
difficult to reverse course…The “path not taken” or the political alternatives that were 
once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost.174 
A path dependent policy starts from a ‘point of departure’, upon which the policy 
will expand.175 
Consensus-building is based on a shared European identity. Wendt defined 
identities as ‘inherently relational’ and ‘relatively stable, role-specific 
understanding and expectations about self’.176 They are shaped by social 
interactions and substantiated by ideas.177 ‘Ideas are mental constructs held by 
individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad 
orientations for behaviour and policy.’178 Ideas could be distinguished between 
normative (or principled) beliefs about right and wrong, policy prescriptions, and 
ideologies.179 Nina Tannenwald defines policy prescriptions as:  
[…] programmatic ideas that facilitate policymaking by specifying how to solve 
particular policy problems. They are at the center of policy debates and are 
associated with specific strategies and policy programs. 180 
Walter Carlsnaes defined ideologies as motivated by collective interest. 
Ideologies share:  
                                                 
173 David 2001: 15; Margolitz and Liebowitz 1995: 205-226. 
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[…] cognitive, affective and action-oriented characteristics […]. [An ideology] is a 
political doctrine which purports to motivate an actor P to do y (or not to do z) for the 
sake of the collective interest of Q.181  
Scaling up sanctions could thus represent a policy prescription that bolsters the 
EU’s identity.  
The ideology embodied in EU foreign policy has been related to liberal 
cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitan liberalism).182 Paul Taylor characterised 
proactive cosmopolitanism as ‘a deliberate attempt to create a consensus about 
values and behaviour – a cosmopolitan community – among diverse 
communities’.183 Cosmopolitanism ‘refers to the consciousness of being a citizen 
of the world, whatever other affiliations we may have’.184 As a consequence of 
intergovernmental and/or inter-institutional dynamics, the defence of human 
rights and democracy represents an effective way to build a consensus on EU 
foreign policy.185 Critical theorist Makau Mutua argued that the promotion of 
human rights constructs the identity of the promoter to its very advantage, by 
drawing a convenient distinction between ‘savages, victims, and saviors’.186 
Policy prescriptions that emanate from a liberal ideology are thus enshrined in 
EU Law. The fifth objective of the CFSP is ‘to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’.187 The Council proclaimed representative democracy a fundamental 
principle of ‘European identity’.188 Art 21 Lisbon Treaty states explicitly: 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
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advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law. 
The enhanced institutionalisation of EU foreign policy through successive 
Treaty-reforms leads to increased interaction among policy-makers. Over time, 
this institutionalisation seems to have an impact on the frequency of sanctions 
adopted by the EU. Annex 6 relates the frequency of EU sanctions regimes to 
the number of years when different Treaties guided EU foreign policy. It reveals 
that, on a yearly average, 37 percent of EU sanctions regimes were decided 
during the period when the Maastricht Treaty was enforced, 27 percent during 
the Lisbon Treaty period, 24 percent during the Amsterdam Treaty period, and 
only 12 percent during or before the EPC period. This more frequent adoption of 
sanctions after the Maastricht Treaty and beyond supports the social 
constructivist hypothesis, that increased interaction among policy-makers 
facilitates the making of a common sanctions policy. 
A consensus hypothesis can be deduced from social constructivist 
approaches to EU foreign policy. Presidency Declarations on behalf of the EU, 
Common Positions, or Common Actions embody a consensus among member 
states. The consensus hypothesis posits that the search for a consensual policy 
reflecting the liberal identity of the EU would lead the EU to behave in three 
different ways: tightening restrictions; easing them; or continuing the same policy. 
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Consensus Hypothesis 
1) The EU is likely to scale up sanctions on a targeted state if such decision 
would maintain or strengthen a consensus between EU policy-makers on 
the identity of the EU as a liberal actor in its international relations;  
2) The EU is likely to scale down sanctions on a targeted state if such decision 
would maintain or strengthen a consensus between EU policy-makers on 
the identity of the EU as a liberal actor in its international relations;  
3) The EU is likely to maintain sanctions on a targeted state as long as such 
policy would maintain a consensus between EU policy-makers on the 
identity of the EU as a liberal actor in its international relations. 
 
This hypothesis will be confirmed if evidence is found that the intention to 
maintain a consensus among EU member states was a key motivation to scale 
up sanctions. Moreover, the interaction between EU member states could lead 
some EU member states to change their national foreign policy. By dint of social 
interaction, they would adopt a policy that substantially differs from the early 
years of EU foreign policy-making.  
By contrast, this hypothesis will be falsified if:  
- Only big member states promote and defend EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar; 
- Material interests of member states prevail over ideational interests;  
- The common foreign policy is the product of the lowest common 
denominator. In that case, the foreign policy tends to be paralysed by an 
EU member state that would constantly block policy initiatives undermining 
its national interests, notably economic interests to do business with the 
pariah state; 
- Preference formation takes place solely at the domestic level and is not 
changed after interaction with other member states at the EU level. 
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3. Conclusions 
The empirical puzzle tackled in this thesis – why the EU scaled up sanctions 
on the SPDC – draws upon a broad theoretical debate in the field of EU foreign 
policy-making. Why do EU member states agree to act jointly, in the specific 
case of sanctions regimes?  
Four competing hypotheses stem from different theoretical assumptions. Each 
hypothesis is geared to capture core independent variables emphasised by 
different theories: US pressure on the EU, compliance by the target with EU 
demands, the utilitarian calculus of the three largest EU member states who aim 
to maximise domestic preferences, and EU policy-makers building a consensus 
on the liberal identity of the EU as an actor in its international relations. Testing 
these competing hypotheses will enable us to determine which theory best 
explains why the EU scaled up sanctions. These hypotheses are built on the 
three independent variables identified in the preceding chapter: ratcheting up 
sanctions; scaling down sanctions; maintaining the same policy without changing 
it. Each hypothesis sketches a different explanation for why the EU scaled up 
sanctions on the SPDC: 
1) It could first be advanced that the EU scaled up sanctions because of US 
pressure on a state perceived as not strategically relevant for the EU;  
2) The second hypothesis posits that the EU scaled up sanctions when the 
target did not comply with EU demands; 
3) The third hypothesis interprets the decisions to scale up EU sanctions as 
the result of an on-going bargaining process between the three largest EU 
member states (i.e. Germany, France, UK), who aimed at satisfying their 
main domestic preferences by making, if necessary, side-payments to the 
other big member states; 
4) Finally, it could be imagined that a principled foreign policy strengthened a 
consensus among EU policy-makers on the identity of the EU as an 
international actor defending liberal values. 
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Explanations based on the above-mentioned theories could be polarised along 
different continua: the dichotomy between ideationalist and rationalist schools of 
thought, the different levels of analysis that competing theories may focus upon, 
and the key actors making EU foreign policy. First, theoretical explanations could 
be crossed along the ideational/material continuum. Neo-realism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism offer explanations that are based on the material 
continuum (e.g. pressures to align with US power in cases that are not 
strategically relevant to EU member states; influence of domestic constituencies, 
especially economic interest groups, within large member states). By contrast, 
social constructivist explanations typically stress ideational inputs into policy-
making (e.g. EU policy-makers’ quest for a common identity).189  
Second, hypothetical explanations lay emphasis on different levels of analysis 
(i.e. systemic, unit, sub-unit, and domestic levels of analysis).190 US influences 
on EU foreign policy refer to the systemic level of analysis, since the structure of 
the international system is polarised around US power. The Council, as the EU’s 
decision-making body, embodies a unit of the international system. Myanmar 
represents another unit. Its (non-)compliance with EU demands directly impacts 
on its interactions with the EU at the unit level of analysis.  
Social constructivist explanations of EU policy-making tend to accentuate the 
sub-unit level of analysis. It entails dynamics between EU member states, 
supranational institutions, and transnational actors interacting at the level below 
the Council (but above the domestic level of analysis). Consensuses are typically 
shaped during the interactive preparation of policy initiatives by EU policy-
makers, maybe even before a proposal is formally examined within the Council.  
By contrast, liberal intergovernmentalism draws attention to the domestic level 
of analysis due its interpretation of negotiations within international regimes as 
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‘two-level games’.191 Liberal intergovernmentalism perceives the national interest 
of EU member states as formed domestically by national lobby groups before 
interaction at the EU level. By all accounts, this conceptual distinction between 
different levels of analysis does not necessarily exclude some kind of interplay 
between various layers of policy inputs. 
Each hypothetical explanation ultimately identifies different actors as the key 
stakeholder in EU policy-making. For neo-realists, US hegemonic power 
constrains EU foreign policy. For sanctions approaches, it is the target’s 
behaviour that determines whether sanctions will be scaled up or down. For 
social constructivist approaches, the interactions between supranational 
institutions, EU member states, and transnational non-state actors tend to shape 
the policy. Liberal intergovernmentalists perceive the three largest EU member 
states as the key actors in EU policy-making.  
In summary, the ensuing empirical investigation shall wrestle with the following 
theoretical issues to elucidate EU foreign policy-making towards Myanmar:192 
1) Who makes foreign policy decisions in the EU: the three big EU member 
states, all member states, supranational institutions, or actors external to 
the EU machinery?193 
2) How do the member states decide EU foreign policy?  
o Are the interests of EU member states given (that is, pre-formed at 
the domestic level), or susceptible to change during interaction at the 
EU level?194 
o Is EU foreign policy driven by ideas or material interests?195 
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o Do negotiations between member states follow a process of 
bargaining, or arguing?196  
o Is EU foreign policy the outcome of an ‘upgraded interest’ or of the 
lowest common denominator among EU member states?197 
3) Are the dynamics determining EU foreign policy endogenous or exogenous 
to the EU?198 
The theoretical framework and hypotheses developed here could, in principle, 
be applied to make sense of various cases where the EU decided to scale up 
sanctions. As background information, Annexes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 thus 
showcase some 68 cases of EU sanctions from 1956 until the end of 2010. The 
subsequent chapters shall now test which of these four hypotheses best explains 
EU foreign policy-making towards Myanmar from its inception until the dissolution 
of the military government in 2011. 
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The Context of EU Foreign Policy towards Myanmar 
 
This chapter introduces the case study of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. 
It delivers a contextual analysis of the main issues at stake in this empirical 
investigation. Historical and contemporary data is presented here to provide the 
reader with relevant background information. Hence, this chapter does not offer a 
detailed chronological overview of EU foreign policy, as this shall be undertaken 
in the three ensuing chapters. 
This chapter is guided by a Foreign Policy Analysis framework, which seeks to 
identify who are the principal foreign policy-makers, what their interests are, and 
which structural factors determine the policy.1 Agents are ‘entities capable of 
decisions and actions in a given context’.2 Structures encompass ‘the sets of 
factors which make up the multiple environments in which agents operate […]’.3 
Structure, therefore, does not merely refer to the external environment; it also 
includes the political, bureaucratic, and social structures, which all condition 
foreign policy-making.4 In the present case, important structural factors include: 
Myanmar’s strategic relevance for the EU; the significance of Myanmar’s 
domestic opposition; the different international approaches towards Myanmar; 
and the objectives of EU policy. Agents making the policy are: EU member 
states, supranational institutions, and non-state actors.  
                                                 
1
 Bryan White showed that FPA can be used in an EU context, although the EU is not a state 
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This chapter is divided in five sections. Drawing upon the bandwagoning 
hypothesis, the first section analyses whether the EU perceives Myanmar as 
bearing strategic weight. The second section outlines the sanctions debate 
against the backdrop of Myanmar’s domestic politics and international 
approaches to the issue of human rights in Myanmar. The next section examines 
the primary objectives the EU aims to achieve in Myanmar. It also considers how 
these goals may have evolved over time from 1990 until 2010. The fourth section 
lays out the interests of the main stakeholders in EU foreign policy. These agents 
could be broadly classified into two competing camps. One caucus upholds a 
principled policy, whereas the other defends a flexible approach to the Myanmar 
issue. The final section summarises this overall analysis and outlines how the 
next chapters of the case study are structured.  
 
1. Myanmar as a State Lacking Strategic Weight for the EU 
The bandwagoning hypothesis formulated in Chapter Two advanced that EU 
policy is contingent upon EU decision-makers’ perception of the targeted state: 
the EU is likely to scale up sanctions if it is pressured by the US to tighten 
restrictions on a pariah state that bears little strategic weight for the EU. The 
ensuing title explains why the EU views Myanmar as lacking strategic value.  
At first glance, Myanmar could appear strategically relevant due to its 
geopolitical situation. It lies at the crossroads between Southeast and South 
Asia, possesses direct access to the Andaman sea, and shares borders with the 
two rising great powers in Asia: China and India. During the imperial period, the 
British considered the territory (then known as Burma) as a geostrategic platform 
to protect the Raj from intruders coming from East Asia (e.g. French colons). The 
country was thus annexed to the Raj as a consequence of the three Anglo-
Burmese Wars successively won by the British in 1824-1826, 1852-1853, and 
1885-1886. During the Second World War, Burma was coveted by both the 
Japanese and the Allies as a strategic junction between China, India, Southeast 
Asia, the Andaman Sea, and owing to its proximity to the Strait of Malacca, which 
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is one of the world’s main shipping lanes. Today, Myanmar possesses Southeast 
Asia’s largest territory (676,578 km2), and a relatively large population (49.19 
million in 2008).5 It is well endowed with natural resources (e.g. gas, timber, 
precious and semi-precious stones, partly untapped fisheries). It has the largest 
number of troops among the ten ASEAN countries: 406,000 members of the 
armed forces as well as 107,250 paramilitary forces.6 
Despite these geopolitical assets, Myanmar’s relative exclusion from the 
globalising world economy has influenced the perception of EU policy-makers. 
Since 1987, it is classified as a least developed country by the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC). Its GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
reached only $76.839 billion in 2010, in stark contrast with its immediate 
neighbours: Thailand ($589.005 billion), India ($4.058 trillion), and China 
($10.120 trillion).7 
Compared to other countries, Myanmar is a marginal economic partner for the 
EU. Imports from Myanmar into the EU 27 economic zone amounted to 
€156,838,787 between January and December 2009. Exports reached 
€90,882,158 during the same period.8 The 0.0 percent share of total EU trade 
bespeaks that such low figures are statistically insignificant from a European 
perspective. Myanmar ranked as the EU’s 139th trade partner in 2006.9 The main 
economic interface between Myanmar and the EU is the investment by the 
French oil firm Total SA in the Yadana gas field.10 
The perception of Myanmar as carrying little strategic weight for EU interests 
is also cultural. Myanmar’s self-isolation under the Cold War has meant that 
cultural and social links with Europeans have been tenuous since General Ne 
Win seized power in 1962. Myanmar maintained few contacts with Westerners. It 
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is only after the tragic events of 1988 and 1990 that Myanmar was unwillingly 
thrust into the international limelight.11 This lack of awareness concerning 
Myanmar certainly contributed to the country’s lack of relevance for Europeans’ 
geopolitical and economic strategies in South and Southeast Asia. To add to this 
perception, the EU was slow to realise the growing importance of Southeast Asia 
in global terms. This relevance was recognised only with the development of a 
New Asia Strategy (NAS), promoted by German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel 
during the Essen European Council of 1994. It preceded the creation of the Asia 
Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996.12 
Myanmar does not seem to pose a direct security threat to the EU. There are 
allegations that Myanmar attempts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction.13 
Myanmar has indeed upgraded its defence cooperation with both North Korea 
and Russia, notably in regards to civil nuclear technology. While various 
hypotheses should not be excluded, such claims are difficult to validate.14 
Suspicions have been only partly substantiated by impartial bodies.15 Senior US 
officials have said that their concerns relate to missile, not nuclear technology.16 
Campaign groups have attempted to instrumentalise such claims without 
sufficient proof, thus partly eroding their credibility. There are also allegations that 
the Myanma army used chemical weapons against ethnic minorities.17 
Furthermore, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) ranks 
Myanmar as the second global producer of opiates after Afghanistan. However, 
narco-trafficking has hardly ever been raised as a source of European concern in 
the EU’s declarations on Myanmar.  
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Europeans have seriously raised the issue of Myanmar as a security threat 
only once. On 15 September 2006, the USA succeeded in putting the issue of 
Myanmar on the UNSC’s formal agenda. In January 2007, the UK and the USA 
initiated a draft for a non-punitive UNSC Resolution on Myanmar, which was 
supported by European countries (including France). The argument was that the 
situation in Myanmar, ‘including the detention of over 1,100 political prisoners, as 
well as the outflow from Burma of refugees, drugs, HIV/AIDS; and other diseases 
[…]’ have serious trans-national effects that are ‘likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.’18 Some European MPs and 
NGOs campaigned for the UNSC to impose multilateral sanctions in the form of 
an arms embargo.19 
Although EU countries supported the draft resolution, they considered 
Myanmar as a threat to regional peace and security – and therefore not a direct 
threat to Europe. The 2007 text received 9 votes in favour (including five EU 
member states), but was vetoed by China and Russia (the first double veto since 
1989), and voted against by South Africa. Indonesia, the Republic of the Congo 
and Qatar abstained from voting.20 Wang Guangya, the representative of 
neighbouring China, had qualified as ‘preposterous’ the view that Myanmar 
constituted a threat to regional peace and security.21  
Consequently, European policy-makers tend to perceive Myanmar as a 
country carrying little relevance for their security and economic interests. 
Following the realist emphasis on strategic interests, it seems likely that the 
perception of Myanmar as a negligible country for European security and its 
economic interests would give the EU little reason to reconsider its punitive 
strategy. The lack of strategic interest could explain why the EU scaled up 
sanctions on Myanmar, especially if compared to states with a similarly bleak 
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human rights record but bearing more strategic weight for the EU. Nevertheless, 
this perception of Myanmar as unstrategic could evolve over time owing to its 
privileged geopolitical location and its gradual integration into the global economy 
since the early nineties. 
 
2. The Foreign Policy Debate  
2.1. Origins of the Debate 
Another important condition is the existence of a vigorous political opposition 
in Myanmar. Opposition parties enjoined the international community to impose 
sanctions on the military government. Ethnic groups, and opposition parties 
including the NLD, most notably its secretary general Aung San Suu Kyi, have 
advocated sanctions.22 Western leaders recognised this plea by authoritative 
opposition leaders as a justification for their imposition, and later for not repealing 
them.23 
NLD welcomed sanctions as a signal of support by Western governments, and 
of disapproval of the SPDC regime. Their primary objective was to push the 
SPDC to include the NLD into the national reconciliation process. The EU initially 
exhorted the SPDC to ‘respect the results of the 1990 elections’.24 It aired 
concerns over the ‘maintenance of military rule’.25 Since Myanmar refused to 
honour these results, the EU later urged  
[…] the military authorities to enter into substantive discussions with the democratic 
movement concerning a process leading to national reconciliation, respect for 
human rights and democracy.
26
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Sanctions have subsequently been renewed owing to: ‘[…] the lack of 
improvement in human rights situation and the absence of substantive progress 
towards an inclusive democratisation process […].’27 
NLD activists deemed such symbolic recognition a crucial element of their 
political aspirations. Despite twenty years in which restrictive measures were 
unsuccessful in bringing down the regime, the NLD hailed their imposition by 
Western powers as one of their political victories. For the NLD, supporting 
sanctions was a tool to demonstrate the extent to which they commanded the 
Western political agenda vis-à-vis the military government.  
A few examples illustrate the considerable importance given to legitimacy by 
the opposition – sometimes at the cost of pragmatism. In June 1996, MPs 
founded the government in exile, called the National Coalition of the Union of 
Burma (NCGUB), with ASSK’s cousin Dr. Sein Win as its Prime Minister. 
NCGUB claims to be Myanmar’s legitimate government, not the SPDC. 
Nevertheless, its influence in Myanmar has been extremely limited.28 On 16 
September 1998, NLD MPs created a Committee Representing the People’s 
Parliament (CRPP) in Yangon, which repealed all decrees passed by the SPDC 
since the 1990 elections. This symbolic decision led to the arrest of over a 
thousand NLD members (including sixty NLD MPs); the government ordered the 
CRPP’s dissolution in July 1999.29 Finally, the importance of symbolic recognition 
is also mirrored in the debate over which name (Myanmar or Burma) is suitable 
to designate the country.30  
The NLD’s position has not always been clear on the question of whether it 
called for sanctions. The party remained periodically silent as to what policy 
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response it expected from the international community pertaining to specific 
domestic events that unfolded in Myanmar.31 
Sanctions were chiefly called for by ASSK during interviews and press 
conferences.32 Already in June 1989, she had publicly requested a trade and 
investment boycott, which she reiterated in 1995 and in August and October 
1996.33 In 1996, ASSK explicitly warned foreign tourists against coming to 
Myanmar during the ‘Visit Myanmar Year’ promotional period. She beseeched 
tourists to boycott Myanmar.34 Another explicit plea asked for a ban on foreign 
assistance for the government. In a Prospect magazine article of July 2001, 
NGOs were asked to withdraw.35 As a direct response to ASSK’s requests, the 
European Parliament pressured the Council to ratchet up sanctions ‘by ending all 
links between the European Union and Burma based on trade, tourism and 
investment’.36 Western policy and the NLD’s stance met fierce opposition by the 
SPDC, which polarised the political struggle further.  
In an apparent about-turn, ASSK denied in 2002 having called upon foreign 
governments to impose sanctions on her country:  
We are of the opinion that sanctions are an action taken by a democratic country to 
promote democracy in another country. Nevertheless, we have not asked any 
country to impose sanctions. The countries concerned took actions according to their 
own reasons and their own decisions.
37
 
High-profile exile and EU lobbyist Harn Yangwhe also stated that the NLD did not 
directly solicit sanctions.38 However, it seems that ASSK maintained her support 
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for sanctions privately, for instance to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jody Williams, 
whom she met three months before her third confinement in May 2003.39  
The question of sanctions is controversial within Myanmar’s political 
opposition, however. Certain political activists independent from the NLD 
denounced sanctions for their counter-productive effects, and called for an EU 
policy change.40 Some criticised Western governments for listening to the NLD’s 
leaders too exclusively.41 In 2010, the four opposition parties that were elected in 
Myanmar’s parliament, namely the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, Rakhine 
Nationalities Development Party, All Mon Regions Democracy Party and National 
Democratic Force, appealed for sanctions to be lifted.42 Speaking on his own 
behalf, the NLD’s Central Executive Committee member Win Tin criticised 
international sanctions for being ineffective.43 
An independent organisation conducted a confidential and relatively reliable 
opinion poll on Western sanctions. Carried out from 4 to 10 March 2010 among 
Yangon’s urban population, responses to the different questions varied between 
1,089 and 1,514 responses. The confidence level in the answers varied between 
95 and 99 percent with a marginal error oscillating between 3 and 4 percent.44 
Only 14.1 percent of the surveyed population was found to have a thorough 
knowledge of sanctions combining political, economic, and social perspectives.  
- 44.3 percent of the surveyed population wanted sanctions to be repealed, 
while 14.5 percent wanted sanctions maintained. The remaining 41.2 
percent delivered a more nuanced answer, wishing economic restrictions 
and the general isolation of the country to be brought to an end, while they 
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favoured the maintenance of personal penalties on government officials and 
business partners, such as the visa ban and asset freeze. 
- 44.7 percent of the surveyed population found that sanctions affected their 
daily life; 18.2 percent of the population thought sanctions were effective in 
achieving their objectives; 15.9 percent thought sanctions were good for the 
country; the remaining sample delivered other answers.  
- 24.16 percent of the surveyed population considered that the first victims of 
sanctions were Myanma people; 23.28 percent the government; 19.34 
percent government crony businesses. The remaining 33.22 percent 
interviewees mentioned other entities. 
- 71.0 percent of the surveyed persons wished that domestic political forces 
would work together in order to lift Western sanctions; 10.7 percent did not 
desire such political movement; and 18.3 percent did not comment.45 
This opinion poll reveals significant differences of opinion among the Myanma 
urban population. Nevertheless, it is obvious that only a minority of interviewees 
were openly supportive of sanctions. 
The EU has never conducted an independent analysis of the effectiveness of 
the sanctions approach, at least not one made public. Some voices within the EU 
argued that sanctions should be repealed, notably owing to their lack of efficacy 
and the sometimes counterproductive effects they have had.46 The promotion of 
political change via sanctions has been criticised for ignoring broader 
humanitarian, economic, and geostrategic issues at stake in Myanmar.47 EU 
policy-makers have on occasion recognised the ineffectiveness of the sanctions 
policy.48 
In the absence of political change in Myanmar, the EU progressively adapted 
its policy formulation. It expanded its wording of support, from NLD to the 
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‘national reconciliation process’ and to ‘tripartite talks’. The latter were geared to 
bring together the central government, the pro-democracy movement and ethnic 
minorities (including those insurgencies that maintained their armed struggle) in 
all-inclusive negotiations.49 However, the SPDC has never recognised the so-
called ‘tripartite talks’ called upon by the international community and ASSK. It 
has successfully led a ‘divide and rule’ policy by negotiating cease-fires with each 
ethnic group separately, from 1989 until the time of writing.50 In this process, the 
SPDC systematically sidelined the democratic opposition represented by the 
NLD and affiliated parties. By the same token, the EU tended to complement its 
support of ASSK and the NLD with expressions of support for the ‘people of 
Burma/Myanmar’.51 The issue of ASSK and the NLD’s exclusion from the political 
process came back to the fore when ASSK was re-arrested in 2000 and 2003, 
her house arrest sentence was extended in 2009, and when the NLD decided to 
boycott the 2010 general election. 
 
2.2. ASEAN versus Western Approaches to Myanmar 
Calls by the political opposition to impose sanctions on Myanmar’s military 
government divided the international community. The countries that decided to 
restrict their relations with Yangon included: the United States, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, the EU and its members, Turkey, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, as well as Ukraine and the Republic 
of Moldova. Japan tended to cautiously revise its development and diplomatic 
cooperation, although it did not adopt statutory restrictions. 
Myanmar’s neighbours refused to emulate Western policy. The lack of 
effectiveness of Western sanctions on the military government can be at least 
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partially attributed to the fact that Asian countries did not restrict their relations 
with their neighbour. Most sanctions scholars subscribe to the generic claim that 
sanctions are unlikely to bear fruit if they are not applied by neighbouring 
states.52 
In-line with its 1989 open-door economic policy, the military government 
attempted to integrate into the buoyant regional economy. Myanmar expressed 
its wish to join ASEAN in 1992. In 1994, Myanmar was allowed to join an ASEAN 
meeting in Bangkok. It applied for full membership in the regional group in 
August 1996, which it joined on 23 June 1997. 
ASEAN resisted pressures by the EU and the US to reject Myanmar’s entry 
owing to its poor human rights record.53 In contrast with the EU, ASEAN tolerates 
differing values among its member states.54 ASEAN does not set specific 
prerequisites with regards to respect of human rights by its members, nor does it 
foist benchmarks for democratic behaviour.55 The ASEAN community articulated 
a common approach of enhanced political, diplomatic and economic relations 
with Myanmar, which external analysts have retrospectively dubbed ‘constructive 
engagement’.56 
ASEAN alluded to constructive engagement when the Union of Myanmar 
became a member in 1997. Citing examples of recent liberalisation processes in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea or even the People’s Republic 
of China, Asian countries defended the position that trade and dialogue would 
bring about positive change in Myanmar, rather than sanctions. ‘Soft 
authoritarianism’ was recognised in Asia as key to economic and societal 
development.57 Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, launched a 
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polemic on Western values that placed the individual above the community, 
which he contrasted with ‘Asian Values’. (Myanmar used similar cultural 
arguments to justify the use of forced labour by the security forces as community 
work and as a practice derived from Theravada Buddhism).58 
ASEAN tended to confront Western approaches to Myanmar as a block, 
although some member states also criticised Myanmar for its domestic 
behaviour. During the ASEAN Bali Declaration of January 2011, the ASEAN 
Chair, Indonesian foreign minister Natalegawa, was quoted as welcoming 
Myanmar’s ‘conducive and transparent’ elections in November 2010. ASEAN 
foreign ministers drew the conclusion that the West should therefore repeal 
sanctions.59 The ASEAN’s constructive engagement strategy has been 
denounced by Western countries (e.g. US, UK) as a smokescreen for the pursuit 
of material interests.60 
When looking closer at the notion of ‘constructive engagement’, one hardly 
finds proof of genuine engagement (with a primary political objective) by ASEAN 
partners. To some analysts, it seems fair to describe the attitude of ASEAN – and 
others in the region – as a ‘business as usual’ approach. As long as the regional 
picture remains stable, reaping economic advantages is the prime objective. The 
achievement of political progress would be welcome as a side effect of economic 
engagement.61 According to this interpretation, an ASEAN statement perceived 
as critical vis-à-vis Myanmar would be released to please a Western audience: 
ASEAN would speak collectively in critical terms, while ASEAN members would 
pursue their daily business with Myanmar.62  
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3. Objectives of EU Foreign Policy  
Policy-making is also constrained by the objectives set by the EU. The broad, 
declared objective of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar is to promote human 
rights, democracy, as well as national reconciliation.63 These primary objectives 
have been articulated in European declarations as well as in the common 
positions towards Myanmar, first decided in 1996, and then renewed on a twelve-
month basis. The EU has constantly re-iterated its support to the ‘people of 
Burma/Myanmar’.64 However, the EU hardly ever alluded to economic and social 
prosperity as policy goal. The FCO states that the purpose of sanctions is:  
To put pressure on the regime to work towards democratic change and respect for 
human rights, through measures which are designed to target those obstructing 
reform and progress, but ensuring that the ordinary people of Burma suffer as little 
as possible.
65
 
 
3.1. Focus on Aung San Suu Kyi 
In practice, democracy promotion has meant that the primary objective of EU 
foreign policy is securing ASSK’s definitive release from house arrest, as well as 
her and the NLD’s participation in politics.66 ASSK’s name is mentioned 
systematically in almost all EU declarations, except when major events occurred 
in the country without her involvement, as during the 2007 uprising, and in the 
aftermath of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis natural disaster. The EU has never ceased 
to reiterate that a sine qua non to repeal sanctions was ASSK’s release from 
house arrest, and the junta entering into a ‘meaningful dialogue’ with the political 
opposition and its leader.67 The direct link between sanctions and ASSK’s 
detainment was demonstrated on multiple occasions, for instance on 16 June 
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2003 when the EU strengthened penalties to denounce her third incarceration.68 
On 13 August 2009, the EU widened its visa ban and asset freeze to those 
responsible for the verdict extending her stay in house arrest for another 
eighteen months.69 This direct cause and effect relation between penalties and 
the handling of ASSK underpins the compliance hypothesis, which shall be 
tested in the subsequent chapters. 
This unflinching European support owes to ASSK’s extraordinary attributes as 
a person. She is the recipient of an unrivalled number of prestigious awards 
(eighty-two international prizes by 2007), including the European Parliament’s 
Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought (conferred in 1990 as one of her very 
first prizes ever) and the Nobel Peace Prize (bestowed upon her in 1991).70  
Together with the 2010 recipient Liu Xiaobo, she was (until June 2012) the only 
laureate who could not collect her prize in person because of her detainment.  
ASSK acted as a catalyst and a symbol of Myanmar’s struggle for democracy. 
The daughter of Myanmar’s architect of independence General Aung San, ASSK 
was seen by her numerous followers as continuing her father’s unachieved state-
building legacy.71 She was widely represented as Myanmar’s political alternative 
after her party won the 1990 elections (although the government did not allow her 
to take part therein). Since then, she has remained the leader of the political 
opposition. ASSK was intermittently confined to house arrest by the government, 
and released three times (arrested on 20 July 1989 and released on 10 July 
1995; re-arrested on 23 September 2000 and released on 6 May 2002; third 
arrest on 30 May 2003 and released on 13 November 2010). Thus, the slogan 
‘Free Burma’ espoused by democracy activists (notably by the web-based 
network Free Burma Coalition (FBC) tended to become a substitute for ‘Free 
                                                 
68
 Ibid.: Conclusions of 16 June 2003. 
69
 Ibid.: Press Release of 13 August 2009; BBC News, August 2009. 
70
 NCGUB website 2007: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's International Awards, Honors & 
Appointments. 
71
 Lintner 1990: 109; Saw Myat 2008: 92. 
113
Chapter III 
Aung San Suu Kyi’.72 She is often portrayed as the martyr of an abject military 
dictatorship and praised for her abnegation, notably for being separated from her 
two sons and from her dying husband, Michael Aris, who lived in England until 
his demise in 1999. 
ASSK remains a democracy icon in the West. Her political message of non-
violence, which she expressed to the international media directly in English in 
books73 and interviews,74 swiftly gained popularity in European countries. With a 
political message of non-violent confrontation, inspired by Gandhi and buttressed 
by Myanmar’s ancestral culture of Theravada Buddhism, her popularity in 
Western countries can be compared to the Dalai Lama’s. The trendiness of 
Buddhism in contemporary Western culture may have contributed to amplify her 
fame. Moreover, she embodies a new generation of women leaders in Asia – 
next to Indira Gandhi in India, Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the Philippines, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed in 
Bangladesh, Sirimo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka, or Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan.75 
She is compared to Nelson Mandela, not least because she sacrificed her private 
life for her political beliefs, and acquired a reputation for being uncorrupted and 
principled.76 European policy-makers claimed they were profoundly inspired by 
ASSK and her struggle for democracy.77 European sanctions also aimed at 
denouncing the illegitimacy of the military government.  
Finally, the quixotic symbol of a photogenic woman promoting non-violent 
means in order to topple tyrannical militaries formed an ideal story to feed 
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European media.78 The European press painted Myanmar’s political tragedy in 
strongly Manichean terms, whether right or not. ASSK’s popularity in the media 
may have enticed EU policy-makers to devote continuous attention to her fate. 
During an interview, a senior FCO official admitted that (s)he ‘recognise[s] in 
ASSK the value of a brand’.79 
Constructivist theories highlighting the role of elites could account for the 
immense support given to ASSK. ASSK embodies the liberal values she aims to 
defend. This raises the question whether the support to ASSK by EU policy-
makers owes to domestic pressure groups within the member states (electoral 
politics), or to the ideological commitment of high-level decision-makers to 
Myanmar’s political struggle.  
Within Myanmar, views on ASSK are seen in a more subtle context. Between 
1988 and 2010, the military government has attempted to sideline her in the 
public sphere, by denying her freedom and opportunities to address her country 
folk. At the same time, there are indications that the government had made 
attempts to lure her into the establishment, by admitting the UN Special Envoy 
Tan Sri Ismail Razali as mediator, appointing Labour Minister General Aung Kyi 
as liaison officer between ASSK and the government in October 2007, and – 
according to unconfirmed reports – offering her positions in a future, civilian 
government.  
In the period prior to the November 2010 elections, criticism started to mount 
against her decision to boycott the vote and her dismissive statements vis-à-vis 
those parties that had decided to campaign for election.80 According to several 
interviews, Myanmar’s domestic political debate may have alienated the NLD 
from some fringes of the urban intelligentsia in the country.81 It is also perceived 
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as a Western inconsistency that Myanmar has been sanctioned despite having 
some political space, although restrained, whereas other undemocratic regimes 
in Southeast Asia were not ostracised because a less radical opposition never 
called for international sanctions.82 
 
3.2. Lack of Benchmarks to Measure the Achievement of Objectives 
During two decades, the EU consistently aimed at three primary objectives: 1) 
to secure ASSK’s release from house arrest as well as the release of other 
prisoners of conscience, 2) to obtain the participation of the NLD in an open and 
democratic constitution drafting exercise, and 3) to honour the results of free, fair 
and open elections to which the NLD would participate as a political party. These 
injunctions were concentrated on the NLD’s participation in the process of 
national reconciliation.  
EU policy was however characterised by the absence of perspicuous and 
publicised benchmarks, indicating under which conditions sanctions would be 
repealed.83 While calling for a ‘substantive dialogue’ between the government 
and opposition forces with a view to bringing about ‘national reconciliation’ 
process, the EU never specified what kinds of agreements should be reached 
between the SPDC and NLD. Neither did it state to what extent ethnic minorities 
should be included in such negotiations, since the NLD is mainly composed of 
the majority Bama ethnic group. The EU enjoined the SPDC to repeal laws 
censuring the debate on the constitution in the National Convention (NC). 
Nonetheless, the EU never outlined explicit criteria to determine when the NC 
would be considered ‘democratic’. Council Declarations on Myanmar have 
tended to be evasive.  
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Various stakeholders may have interpreted such statements differently.84 The 
numerous common positions reiterated the objective of bringing about 
‘substantive dialogue’ between the political opposition and the military 
government. Nonetheless, this broad objective was understood in a variety of 
ways. A maximalist interpretation of the EU’s objectives tended to prevail: 
sanctions would be repealed if Myanmar honoured the results of the 1990 
elections.85 Some member states interpreted EU objectives more flexibly. 
Germany objected that sanctions could be partially repealed if a progress of the 
human rights situation were to be witnessed on the ground. Improvements could 
be measured by specific milestones such as the release of political prisoners, the 
respect of cease-fire agreements with ethnic minorities, or a diminution in the use 
of forced labour by security forces.86 Sanctions would not solely focus on the 
occurrence of a ‘substantive dialogue’ between the SPDC and NLD, but on the 
broader security outlook.87  
This overt vagueness could hide internal benchmarks. As triggers of a review 
of the sanctions regime, the EU could set ‘confidential internal benchmarks’ that 
would be concealed from the public. Another option could reside in the existence 
of ‘non-confidential benchmarks’, which are kept from the public eye but shared 
with Myanmar’s leaders. ‘Non-confidential benchmarks’ would entice the military 
government to modify its behaviour without enduring the pressure of public 
opinion. 
The confidential character of such conditions for policy change would be 
difficult to prove, but evidence gathered from interviews points to the absence of 
such internal criteria.88 Purely internal benchmarks for policy change could not, 
by definition, be seen part of a negotiating process with the SPDC. Possible 
European conditions communicated exclusively to the Myanmar authorities were 
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not confirmed by EU representatives who officially met with them.89 In short, one 
can assume that the EU has never established internal benchmarks as part of a 
negotiation process and to trigger a change of policy.90 In contrast with Myanmar, 
the EU pursued a ‘benchmarks approach’ towards another pariah state, Belarus, 
notably in 2001 when it offered specific steps in restoring relations in return for 
gradual moves by Minsk towards democratisation.91  
In summary, the primary objectives of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar 
consist in promoting human rights, democracy, as well as national 
reconciliation.92 More specifically, sanctions restrict relations with Myanmar in 
order to secure the release of ASSK, and the participation of political and ethnic 
opposition parties in an open and democratic National Convention. Nevertheless, 
European conditions for lifting sanctions were not very clear if some, but not all, 
of these objectives were attained. 
 
4. Interests of EU Policy-makers  
Another important variable influencing EU foreign policy-making is the 
existence of two contending approaches to deal with Myanmar: a principled and 
a flexible approach towards the SPDC. The principled approach prevailed in EU 
foreign policy at least since 1996, except in the area of humanitarian aid where 
the EU changed its policy in 2004. Four European embassies are present in 
Myanmar: France, Italy, UK, and Germany, in addition to a European 
Commission antenna (Humanitarian Aid Field Office), working under the 
Commission’s delegation in Thailand and the ECHO regional outfit in Bangkok.  
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4.1. The Principled Position 
4.1.1. EU Member States 
Those taking the principled position tended to follow the pleas expressed by 
ASSK and the NLD to the international community. Its representatives called for 
international pressure as long as the government had not fully committed itself to 
a democratic transition. Principled policy-makers were rather maximalist in their 
approach. They contended that the EU should lift sanctions incrementally, after 
the regime commits itself to an irreversible transition, for instance after having 
staged new elections that the EU recognises as free and fair.93 Engagement was 
decried for condoning a regime whose behaviour is anathema to liberal 
democracies. Most human rights campaigners, Northern member states, the 
Czech Republic, and a number of MEPs tended to advocate this principled 
position.  
The prime objective of principled policy-makers is to promote human rights 
and democracy in Myanmar. Northern member states (i.e. the UK, Ireland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden) traditionally upheld liberal 
values in their foreign policy. The Czech Republic owed its principled stance on 
the Myanmar issue to the influence of former President Vaclav Havel, who had 
originally submitted ASSK’s name to the Nobel Committee.94 The position of 
Denmark has been partly determined by the death of its honorary consular 
representative in Insein prison in 1996. Apart from the UK, principled Northern 
European states did not enjoy noteworthy historical or economic relations with 
Myanmar. 
Relations between Myanmar and the UK have been tenuous since 
independence in 1948. Myanmar belongs to the few British colonies that abruptly 
curtailed relations with the former Empire, together with Ireland and Ghana. Anti-
colonial rhetoric has marked Myanmar’s relations with its former colonial 
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metropole.95 The government’s mouthpiece New Light of Myanmar systematically 
accused the UK (together with the United States) of being responsible for most of 
its woes: economic hardship and international pariah status. By removing an 
openly hostile government, ‘regime change’ could advance British interests in 
Southeast Asia.  
In contrast to the army, the political opposition led by ASSK is sympathetic to 
the UK, which has constantly supported the cause of democratisation since 
1988. A staunch opponent of the SPDC, the UK is an ‘indefectible supporter’ of 
ASSK.96 Having been married to a renowned British specialist in Tibetan 
Buddhism, and having studied at Oxford and conducted researches at the School 
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),97 ASSK enjoyed certain links to the 
British academic and political elite. ASSK’s unrivalled global stature enhanced 
the effectiveness of international campaigns for democracy in Myanmar. 
During the last two decades, UK policy can be divided into three periods. 
Before 1996, the UK vindicated ‘critical engagement’ towards the junta, whereby 
it rejected an isolation policy.98 Since 1996, the UK has become a proponent of 
tougher sanctions against the SPDC.99 The election of New Labour in 1997 
decisively strengthened this policy orientation. Since 2004, the UK has enhanced 
its sanctions policy by becoming the biggest provider of humanitarian aid. In the 
EU, the UK has been the primary defender of sanctions against Myanmar.  
Afraid of unpopularity and boycott, British companies divested massively from 
Myanmar. The UK withdrew Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD) 
facilities, a cover scheme for investment. British authorities thus highlighted that 
commerce was insignificant for British economic interests: 
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In 2008 UK import of goods from Burma were worth £36.3 million and exports were 
worth £3.5 million, while in 2007 UK imports of services from Burma were worth £1 
million and exports £34 million.
100
 
Figure 1 confirms this trend in the bilateral trade between Myanmar and the UK. 
However, it also shows that, despite increasingly trade-related European 
restrictions, Myanmar has run a trade surplus with the UK since 1997. By 
contrast, its balance of trade was negative from 1980 until 1997.  
 
Figure 1: Trade Myanmar-UK, 1980-2010 in million $ (annual values) 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
 
4.1.2. The European Parliament  
The European Parliament has unwaveringly supported ASSK and the NLD, 
ever since the SPDC disregarded the results of the 1990 elections. It has almost 
constantly voted for resolutions endorsing the NLD and censuring the military 
government. It has shown awareness of ethnic minorities’ issues, notably by 
favouring the ‘tri-partite dialogue’. It urged the SPDC to: 
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[…] enter into a nationwide ceasefire and negotiate a political settlement with the 
ethnic nationality leaders, on the basis of the principles of the 1947 Panglong 
Agreement.
101
 
The European Parliament has been a fervent advocate of sanctions against the 
regime as an adequate response to the SPDC’s determination not to share 
power with democratically elected parties. It has recommended the increased 
diplomatic isolation of the government.102 It did not hesitate to inveigh against 
decisions taken by the Council, for instance by criticising the EU’s decision to 
waive the visa ban on SPDC representatives attending multilateral summits,103 
urging the European Commission not to log a WTO complaint against the 
Massachusetts Burma Act,104 or disapproving of Ireland’s decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with Myanmar.105 The European Parliament welcomed the 
Troika delegations sent on behalf of the EU to Myanmar, but condemned the 
regime for not correcting its behaviour despite these visits.  
The European Parliament Resolutions are, however, the product of a small 
number of interested MEPs. Hardly more than 10 percent of the full quorum 
usually votes on Myanmar issues.106 It is also noteworthy that most European 
Parliament questions on Myanmar are raised by Anglo-Saxon, if not British 
MEPs. Certain MEPs continue to work closely with their domestic 
constituencies.107 Well-connected organisations have even drafted some 
Parliaments’ resolutions on behalf of certain groups of MPs, or MEPs.108 For 
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lobbyists, contacts to those drafting the legislation can be as important as high-
level connections.109 
 
4.1.3. Non-State Actors  
Although they are not directly involved in EU decision-making, non-state 
actors play a pivotal role by lobbying European policy-makers on the Myanmar 
issue. Human rights campaigners in Northern member states have pressured 
governments to impose blanket sanctions. Nonetheless, they did not gain as 
wide a resonance in Southern member states and in Germany. Most 
campaigners have amplified the message carried across by the NLD. They have 
been instrumental in crafting a tougher stance towards the junta, and lobbied 
European governments and institutions for this purpose. Campaigners tended to 
encourage an increase of sanctions, to reject high-level meetings with the junta, 
and to press the UNSC to impose a multilateral arms embargo on Myanmar.110 
In reaction to the disregard for the 1990 elections, Myanma pro-democracy 
activists sought asylum in foreign countries where they created institutions 
hoping to represent the pro-democracy movement.111 Exiled activists have forged 
an influential network of Burma offices in Western countries.112 The National 
Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), founded in 1992, is a federation of 
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various opposition parties.113 It nominates a government, the NCGUB, which was 
established in June 1996 by exiled NLD delegates, some of whom had been 
elected during the 1990 elections. The NCGUB’s objective is to contribute to the 
restoration of democracy and human rights; the NCGUB claims it should be 
disbanded when this aim has been attained.114 The Ethnic Nationalities Council 
(ENC) was founded in 2001, in order to foster enhanced unity among ethnic 
minorities and to prepare them to the ‘tri-partite dialogue’ between the NLD, 
ethnic minorities, and the central government. The Federation of Trade Unions of 
Burma (FTUB), headquartered in the US, represents Myanma trade unions, 
which were forbidden organisations inside the country until 2011. These 
campaigners subsist via various sources of private and public funding, including 
from European governments, foundations, and agencies. 
In 1997, lobbyists established a Euro-Burma-Office (EBO) in Brussels, with the 
aim of promoting the cause of Myanma democracy to European institutions. The 
office has gained wide resonance within the Brussels’ policy-making community, 
particularly the European Parliament, and used to receive funding from the 
European Commission.115 Due to its position in Brussels, the EBO fulfils the 
function of campaigner and advocacy coordinator among transnational pro-
democracy networks lobbying EU governments and institutions.  
European trade union organisations such as the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) have constantly pleaded for tightening the screws, justified inter alia by 
the army’s forced labour practices. It is due to their initiative that the EU withdrew 
trade benefits under the GSP scheme from Myanmar.116 This principled stance is 
also backed up by the Brussels-based think tank European Institute for Asian 
Studies (EIAS), which is close to some MEPs. It used to be funded by the 
European Commission until 2005, albeit not for its Myanmar-related activities. 
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Other organisations based in the member states have access to national 
government as well as to European institutions, such as Burma Campaign UK 
(founded in 1991 as the Burma Action Group117), UK-founded Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, Global Witness, EarthRights International 
(ERI), Christian Aid, Paris-based Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits 
de l’Homme (FIDH), and Reporters Without Borders. They mobilise European 
media and civil society around the principled stance.118 The increased 
international awareness of the Myanmar issue since 1988 can be best illustrated 
by comparing the relatively limited attention given by the international media to 
the bloodshed of 1988, with the immense resonance of the mass protests 
(labelled ‘saffron revolution’ by the international media) that took place between 
August and October 2007.119 
 
4.2. The Flexible Position  
Supporters of the flexible approach support a policy of engagement with 
Myanmar, which confronts the regime less openly. It is sceptical of the 
effectiveness of punitive measures. Consequently, advocates of this policy plead 
for maintaining an open, albeit critical, dialogue with the SPDC. On this view, 
sanctions could have been partially lifted even before new elections had been 
staged. Minor concessions from the SPDC – for instance releasing prisoners of 
conscience – could justify a temporary removal of sanctions.  
Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Poland, Bulgaria, the 
European Commission and the EU External Action Service usually uphold the 
flexible approach.120 Most of these actors defend these policies as a result of a 
general scepticism vis-à-vis the effectiveness of sanctions on Myanmar. 
Greece’s position has been partly shaped by the personal interest of a Greek 
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ambassador in the Myanmar issue.121 Italy has promoted diplomatic engagement 
with the regime, notably with the nomination of an EU Special Envoy for 
Burma/Myanmar, Piero Fassino. Only two member states upholding the flexible 
approach have significant material interests in Myanmar: France and Germany. 
 
4.2.1. Germany 
Bonn was the main provider of development aid to Myanmar throughout the 
Cold War. However, Germany was the first European country to cancel 
cooperation in the aftermath of the 1988 coup. With the political turmoil unfolding 
in Myanmar, bilateral relations soured dramatically. The German government 
subsequently discouraged investments in Myanmar by suspending Hermes 
Bürgschaften, a public insurance scheme that protects German private 
investments against political risk in foreign countries. Today, Germany has lost 
the privileged bilateral contacts and the prestige it used to enjoy in Myanmar.122  
Germany’s rationale, however, evolved owing to the entrenchment of the 
military junta. Within the EU, Berlin has become the main advocate of more 
flexible engagement towards the regime. Germany criticised economic coercion 
for being ineffective and for contributing to unemployment among ordinary 
Myanma people.123 This position is underpinned by the belief that ostracism 
cannot be effective against a regime that has been a quasi-autarky since 1962. 
Some German officials have vented their frustration by pointing out that imposing 
sanctions had the counterproductive effect of severing relations with the Myanma 
authorities.124  
This flexible position is defended by the Social-Democratic Party (SPD). 
Social-democrats argued that Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr’s Ostpolitik towards 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) could be emulated towards 
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Myanmar.125 This position tends to be shared by other mainstream parties (e.g. 
Christlich Demokratische Union/CDU, Green Party). The Freie Demokratische 
Partei (FDP) is the only party in the Bundestag to have recently advocated a 
tightening of sanctions, although FDP foreign minister Guido Westerwelle did not 
favour such policy during his tenure from October 2009 until the time of writing.126 
Under Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship, FDP foreign minister Klaus Kinkel 
encouraged high-level meetings with the SPDC.  
According to Myanmar’s Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), the bilateral 
trade volume in 2007 and 2008 reached $429 million, with $262 million in exports 
and $166 million in imports. The main source of German imports is garments, 
while exports are machinery, chemical products, plastics and motor vehicles. 
German FDI in Myanmar reaches only about $15 million.127 Figure 2 illustrates 
Myanmar’s trade with Germany. It shows that despite European restrictions on 
Myanmar’s exports, Myanmar’s balance of trade with Germany has become 
positive since 2000. 
 
Figure 2: Trade Myanmar-Germany, 1980-2010 in million $ (annual values) 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
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4.2.2. France  
French foreign policy towards Myanmar is driven by the promotion of human 
rights and democracy, as well as the protection of some economic interests. 
France’s policy has been influenced by the controversial investments of Total in 
the Yadana offshore gas field since the early nineties. The company extracted, 
refined and supplied gas to Thailand (ca. 75 percent) and Myanmar (ca. 25 
percent) in partnership with Unocal, the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas 
Enterprise (MOGE), and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration & 
Production (PTT-EP).128 With an upfront investment estimated at $1 billion, the 
production started in 1998.129 (Nonetheless, Total’s activities pale in comparison 
with investment from Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, and Singaporean extractive 
industries). These business activities prompted the French government to reject 
the imposition of commercial sanctions against Myanmar during the nineties, 
although it caused some embarrassment to a nation that takes its pride in having 
‘invented’ the notion of universal human rights in 1789.130 France has maintained 
its presence in Myanmar with a small office of the Alliance Française in Yangon. 
Diplomatically, France has officially supported a ‘critical engagement’ 
strategy.131 French foreign policy had been low-key until Bernard Kouchner 
became foreign minister in May 2007. The former human rights activist 
personally took the lead on the issue of Myanmar. Kouchner and President 
Sarkozy are the only French officials who have met representatives of the 
Myanma opposition (Dr. Sein Win).132 Kouchner argued that the UNSC should 
apply the Responsibility to Protect during the Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Kouchner 
also claimed sanctions were ‘useless’, and criticised the lack of European 
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openness towards the SPDC.133 His successors have continued a principled 
course since November 2010. 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of bilateral trade between Myanmar and 
France. It shows that, despite Total’s investments, Myanmar’s trade with France 
is relatively less significant than with Germany and the UK. It has been volatile 
since 1993. 
 
Figure 3: Trade Myanmar-France, 1980-2010 in million $ (annual values) 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
 
4.2.3. The European Commission  
The European Commission favours a flexible approach to Myanmar in order to 
strengthen basic human rights in the country, as well as to enhance the EU’s 
relevance as an actor of international relations.134 It tends to view categorical 
opposition to the regime as leading to a stalemate which the EU cannot sustain 
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successfully. Commission officials subscribed to the view that, given the 
imbalance of strength between the opposition and the regime, it is improbable 
that the SPDC would ever recognise the 1990 elections.135 A policy of categorical 
opposition to the regime therefore does not constructively promote national 
reconciliation in the country. Such a policy does not provide the EU with a 
sufficient margin of manoeuvre to effectively influence the political and 
humanitarian situation.136  
The Commission has proposed various ways to craft a more flexible common 
policy. Since 2003, it has organised a Burma/Myanmar Day conference every 
second year, where epistemic communities exchange views on EU policy on the 
issue. The Commission’s strategy of critical engagement with the regime was 
introduced explicitly during its 2005 conference. An independent report 
sponsored by the Commission stated inter alia that the EU’s focus on supporting 
the NLD was reductive, and that the sanctions strategy obscured alternative 
avenues for seeking change in Myanmar.137  
Diplomats in the Council Secretariat tend to subscribe to the Commission’s 
view that a categorical confrontation with the SPDC is unlikely to alter the power 
imbalances in Myanmar’s domestic politics. A Council Secretariat representative 
privately complained that the common foreign policy was ‘paralysed’ partly due to 
refusals by principled member states to experiment with alternative policies; 
accordingly, the European policy was designed to reassure policy-makers and 
their publics that they actively ‘do something’ for democracy.138 
 
4.2.4. Non-State Actors  
In contrast with other non-state actors, the Brussels-based International Crisis 
Group (ICG) speaks for a more flexible policy. It contends that sanctions are 
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counter-productive.139 The UK-based association Network Myanmar, too, is 
openly critical of sanctions.140 Humanitarian NGOs (who operate in the country to 
deliver humanitarian assistance) plead for an increase in assistance, especially 
to people struggling to meet their basic needs. Humanitarian NGOs usually have 
less resonance in the European public than campaigners. 
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Summary 
Drawing upon a Foreign Policy Analysis framework, the chapter has delivered 
a contextual overview of the main structures and actors that contribute to shaping 
EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. Three structural factors influence the 
making of EU foreign policy. First, the likely perception of Myanmar as a state 
lacking in strategic weight may induce the EU to scale up sanctions, since the 
material costs of severing relations with Myanmar were relatively low.  
Second, the prominence of Myanmar’s political opposition in the foreign policy 
debate could further orientate EU policy. However, there is an important chasm 
between Western and Asian approaches to Myanmar, particularly with the 
regional group ASEAN. The engagement policy of Myanmar’s neighbours is 
likely to affect the effectiveness of EU foreign policy measures.  
Third, EU policy objectives are mainly focused on securing ASSK’s release 
from house arrest and enabling the NLD to participate in an open and democratic 
government. The absence of straightforward benchmarks to achieve the 
objective of ‘national reconciliation’ could leave the EU some room for 
manoeuvre to negotiate with Myanmar’s government on sanctions and 
incentives. The vagueness of policy objectives could also create some 
misunderstanding on the policy course effectively charted by the EU.  
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Finally, the actors of EU foreign policy are on the whole divided between those 
defending a principled stance, from those upholding a flexible approach to the 
SPDC. Advocates of a principled approach focus on a foreign policy that 
supports the democratic opposition, embodied by the NLD. Partisans of a flexible 
approach are more willing to negotiate with the military government. 
 
5.2. Chronological Analysis of EU Foreign Policy towards Myanmar  
Building upon this contextual analysis, the next three chapters deliver a 
chronological study of EU foreign policy. This investigation is guided by the 
following questions:  
- Which developments prompted the EU to adopt new measures? 
Conversely, to which important developments did the EU not react? 
- What measures did the EU consequently decide upon?  
- What was the impact of the EU’s measures on Myanmar’s behaviour?  
- Accordingly, which competing hypothesis best explains EU foreign policy 
decisions towards Myanmar? 
The empirical material is organised around three phases of EU policy, which 
are punctuated by ASSK’s successive releases from house arrest and 
subsequent re-arrests between 1988 and 1995; 1996 and 2003; 2004 and 2010. 
Indeed, ASSK was first arrested in 1988; released in 1995; arrested in 2000; 
released in 2002; arrested in 2003; and finally released in 2010. These recurring 
events embody important caesuras in the evolution of EU strategy, because 
securing ASSK’s release has been one of the EU’s main objectives. These 
developments have therefore contributed to shaping EU foreign policy in what 
can be identified as three distinct periods. 
Moreover, systematically analysing the EU’s reaction to ASSK’s releases and 
arrests shall enable us to test the compliance hypothesis before concluding the 
study of each period. This hypothesis posits that partial compliance by a pariah 
state presents new momentum to revise EU foreign policy, while noncompliance 
leads the EU to scale up restrictions. The EU is thus expected to behave 
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differently whether the SPDC releases ASSK or puts her under house arrest. 
Such chronological analysis also helps to better understand the evolution of EU 
foreign policy over twenty years. If social constructivist approaches are correct, 
EU foreign policy may become more cohesive over the years, as member states 
have been increasingly interacting and successive Treaty reforms have 
progressively enhanced the EU’s institutional machinery.141 
Chapter Four covers EU foreign policy from 1988 until ASSK’s first release 
from house arrest in 1995. From 1990 until 1995, EU foreign policy could be 
characterised as an approach of ‘critical engagement’, where sanctions were 
relatively limited.142 Chapter Five examines EU foreign policy from the adoption 
of the Common Position 96/636/CFSP in 1996, until ASSK’s third arrest in 2003. 
This period is defined by consistently tougher sanctions in support of democracy 
and human rights. Chapter Six is dedicated to the ‘dual approach’ crafted by the 
EU from 2004 until 2010. During this third period, the EU continued to decide 
significant measures despite an important logic of diversity among the member 
states. The case study is finally brought to a close in 2011, after general 
elections were held and ASSK released for a third time in November 2010. This 
three-pronged structure follows the chronological unfolding of political and 
economic events in Myanmar, in the EU, and internationally. Nonetheless, it may 
at times appear judicious to incorporate brief projections on other chapters, when 
the consequences of specific events reach beyond the period covered. 
Each policy decision is analysed in three steps. The analysis shall 
successively examine: significant events shaping EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar, the EU’s reaction to these events (or lack of it), and the general impact 
of the EU’s decision on Myanmar’s behaviour. This impact assessment seeks to 
evaluate whether EU policy met its primary objectives, and thus clarify whether 
the achievement of declared goals motivated the adoption of specific measures. 
An appraisal of relevant hypotheses is weaved into this three-pronged analysis, 
in order to explain why the EU reacted the way it did. The conclusion of each 
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individual chapter summarises key findings, and delivers an overall hypothesis 
assessment. 
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Chapter IV 
The EU and Myanmar until 1995:  
From a Non-existent Relation to ‘Critical Engagement’ 
 
The present chapter lays out the first period of EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar, which spans from the Cold War origins of Myanmar’s relations with 
European countries until Aung San Suu Kyi’s first release from house arrest in 
1995. During this time, the EU acted under its former Treaty mandate. Foreign 
affairs were in their infancy with the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The 
Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht in the mid-nineties provided the EU with a 
more robust political mandate.  
A brief presentation of bilateral Cold War relations between European states 
and Myanmar (then known as Burma) is necessary to understand the historical 
legacies of EU foreign policy.1 Following that, the time span that follows the 
imposition of formal sanctions in 1991 and goes until the adoption of a common 
position in 1996, is labelled ‘critical engagement’ in this thesis. Although the term 
had not been explicitly mentioned by the EU, its use is justified because the UK, 
France, and Germany all referred to it to label their national foreign policy.2 This 
analysis is guided by two main questions:  
- Why did the EU initially adopt sanctions against Myanmar?  
- Subsequently, why did the EU continue the same policy despite the 
occurrence of domestic events in Myanmar that could have led the EU to 
scale its restrictive measures either up or down? 
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In the first section, this chapter lays out Burma’s relations with European 
states during the Cold War. The ensuing section analyses the EU’s reactions to: 
the 1988 uprising; the 1990 elections; and the convening of the National 
Convention. The third section examines the fledgling EU foreign policy during the 
following years. The fourth section explores the EU’s reaction to ASSK’s release 
from house arrest in 1995. In the final section the core findings of the chapter are 
summarised and a hypotheses assessment for this early period is offered. 
 
1. Burma’s Relations with European States under the Cold War 
During the Cold War and particularly under the leadership of General Ne Win 
from 1962 until 1988, Burma maintained a foreign policy of neutrality that stymied 
the influence of outsiders. This policy was partly based on a refusal to take party 
in the confrontation between the Western and Soviet camps. This doctrine, 
labelled the Burmese Way to Socialism under General Ne Win’s rule, implied 
relative autarchy, as well as economic and political isolation. As a consequence, 
Burma remained a marginal trade partner for European states. Bilateral trade 
increased slightly during the Cold War period. The European Community was 
one of Burma’s biggest trading partners in 1988, with 19.2 percent of Burma’s 
official trade (25 percent of Burma’s imports, or $61.9 million, and 9 percent of its 
exports, or $13 million).3 Nonetheless, only two members of the European 
Community had a noteworthy relationship with Burma: the UK and Germany. 
 
1.1. Bilateral Relations with the UK 
From 1948 until 1962, UK was the main provider of economic assistance, 
although Burma opted out of the Commonwealth upon independence.4 Anti-
colonialism animated the Revolutionary Council’s foreign policy. It had estranged 
relations with West-European countries. Burma has been resentful vis-à-vis the 
UK, the colonial power between 1886 and 1948. Formed by a majority of 
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Buddhists and the majority Bama ethnic group, the central government 
denounced links between the British (particularly former British governor of 
Burma Lord Dorman Smith) and secessionist Christian minorities (e.g. Karens5 
and Chins) against Burmese independence. Burmese officials have commonly 
alleged that the assassination of Burma’s national hero in 1947, General Aung 
San, was plotted with connivance from members of the colonial government.6	
Upon seizing power in 1962, General Ne Win strengthened Burma’s neutrality 
and relative self-isolation. Figure 4 shows that, throughout the period, Burma 
represented a marginal trade partner for the UK. Burma’s imports from the UK 
reached their highest point of $75 million in 1981, which still remained a marginal 
share of British total imports. Burma’s exports never exceeded the threshold of 
$26.4 million, reached in 1963. Despite this marginal economic interface, the UK 
maintained some relations with Burma’s military state, notably by conducting 
training sessions for the Burmese navy.  
 
Figure 4: Trade Burma-UK, 1948-1988 in million $ (annual values) 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
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Burma’s official policy of disengagement did not impede General Ne Win from 
maintaining cordial, though low-profile, relations with Western Europe, as well as 
with the communist bloc in the post-1962 period. Almost every year, the General 
used to conduct private trips to Europe, notably to the UK, Germany, and Austria, 
in which government affairs and private businesses were tightly interlinked.7  
General Ne Win enjoyed cordial relations with some members of the royal 
family, notably with Princess Alexandra who invited him to her wedding with 
Angus Ogilvy on 24 April 1963. Queen Elizabeth offered him tea in 1974. He was 
also welcomed to Number 10 Downing Street.8 Lord Mountbatten of Burma 
remained a frequent visitor. Princess Anne and Princess Alexandra also paid 
visits to Burma. 
 
1.2. Bilateral Relations with Germany 
As a non-colonial power in Southeast Asia, West Germany built Burma’s 
confidence and became its closest West-European partner. With a total of DM 
1.15 billion in development aid between 1956 and 1988, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) was the second biggest donor of development aid to Burma 
during the Cold War, after Japan.9 	
The relationship was low profile. It was only in 1968 that General Ne Win 
officially visited West Germany, although he used to sojourn in the country 
privately nearly every year. In 1986, President General San Yu officially visited 
West Germany, a visit reciprocated in 1987 by Bundespräsident von Weizsäcker.  
The rationale behind the West German-Burmese relationship was, on the one 
hand, Burma’s need for the FRG’s development aid, which came in the form of 
financial assistance and technical cooperation. On the other hand, the FRG 
sought diplomatic recognition from Burma, as Bonn competed with East 
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Germany for diplomatic recognition worldwide. According to the Hallstein 
Doctrine (1955-1969), the FRG would sever diplomatic ties with any country that 
recognised the German Democratic Republic (GDR). By awarding substantial 
development aid, West Germany ensured that Burma never opened an embassy 
in East Berlin, despite ideological solidarity between both socialist states. 
Drawing upon neo-realism, we can understand the FRG’s foreign policy as 
determined by the bipolar structure of the international system.10 
The FRG’s development aid was also motivated by the vested interests of an 
industrial company, Fritz Werner GmbH, with an expertise in light weaponry 
production.11 Fritz Werner enjoyed privileged links to the West German 
government – it was a state-owned company until 1992 – as well as to the 
Burmese leaders. General Ne Win maintained friendly personal relations with 
Fritz Werner’s Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Meyer. He used to privately visit Fritz 
Werner’s headquarters in the small city of Geisenheim during his yearly trips to 
Western Europe. Fritz Werner was the only Western enterprise allowed to 
operate in Burma during the socialist period between 1962 and 1988.12 
Despite these personal relationships, German diplomats and businessmen 
were not able to persuade the Burmese authorities to relax their doctrine of 
relative self-sufficiency and socialism. In 1965, the FRG’s embassy had to close 
its Goethe-Institut owing to anti-Western policies. It has never been re-opened 
(unlike the USA, UK, or France, who operated their cultural institutes within their 
respective embassies until the government eventually abandoned this 
xenophobic policy).13 In 1968, the FRG sponsored a project aimed at extracting 
and refining gas in the Martaban Golf. The Germans stated their intentions to 
exploit the field, but Burma never allowed the federal institute Bundesanstalt für 
Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) and the company Deminex to extract 
gas from these offshore fields. Fear of foreign intrusion prevailed over economic 
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incentives.14 Hence, Burma’s independent policy led European policy-makers to 
perceive the regime’s behaviour as impervious to their demands.15  
Figure 5 indicates that Burma represented a marginal trade partner for the 
FRG despite the commercial interests of Fritz Werner. Burma’s imports from 
Germany peaked in 1980 at $58 million. Its exports were highest in 1981 at $16.6 
million. These amounts constituted a marginal share of the FRG’s total trade. 
Bilateral trade with the GDR was almost insignificant.  
 
Figure 5: Trade Burma-Germany, 1948-1988 in million $ (annual values) 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
*** 
Given the history of Burma’s relations with Western Europe, European policy-
makers tended to believe, during and in the aftermath of the Cold War, that it was 
difficult to influence the behaviour of this self-isolated state. From a European 
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perspective, the ‘interaction capacity’16 between European countries and Burma 
was very low. With the exception of West Germany, European states were not 
allowed to significantly invest in Burma under socialist rule. West Germany was 
permitted to do so but within the rigid boundaries of Burma’s policy of neutrality. 
By the end of the General Ne Win era, the government relied on development 
aid from foreign countries, especially Japan and the FRG, as well as international 
organisations. Owing to its anaemic economy, Burma was reduced to the status 
of LDC in 1987, a specific UN category for low-income countries that allows for 
increased multilateral assistance. Nonetheless, the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended cooperation with Burma later 
during the same year, because there was a lack of governmental transparency 
when using multilateral funds.17 In the last months of his reign, General Ne Win 
attempted to address his country’s economic woes, which precipitated the 
‘8.8.88’ demonstrations.18 
 
2. Upheavals in Myanmar’s Domestic Politics 
2.1. 1988 Uprising 
2.1.1. Events in Myanmar 
The dire state of Myanmar’s economy worked as a catalyst for upheaval. 
Embedded in a quasi-totalitarian political system, the official doctrine of the 
Burmese Way to Socialism led to economic bankruptcy.19 In September 1987, 
25, 35 and 75 Kyats notes were declared illegal and no compensation was paid 
for their cancellation. In combination with other economic reforms such as the 
                                                 
16 Buzan and Little 2000: 80. 
17 Steinberg 2000: 296. 
18 The current official name ‘Myanmar’ will be used from now on to emphasise that EU-Myanmar 
relations enter in a new phase with the downfall of Ne Win’s regime. Burma officially changed its 
name to Myanmar in 1989. 
19 Saw Myat (2008: 37ff.) defines Myanmar under Ne Win as a ‘sultanic regime’. A sultanic 
regime corresponds to a specific type of quasi-totalitarian state, where the state authority is 
exclusively concentrated in the hands of a single person (see also: Stephan and Linz 1996: 66-
83). 
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liberalisation of food prices, this measure provoked hyperinflation: nominal rice 
prices soared three times in a few months.20 Figure 6 shows that GDP growth 
collapsed between 1986 and 1988. In 1988, GDP per capita growth reached its 
lowest point with -12.82 percent. 
 
Figure 6: Myanmar’s GDP Growth Rates, 1961-2006 
 
Source: World Bank (2011): WDI.21 
 
The economic crisis induced an overwhelming popular outburst in the capital 
Yangon and other major cities. Resentments against the state-controlled and 
single party Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) intensified after student 
Phone Maw’s death on 13 March 1988. People went to the streets and called for 
political reforms. Confronted with mounting pressure for change, General Ne Win 
unexpectedly resigned from his positions as President and BSPP chairman on 23 
July 1988, and promised multi-party elections.22 
Instead of calming the protests, General Ne Win’s resignation provoked 
heightened anti-government demonstrations, which culminated on 8 August 
                                                 
20 Steinberg 2001a: 4ff. 
21 Original figure by: Collignon 1997: 5. 
22 Saw Myat 2008: 88ff. 
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1988. The political opposition retrospectively dubbed the student-led uprising 
‘8.8.88’. General Ne Win finally decided to quell the unrest. Over 3,000 people 
were killed in the five days following the demonstrations.23 The total number of 
casualties from August until September 1988 remains disputed, but could have 
amounted to 5,000 (or even more).24 
Opposition groups nonetheless continued to proliferate. ASSK entered the 
political arena by addressing a crowd on 26 August 1988 in front of the 
Shwedagon Pagoda, a mythical monument and a powerful symbol of Buddhist 
culture. After a series of shuffles within the tottering transitional government, a 
clique of Generals staged a coup on 18 September 1988. They established the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which snuffed out the 
demonstrations. 
Although ASSK did not actively take part in the 8.8.88 movement, she swiftly 
emerged as an essential leader in Myanmar’s opposition politics. The early 
people-power movement was disordered and original student leaders had 
enjoined her to act as their figurehead.25 She later co-founded the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) on 27 September 1988, but only after SLORC had 
already come to power. Her party became paralysed soon after its creation due 
to relentless harassment. 
Between 1988 and 1989, SLORC imprisoned student activists and artists who 
had galvanised the people-power movement, as well as NLD secretary general 
ASSK and its vice-chairman Tin Oo. Other students fled from Yangon to the 
Thai-Myanma and Indo-Myanma borders after student unions were persecuted. 
In November, they created the All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF), the 
first student army in the world.26 The ABSDF joined the ranks of ethnic 
insurgencies (e.g. Karen) against the central government. ASSK and NLD 
                                                 
23 Steinberg 2001a: 4-8; Egreteau 2010: 41. 
24 Lintner 1990: Chapter IV. 
25 Interview 49. 
26 Saw Myat 2008: 75. 
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distanced themselves from these armed movements, by staying in urban centres 
and promoting peaceful resistance. Nonetheless, ASSK was also put under 
house arrest on 20 July 1989. At that time, maintenance of martial law allowed 
for detention without charge of trial for a period of up to three years. 
Following the demonetisation of November 1987, Burmese expatriates and 
exiles had already held demonstrations outside embassies in the UK, Germany 
and USA. As dissidents escaped Myanmar in the aftermath of the reassumption 
of power by the military in September 1988, campaigning organisations started to 
spring up throughout Western countries.27 This movement became the 
Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB). With member 
organisations in Germany, the UK, and the USA, the CRDB initially appeared to 
be the main focus of overseas activism and was admitted into the larger 
opposition group the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB).  
By 1991, internal rifts and squabbles had divided the CRDB in several 
countries. As the CRDB split, it began to be eclipsed by new groups formed by 
recently exiled veterans of the 1988 movement and solidarity NGOs set up by 
foreign supporters (like the British charity Prospect Burma, which was founded in 
1989).28 International human rights organisations started to produce reports 
critical of Myanmar’s human rights records.29 In 1990, Amnesty International 
launched a campaign, which was marked by the publication of reports in 
November of that year.30  
 
2.1.2. The European Community’s Reaction 
Prior to 8.8.88, there was no interface between the European Community (EC) 
and Myanmar. A Commission delegation had visited Yangon in 1988 with a view 
                                                 
27 IDEA 2001: 133, footnote 192. 
28 Ibid.: 164. 
29 Human Rights Watch 1991; 1993; 1995. 
30 Amnesty International 1990a; 1990b. See also: IDEA 2001: 164. 
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to cementing a future cooperation agreement. The SLORC’s putsch discouraged 
these early attempts.31 
In the absence of an already established common policy towards Myanmar, 
the European Community did not formally take specific measures in reaction to 
the 1988 events. The official response was limited to rhetoric. The Community 
and its member states adopted statements condemning the government’s human 
rights abuses.32 Measures taken unilaterally by the member states were not 
formally coordinated at the Community level until 1991. Nevertheless, member 
states decided, on 28 September 1988, to suspend bilateral development 
assistance.33 This was yet not a statutory measure.  
On 2 January 1989, the resident ambassadors from the United States, EC 
member countries, and Japan, left Yangon to avoid attending a national 
reception on 4 January in celebration of Myanmar's Independence Day.34 This 
first diplomatic boycott did not reflect a common European policy; it only involved 
the four European states who had an embassy in Yangon. The resident 
ambassadors intended to show their disapproval of the human rights abuses 
committed by the national authorities.  
On the issue of cooperation, the picture was mixed. France had suspended 
the delivery of diesel engines to Yangon when the political upheaval broke out.35 
The FRG, Myanmar’s second bilateral donor, unilaterally restrained development 
cooperation. In December 1988, Berlin froze all new development aid, and 
suspended an outstanding budget line of DM 50 million that had not yet been 
disbursed.36 The Bundestag reinforced the government’s decision by voting for a 
                                                 
31 European Commission 1988: Bull. 7/8: 2.2.38.; Khaliq 2008: 207. 
32 European Commission 1988: Bull. 7/8: 2.4.7.; Ibid. 1988: Bull. 7/8: 2.4.4. quoted in: Khaliq 
2008: 90. 
33 Frittin and Swanström 2010a: 1; Soe Myint Aung 2003. 
34 Washington Post, 12 January 1989, quoted in: Peterson Institute for International Economics 
2006. 
35 Camroux and Egreteau 2010: 271. 
36 Revel 2008: 32. 
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motion to cancel all new funds in response to the 1988 turmoil.37 This change in 
West Germany’s foreign policy represents a ‘problem/goal change’ according to 
David Hall’s terminology.38 
The US cancelled all arms sales and assistance with the exception of 
humanitarian aid on 22 September 1988. Drawing upon the bandwagoning 
hypothesis, it is striking that the European member states informally decided to 
suspend European development assistance to Burma on 28 September 1988, or 
only six days after the US imposed analogous penalties. However, there is no 
evidence of direct US pressure on the European Community to follow suit to its 
policy. In any case, European restrictions were non-statutory. 
On 14 April 1989, the US suspended Myanmar’s eligibility under its General 
System of Preferences (GSP). The EU did not immediately emulate this 
measure, since member states had first delayed the imposition of statutory 
sanctions. It is noteworthy that only some individual European states, like the 
FRG, decided statutory sanctions in the aftermath of the 1988 events.39  
Since the EC did not impose statutory sanctions despite gross human rights 
violations in Myanmar, the compliance hypothesis does not pass its first test. 
Only single member states unilaterally reacted to these events, the EC did not 
formally act as a whole. It is only in 1990 that the EU was to react, and in that 
case, to SLORC’s decision not to honour the 1990 election results. 
This lack of resolve seems best explained by neo-realism. The bipolar 
structure of the international system between US and Soviet powers was 
constraining the space for the European Community to act decisively as an actor 
in its international relations. Human rights were explicitly recognised as an 
important concern of the European Community, but European member states did 
not have the institutional capacity to take stringent measures in their defence. 
While the European Political Cooperation (EPC) had a political finalité from the 
                                                 
37 Interview 21. 
38 Hall 1993: 279. 
39 S. Jones 2007: 112. 
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outset, a formal political mandate came only after the end of the Cold War with 
the enforcement of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam (in 1993 and 
1997). In 1988, the then European Community had no proper mandate to act.40 
From a neo-realist perspective, the bipolar structure of the international system 
considerably hindered the construction of a full-fledged common defence and 
foreign policy. It made impossible the development of common European 
institutions with a mandate to act more resolutely.41 
In sum, the 1988 uprising represents a watershed in the history of European 
relations with Myanmar, although it did not directly trigger effective policy 
measures from the EU. The suppression of the people’s outbreak crystallised the 
positions held by the key actors of Myanmar’s domestic politics (e.g. the 
SLORC’s takeover; the emergence of ASSK as charismatic opposition leader) for 
the next twenty years to come. Later EU foreign policy has been determined by 
the dynamics borne out of the 1988 upheaval, although the EU first limited its 
reaction to declaratory diplomacy.42  
 
2.2. 1990 Elections 
2.2.1. Myanmar’s Elections and National Convention 
On 27 May 1990, SLORC held multi-party elections for the first time since the 
military had seized power in 1962. They were supposed to lead to the multi-party 
system promised by General Ne Win when he resigned as head of state in July 
1988. The elections lacked clarity of purpose. SLORC gave some indication that 
they would bring about a new government, but also stated that an assembly was 
needed to draft a new Constitution, since the 1974 Constitution had been 
                                                 
40 Hristov (2009: 108-9) also attributed this lack of formal reaction by the European Community to 
the EPC’s inchoate development as an institution making multilateral foreign policy. 
41 Posen 2004; and 2006: 146-196. 
42 European Commission 1988: Bull. 7/8: 2.2.38.; Ibid. 1988: Bull. 7/8: 2.4.7.; Ibid. 1988: 7/8 Bull.: 
2.4.4. quoted in: Khaliq 2008: 90. 
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suspended in 1988.43 ASSK, in an interview with Asiaweek, said that the first task 
of the new assembly would be to draft a Constitution.44 
In contrast to negative views prior to the poll, the EC considered the 1990 
election result as generally free and fair, mainly because the opposition won 
them.45 This judgement, however, is contestable, as results are not necessarily 
the best indicator of an election’s fairness.46 For three reasons there was ground 
to dispute the election’s conformity with international standards:  
- Major opposition parties were disbanded and not allowed to participate, like 
the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) founded by student leader 
Moe Thee Zun in 1988. After SLORC took over, leaders of the 8.8.88. 
political movement had to flee the country or be arrested;  
- In about 20 percent of the territory – mostly in ethnic areas – no poll was 
held as a result of armed conflict and insecurity; and  
- ASSK and other opposition leaders were refused participation.  
ASSK was at first allowed to contest the elections by the electoral commission. 
It is only after a member of the main competing party – the National Unity Party 
(NUP) – appealed twice against her candidature that she was found ineligible. 
The decision was taken on the following grounds: she was said to owe allegiance 
to the Queen of England, being the wife of a British subject, she had her 
permanent address in Oxford rather than Myanmar, and a suspect of terrorism 
had been arrested on her premises.47 
The government openly published the election results. NLD won 392 out of 
485 seats (nearly 60 percent of the votes and 80 percent of the seats), whereas 
the NUP won 10 seats. SLORC had not formally backed NUP, but may have 
hoped that pro-establishment NUP would secure a majority. The 1990 vote was 
                                                 
43 R. Taylor 2008; Tonkin April 2007. 
44 Tonkin, 26 February 2010; Tonkin, April 2007. 
45 European Commission 1991: Bull. 7/8: 1.4.10; ibid.: 1991: 1/2 Bull.: 1.4.3. 
46 Massicotte 2004: 43ff. 
47 Tonkin, 17 March 2010; Hla Min 2000: 17ff.  
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recognised by many as being against the government and for the political 
opposition embodied by NLD. 48  
After having contested the purpose of the election, the government launched a 
constitution drafting exercise to be drawn by the NC, made up of elected and 
appointed delegates. A Coordinating Commission of the NC first met on 14 April 
1992, which set the six objectives of the NC: 1. Non-disintegration of the Union; 
2. Non-disintegration of national unity; 3. Perpetuation of national sovereignty; 4. 
Promotion of a genuine multiparty democracy; 5. Promotion of the universal 
principles of justice, liberty and equality; 6. Participation by the Defence Services 
in a national political leadership role in the future state.49  
The NLD objected that the NC should not convene until the following 
conditions were met: repeal of martial law, recognition of the 1990 election 
results, and release of all political prisoners. These calls were subsequently 
reiterated by the European Union, which made the NLD’s pleas its own.50 The 
NLD aired its concern that the NC objectives were laid out by the Coordinating 
Commission without consulting the people’s representatives. It disagreed with 
specific goals, such as the NC’s sixth objective of maintaining the army’s 
participation in government.51 
The SLORC denied that they ignored the result, asserting that it was the 
election winners who attempted to seize power prematurely before a constitution 
had been approved in a national referendum. The main argument was that, in the 
absence of a Constitution, the NLD had no legal mandate to govern. An unofficial 
motivation was the SLORC’s belief that a ruling NLD would publicly try army 
officers and informers suspected of involvement in repressing the opposition. In 
the aftermath of the 1990 election, NLD spokesman Kyi Maung had triumphally 
speculated that some members of the SLORC (like MI-head General Khin Nyunt) 
                                                 
48 Michael Aris’ comments, in: Aung San Suu Kyi 1991: xxiv; Saw Myat 2008: 93ff. 
49 Irrawaddy, March 2004. 
50 Interview 6. 
51 Irrawaddy, March 2004. 
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‘might reasonably feel themselves pretty insecure [for having lost the election] 
[…]: In actual fact, how many Germans stood trial at Nuremberg?’52 
The NC’s 702 delegates were nominated on 10 July 1992. Among them, only 
99 elected Members of Parliament were invited to attend. According to the 
opposition magazine Irrawaddy, 70 percent of the delegates were township level 
officials handpicked by the military.53 The NLD initially took part in the NC, 
although it was critical of the entire process.  
The government regularly suspended the NC because of diverse issues, 
notably disagreements with ethnic representatives over the federal structure of 
the new state.54 Hence, the NC convened irregularly from January 1993 until its 
finalisation fifteen years later in April 2007. It was suspended between 1996 and 
2004.55 It was only on 11 March 2010 that the election result from 1990 was 
officially voided in the run-up to the 2010 general elections.56 
 
2.2.2. The European Reaction to the 1990 Elections 
The SLORC’s refusal to follow up on the result of the 1990 elections marks a 
turning point in the EC’s relations with Myanmar. The EC welcomed the holding 
of free and fair elections, but rebuked the SLORC’s decision to ignore their 
result.57 Démarches and statements adopted by the member states became 
more exasperated as it became evident that the election result would remain 
without practical consequences.58  
                                                 
52 Asiaweek, 13 July 1990: 28. 
53 Irrawaddy, March 2004. 
54 Saw Myat 2008: 118. 
55 Wintle 2007: 420. To define the historical evolution of Myanmar’s politics more accurately, two 
National Conventions could be distinguished – one which started in 1993 and aborted in 1996, 
and another one which was initiated in 2004 and eventually led to the 2010 election. 
56 Reuters, March 2010; interview 46. 
57 European Commission 1991: 1/2 Bull.: 1.4.3. 
58 European Commission 1990: Bull. 6: 1.5.2; ibid.: 1990: Bull. 6: 1.5.10; ibid.: 1991: Bull. 1/2: 
1.4.3; ibid.: 1991: Bull. 5: 1.4.10. 
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The European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of 
Thought to ASSK in 1990. ASSK was the fourth laureate of this prestigious 
award, following Anatoli Marchenko, Nelson Mandela, and Alexander Dubček. 
British MEPs who had met with ASSK’s husband Dr. Michael Aris helped to 
convince the European Parliament to attribute this award to her, although she 
had started her political career only two years previously.59 
The member states of the Community adopted a series of coordinated 
measures aiming at supporting democracy and human rights in Myanmar. In 
conformity with the compliance hypothesis, the member states decided on 
negative measures to try to compel Myanmar to honour the result of the 1990 
election. Despite controversy over the elections’ purpose, and that they led to a 
constitutional process, the member states took sides with the domestic 
opposition. The Council’s involvement could be related to their general statement 
that the respect of human rights in third countries was a legitimate component of 
EU foreign policy: 
The different ways of expressing concern about violations of rights, as well as 
requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference in 
the internal affairs of a state, and constitute an important and legitimate part of their 
[EU member states] dialogue with third countries.60 
EU member states banned the sale of military equipment to Myanmar in 1990 
(but not its shipment).61 The decision was confirmed by a Declaration of the 
General Affairs Council on 29 July 1991.62 Military cooperation was informally 
downgraded by expelling military staff from Myanmar’s diplomatic missions in 
                                                 
59 Interview 37.  
60 Council of the EU, 28 and 29 June 1991: Declaration. For other declarations on the European 
commitment to defend human rights and democracy, see: Council of the EU: Declaration of 21 
July 1986; ibid.: Declaration of 14 December 1973; European Commission: Communication of 25 
March 1991. 
61 The official document could not be retrieved, but the secondary literature mentions 1990 as the 
year when the arms embargo was informally imposed (Hristov 2009: 109; Kramer 2010: 18; 
SIPRI website October 2011). 
62 European Commission 1991: Bull. 7/8: 1.4.10. 
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Europe and withdrawing the member states military attachés from Myanmar.63 
This measure was to be formally enshrined five years later with Common 
Position 1996/635/CFSP. Deploring the decision to ignore the elections results, 
the twelve member states of the Community issued statements in November 
1991 on the detention of ASSK.64 The Community and its member states decided 
to coordinate their action and suspend all non-humanitarian development aid, so 
that the possible delivery of assistance was substantially curtailed.65 The 
Community’s action was strengthened by parallel restrictions placed by some 
member states. Germany unilaterally cancelled all training of military officers, 
which had nonetheless continued to take place on a yearly basis hitherto.66  
Existing business interests did not dissuade Germany from imposing sanctions 
that carried some economic cost. The restrictions Germany unilaterally imposed 
on bilateral cooperation with Myanmar brought the expansion of German 
business interests in the country to a standstill, since Fritz Werner’s businesses 
were partly financed by German development funds. Having imposed unilateral 
penalties, Germany had relatively little economic interest in Myanmar after 1989. 
This empirical finding disconfirms claims by campaigners and Myanma 
opposition media that the flexible policy of particular EU member states (and 
particularly of Germany) was a mercantilist policy driven by economic interests.67 
Other EU members continued to suspend development aid as a non-statutory 
measure. 
The decision not to honour the 1990 election increased the international 
awareness of the Myanmar issue. It created momentum for the formation of a 
number of single-issue NGOs in Europe and the US. The NLD founded an exile 
branch located in England in the beginning of the nineties. The Burma Action 
Group UK was founded in 1991. Later revamped as Burma Campaign UK, it 
                                                 
63 Eriksson 2005: 11. 
64 European Commission 1991: Bull. 11: 1.4.14. 
65 Ibid.: Bull 1/2: 1.4.3. 
66 Revel 2008: 32. 
67 BC UK website 2010, Irrawaddy website 2010, and Democratic Voice of Burma website 2010. 
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sought to intensify the campaign to influence UK foreign policy.68 Burma Center 
Netherlands was founded in 1993 with similar objectives in the Netherlands. In 
addition to the single-issue ‘Burma Bureaux’ that steadily spread throughout 
Europe, many UK-based human rights NGOs promptly pleaded to punish the 
regime: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Global Witness, 
EarthRights International (ERI), and Christian Aid. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence that these pressures effectively influenced the foreign policy of the EU 
or of any of its member states at this early stage of EU-Myanmar relations.  
 
2.2.3. Impact of EU Measures 
The arms embargo, the suspension of assistance, and the withdrawal of 
European military attachés, did not have the intended impact on Myanmar’s 
behaviour. One reason is that these early Community measures remained limited 
in scale. They did not encompass economic restrictions. At the time, the adoption 
of an economic embargo had not yet been proposed.  
The 1990 European arms embargo had a limited impact on Myanmar. Member 
states had never been major suppliers, mostly because of their more expensive 
items they had on offer. The ban on development aid by European donors like 
Germany made the services of European defence companies, such as Fritz 
Werner, even less affordable. Myanmar had diversified its network of suppliers 
and enjoyed military cooperation with other countries, such as China, Russia, 
North Korea, and Israel - and to a lesser extent, India, South Korea, Pakistan, 
Serbia, Ukraine, and, before their entry into the EU, Poland and Slovakia.69 The 
European embargo on arms shipment was introduced only later in 2000, so that 
arms could legally be shipped via European vessels. The export of European 
nonlethal items (e.g. military boots) still took place during the early years of the 
                                                 
68 IDEA 2001: 164. 
69 Interview 47; Camroux and Egreteau 2010: 279; Egreteau and Jagan 2008; Em Marta 1993: 
17. 
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arms embargo.70 However, few European companies were willing to run the 
reputational risk of supporting the military government. The Bundestag alleged 
that Fritz Werner had exported dual-use civilian products, such as gas and 
thermo bottles that could have been used to deliver poison gas.71 Ongoing 
cooperation programmes, including those in the defence sector, were continued 
unabated until the projects expired.72 Myanma military officers were thus trained 
until autumn 1991 in Sonthofen, notably to acquire knowledge of ABC 
weapons.73 
Germany’s ban on assistance may have had significant impact in terms of 
governmental loss of revenues and international exposure. In 1988, Germany’s 
bilateral ODA amounted to $37.1 million; it had reached a peak of $75.3 million in 
1983.74 Germany’s two-decades ban on assistance has certainly had unintended 
negative effect in terms of lost development opportunities, particularly in the 
underfunded sectors of education and health, the transfer of technical know-how, 
and capacity building. 
It has been suggested that international bans on aid, notably by Japan and 
Germany, led the SLORC to open up its economy, in order to diversify sources of 
revenues.75 Nevertheless, suspending development aid did not prompt Myanmar 
to mend its ways on the political scene. ODA has constantly been considered 
with suspicion by a Myanma leadership anxious to prevent foreign meddling into 
the state’s sovereign affairs. Foreign minister Aung Win made a notorious 
statement at the Chilston Park conference of October 1998, concerning 
Myanmar’s categorical refusal of all foreign aid (in this case from the World Bank) 
that would come attached with political strings:  
                                                 
70 Revel 2008: 54ff. 
71 Bundestag, 24 September 1991: Antwort; Bundestag, 23 October 1990: Antwort. 
72 Interview 48. 
73 Bundestag, 14 March 1995: Antwort. 
74 Revel 2008: 17. 
75 Steinberg 2001a; Hashimoto 1988. 
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[…] We welcome any assistance from anywhere that is offered with goodwill and 
sincerity. And we will consider it when it comes. But for us, giving a banana to the 
monkey and then asking it to dance is not the way. We are not monkeys.76 
Germany’s ban on development aid was unilaterally decided in December 
1988. It did not implicate the EU. It is only later in 1991 that the ban on 
development aid formally took place in the EU framework. The collective EU ban 
on assistance had a negligible impact on the regime’s behaviour, since Germany, 
the main European donor of aid to Myanmar, had already halted all new 
programmes. 
Withdrawing European military attachés may have yielded a counterproductive 
impact.77 Such symbolic measure did not exert tangible pressure on the SPDC. 
Besides, it cut viable diplomatic channels to a military government that could 
have felt more confident engaging with military counterparts rather than civilians. 
The withdrawal of military attachés also kept European embassies from acquiring 
proper security intelligence. To conclude, despite their commitment to condemn 
human rights violations, European member states faced difficulties to decide 
common foreign policy measures that could influence Myanmar’s behaviour 
effectively. 
 
3. ‘Critical Engagement’ with Myanmar (1991-1996) 
3.1. Economic and Diplomatic Policy 
From 1990 until the adoption of Common Position 96/635/CFSP, EU policy 
was coordinated in a loose legal and institutional framework. This foundation for 
EU policy was initially defined by the measures adopted in 1988 and 1990 and by 
the subsequent Council Declaration of 29 July 1991. This loose framework gave 
the member states ample room for manoeuvre so that they could conduct their 
national foreign policy independently from one another.  
                                                 
76 Irrawaddy, December 1998. 
77 Camroux and Egreteau 2010: 279. 
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The UK, France, and Germany independently called their approach a policy of 
‘critical engagement’, which was eventually placed in a wider European 
framework.78 On the one hand, these principles entailed condemnation of 
Myanmar’s behaviour in diplomatic statements as well as limited bans on 
targeted sectors, such as an arms embargo and restrictions on assistance. On 
the other hand, the approach did not proscribe national trade and foreign 
investment in sectors not related to the defence industry. This policy could hence 
be interpreted as concealing material interests of the largest member states, who 
were eager not to impose economic sanctions on an economy newly opening to 
foreign investment.79 
Some European states had a vested interest in maintaining friendly economic 
relations with Myanmar, as a country that had recently opened its borders to 
foreign investors. In 1992-1993, the official growth rate published by the 
government reached 10 percent.80 Official figures showed 6 percent growth in 
1994 and 8.2 percent in 1995.81 The French ambassador from 1994 until 1999, 
Bernard Pottier, characterised the period from 1994-1996 as ‘euphoric’ for 
foreign investors.82  
The French company Total started to invest in the Yadana offshore gas field 
in 1991 (investment evaluated at $1 billion in 2008).83 The French government 
supported this investment in 1994 by guaranteeing it under the COFACE scheme 
(Compagnie Française d’Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur).84 This 
                                                 
78 House of Commons, 7 February 1996: Question; Assemblée Nationale, 25 April 2000: Answer; 
Federal Government of Germany, 9 March 2004: Antwort. Interpretation of the texts confirmed 
during interview 6. 
79 Youngs 2001: 141ff. 
80 IDEA 2001: 139. These numbers are indicative, for official statistics are known for their lack of 
reliability.  
81 Ibid.; Hadar 1998; Economist Intelligence Unit 1995. The data published by the WB (2011) 
differs from these statistics, as figure 6 illustrates. 
82 Pottier 1999. 
83 Offshore-Technology website 2010. 
84 Assemblée Nationale, 25 April 2000: Answer. 
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insurance scheme has later dissuaded the French government from imposing an 
investment ban on European companies operating in Myanmar.85  
French diplomacy, however, was not limited to mercantilism. In 1992, France 
drafted a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission, which triggered the 
nomination of a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar.86 The resolution was sponsored by all EC member states. The Human 
Rights Rapporteur is still in place at the time of writing. This resolution was 
castigated by the Myanmar representative Kyaw Win as ‘a political resolution 
through and through’.87  
In this early period, initiatives by smaller member states, and the European 
Parliament, were rebutted or ineffective. In 1992, the European Parliament 
condemned the military government and quoted a report from the Swiss 
International Centre for the Dignity of Children, which claimed that 40,000 
Myanma women and children had been sent to Thailand for prostitution.88 In 
early December 1993, the Netherlands expressed its support for a ‘critical 
engagement’ approach, whereby the EU would tentatively step up pressure on 
the regime, while at the same time increasing humanitarian aid, and offering 
support to the NLD.89 Copenhagen supported the Netherlands’ proposal to 
strengthen the arms embargo by extending it to the shipment of weapons.90 
Nonetheless, the measures were not adopted. The EU finally applied these 
measures only in 2000, when the UK – a big member state – issued a similar 
proposal. This inability of small member states and the European Parliament to 
effectively influence EU foreign policy backs up the large member states 
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86 IDEA 2001: 147; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Resolution 1992/58 of 3 March 
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87 UN Economic and Social Council, 17 July 1992: Statement. 
88 Hristov 2009: 111. 
89 Ibid.: 112; Kramer 2009: 19. 
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hypothesis, which contends that only big member states decide EU foreign 
policy. 
Some member states pushed for critical engagement. In February 1994, the 
Greek Presidency prepared a synopsis paper, stating that Greece regretted the 
Myanma government’s tight control of the NC. Nevertheless, it welcomed the 
lifting of martial law, the re-opening of universities, the release of 1,600 prisoners 
of conscience, and ceasefire negotiations with the three main ethnic insurgent 
groups (Karenni, Mon, and Karen).91 In April 1994, Athens identified nine points 
of action for an EU strategy of critical engagement.92 The review was criticised by 
NGOs, claiming that European commercial interests above all underpinned the 
plea for a new policy of ‘critical dialogue’.93 The timing of the review, which 
coincided with the July 1994 EU–ASEAN ministerial meeting, could give 
credence to such claims, although there is no empirical evidence to back them 
up. In-line with the US policy review, which took place at the same time, the EU 
came up with the following demands: 
- the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners; 
- meaningful dialogue between the SLORC and the NLD; 
- free access to Burma by foreign IDOs; 
- the liberalization of the economy; and 
- progress on the creation of democratic institutions.94 
With the exception of ASSK’s release, these ‘benchmarks’ were rather hazy. It 
would prove difficult to ascertain when they have effectively been reached. 
In addition to Greece, the only big member state to effectively advocate for 
diplomatic engagement was Germany. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel met with his 
SLORC counterpart Own Gyaw in 1994.95 In comparison with the UK, domestic 
                                                 
91 Ibid.: 113-4. Karen stands for people from the Karen ethnic group (with most Karens residing in 
Myanmar’s Delta and in Yangon, rather than in the Karen state); Karenni stands for the Karenni 
ethic group, which mainly resides in the Kayah state. 
92 Ibid.: 115; Kramer 2009: 20. 
93 IDEA 2001: 166. 
94 Ibid.: 139. 
95 See: Hristov 2009: 115. 
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constituencies play an insignificant role in German foreign policy towards 
Myanmar. Interests groups in Germany (e.g., Burma Bureau e.V.96, AsienHaus in 
Essen) are not as influential as the Burma Campaign in the UK. Beyond sporadic 
surges of attention, public interest in Myanmar is generally lacking.  
In February 1995, the German deputy foreign minister travelled to Yangon. 
This visit was criticised as a public relations blunder, for it occurred 
simultaneously with an influx of 10,000 refugees on the Thai-Myanma border. 
This stream of fugitives was caused by the assault of the Myanma army on 
Manerplaw, the Karenni headquarters. The British embassy launched a second 
‘British Week’ promoting trade, which also received bad press by British 
campaigners.97 
The military standoff at the Thai-Myanmar border intensified the UK and the 
Netherlands’ principled positions. The European Parliament issued a resolution 
on 16 February 1995 condemning gross human rights violations. The French 
Presidency issued a statement in March condemning the decision to leave ASSK 
under house arrest, despite previously stated intentions to release her.98   
European human rights groups denounced the ‘critical engagement’ approach 
with the SPDC.99 For them, it struck a poor balance between thriving business 
interests and weak diplomatic opprobrium. They called instead for a ban on 
investment and trade that would impose more sanctions than the US, or at least 
align EU and US policy.  
This ideological connection between European domestic pressures and US 
foreign policy does not necessarily corroborate the bandwagoning hypothesis. 
There is no empirical evidence of direct links between European human rights 
groups and US foreign policy. The Clinton administration faced similar domestic 
                                                 
96 e.V. stands for eingetragener Verein, or  ‘registered association’. 
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pressures, for instance from Senator Mitch McConnell who introduced the Burma 
Freedom and Democracy Act on 29 December 1995, proposing to ban US 
investment, assistance, and travel in Myanmar, as well as to ban imports from 
this country. But the US did not yet adopt these proposed restrictions. 
 
3.2. Humanitarian Aid 
The low level of assistance pledged to Myanmar by the main proponents of 
the ‘critical engagement’ approach gives further credence to the argument that it 
concealed the material interests of the big EU member states. In relation with the 
suspension of ODA, the level of humanitarian aid provided by the EU and its 
member states had fallen to very low levels during the nineties. During this 
period, most EC assistance awarded was allocated to refugees along the Thai-
Myanma borders, and channelled via the UNHCR, and NGOs like the Thai-
Burma Border Consortium (TBBC). This included the sum of 26 million Thai Baht 
in form of food and medicines to 75,000 Karen refugees.100 The UK, which later 
became the biggest donor of humanitarian aid, spent a limited amount of aid 
throughout this period. As exhibited in the table below, the UK did not deploy the 
necessary means to ‘engage’ in Myanmar during this early period. Yearly 
assistance never even reached a million pounds.101 
 
  
                                                 
100 Hristov 2009: 116; Kramer 2009: 20. 
101 House of Commons, 24 October 1996: Debate.  
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Table 2: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 1993/1994-1999/2000 in thousand £ 
 
           Source: UK Governmental Statistical Service (2010). 
 
This lack of allocated aid could at first be explained by Myanmar’s lack of 
compliance with EU demands. In a classical realist perspective, Hans 
Morgenthau argued that aid has practically no impact in countries like Myanmar, 
where government policy (or developmental incompetence) precludes economic 
development. Aid could therefore be cut, since it would not meet its targets. 
A civilization, such as the Burmese, which deprecates success in this world because 
it stands in the way of success in the other world, puts a cultural obstacle in the path 
of industrial development, which foreign aid by itself cannot overcome.102 
[In such countries,] […] foreign aid requires drastic political change as a necessary 
condition for its success. Foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, 
either voluntarily induced from within or brought about through pressure from 
without.103  
A complementary explanation for this reluctance to provide aid is related to 
domestic pressures from campaign and diaspora groups, which became 
increasingly vocal as the political stalemate in Myanmar grew more protracted. 
UN Resident Coordinator Charles Petrie (2003-2007) was to later regret that 
domestic pressures affected donor governments.104 Campaign groups were 
                                                 
102 Morgenthau 1962: 305. 
103 Ibid.: 306. 
104 Petrie 2008: 21. 
Year Assistance
1993/94 195
1994/95 250
1995/96 324
1996/97 314
1997/98 262
1998/99 795
1999/00 559
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afraid of a diversion of aid from the ‘border’ to ‘inside’. Some also argued that by 
alleviating people's suffering, regime change would be delayed.105  
The campaigners’ underlying argument was that assistance did not tackle the 
roots of Myanmar’s woes, which are intrinsically political. ASSK tirelessly 
stressed that ‘good governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian 
problems’.106 Aid could worsen these issues by bolstering the SPDC’s 
stranglehold. The state’s endemic corruption would tend to funnel funds away 
from the people targeted.107 The European Parliament was equally critical of the 
EU’s delivery of assistance programmes in Myanmar.108 Among other MEPs, 
Glenys Kinnock explicitly warned the Commission: 
[…] there would be widespread dismay and consternation if any decision was taken 
to channel EC funds through the line ministries of the military junta in Rangoon.109 
In sum, the EU’s decision to decrease aid partly related to fulfilling secondary 
objectives of sanctions, i.e., meeting domestic demands to punish Myanmar. 
 
3.3. Impact of the Ban on Aid  
The curtailment of aid for twenty-three years has had counterproductive 
effects. Despite the difficulty to accurately quantify the developmental costs 
generated by the absence of European aid projects in Myanmar, this boycott 
could arguably amount to billions of dollars over the years. ODA by only one 
member state (Germany) already amounted to DM1.15 billion (or €588 million) in 
less than a quarter century.110 Hence, an analogously long ban on development 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
106 Aung San Suu Kyi, August 2002: Interview. 
107 These fears stem from various problems linked with lack of visibility. For instance, in July 
2008, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes acknowledged that the 
UN had lost $10 million due to a foreign exchange scam with the Myanma government 
(Buncombe, 30 July 2008). 
108 EP, 6 April 1998: Written Question No. 3172/97. 
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aid by all EU member states may represent a loss of developmental capital that 
is considerably higher than €588 million. This estimate is conservative because it 
does not even take into account: total aid by all EU member states; cancelled aid 
programs that are not quantified as ODA; assistance granted by European non-
state actors (e.g. NGOs, funds, or foundations), which may easily amount to 
millions; and innovative mechanisms for financing development, which usually do 
not figure in ODA statistics.111 
Efficient aid tends to generate multiplier effects for the economy of low income 
countries, by providing mechanisms to catalyse finance, basic services, and 
technical expertise where a fragile government does not have the capacity (or in 
Myanmar’s case, the tradition) to intervene, such as priority social areas.112 For 
example, Myanmar’s social expenditures (health and education combined) fell 
from 5.3 percent of GDP in the financial year 1989/1990 to 3.1 percent in 
1994/1995.113 The situation has not substantially changed over time, since 
Myanmar’s health expenditures amounted only 2.0 percent GDP in 2008.114 Aid 
projects can facilitate access to health care and education facilities, improve food 
security and water sanitation, open up remote areas by building infrastructures, 
and build local capacities.115  
While the EU reduced development aid to insignificant levels, this LDC ranks 
at the bottom of the OECD list of thirty-eight ‘fragile states’.116 In 2007, it received 
only $4 per capita in ODA. In 2009, the country received $8 (while Laos and 
Vietnam got up to 10 times more). Myanmar is off track on most MDG 
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indicators.117 Myanmar is singled out, even among the group of aid recipients 
with a deficient democratic record; not-free countries which receive a share of EU 
aid greater than 50 percent of total aid included in 2004: Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, and 
Zimbabwe.118 This puts Myanma people at a direct disadvantage relative to 
countries in analogous situations of poverty and MDG underperformance.  
Finally, delivery of development assistance has not provided leverage to press 
for political change. Western financial offers were unsuitable carrots to induce a 
behavioural change by a government that is more concerned with security issues 
than human rights and economic development. The ban on development 
assistance constrained aid and engagement in sectoral policy dialogues. It did 
not only affect the military government, as any negative consequence hit the 
population at large.119 
 
4. Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release from House Arrest (1995) 
4.1. Events in Myanmar 
Military leaders held a series of talks with ASSK in September and October 
1994, the first time since she was placed under house arrest.120 On 10 July 1995, 
the SPDC released ASSK, along with other prisoners of conscience. The EU 
welcomed these releases in diplomatic declarations.121  
The SPDC continued to conclude cease-fire agreements with three main 
remaining ethnic insurgent groups (Karenni, Mon and Karen). It signed a MoU 
with the UNHCR on the re-admittance of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh 
                                                 
117 The most important areas concern indicators 2.1: Net enrolment ratio in primary education; 
4.1: Under-five mortality rate; and 7.8: Proportion of population without proper access to water. 
118 European Commission, March 2011: Atlas.  
119 Interview 5. 
120 Soe Myint Aung 2003. 
121 Council of the EU, 13 July 1995: Declaration; EP, 3 July 1995: Resolution. 
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into Myanmar.122 These events shed some light on the political priorities of the 
military leadership at that time: ensuring domestic regional stability was 
important, but not negotiating democracy reform with the opposition. 
To the disappointment of EU policy-makers, talks with NLD did not resume, 
despite ASSK’s release from house arrest. Upon her release, ASSK said at a 
press conference that the choice must be between ‘dialogue or utter devastation’. 
This statement rankled the Generals for years to come.123 The SPDC made few 
additional concessions to the NLD, having already released some 1,600 
prisoners of conscience by February 1994.  
Negotiations between the regime and the NLD stalled over the question of the 
NC, tasked to draft a new constitution. The SPDC initially summoned the NLD to 
join the NC as a condition for starting negotiations. On 28 November 1995, the 
NLD requested a review of the Convention’s working procedures. It sought to 
repeal orders that censored debate and allowed for criminal prosecution of those 
who spoke against the army during the Convention. The NLD also complained 
that there had been no movement whatsoever towards meaningful debate in the 
NC, which was enduring five months of procrastination.124 Authorities rejected 
the NLD’s request out of hand. Therefore, the 86 NLD delegates decided to 
boycott the NC meetings. 
Guided by ASSK, Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, the NLD announced it would walk 
out from the NC on 29 November 1995 (only one day after having requested the 
review).125 This decision owed in fact to ASSK’s determination to boycott the 
NC.126 The party took this decision on the ground that, as the winner of the 1990 
election, it was being sidelined within the NC by the military government and 
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affiliated groups. The NLD also complained about the lack of inclusiveness of the 
process with other groups, and undemocratic rules.  
Tonkin contended that, in conjunction with the legal context, responsibility for 
the stalemate between the government and NLD partially fell on the NLD’s 
principled stance. The NLD abruptly walked out of the NC without seeking a way 
out of the crisis.127 Seen from outside, both parties adamantly maintained their 
incompatible positions: the SPDC refused to share or to cede power, as long as 
the constitutional transition was not firmly ensured; while the NLD urged the 
SPDC to first recognise the 1990 election results that would have given them a 
mandate to govern without military oversight. Following the boycott by the NLD, 
the number of MPs elected in 1990 made up less than 3 percent of all NC 
delegates. For the EU, this lack of representativeness de-legitimised the 
constitution drafting exercise. 
  
4.2. The EU’s Reaction to the NLD’s Withdrawal from the National 
Convention 
As a consequence, the Spanish EU Presidency, in December 1995, 
denounced the NC, claiming it did not reflect democratic principles. It exhorted 
the SLORC to resume dialogue with the NLD.128 The EU, however, did not take 
an official position with regards to the NLD’s decision to boycott the junta-led NC.  
The EU’s position was supported by advocacy groups in Europe, like the 
Burma Campaign UK – with whom it is alleged that ASSK had communicated 
when allowed by the authorities.129 The belief of European public opinion, the 
media, and among policy-makers persisted that diplomatic and economic 
pressure could give rise to political change in Myanmar.130 Some pundits 
asserted that Western pressure secured ASSK from house arrest in 1995 – and 
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also led to talks between her and the SPDC leadership in 1994 and 2001.131 
Western countries were responding to ASSK’s calls for pressure by incrementally 
imposing sanctions against the SPDC. Hence, increased pressure on the military 
government accompanied ASSK’s release. From 1995 until 2000, ASSK faced 
manifold restrictions that aimed to block her from leaving the capital and to travel 
up-country. The EU, France, the UK, the US, and Norway demanded that she be 
allowed to travel freely.132  
Several elements explain why the EU did not review its sanctions policy, 
despite ASSK’s release in 1995. All corroborate the compliance hypothesis. First, 
Brussels seemed wary that ASSK’s release on 10 July 1995 was only a cosmetic 
measure to bring respite from international demands in order to smooth 
Myanmar’s approaching accession to ASEAN.133 The EU refrained from 
repealing negative measures in the expectation that further steps towards 
democratisation would follow. It was generally suspected that the dialogue 
process between the opposition and the government would halt as soon as 
Myanmar entered ASEAN.134  
Second, many EU policy-makers objected that ASEAN should reject 
Myanmar’s membership application owing to its poor human rights record. 
Hence, revising European restrictions would have officially endorsed ASEAN’s 
constructive engagement policy. The EU did not revise its restrictive approach in 
order to compel Myanmar to continue its reforms before joining ASEAN. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the interpretation that Myanmar’s reforms would 
stop after joining ASEAN seems well founded. Myanmar’s bid ultimately 
succeeded in April 1997 amid widespread Western censure. It did not mend its 
ways after it entered ASEAN. The talks with the opposition actually flew in the 
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face of European expectations with the NLD’s withdrawal from the NC. ASSK 
was eventually put under house arrest again in 2000. 
Last but not least, a third reason not to reward ASSK’s release was that, one 
year after her release in 1996, the arrest and demise in prison of the honorary 
consul of a member state outraged the entire EU, as the next chapter shall show. 
Hence, even if the EU had at the time considered rewarding the SPDC for 
releasing ASSK, the dismal treatment of a European representative by the 
Myanma authorities would have cut short proposals to rescind sanctions. 
The compliance hypothesis therefore explains why the EU did not change its 
policy after ASSK’s release in 1995. The absence of policy change mainly owed 
to the junta’s behaviour, which infringed human rights, and hoped to enter 
ASEAN despite its human rights situation. EU policy-makers did not give credit to 
the declared intentions of the SPDC leadership to enter into a meaningful 
dialogue with the political opposition.135  
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Summary 
This chapter demonstrated that, during this early period, EU foreign policy 
represented little more than the lowest common denominator. Apart from 
diplomatic statements, no statutory measure was taken in condemnation of the 
1988 uprising. The EU did not adopt formal measures until 1991, which consisted 
in an arms embargo and a suspension of development aid. In the subsequent 
years, the EU neither scaled up sanctions nor did it offer incentives to the military 
regime. During this period, the EU did not heed the NLD’s calls to enforce 
economic penalties against Myanmar.  
EU sanctions did not constrain the national foreign policy of the member 
states. The EU did not adopt significant economic or diplomatic restrictions that 
would have harmed economic interests of some EU member states, or impeded 
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diplomatic relations with Myanmar. The only diplomatic penalty (i.e. withdrawing 
military attachés) did not threaten European interests, given Myanmar’s lack of 
strategic importance for all European countries. The implicit approach of ‘critical 
engagement’ enabled the member states to conduct their own national foreign 
policy in a European framework that was loose and not constraining. EU foreign 
policy condemned Myanmar’s behaviour, but respected the diverse interests of 
EU member states.  
This finding on the lowest common denominator is corroborated by the 
marginal impact of strictly EU measures. In a unilateral move, Germany had 
already suspended new bilateral assistance programmes in 1988, before its 
formal adoption by the European Community in 1991. These bilateral restrictions 
were significant because Germany was Myanmar’s second biggest provider of 
development aid, in addition to contributing to flourishing business operations by 
supporting the investments of a German state-owned company. By contrast, 
Yangon’s interaction with other EU member states was tenuous. Therefore, EU 
sanctions per se had less economic impact on the SPDC than the bilateral 
measures imposed by Germany almost three years before. On the other hand, 
however, the political opprobrium conveyed by common European sanctions was 
more stringent than restrictive measures by a single European country.  
Sanctions were enforced because of Myanmar’s flagrant human rights 
violations, and the EU’s commitment to condemn such gross abuses. The EU 
continued the same policy for two reasons. Apart from the Netherlands who 
advocated a tighter arms embargo with support from Denmark, EU member 
states did not propose tougher sanctions, notably because some of them 
(notably two big member states) had identified an economic interest in 
Myanmar’s opening economy. On the other hand, persistent human rights 
violations did not allow the EU to scale down the restrictive measures already in 
place.  
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5.2. Assessment of Hypotheses 
5.2.1. Bandwagoning Hypothesis 
The bandwagoning hypothesis offers plausible explanations of the EU’s 
reaction to the events of 1988 and 1990. The lack of reaction to the putsch of 
1988 could be informed by the Cold War context. Human rights and democracy 
did not yet feature at the forefront of Western foreign policy. It is only in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent break-up of 
the Soviet Union that human rights became a more central concern of EU foreign 
policy.136 The bipolar structure of the international system therefore explains why 
the EU did not effectively react to the clampdown on the 1988 uprising.137  
The dramatic shift in the structure of the international system could also 
explain why the EU reacted more robustly to Myanmar’s disregard for the 1990 
election results than to the quelling of the 1988 uprising. The novel unipolar 
structure of the international system around US power induced US allies to more 
aggressively promote America’s values on the global stage, under the banner of 
liberalism.138 By the end of the Cold War, the US and the EU were formally 
committing themselves to the achievement of common goals, notably to: ‘support 
democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and individual peace 
[…]’.139 To that end, they set up an institutional framework for consultation on 
foreign policy issues, which entailed bi-annual consultations between high-level 
American and European decision-makers.140 In any case, the EU adopted 
measures similar to those wielded by the US: first informally in September 
1988141 and then formally in 1991.142  
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However, the EU approach differed noticeably from the US insofar as it did not 
impose economic penalties. Such sanctions would have precluded the expansion 
of European economic interests in a newly opening market. It did not withdraw 
Myanmar from GSP treatment at that point, although the US had already 
implemented this measure on 14 April 1989. The EU therefore bandwagoned 
with the US, but maintained a degree of independence and safeguarded its 
material interests. Consequently, the bandwagoning hypothesis finds broad 
support during the early period covered in this chapter. 
 
5.2.2. Compliance Hypothesis 
The compliance hypothesis was confronted with three tests: the events of 
1988, 1990, and 1995. This hypothesis did not pass the test in dealing with 
events in 1988. The lack of reaction to the clampdown on the 1988 uprising could 
be attributed to other factors, such as the bipolar structure of the international 
system, and, correlatively, the inchoate development of EU foreign policy during 
these early years. European penalties were not very sturdy, notably due to the 
nascent character of EU foreign policy under the initial European Political 
Cooperation framework.  
The compliance hypothesis passed the test for the 1990 elections. It seems 
logical that the EU imposed restrictions on Myanmar in order to punish Yangon 
for its decision not to honour the 1990 election results. The hypothesis also 
passed the test for 1995, when the EU decided not to immediately reward the 
SLORC for allowing ASSK to leave her house arrest, in the expectation that 
further reforms would follow.  
 
5.2.3. Large Member States Hypothesis 
Since this chapter concluded that EU foreign policy was the product of the 
lowest common denominator among the member states, it is not surprising that 
the large member states hypothesis was confirmed throughout the period 
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covered. In-line with predictions of liberal intergovernmentalism, the material 
interests of the UK and France guided EU foreign policy. Paris had vested 
interests to maintain an economic interface with Myanmar, owing to Total’s 
business ventures in Yadana. London was eager to expand business 
opportunities for British companies. Prospects for economic benefits deterred 
these two big member states from proposing economic sanctions on a state 
endowed with natural resources, which was just opening its economy. This policy 
contrasts sharply with the one carried out by Germany, which acted unilaterally 
against its commercial interests by privileging human rights. 
Proposals by smaller member states, like the Netherlands and Greece, were 
not effectively taken into account by the Council. The European Parliament 
distinguished its normative stance by bestowing the Sakharov Prize upon ASSK. 
Nevertheless, the Parliament did not exert a noticeable influence on the very 
measures decided by the Council.  
Domestic groups campaigning on the issue of human rights in Myanmar did 
not play a tangible influence on EU foreign policy either. Existing campaign 
groups (like the CRDB) were not well organised. With the exception of the 
European Parliament, they did not represent their collective interests effectively 
in the EU.143 Consequently, national interest formation in EU member states 
followed the economic objectives of national business groups. 
None of the member states, whether big or small, have altered their national 
interest during the interaction with other stakeholders at the EU level. Despite the 
massive human rights violations committed in 1988 and 1990, the EU had 
relatively little interest in the Myanmar issue. The common policy was limited to 
diplomatic statements and few effective decisions. EU measures did not damage 
the material interests of its member states. The foreign policy could therefore be 
interpreted as the result of lowest common denominator preferences among the 
member states, in-line with predictions of liberal intergovernmentalism.  
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5.2.4. Consensus Hypothesis 
The consensus hypothesis possesses a limited explanatory power during this 
early period, mainly because the consensus among policy-makers on the nature 
of the common foreign policy was not yet firmly established. A consensus could 
hardly emerge without institutional mechanisms for regular policy consultation.  
The only issue area where EU member states built a stronger consensus 
consisted in a boycott of aid delivery and an arms embargo, which they 
unanimously agreed to implement. In the diplomatic sector, member states 
carried out their own national diplomacy. Sanctions were non-existent in the 
economic sector, where EU member states agreed not to change the status quo.  
Despite its restrained explanatory power during this early period, the 
consensus hypothesis did pass a crucial test. The EC’s reaction to a violation of 
democratic principles in 1990 underlines the ideological origins of EU foreign 
policy towards Myanmar. In contrast with the European sluggishness in the 
aftermath of the crackdowns of 1988, the EC imposed negative measures 
because of the decision not to honour the polls results.  
This reaction to the 1990 election supports a proactive cosmopolitan 
interpretation of EU policy. EU member states converged around the necessity to 
support the political opposition. This symbolic solidarity with Myanmar’s pro-
democracy movement is captured by Paul Taylor’s definition of proactive 
cosmopolitanism.144 The EU’s dedicated support of the NLD was justified by a 
shared commitment to liberal values: the NLD defended democracy, human 
rights, and non-violent political activities – unlike other opposition parties like the 
ABSDF, which embraced armed struggle as a means to restore democracy.145 
EU policy-makers recognised a community of inalienable values between the EU 
and the NLD. This community of values was strengthened when the European 
Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize to ASSK. Supporting kin values is a key 
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characteristic of a liberal foreign policy, which reflected positively upon the EU’s 
identity.146 
The sanctions of the early nineties should therefore be set back into the 
broader context of EU foreign policy-making. With the end of the Cold War, the 
then European Economic Community started to orientate its foreign policy 
towards a more firmly grounded defence of human rights in third countries. The 
European Council enunciated in June 1991 that promoting human rights was one 
of the cornerstones of European Cooperation. It pinpointed its particular 
attachment to the principles of parliamentary democracy and the primacy of 
law.147 A consensus was therefore starting to emerge on the use of sanctions as 
tools of democracy promotion by the EU. While economic interests may have 
precluded the adoption of economic sanctions, domestic business lobbies do not 
explain why sanctions were effectively adopted in 1991. This analysis echoes 
Drezner’s refutation of pluralist explanations of the initiation of sanctions: 
The domestic politics approach does not explain the initiation of sanctions attempts; 
senders do not initiate coercion attempts in response to domestic pressure, but 
rather from a rational calculation of the sender’s interests in the international 
system.148 
The next chapter shall now cover EU foreign policy from 1996 until 2003.  
                                                 
146 Doyle 2008: 66. 
147 Council of the EU, 28 and 29 June 1991: Declaration; Ibid.: Resolution of 28 November 1991. 
148 Drezner 1999: 128. 
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Chapter V 
The EU and Myanmar between 1996 and 2003:  
UK Norm Entrepreneurship and European Consensus  
 
The preceding chapter stressed that, between 1988 and 1995, large EU 
member states did not propose to reinforce existing sanctions on Myanmar. This 
policy contrasts sharply with the one adopted during the following period. The EU 
ratcheted up restrictive measures considerably from 1996 until 2003. 
This chapter investigates why the EU scaled up penalties, despite the previous 
policy by some members – mainly large states – to promote their bilateral 
economic interface with Myanmar’s opening economy. Another paradox is that 
the EU tightened penalties after Myanmar had already joined ASEAN in 1997. 
Yangon’s membership in the regional organisation was likely to undermine the 
impact of EU sanctions. 
This chapter covers the period extending from James Nichols’ demise in 1996, 
until ASSK’s third arrest in 2003. Divided in five sections, the chapter first spells 
out how the UK fostered a European consensus on a principled policy. The 
second section probes why this emerging consensus did not include broad-brush 
statutory economic restrictions. The third section explains why the consensus 
was redefined between 1999 and 2002, notably with regard to EU relations with 
ASEAN. The penultimate section examines how the compliance hypothesis is 
challenged by specific events, including the EU’s Troika meetings with Myanmar 
and ASSK’s second release from house arrest in 2002. The final part discusses 
the validity of the four competing hypotheses during the period extending from 
1996 until 2003.  
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1. The UK Builds a Consensus on a Principled EU Foreign Policy  
It was not until 28 October 1996 that the EU articulated a common position, 
although the Community had censured the Myanma government in response to 
its disregard for the 1990 election results.1 It is therefore critical to explain why 
the EU changed its policy in 1996. This new policy course was strengthened 
considerably the next year, after the election of New Labour in the UK.  
 
1.1. The Common Position 1996/635/CFSP 
1.1.1. Demise of James Nichols  
James Leander Nichols was honorary consul representing Denmark, Norway, 
Finland, and a correspondent for Switzerland.2 In April 1996, the Myanma 
authorities sentenced Nichols to three years in jail for the unauthorised use of fax 
machines and telephones. The hidden reason behind this sentence was that, 
using these devices, he had allegedly enabled ASSK to communicate with the 
outside world.3 Suffering from fragile health (e.g. diabetes), he died in custody on 
22 June 1996.4 The Myanma government rejected calls for the UN Special 
Rapporteur to conduct an independent autopsy, as was notably expressed by the 
Irish Presidency on behalf of the EU on 5 July 1996.5 Myanmar’s lack of 
‘satisfactory explanation’6 for the demise of James Nichols provided a concrete 
impetus for action by the EU. 
 
                                                 
1 European Commission 1991: Bull. 1/2: 1.4.3.  
2 According to records from the European Parliament, Nichols was a ‘[Burmese national] of Greek 
extraction’ (EP, 26 February 1997: Written Question No. 2275/96). 
3 Nichols was a close friend of ASSK. The Thai newspaper The Nation presented Nichols as 
ASSK’s godfather (Nation, 1 May 1996). 
4 Tamen 2004: title 3.1. James Nichols was incarcerated in Insein prison with common criminals, 
and not with prisoners of conscience (interview 23).  
5 European Commission 1996: Bull. 7/8: 1.4.7. See also: Tamen 2003: 28; Lintner 2006; Hristov 
2009: 119.  
6 European Commission 1996: Bull. 7/8: 1.4.7.  
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1.1.2. EU Reaction to the James Nichols’ Case 
i. The 1996 Meetings 
Before deciding to ratchet up sanctions, the EU held three Troika meetings in 
order to seek explanations for James Nichols’ demise. An informal meeting was 
held at the margins of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (APMC) on 24 
July 1996. The EU convoked a bilateral meeting with Myanmar’s minister for 
foreign affairs, Ohn Kyaw, on the occasion of the 51st United Nations General 
Assembly on 26 September. The Commission set forth:  
The European Union was disappointed at the outcome as Burma/Myanmar did not 
seem interested in pursuing a meaningful dialogue with it.7 
Another Troika meeting was convened in October 1996 with Myanmar’s foreign 
minister Win Aung at the margins of the UN General Assembly.8 This last 
meeting was deemed ‘most unsatisfactory’.9 
This lack of progress could be attributed to different factors. The EU put 
various topics on the agenda, which were all intertwined.10 Acceding to one 
demand (i.e. explaining James Nichols’ death) would have led Myanmar to make 
further concessions in other areas (e.g. recognising the grim state of Myanma 
prisons). Besides, European diplomacy was perceived as meddling into 
Myanmar’s internal affairs by overtly siding with domestic opposition parties.11 
 
ii. Dynamics Endogenous to the EU 
Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen was determined to step up 
international pressure to punish the imprisonment of Denmark’s representative, 
as well as to condemn repeated human rights violations.12 Copenhagen’s 
                                                 
7 European Commission: Answer of 17 January 1997. 
8 Khaliq 2008: 201, footnote 59. 
9 European Commission: Answer of 14 March 1997. 
10 Interview 46. 
11 Interview 24. 
12 Copenhagen Post, 2 July 1998.  
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proposal for economic sanctions was on the Council’s agenda on 16 July, even 
before the EU had the opportunity to meet with Myanmar. The General Affairs 
Council declared it would ‘consider possible further restrictive measures in co-
operation with other countries concerned’.13 (This statement implicitly referred to 
international consultations, notably with the US).14 The unproductive meetings 
with Myanmar encouraged Denmark to vociferously push for the imposition of 
sanctions on trade and investment.15 In July, a leading Danish pension fund sold 
$10.45 million holdings in Total for fear of international boycott against the 
company.16 
In parallel but not systematically connected to the James Nichols’ case, the 
European Parliament mounted pressure to act by tabling multiple resolutions in 
1995 and 1996, while individual MEPs asked many questions about forced 
labour, child labour practices, political prisoners rights, and the general human 
rights situation in Myanmar.17 It called on the Council to ‘apply all the pressure 
required to secure democratization in the country’.18 MEP Glenys Kinnock voiced 
consternation on Myanmar’s accession to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to 
which the EU is a party.19  
The Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Emma Bonino, visited Myanmar and 
some camps along the Thai-Myanma border. She met with ASSK in Yangon (but 
not with the government).20 She undertook the visit on her own initiative.21  
                                                 
13 Council of the EU: Conclusions of 16 July 1996. 
14 Interview 5. 
15 Khaliq 2008: 201; Hristov 2009: 122ff. 
16 Financial Times, 19 July 1996: 1, quoted in: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
August 2006. See also: Soe Myint Aung 2003. 
17 EP, 16 February 1995: Resolution; EP, 3 July 1995: Resolution; EP, 22 January 1996: 
Resolution; EP, 10 June 1996: Resolution; EP, 6 December 1995: Written Question; EP, 18 
October 1995: Written Question; EP, 26 July 1996: Written Question; EP, 27 August 1996: 
Written Question; EP, 12 December 1996: Written Question. 
18 EP, 10 June 1996: Resolution. 
19 EP, 12 July 1996: Written Question; EP, 11 July 1996: Written Question. 
20 Hristov 2009: 119. 
21 Interview 6. 
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Although Denmark initially called for sanctions, it was in fact the UK's proposal 
that was ultimately adopted. Hristov ascribes the UK's position to US pressure to 
impose sanctions on Myanmar – an allegation for which little empirical evidence 
is available though.22 Another more plausible explanation is that ASSK had 
recorded calls for international sanctions on a tape smuggled out of Myanmar to 
attempt influencing the international community.23 Furthermore, the UK 
strengthened its resolve to support the democratic opposition after the NLD had 
withdrawn from the NC on 29 October 1995.24 Pro-NLD campaigners, including 
ASSK's husband Michael Aris, held extensive meetings with British and 
European officials, especially with members of parliaments.25 
On 27 May 1996, the SPDC arrested 262 of NLD’s elected members of 
parliament who were attending the first NLD party congress, marking the 
anniversary of the 1990 elections after ASSK’s release.26 The arrest caused 
uproar among principled EU member states and the European Parliament.27 The 
European Parliament repeatedly incited the Commission and the Council to apply 
pressure on Myanmar to release the many prisoners of conscience.28 Renewed 
detentions of NLD activists and elected MPs in September 1996 may have 
contributed to the adoption of the Common Position 1996/635/CFSP.29 In sum, 
policy inputs stemmed from Myanmar’s domestic politics, institutional dynamics 
at the EU level, and domestic politics within the UK.  
The UK thus supported Denmark's initiative to impose sanctions, but refrained 
from imposing a European investment ban. British foreign secretary Malcolm 
Rifkind declared: ‘Any decision to impose economic sanctions against the military 
                                                 
22 Hristov 2009: 122. 
23 Ibid.: 122. 
24 Interview 46. 
25 Interview 37. 
26 EP, 10 June 1996: Resolution. 
27 Hristov 2009: 121. 
28 EP, 30 June 1997: Resolution; EP, 1 June 1998: Resolution; EP, 3 April 2001: Written 
Question; EP, 26 September 2002: Written Question; EP, 12 December 2002: Written Question. 
29 IDEA 2001: 139. 
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government in Burma should be made by the UN Security Council’.30 The large 
member states hypothesis is corroborated here because it was the UK, and not 
Denmark’s proposal that was ultimately adopted. Sanctions were brought into 
effect following a proposal by a big member state. Furthermore, the restrictions 
did not jeopardise European material interests.  
Nevertheless, and in contrast with liberal intergovernmentalism, the drivers of 
foreign policy were not material but ideological. Other EU member states felt they 
had to demonstrate European solidarity with outraged Denmark as well as 
towards the NLD.31 A mix of theoretical approaches is therefore needed to 
explain EU foreign policy-making. Liberal intergovernmentalism rightly identifies 
the big member states as the core decision-makers, but it cannot unveil the real 
drivers of the foreign policy. By acting together, EU member states demonstrated 
that European solidarity mattered more than their diversity of views. 
Constructivism aptly captures this social dynamic in EU policy-making. 
 
iii. The Adopted Measures  
The sanctions put in place by Common Position 96/635/CFSP reaffirmed the 
measures already coordinated by the member states since 1990: expulsion and 
withdrawal of military personnel attached to the embassies in the member states 
and in Myanmar; an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment; and 
the suspension of non-humanitarian assistance (with exceptions). Restating 
these negative measures in the framework of a common position reinforced their 
formally binding character.32 Additional restrictions were implemented in 
Common Position 96/635/CFSP: a visa ban on targeted members of the SLORC, 
armed forces and their families; suspension of visits by high-level European 
                                                 
30 Pederson 2008: 35. 
31 Interview 6.   
32 A ‘Common Position’ was a politically binding policy framework under the pre-Lisbon-Treaty 
setup. To the extent that it referred to (EU) Community competences, an implementing 
Regulation was regularly added (initiated by the European Commission and adopted by the 
Council). Under the Lisbon Treaty, the system remains essentially the same, but the term 
‘Common Position’ has been replaced by ‘EU Decision’.  
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officials to Myanmar. The common position thus brought the period of ‘critical 
engagement’ to an end – although it formally ‘reaffirms [the EU’s] determination 
to resume such dialogue at any time.’33 This common position has been renewed 
every twelve months, and the measures eventually scaled up.  
The Common Position 96/635/CFSP was mainly a political document that 
aimed at showing solidarity with Denmark and Myanmar’s oppressed democratic 
opposition. The common position did not entail new measures, with the exception 
of the visa ban and moratorium on high-level visits to Myanmar. Neither did it 
bring up the obstacles met by the National Convention. Therefore, the measures 
adopted were not far from the status quo. Competitive bargaining among the 
largest member states explains why the policy decided in 1996 could still be 
characterised as a product of the lowest common denominator, despite its 
ideological drivers. The bandwagoning hypothesis is not necessarily 
disconfirmed by the adoption of this new policy, although the EU’s decision was 
essentially motivated by intramural dynamics. On 3 October, President Clinton 
barred Myanmar government leaders from entry into the US.34 On 25 October, 
the Irish Presidency announced the EU would replicate the same measure. 
 
iv. Competitive Bargaining 
The rebuttal of Copenhagen’s proposal is explained by the reluctance of the 
three big EU member states to adopt economic restrictions. The preceding 
chapter already mentioned that Myanmar was considered an untapped market 
with potential entry points to other Asian countries.  
France rejected economic sanctions in order to defend Total’s business 
interests. This position could be characterised as derived from mercantilism, or 
                                                 
33 Council of the EU: Common Position 96/635/CFSP of 28 October 1996. 
34 New York Times, 4 October 1996: A6, quoted in: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, August 2006. 
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economic nationalism.35 Conservative French MPs alleged that the Socialist 
Party (PS) was backing Total’s investments under François Mitterrand’s 
Presidency (1981-1995) and again during Lionel Jospin’s cohabitation 
government from 1997 until 2002.36 There is, however, no proof of direct 
connections.  
The dearth of pressure by the French civil society eased this position, which 
protected national business ventures. In a Gaullist tradition usually upheld by 
Jacques Chirac from 1995 until 2007, French foreign policy consisted in a 
domaine réservé under the President’s authority. Civil society tended to exert 
little influence.37 Despite the principled involvement of campaign groups then and 
in subsequent years (e.g. Info Birmanie, Reporters sans Frontières, Ligue des 
Droits de l’Homme, Amnesty International France, SOS Aung San Suu Kyi) and 
of a few French celebrities (e.g. singer Jane Birkin, actress Catherine Deneuve), 
French public opinion showed only minor interest in Myanmar.  
The decision not to impose economic restrictions is also related to goal-
orientated approaches to sanctions policy.38 French, German and even the 
British foreign ministries subscribed to the view that sanctions would be 
ineffective against a country that had subsisted under relative autarky for more 
than twenty-five years.39 This interpretation corroborates the large member states 
hypothesis: the agreement between big member states not to impose economic 
sanctions determined EU foreign policy.  
Doubt was voiced by some member states and the Commission ‘on the 
usefulness of economic sanctions to achieve political objectives’.40 The Quai 
                                                 
35 Krasner 1978; Gilpin 1975. On the question of commercial (and energy) interests of French 
foreign policy, see: de La Genière 1986. 
36 Assemblée Nationale: Written Question of 25 April 2000. 
37 Badie and Fardeau 2003: 14-15. 
38 Pape 1997: 94-5; Morgan and Schwebach: 45-46; Tsebelis: 3-4; Leyton-Brown: 308ff. 
39 House of Commons, 7 February 1996: Question; Assemblée Nationale, 25 April 2000: 
Question; Federal Government of Germany, 9 March 2004: Antwort. 
40 European Commission: Answer of 24 June 1997. 
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d’Orsay dismissed the argument that a ban would exert influence on the SPDC, 
stating that Total’s investment was only 0.5 percent of Myanmar’s total FDI.41 
Foreign minister Védrine uttered:  
All European countries consider that it [Myanmar’s government] is little sensitive to 
the actions they may undertake, because it does not live from external aid, whose 
contribution to the national economy is marginal.42 
Germany opposed sanctions against trade and investment for normative 
reasons. The German government expressed its concern that economic 
sanctions would bear deleterious impact on the population, while inflicting 
negligible harm on the junta.43 Germany had few relevant economic interests left 
in Myanmar. During the Cold War, German investments had been sponsored by 
the state, so that the ban on development aid had eliminated German economic 
interests inherited from the Ne Win era.  
Also the UK was not persuaded by the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
proposed by Denmark (and British domestic campaign groups).44 The rationale 
behind this position was that economic sanctions would cut off bilateral relations, 
and threaten the ‘critical dialogue’ with Myanmar.45 Like the Quai d’Orsay, 
Whitehall highlighted that no international consensus prevailed on sanctions, and 
that UK bilateral trade with Myanmar was minimal.46 Notwithstanding, the UK 
                                                 
41 Assemblée Nationale, 25 April 2000: Answer by the foreign affairs minister Hubert Védrine. 
Foreign minister Védrine does not use the term FDI, but ‘part de marché’ (‘market shares’). The 
Quai d’Orsay’s calculation seems nonetheless understated. According to field interviews with 
professionals working with Total, the revenues extracted from the Yadana pipelines amounted to 
ca. $2 billion a year in 2009 (Interview 24). The newspaper Myanmar Times reported in its 20-26 
August 2007 edition that the Yadana project earned a total US$2.16 billion in 2006. Another 
estimate for the consortium’s earnings in 2007 is US$2.8 billion (Niksch 2008: 19; Tonkin 4 
November 2010). The European Parliament noted in 1998 that: ‘European multinational oil 
companies now provide almost a third of the total legal foreign investment committed in Burma 
and an even higher proportion of funds disbursed’ (EP, 12 October 1998: Resolution, par. G.). 
42 Translation by the author. (In this context, external aid seems understood as development 
assistance as well as FDI). Assemblée Nationale: Answer of 25 April 2000. 
43 Federal Government of Germany 2004: Antwort. 
44 House of Commons, 12 June 1996: Question; House of Lords, 22 July 1996: Question. 
45 House of Lords, 22 July 1996: Question. 
46 Ibid. 
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suspended Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) delegations to Myanmar by 
mid-1996, notably due to mounting pressures from Westminster and civil society 
to sever relations with a state offending human rights.47 The election of New 
Labour further orientated UK foreign policy towards a principled stance. 
 
1.2. Reformulation of British Interests 
1.2.1. Election of New Labour 
On 1 May 1997, the election of New Labour to government had a lasting 
impact on EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. Upon taking office, foreign 
minister Robin Cook vowed to carry out a foreign policy with ‘an ethical 
dimension’, which would make ‘Britain once again a force for good in the world’.48 
This pledge was later buttressed by Tony Blair’s ‘doctrine of the international 
community’ set out on 22 April 1999 at the Economic Club of Chicago. This 
governmental campaign sought to distinguish Labour’s foreign policy from that of 
the Conservative Party, which Labour had castigated for its ‘narrow realpolitik’.49 
The issue of Myanmar became a showcase for a vigorous human rights policy. 
This principled stance also aimed to contrast with the stance of John Major’s 
administration, which was at first disinclined to impose economic sanctions on 
Myanmar. This principled policy was crafted at the highest level of the Labour 
party, notably by PM Tony Blair (1997-2007) and foreign minister Cook (1997-
2001), who have repeatedly expressed their support of ASSK.50 Blair had invited 
ASSK to join the Labour’s pre-election party conference in 1997.51 PM Tony Blair 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown sent her New Year and birthday 
                                                 
47 House of Commons, 12 June 1996: Question. 
48 Cook: Press conference of 12 May 1997. 
49 Ibid. 
50 BC UK website 2010; Tonkin 24 October 2009; Brown 2007; interview 46. 
51 BC UK, 10 June 2005. 
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wishes (on 19 June).52 This leadership placed the UK as the EU’s primary sender 
of sanctions on Myanmar. 
This personal involvement of high-level policy-makers in UK policy led 
Downing Street to exert considerable leverage on the UK’s stance. In fact, the 
Prime Minister’s Office tended to circumvent Whitehall from important political 
decisions.53 The Westminster model of democracy enables a concentration of 
power in the hands of the Cabinet.54 Tony Blair’s presidential style of Premiership 
increased this prominence.55  
This politicisation of UK foreign policy was also brought about because of the 
salience of domestic pressure groups focused on Myanmar. According to a FCO 
representative, the UK’s policy towards Myanmar is ‘possessed by the 
Parliament’.56 An ‘All Party Parliamentary Group on Burma’, presided by the time 
of writing by the Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead, was founded. British MPs, co-
established a ‘European Parliamentary Caucus on Burma’ with MEPs and MPs 
from other European countries to ‘raise[s] awareness about Burmese problems 
within Europe’.57 Westminster’s support to the political opposition can be justified 
by the close links between individual MPs and campaigners, as well as by 
solidarity with fellow elected Myanma MPs, whom SPDC has persecuted in the 
aftermath of the 1990 elections. BC UK attracted frequent media attention, 
notably by rallying celebrities to the cause of democracy in Myanmar (e.g. 
entrepreneur Richard Branson, U2 singer Bono, former Beatle Paul McCartney, 
Damien Rice, or bands like U2, REM, and Coldplay).58 Its representatives were 
invited at Number 10.59 Prominent politicians were personally implicated with the 
                                                 
52 Tonkin, 1 January 2010: 1-2; FCO, October 2008: Latest News. 
53 Interviews 6 and 46; Tonkin 2010c. 
54 Lijphart 1984. 
55 Kavanagh 2005: 8ff.; Hill 2005: 400-401. 
56 Interview 1. 
57 EPCB website 2012. 
58 Youngs 2001: 142; Wintle 2007: 355; BC UK website 2010. 
59 Interview 3.  
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campaign (e.g. MEP Glenys Kinnock has been a longstanding BC UK board 
member).60  
 
1.2.2. European rather than Unilateral Sanctions 
Confronted with the refusal of some member states to impose economic 
sanctions, New Labour envisaged embarking on unilateral sanctions outside the 
European framework. Campaigners, certain MPs, and British MEPs like Glenys 
Kinnock, urged the Labour government and the European Commission to act 
under the authority of Article 60.2 Rome Treaty.61 This Article authorises a 
member state to impose sanctions unilaterally on a non-EU country where there 
are ‘serious political reasons and on grounds of urgency’.62  
Whitehall clarified that unilateral UK sanctions would contradict the free 
movement of European goods and capital. The UK preferred to stay attached to 
the European framework in order to reap benefits from ‘politics of scale’ (to 
borrow Ginsberg’s expression).63 For the total trade between the EU and 
Myanmar was four times greater than with Myanmar’s single largest EU trading 
partner, Germany.64 In light of impending EU sanctions against Myanmar, former 
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated:  
I am bound to say I think actually it would be pointless for Britain itself to try and 
apply its own economic sanctions... We are upholding the European Union approach 
to Burma.65  
 
 
                                                 
60 Email exchange 1. 
61 House of Commons: Examination of 10 October 2007, question 404; BC UK website 2010: 
Actions: Sanctions Briefing; EP, 8 April 1999: Written Question. 
62 Rome Treaty, Art. 60 (2); EC Treaty, Art. 73g (2); Burma Campaign UK 2010b; European 
Commission: Answer of 5 October 1998. 
63 Ginsberg 1998. 
64 IMF 1998: 517; ibid.: 18. 
65 Quoted after S. Jones 2007: 117; interview given by the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 
14 May 1998. 
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1.2.3. New Labour’s Non-statutory Measures 
The UK found a middle ground by imposing unilateral non-statutory sanctions. 
By doing so, the British government dodged the imposition of unilateral statutory 
sanctions, which would have undermined the European approach.66 At the same 
time, unilateral but non-statutory sanctions mollified domestic pressures.  
The UK unilaterally suspended financial support for companies trading with 
Myanmar, discouraged tourism, and urged British companies to divest, including 
Premier Oil and British-American Tobacco (BAT).67 BAT was one of the largest 
British investors in Myanmar with its BAT/Rothmans joint venture with Economic 
Holding Myanmar.68 By the end of the nineties, Whitehall had encouraged British 
companies to withdraw from the country.69 The UK’s Export Credits Guarantee 
Department (ECGD) withdrew all finance cover facilities. Burton (UK) and British 
High Street divested in 1997; followed by British American Tobacco (BAT) in 
2003.70 In September 2002, Premier Oil reviewed its operations due to pressure 
by its own shareholders and the British government.71 Lloyds, Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper, and Rolls Royce also pulled out.72 By 1999, FDI to Myanmar had 
‘decreased by 90 percent from its peak’.73 By the time of writing, only small-sized 
British businesses operate in Myanmar.74 Apart from Total, the biggest European 
                                                 
66 It is noteworthy that the UK adopted a different European policy towards Libya in 1984, when it 
unilaterally cut diplomatic ties with Tripoli following the assassination in London of Mrs. Fletcher, 
a British policewoman. The European Community implemented a European arms embargo only 
two years later following the EPC ministerial meeting of 27 January 1986, and diplomatic 
sanctions on 14 April 1986 (Council of the EU: Statement of 27 January 1986; ibid.: Statement of 
14 April 1986). 
67 Hristov 2009: 122. 
68 EP, 18 September 2003: Written Question. 
69 Khaliq 2008: 211, footnote 112. 
70 Ibid. BAT’s investments were sold out to Singaporean partners (Hristov 2009: 239). 
71 Youngs 2001: 141; Pederson 2008: 38. Notwithstanding, Premier Oil is reported to have 
invested US$650 million into the Yetagun gas pipeline (Hristov 2009: 193, footnote 423; 
Fawthrop, 10 October 2002). Premier Oil’s withdrawal did not create an economic vacuum, for 
the investment was then sold out to the Malaysian bidder Petronas (Hristov 2009: 239). 
72 BC UK website 2010. 
73 Bowman: British ambassador address of 29 April 2006. 
74 Ibid.  
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MNCs pulled out of Myanmar: BHS, Heineken, Carlsberg, the Burton Group, and 
Ericsson – the latter was influenced by its loss of a contract in San Francisco due 
to the city’s sanctions against companies having dealings with Myanmar. 
In sum, the UK’s policy change was not caused by the interaction with other 
member states at the EU level, but by new British elites’ conviction to adopt a 
policy that would bolster liberal values. This reflects Hoffmann’s explanation of 
foreign policy change as caused by the institution of a new government within an 
EU member state.75 It therefore confirms liberal intergovernmental expectations. 
 
1.2.4. Impact of European Divestments 
The impact of these divestments is challenging to quantify. It is difficult to 
assess how many potential investors eventually ditched their plans. Moreover, 
Asian competitors have filled many market sectors abandoned by Europeans. 
Finally, high price volatility and business risks make it challenging to predict how 
much European companies would have sustainably invested in the country. 
Myanmar’s precarious business climate makes it likely that some companies 
would have later reconsidered their expansion plans, even if business activities 
had not been officially discouraged by the UK and other EU member states.  
In any case, these non-statutory sanctions had a formidable impact. At least a 
dozen big European companies effectively pulled out of Myanmar between 1997 
and 2003. Potential investors also cancelled their plans. By opening its economy, 
Myanmar was hoping to attract Western direct investment. Non-statutory 
sanctions may have produced more damage on Myanmar’s economy than 
statutory EU sanctions, not least because reputational risks had deterred 
European companies from venturing into Myanmar. So far as statutory sanctions 
are concerned, the EU had few cards to play as the economic, commercial, and 
industrial interface with Myanmar was so modest, and eventually only marginal.76  
                                                 
75 Hoffmann 1966: 905. 
76 Email exchange 2. 
188
Chapter V 
On the Myanma side, the authorities attempted to demonstrate that Western 
sanctions did not have a substantial impact on the behaviour of foreign 
companies. Statistics by the Myanmar Investment Commission showed that the 
UK was among the first investors. The UK, however, contests the numbers 
published by Myanmar, notably because they include UK overseas territories that 
are not reported in UK statistics. Moreover, there is a substantial difference 
between the investment that is approved by the Myanma authorities and the 
realised investment, which is more modest. Finally, official Myanma statistics are 
known for being unreliable, while they are also the only comprehensive data 
provider. In any case, table 3 indicates that Myanmar’s three biggest foreign 
investors are: China, Thailand, and the UK (when including overseas territories). 
 
Table 3: Cumulative Foreign Investment in Myanmar, 1988 - end May 2009 
(Approved, not realised investment, as registered with the Myanmar Investment Commission) 
Country No. of projects $ million 
China (28 May 2011) 72 15,800.0 
Thailand 59 7,406.8 
UK (includes UK Overseas Territories) 50 1,861.0 
Singapore 72 1,553.2 
Malaysia 33 660.7 
Hong Kong 31 504.2 
France 2 469.0 
US 15 243.6 
Indonesia 12 241.5 
Netherlands 5 238.8 
South Korea 37 238.8 
Japan 23 213.0 
Source: Myanmar Investment Commission (May 2011), quoted in: Network Myanmar website 
(2012).  
 
1.3. Meetings with ASEAN (1997-1999) 
1.3.1. Diplomatic Boycotts 
Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN on 23 June 1997 strengthened the consensus 
among Europeans to carry out a policy of diplomatic pressure on ASEAN. 
Principled member states, particularly the UK and the Netherlands, persuaded 
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other European states to engage in such a policy. This position was also justified 
by the visa ban imposed since 25 October 1996 against members of the Myanma 
government. Some MEPs, in cooperation with lobby groups like the Euro-Burma-
Office, had pressured the EU not to welcome Myanmar into the ARF.77 The 
European Parliament also refused to fund Myanmar's participation in any 
ASEAN-EU projects.78 
Due to Myanmar’s poor human rights record, the EU refused to enter into 
treaty relations with that country. In 1980 the (then) European Economic 
Community entered into a Cooperation Agreement with the (then) five members 
of ASEAN.79 The Community subsequently expanded contractual relations with 
those states that joined ASEAN – with the sole exception of Myanmar. EU heads 
of states decided to boycott EU-ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and 
ASEM summits if Myanmar was to attend. The argument was that ASEAN had 
not consulted them about Myanmar’s entry into the process after it had joined the 
regional group in 1997. Myanmar’s participation in meetings with the EU would 
have badly reflected on the EU’s identity as a ‘club’, in which all members have 
to explicitly adhere to principles of democratic governance.80 ASEAN-EU 
ministerial meetings were indefinitely called off as a result of the visa ban. On 26 
June 1997, the Council expressed the view that the ASEAN-EU dialogue was a 
forum which the Union should use to raise ‘the issue of human rights in 
Myanmar’.81  
It also stated that Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN did not automatically mean 
membership in ASEM.82 The EU confirmed this statement at the ASEAN Post 
Ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July, where it was announced that 
                                                 
77 EP, 14 March 1997: Written Question. 
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Myanmar could not participate in the ASEM 2 summit in London. Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad recriminated in September, warning that 
ASEAN could boycott this summit as well.83 But Mahathir’s reaction was not 
approved by other ASEAN leaders.84 UK foreign minister Robin Cook firmly 
rejected Myanmar’s participation in the second ASEM summit held in London on 
3-4 April 1998, owing to the SPDC’s failure to enter into a dialogue with ASSK.85 
A temporary compromise was found to the intractable problem of ASEM 
membership: new applications for membership into ASEM would require 
approval from all participants, so that membership in either regional organisation 
did not automatically imply partnership with ASEM.86 In the second part of 1998, 
the Belgian ambassador proposed to involve ASEAN to step up pressure on 
Myanmar.87 The Austrian Presidency presented démarches to each ASEAN 
ministry of foreign affairs (except Myanmar).  
The visa ban applied even for the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee 
(JCC), which was not held from February 1997 until the Bangkok meeting of 24-
27 May 1999.88 This cancellation delayed mutual development programmes.89 
European ministers hastened to block the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings for 
three years until the Vientiane meeting of 11 December 2000.90 The Berlin 
AEMM, scheduled for 30 March 1999, and the ASEAN-EU JCC were both 
cancelled as a consequence of the visa ban and the uncompromising stance of 
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the SPDC over the case of ASSK’s dying husband. Michael Aris was denied an 
entry visa to see his wife despite being terminally ill.91  
A settlement was found for the ASEAN-EU JCC meeting in Bangkok on 25-26 
May 1999. Myanmar was allowed to attend as a non-signatory country, just like 
Laos and Cambodia, with no speaking rights. On the other hand, the EU 
conceded not to bring up any extraneous political issues outside the purview of 
the JCC.92 However, this informal agreement did not resolve the issue of the visa 
ban on high-level Myanma officials with regards to summits held in EU territory. 
 
1.3.2. Impact of EU Measures 
In this regional context, EU diplomacy has created a serious reputational 
stigma for Myanmar. The boycott of summits with ASEAN may have induced 
some Asian states to pressure Myanmar on human rights issues. Despite these 
intramural challenges to the ASEAN way, however, even the more critical 
member states like the Philippines refrained from exerting diplomatic pressure 
that could have infringed upon the sovereignty of another ASEAN state. ASEAN 
could not adopt statutory sanctions on Myanmar.93  
Instead of bowing to international pressure, Myanmar further entrenched itself 
into political isolation, particularly from the West. Yangon intensified its relations 
with allied countries, including within ASEAN. While the symbolic impact of EU 
diplomatic sanctions was certainly strong, it did not substantially affect 
Myanmar’s behaviour. The history of Myanmar’s interactions with the rest of the 
region has illustrated that even ASEAN could extract few concessions from 
SPDC.94 The SPDC tended to prioritise its domestic security to integration into 
the international system. Jürgen Haacke characterised this behaviour as the 
‘political-security imperative’, which means securing the military’s hold on power 
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so as to thwart potentially secessionist rebellions by ethnic factions – whatever 
the international consequences for Myanmar.95 This imperative is reflected by the 
regime’s commitment to three main causes: ‘Non-disintegration of the Union,’ 
’Non-disintegration of National Sovereignty,’ and ‘Consolidation of National 
Sovereignty.’96 The military government refused to compromise with ASSK and 
NLD, because the opposition challenged the military’s role at the helm of the 
state.97 
Some European policy-makers decried the counterproductive effects of the 
visa ban. The suspension of high-level visits under the CFSP Decision – 
notwithstanding sporadic contacts – prevented communicating political 
messages. It conveyed a denial-of-dialogue attitude to the government. While it 
is impossible to ascertain whether the military leaders would have been more 
responsive to European concerns, had there been in place a proactive attempt 
for dialogue, practitioners recognise that the ban did not force the SPDC to 
negotiate with the political and ethnic opposition.98 
The striking feature of the EU’s Myanmar policy towards ASEAN is the 
emphasis laid on symbols (i.e. refusing to shake hands with military dictators), 
rather than on the effectiveness of its promotion of democracy and human rights. 
Myanmar could offset these boycotts by developing a web of relations with its 
less critical neighbours. EU-ASEAN and ASEM statements do not have any 
enforcement mechanisms, so that Myanmar’s presence on the agenda of 
international summits was unlikely to yield ‘much impact on Myanmar’s policy’.99 
The EU’s inability to persuade ASEAN to reject Myanmar’s membership laid 
bare the impotence of EU sanctions to influence Myanmar’s neighbours during 
the period covered. Asian countries were critical of the signals sent by the EU, 
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which contravened ASEAN’s ‘sacrosanct principle of non-interference’.100 Karen 
Smith contended that the EU’s lack of effectiveness is more flagrant when 
examining the European inability to influence Myanmar’s neighbours.101 It is not 
so surprising that the ‘quasi-totalitarian state’102 in Myanmar seemed insensitive 
to EU demands. Although the EU enjoys regular contacts with Myanmar’s more 
liberal neighbours, it has not been able to coax them into complementing its 
strategy of pressure on the SPDC. In effect, EU and ASEAN strategies towards 
Myanmar have offset each other.  
ASEAN has at times infringed upon the principle of non-interference, for 
instance by expressing demands for tangible reforms in Myanmar (as early as 
during the 2005 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur).103 Tivo Kivimäcki thus 
noted that the regional meetings might have, over time, led both the EU and 
ASEAN to add nuance to their respective approaches towards Myanmar.104 
Nevertheless, such secondary effects hardly exerted a sustainable influence on 
the SPDC’s behaviour. Despite rhetorical statements critical of Myanmar’s 
domestic affairs, ASEAN members generally continued to provide political 
protection and intensify their economic interface with Myanmar. If the tertiary 
objectives of EU policy consisted in changing ASEAN strategy towards Myanmar, 
then this goal has been conspicuously unattained. 
Reflecting upon the undeclared objectives of EU sanctions policy, a mix of 
various theoretical approaches could explain why the EU continued such a vocal, 
but, for obvious reasons, ineffective boycott policy on ASEAN. A first explanation 
could be based on ideological motivations of EU foreign policy, notably the 
influence of liberal cosmopolitanism.105 Policy-makers had decided measures 
they felt morally responsible to implement. Snubbing Myanmar’s participation in 
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multilateral summits served the purpose of symbolically defending liberal values. 
This policy stemmed from the EU’s internal identity, which could not accept to 
normalise relations with a state having such deplorable human rights record.106 
The ideological underpinnings of EU foreign policy were more important than the 
effectiveness of sanctions.107  
From a liberal perspective, this symbolic measure could also have been 
derived from the secondary objective to heed pressures from domestic 
constituencies. Multifarious domestic actors, such as the European Parliament, 
national parliaments (particularly in the former colonial power UK, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark), the media, and campaign groups had urged national 
governments and the Council not to allow Myanmar into regional meetings.  
This less benevolent interpretation can be wedded to rational choice 
approaches to sanctions.108 Boycotting meetings with Myanmar was the least 
costly alternative, and ‘politically risk-free’.109 From a realist perspective, inter-
regionalism and multilateral meetings do not bring much benefit to states.110 
They can be suspended without substantially damaging the national interest of 
EU member states. Silka Keva advanced that the EU’s stance towards ASEAN 
was induced by the EU’s relative lack of strategic interest in Myanmar: 
Burma/Myanmar has provided a safer and more limited platform for human rights 
and democracy discussion for the ASEM partners, in which, at least for the EU, there 
is less to lose economically and politically [than in China’s treatment of human 
rights].111 
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2. Setting the Boundaries of the European Consensus (1997-2000) 
Despite the emerging European consensus following the adoption of the 
Common Position 96/635/CFSP, European enthusiasm for a punitive strategy 
was limited when it came to wielding economic penalties. This unwillingness to 
impose economic restrictions was first embodied by Paris’ stance with regards to 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).  
 
2.1. Withdrawal from the Generalised System of Preferences (1997) 
2.1.1. EU Policy 
On 24 March 1997, the EU removed Myanmar’s access to the GSP,112 to 
which it had benefited since 1994.113 The GSP was withdrawn to punish SPDC 
for using forced labour.114 This decision was the first economic penalty the EU 
officially placed on Myanmar. In-line with the rationalist tenet of the large member 
states hypothesis, this withdrawal did not affect European economic interests 
since it suspended a preferential treatment of which Myanmar was a beneficiary. 
The EU justified this restriction due to the use of forced labour by the Myanma 
army, concerning 800,000 forced workers. This finding was underscored by a 
European Commission report.115 The Myanma authorities had refused to allow 
Commission representatives to conduct a field enquiry, declaring that forced 
labour was not practiced in the country.116 The Commission had therefore to rely 
on external testimonies from the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), given on 
7 June 1995.117 These organisations are known for their principled stance on the 
Myanmar issue. In June 1995, the European Parliament supported the ICFTU 
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action in a resolution calling on the European Council and member governments 
to:  
[…] investigate possible cooperation between companies of the European Union in 
Burmese projects applying forced labor and examine the desirability of imposing 
economic sanctions.118  
The Commission submitted its proposal to the Council on 19 December 1996.119 
It was endorsed by the Council on 24 March 1997.120 The adoption of the 
proposal demonstrates that transnational lobby groups can influence specific 
measures decided by the EU, in-line with social constructivist predictions.  
By extension, the GSP suspension implied the denial of benefits under the 
Everything-But-Arms Initiative (EBA) introduced in 2001, to which Myanmar 
would be otherwise entitled as a LDC. The EBA grants LDCs duty-free and 
quota-free access to the EU market for all products except arms and 
ammunitions.121 
This withdrawal was the result of domestic pressures at the EU and national 
levels. ASSK provided ‘strong support’ for the withdrawal of EU preferences, 
which triggered a rally call among various European constituencies.122 The 
European Parliament adopted resolutions to that end.123 Trade unions, non-
governmental organisations, including human rights groups and consumer 
organisations, promoted the adoption of economic restrictions by the EU.124 
Domestic pressures within EU member states and transnational lobbies in 
Brussels hence contribute to explaining why sanctions have been scaled up in 
1997.  
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Although the motion was proposed by the Commission, the decision to 
suspend the GSP was the outcome of a bargaining process between principled 
and flexible member states.125 Youngs points out that France insisted that the 
decision to remove GSP provisions would not be presented as an ‘explicitly 
political position aimed at human rights and democracy’.126 France was reluctant 
to set a legal precedent since violations of labour rights happen in many 
countries, especially poor ones. France’s position also attempted to shield Total’s 
investments. There were allegations that Total had benefited from the use of 
forced labour by Myanma security forces near the Yadana gas pipeline.127 
Several members of the European Parliament and of the Assemblée Nationale 
had raised the issue.128 Although illegal in international law, campaigners 
advocated for a retroactive ban on European investments, which would have 
compelled Total to divest. The economic cost of Total’s withdrawal would have 
been eventually carried by the French state, since Total’s Yadana project was 
covered by COFACE, the French insurance company for external trade.129 Paris 
was therefore constrained to endorse the proposal concerning the GSP 
withdrawal, but pressed for a European Commission-led initiative limited to the 
issue of forced labour. Bargains by France to safeguard its economic interests 
show that the large member states hypothesis proffers a plausible explanation of 
how the GSP withdrawal was decided. 
The long decision-making process from 1995 until 1997 strengthens the liberal 
intergovernmental hypothesis that a bargaining process prevailed between 
principled and flexible member states, led by France.130 To add weight to this 
interpretation, the Commission neither reviewed its policy during fifteen years of 
implementation, nor did it heed the ECOSOC’s recommendation that:  
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[…] if the situation in Myanmar does not change in the future, the Commission 
should repeat its request to the government every year.131 
A liberal intergovernmental interpretation could also be corroborated by the fact 
that Myanmar seemed singled out. The European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) noted that the suspension of GSP benefits with Myanmar 
would set a ‘vital precedent’ in the EU’s history.132 Nevertheless, it was 
reproduced only with Belarus in 2007, for which Myanmar served as a 
precedent.133 Unlike Myanmar, Belarus is not an LDC. Legally, the GSP 
withdrawal is not a sanction under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Politically, it enters partially into the remit of the EU sanctions regime, as it 
attempts to impel the government to changing its ways, i.e. into abolishing the 
practice of forced labour.134 
Analogously poor labour conditions in other countries did not lead to the same 
measure: the EU did not penalise Bangladesh, Cambodia or Pakistan. The 
International Labour Organisation also reproved these countries for widespread 
use of child and forced labour.135 The EU explicitly threatened Pakistan with 
removal of the GSP, but later refrained from withdrawing this preferential 
treatment.136 
 
2.1.2. Impact of EU Measures 
Derived from liberal intergovernmentalism, this interpretation of the GSP 
withdrawal as a symbolic measure resulting from a bargaining process between 
member states seems corroborated by the fact that the penalty could not have 
yielded much economic impact by the time it was decided. First, the GSP 
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withdrawal affected only 1.23 percent of Myanmar’s total exports as of 1995. 
Therefore, the economic cost incurred by the GSP withdrawal could only amount 
to a marginal share of Myanmar’s GDP.137 Table 4 shows that only 5.41 percent 
of Myanmar's total exports were directed towards the EU. Only €40.3 million 
were eligible for GSP treatment in the fiscal year 1994/1995. The effective GSP 
utilisation ratio by Myanmar stood at internationally low levels since only €14.7 
million (or 36.6 percent) of the eligible amount benefited of GSP.138  
 
Table 4: Effective Utilisation of GSP as Share of Myanmar’s Exports, 1994-
1995 
Value (€) Share of total exports
Myanmar's total exports (1995)* 1,197,860,000 .. 
Myanmar's exports to EU (1995)*      64,752,989 5.41% 
Eligibility to GSP (1994/1995)**      40,332,000 3.37% 
Effective utilisation of GSP 
(1994/1995)**      14,762,000 1.23% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on (*) IMF (2012) data and (**) Collignon (1997: 25).139  
 
Second, the restriction was symbolic because it was set off the target.140 
Forced labour does occur under the responsibility of local army commanders, but 
not in the private sector where the armed forces have no stake.141 Yet, the 
measure mostly targeted private firms exporting to the EU – and to a lesser 
extent public companies trading with the EU. Private firms are unlikely users of 
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forced labour, whereas local army officers could be held responsible for these 
practices. The armed forces were the intended target of this sanction, but private 
businesses paid the price. 
Third, trade soared between 1996 and 2004 as a result of Myanmar opening 
its economy – and despite the 1997 GSP withdrawal. Myanma exports to the EU 
spiralled from $102 million in 1996 to $500 million in 2004.142 The terms of this 
increased trade volume were however unequal since Myanmar did not benefit 
from GSP benefits like other LDC counterparts. Myanma producers had to pay 
custom taxes to the EU, unlike those of Laos or Cambodia.143 
This soaring trade was short-lived, especially in the booming textile sector. 
Before the GSP withdrawal, the effective GSP utilisation ratio for textile stood 
between 1.8 percent when the benefit was introduced and 10.4 percent when it 
was withdrawn.144 One reason was the absence of a significant domestic 
spinning industry, since EU rules of origin require the use of local yarn as input. 
Despite the GSP withdrawal, textile exports saw an increase between 1996 and 
2004, thanks to the sharp depreciation of the local currency, and to the existing 
country-quota system implemented under the Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) 
through 2004. Thus, Myanmar’s garment industry grew from 25 to 291 textile 
factories between 1994 and 1999. However, in part due to the expiry of the MFA 
on 1 January 2005, textile exports later collapsed. 149 factories had closed by 
2005, taking the jobs of 30,000 to 44,000 workers, most of them women.145 
Unlike its LDC peers, Myanmar authorities and the garments industry were not 
advised to prepare. They were therefore unable to cope with the new 
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international textiles regime. Furthermore, international investors had more 
incentive to invest in LDCs that benefited from the GSP than in Myanmar where 
the exports costs to the EU were higher.146 As a consequence, the GSP 
withdrawal indiscriminately affected the population since the lost market shares 
for Myanmar exports resulted in loss of jobs and income opportunities. The 
penalty was not really harmful when it was decided in 1997, but it yielded 
unintended damage in the long-term.  
In a regional context, the period until the late 1990s saw large parts of the 
European textile industry being permanently shifted from Europe to Asia (e.g. 
Bangladesh, Thailand, or Cambodia). Investment flows from Europe to South- 
and Southeast Asia resulted at the time in durable production and trade patterns 
that have lasted until the time of writing. In a number of Asian countries, the 
production capacities thus established yielded impressive benefits for the 
population, inter alia with regards to employment and welfare creation. Myanmar 
was left behind, despite its recognised production capacity due to low labour 
costs. By comparison with Cambodia (a country with similar levels of poverty, 
problems in governance, and levels of corruption), garment manufacturing has 
risen from an insignificant sector in the nineties to an essential economic driver, 
in part thanks to preferential access to European and American markets. The 
sector accounted in 2008 for around 14 percent of Cambodia's GDP, 82 percent 
of exports, and employed 45 percent of its manufacturing workforce.147 It can 
therefore be assumed that, while failing to alter the SPDC’s behaviour, the GSP 
withdrawal resulted in serious economic damage for Myanmar. Under the 2011 
GSP/EBA system, Myanmar’s duty-free access would have implied a reduction 
from average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs of 11.2 percent for textiles and 
8 percent for fishery products respectively, down to zero.148 
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To conclude, the GSP withdrawal had mainly a symbolic function with no 
domestic cost for the EU. Its impact on Myanmar’s economy has been initially 
marginal, but unexpectedly counterproductive in the long term since it impeded 
the creation of job opportunities instead of effectively addressing practices of 
forced labour. Several reports by NGOs and UN agencies highlighted that 
international pressure may have led to the incremental decrease in forced labour 
practices.149 This reduced frequency could also be attributed to the 
complementary influence of hybrid strategies, including the ILO’s policy that 
combined diplomatic pressure with engagement on the ground.150 
Despite these shortcomings, the withdrawal was perceived as a partial 
success by lobbyists. It was deemed a success because the influence exerted by 
campaigners on policy-making was unprecedented in the EU’s history. Yet, its 
success was limited insofar as the penalty did not quickly yield tangible impact on 
the SPDC. Campaign groups therefore continued their calls for tougher economic 
penalties.  
 
2.2. Discouraging Tourism (1998) 
2.2.1. EU Policy 
On 26 October 1998, the Council decided to strengthen the common position 
by prohibiting the issuance of transit visas and extending the visa ban to cover 
Myanma authorities in the tourism sector. It echoed the view, put across by 
campaigners, that it was inappropriate for tourists to visit Myanmar. Common 
Position 98/612/CFSP suspended ‘high-level bilateral government (ministers and 
officials of political director level and above) visits to Burma/Myanmar’.151 
Member states made statements discouraging European tourists from traveling 
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to Myanmar.152 The Council also envisaged the possibility of economic and 
financial sanctions against Myanmar, but did not enact such restrictions.153 
This measure was the result of endogenous dynamics within the EU, rather 
than induced by exogenous factors. It was enforced after Myanmar had 
organised its ‘Visit Myanmar Year 1996’. This tourism promotion initiative was 
condemned by the NLD and, in Europe, by members of parliaments and human 
rights campaigners. There were unconfirmed reports of severe human rights 
abuses perpetrated by military troops supervising the security of the construction 
of infrastructure promoting tourism, notably near the archaeological site of 
Bagan. Slow dynamics of decision-making led to the sanctions being taken 
retrospectively after the tourism year. Following liberal intergovernmentalism, 
these sanctions were applied because they did not significantly damage the 
economic interests of big European companies.  
This liberal intergovernmental interpretation seems reductive, however. 
Ideational factors had been progressively outweighing economic interests. 
Sanctions promoting human rights had contributed to the tarnishing of the 
reputation of companies doing business in a pariah state. SMEs from the tourism 
sector, and more significantly Total, complained of bearing the collateral impact 
of sanctions. By the late nineties, bad publicity was an important reason that led 
British and Danish companies to withdraw from Myanmar.  
 
2.2.2. Impact of EU Measures 
The visa ban on entities related to tourism carried a symbolic impact. It did not 
immediately influence the junta’s behaviour with respect to the demands 
expressed by the EU. It bore indirect sectorial costs on smaller European 
companies and tour operators. These self-inflicted economic inconveniences 
were negligible for European countries. 
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Statements against European tourism and the 1998 sanctions against 
authorities involved in tourism kept European tourists from travelling to Myanmar. 
This impacted negatively on Myanmar’s socio-economic development. 7 million 
tourists from the EU visit ASEAN countries each year, but only a tiny portion 
goes to Myanmar. Table 5 compares the economic weight of the tourism sector 
with the number of visitors to selected Southeast Asian countries. Despite a 
renowned cultural and natural heritage, Myanmar barely received 4 percent of 
the regional visitors in 2010. The small number of visitors is mainly a direct 
consequence of Western sanctions and of statements that discouraged tourists. 
The tiny Myanmar tourism sector employs 1.2 million people, or 5.2 percent of 
the country’s workforce.154 This small share of tourism mirrors the size of 
Myanmar’s services sector, which represented 16 percent of Myanmar’s GDP in 
2007/2008. Strengthening tertiary activities, however, is an important step 
towards the emergence of a middle class, which can act as an agent of 
democratisation.  
 
Table 5: Size of Tourism in Southeast Asia, 2010 data 
 Number of visitors Tourism’s share of GDP 
Myanmar   311,000 5.0% 
Laos 2,400,000 8.5% 
Cambodia 2,500,000 n.a. 
Vietnam 5,400,000 13.0% 
Thailand 15,800,000 14.0% 
Malaysia 25,000,000 13.0% 
Source: World Tourism Organisation (2011) and interview 6. 
 
Figure 7 compares the number of international tourist arrivals in Myanmar and 
Laos between 1995 and 2009. It shows that the number of tourists increased 20 
times in comparatively poor Laos. By contrast, the number of arrivals nearly 
stagnated in Myanmar, despite being endowed with a bigger touristic potential. 
Until 2003, however, Myanmar had on average more tourists than Laos.  
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liners.158 More such tourism may indeed help to overcome the wall of isolation 
that the tourism boycott has helped to create.159 
 
2.3. Consensus on the Absence of Blanket Sanctions (1998-2000) 
Despite the growing agreement within the EU to punish Myanmar for its 
reprehensible non-respect of basic human and civil rights, policy-makers set 
boundaries to the European consensus by agreeing not to impose a ban on trade 
and investment. The European decision not to impose blanket economic 
sanctions was based on the EU’s determination not to infringe WTO agreements. 
This would have set a legal precedent for the EU, which EU member states as 
well as the Commission were keen to elude. The Commission later explained 
that a trade embargo would be illegal and detrimental to the welfare of Myanma 
people.160 
As regards trade relations, Burma/Myanmar is a member of World Trade 
Organisations (WTO) and its trade is therefore protected by WTO Rules from any 
discriminatory treatment.161 
The Massachusetts Burma Law of 20 June 1997 prohibited the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ state agencies from contracting companies 
doing business in Myanmar, independently from their nationality. It also imposed 
a 10 percent negative preference against companies active in Myanmar.162 This 
law (subsequently emulated by other American states and public entities) also 
impacted against European companies active both in Myanmar and in the state 
of Massachusetts.163 In addition to these penalising extraterritorial regulatory 
                                                 
158 NLD asserted that cruise liners bring substantial income to the state, although these liners 
only use private companies for onshore excursions. Interviews 6 and 18. 
159 House of Lords: Committee of 12 October 2007. 
160 Pederson 2008: 39. 
161 European Commission: Answer of 16 October 2002. 
162 Schaeffer 2002: 3. 
163 ‘From 1996 to 2000, twenty-three other states, cities and counties followed the Massachusetts 
initiative: Alameda county, CA; Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO; Brookline, MA; 
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effects, the law would have created a legal precedent for the European 
Communities.  
The EC declared that this law infringed the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) rules signed with the US.164 In September 1998, the European 
Commission filed a complaint at the WTO against the state of Massachusetts. 
This complaint fomented a stir in the Congress and among the US diplomatic 
corps.165 By all accounts, the WTO complaint put EU foreign policy in harmony 
with WTO non-discrimination principles.166 The EU defined the European 
consensus by discarding blanket economic sanctions on Myanmar, thus 
preserving core economic interests of its member states. 
This decision was taken after several meetings between European and 
American officials, at the outset mediated by the UK consul in Boston and later 
with EU officials together with the UK.167 As part of the negotiations, the EU 
offered to drop its WTO-complaint if Massachusetts amended specific measures, 
so that formal sanctions on Myanmar could have remained in place without 
hurting European companies. Nevertheless, negotiations collapsed, notably 
because the EU was unable to propose additional restrictions it would take 
against the SPDC.168 
It is noteworthy that the UK government did not oppose the European 
complaint against the Burma Massachusetts Act, despite its principled stance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carrboro, NC; Chapel Hill, NC; Los Angeles, CA; Madison, WI; Massachusetts; New York, NY; 
Newton, MA; Oakland, CA; Pablo Alto, CA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA; San 
Cruz, CA; San Monica, CA; Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; Vermont; and West Hollywood, 
CA’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2006; see also: Schaeffer 2002: 11). 
164 The GPA of 1979 did not cover procurement practices of sub-national governments. However, 
the so-called ‘federal state clause’ of GATT Art. 24 (2) clarified that federal states are fully 
responsible for the actions of their component units (Schaeffer 2002: 3; 5-6). 
165 In August 1998, ambassador Barshefsky had announced her intention to defend the 
Massachusetts law in any WTO panel proceeding. Rep. Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) 
introduced a bill in the same month that would have barred the US Department of Justice from 
using funds to challenge state laws inconsistent with trade agreements (Schaeffer 2002: 11). 
166 European Commission: Answer of 16 October 2002. 
167 Financial Times, 24 June 1997: 6; ibid.: 9 July 1997: 4, quoted in: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, August 2006. 
168 Schaeffer 2002: 10. 
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and domestic pressures in favour of economic sanctions. This policy shows that, 
at least in this instance, British economic interests prevailed over the defence of 
human rights. This pragmatism is reminiscent of the policy led by the 
Conservative government before 1997. Therefore, this stance should not be 
attributed to an alteration of initial preferences following social interaction with 
other EU policy-makers, but to the defence of important British interests spanning 
two decades.  
The bandwagoning hypothesis is not refuted by the Burma Massachusetts Act. 
The case has never been directly transposed into US foreign policy. The Federal 
Court of the United States nullified the law on 20 June 2000 by ruling that the 
State Act was pre-empted under the Supremacy clause of the US Constitution.169 
Neo-realism does not consider that domestic politics – below the federal level – 
represent an important variable to explain the interactions between actors of 
International Relations. 
The Burma Massachusetts Act enticed domestic constituencies in EU member 
states to call for tougher sanctions on Myanmar. In 1997, MEPs already 
suggested that the Commission issued: 
[…] a proposal as soon as possible for an end to investments on the part of the 
Union so that, together with the US, maximum pressure can be put on Burma.170 
The European Parliament and UK Parliament passed resolutions urging the 
Commission to retreat from its challenge of the Massachusetts law.171 
Registering the complaint induced European countries (e.g. the UK) to 
unilaterally discourage trade with Myanmar. In its Resolution of 19 February 
1998, the European Parliament had already proposed adopting informal 
restrictions to the Commission. In October 1998, newly nominated Dutch minister 
of foreign affairs van Aartsen and the minister of development cooperation 
Herfkens expressed, for the first time, the Netherlands’ public support for 
                                                 
169 Supreme Court of the United States, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 19 June 2000. 
170 EP, 22 January 1998: Written Question No. 1632/97. 
171 EP: Resolution of 12 June 1997; EP: Resolution of 17 September 1998; Guay 2000: 361. 
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economic sanctions in the form of an investment ban. But French cooperation 
minister Charles Josselin stated that France would oppose any proposal for 
economic sanctions, which would fail to achieve their political objectives and 
harm the civilian population.172 
The prevalence of the UK’s position in EU policy towards Myanmar sheds light 
on how America’s principled stance may have indirectly influenced the EU. 
Hardening the European stance served to counterbalance the impact of the WTO 
complaint. British diplomats mentioned that they ‘exchange views on Burma 
policy quite frequently’ with their American counterparts.173 Historically, the UK 
has been intent to follow the grain of American democracy promotion – and even 
more so under Blair’s Premiership.174 
There is, however, no empirical evidence of direct US pressure on the UK to 
scale up sanctions. British domestic groups independently favoured a policy of 
sanctions emulating the US. They lobbied the parliament and government – and 
European institutions (although to a lesser extent) – to follow suit on US bans on 
investment and trade.175 Liberal intergovernmentalism thus seems more apt to 
explain the dynamics of policy-making. The EU decided to safeguard its 
economic interest in the case of Massachusetts; concurrently, domestic and 
parliamentary groups intensified calls for a principled policy. These internal 
pressures subsequently led to further restrictions. The ensuing section shows 
that a bargaining process among EU member states led the EU to reinforce 
restrictions, while also charting a track of diplomatic engagement with the SPDC.  
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Pederson 2008: 37-38. 
173 Email exchange 5.  
174 Interviews 3 and 6. 
175 EP, 22 January 1998: Written Question No. 1632/97; EP, 30 April 1998: Written Question No. 
2743/97. 
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3. Deepening the Consensus: Diplomatic Engagement in 
Combination with Tougher Sanctions (1999 – 2002) 
3.1. The 1999 Troika 
Four years on after ASSK’s release on 10 July 1995, the EU indicated it was 
willing to resume relations by sending a Troika to Yangon on 6 July 1999. The 
delegation met with ASSK and SPDC Secretary-1 General Khin Nyunt. This mid-
level mission comprised a representative of Finland, then holder of the EU 
Presidency, Portugal (to hold the next Presidency), the European Commission, 
and the Council secretariat.176 Discussion topics included: bilateral trade, EU-
ASEAN relations, ASSK, and the human rights situation.177 
The Troika was an outcome of the German Presidency (January-June 1999), 
which had pressed the Council for engaging with the junta.178 Berlin had argued 
that engagement would make EU policy more effective. Principled member 
states retorted that sanctions should be heightened if engagement did not bear 
fruit. Germany used its own policy evaluation as well as bargaining tactics to 
secure a Troika to Yangon. Berlin had extracted this concession from principled 
member states, in exchange for an increase of targeted sanctions if the Troika 
mission would not bear fruit.179 Thus, EU member states still bargained to reach 
joint decisions. Rather than competitive bargaining, this process of decision-
making could be described as ‘cooperative bargaining’, or ‘problem-solving’.180 
As the first point of contact since 1996, the EU Troika did not yield substantial 
result. To begin with, this could be accounted for by the reclusion of the top-
SPDC leadership. The EU met with only one decision-maker (i.e. SPDC 
Secretary-1 General Khin Nyunt), and not with the two others (i.e. SPDC 
Chairman Senior General Than Shwe, and SPDC Vice-Chairman General 
                                                 
176 Reuters, 6 July 1999.  
177 Hristov 2009: 128-9. 
178 Ibid: 129; 135. IDEA 2001: 41. 
179 Interview 13.  
180 Thomas 2011: 18ff. 
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Maung Aye). Important decisions could hardly be taken without the involvement 
of these more senior generals. Therefore, the EU Troika could not adequately 
address the SPDC’s system of decision-making that involved a group of generals 
rather than one-man rule.181 
Second, the member states represented (i.e. Finland and Portugal) never 
displayed a vested interest in the issue of Myanmar. For liberal 
intergovernmentalism, they were ‘smaller’ members, unable to influence the 
positions of the three big member states. The intergovernmental dynamics of EU 
policy-making stifled the Troika’s capacity to negotiate with the SPDC.  
 
3.2. Tightening Sanctions in 2000  
3.2.1. EU Policy 
Since no tangible progress was recorded after the 1999 Troika, sanctions 
were tightened on 26 April 2000. The EU extended its visa ban on new high-
ranking Myanma military figures and tourism authorities, and banned the export 
of ‘equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism’.182 This 
reinforcement of the 1990 arms embargo forbade the shipment of military 
equipment to Myanmar, which had been possible hitherto. This measure had 
already been proposed by the Netherlands in 1993.183 The EU also imposed a 
freeze on assets held abroad by the officials targeted by the visa ban. 
An additional type of economic sanctions consisted in forbidding loans to 
enterprises owned or associated with the Myanmar government.184 This 
measure, initiated by the UK, was partially a response to pressure from the 
public. Also the European Parliament had again and again called for the 
imposition of blanket sanctions on Myanmar, such as a ban on trade or 
                                                 
181 Saw Myat 2008: 60. 
182 Council of the EU: Common Position of 26 April 2000; ibid.: Regulation (EC) of 22 May 2000. 
183 Hristov 2009: 113. 
184 Council of the EU: Common Position of 26 April 2000; ibid.: Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2000 of 
22 May 2000. 
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investment.185 It was the UK that proposed the imposition of these measures in 
2000.186 In contradiction with the compliance hypothesis, no adverse domestic 
developments had occurred in Myanmar, which would have warranted scaling up 
penalties. This increase of restrictions in 1998 and 2000 was triggered by a 
dynamic purely endogenous to the EU. It reflected the will of principled member 
states to escalate the instruments enforced.  
Member states with a vested interest in securing their investments in Myanmar 
did not really suffer from the ban on loans. No loan of this type has been reported 
since Germany cancelled all development assistance in the late eighties. 
Moreover, significant new investments were already deterred by the bad publicity 
related to Myanmar. Representatives of Total confessed that the Yadana 
investment had substantially harmed the company’s image.187 The group’s 
impressive corporate and social responsibility programme, with an (in 2011) 
annual budget of USD 2.7 million and more than 100 staff members dedicated to 
CSR, aimed at re-establishing their good reputation towards shareholders.188  
Paris defended its economic interests less aggressively than in 1996 or 1997 – 
although punitive measures may have eroded the reputation of French 
companies as reliable business partners for Myanmar. It would be erroneous to 
depict France as a member state that is solely driven by its national economic 
interests – as campaigners have done.189 Paris was increasingly convinced by 
the moral necessity to adopt a normative position vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue, 
albeit putatively offsetting French business interests. France was reluctant to 
appear as the member state ‘dragging its heels’ in the Council.  
                                                 
185 EP, 16 June 1998: Written Question No. 3679/97; EP, 25 May 1998: Written Question No. 
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EU member states insisted (with the USA) that international organisations put 
political conditions on loans they would grant to Myanmar. As a consequence, 
the World Bank offered a $1 billion loan in 2000‚ but only on condition that the 
regime begun talks with the opposition. Due to the lack of progress, the World 
Bank did not award the proposed credit.190  
 
3.2.2. Impact of EU Measures 
The ban on loans to state-owned enterprises had practically no impact on the 
target’s behaviour. EU member states had made no loans to Myanmar in the last 
decade. The measure was merely symbolic. 
The asset freeze was an equally symbolic measure. It has never been proven 
that the entities targeted by the asset freeze since 2000 ever held any significant 
funds in EU territories.191 The measure had even been announced by some EU 
officials before its adoption, so that the necessary surprise effect was limited.  
It is officially unknown how much has been seized in total in the EU. This 
measure is implemented solely by the member states without European 
Commission oversight.192 Had there been any Myanmar funds in EU banks, the 
asset freeze could be made more effective if it was centrally monitored, as some 
member states are better at implementing common measures than others.  
It has nonetheless been assessed that no more than €200,000 have been 
frozen throughout the entire EU between 2000 and 2009.193 Funds frozen in the 
UK amounted to £49,500 between 2000 and 2007.194 BC UK advanced that, in 
2001, funds seized by all member states solely amounted £89.195 For 
comparison, the US asset freeze led to $320,000 seized between 2003 and 2007 
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in US territory.196 This limited impact contrasts with the EU asset freeze on 
Zimbabwe, where £160,000 of Zimbabwean assets were frozen only in UK banks 
by late 2006.197 (This seizure represents, however, one isolated case of 
success). The inability to seize substantial funds confirms that the asset freeze 
was a symbolic measure unlikely to tilt the power struggle in favour of Myanmar’s 
democratic forces. It could be asked why the members of the government should 
have renounced to their economic rent when the EU was unable to freeze their 
financial assets. 
 
3.3. Consensus on Resuming Cooperation with ASEAN  
In exchange for scaling up targeted economic sanctions, principled EU 
member states agreed to introduce a waiver on the visa ban. This decision was 
motivated by the desire not to hold the ASEAN-EU meetings hostage to the 
Myanmar issue.198 Between 25 October 1996 and the ASEAN-EU JCC meeting 
held in Bangkok on 25-26 May 1999, EU member states had strictly cancelled all 
multilateral meetings where Myanmar was a party.199 After a delay of more than 
a year and a half, the EU and ASEAN finally worked out a formula allowing 
Myanmar to attend meetings between ASEAN-EU JCC representatives in 
Bangkok in May 1999.200 The conditions were that human rights would be 
included on the agenda and that Myanmar would only attend as silent observer.  
This decision fomented a row among principled member states, notably the 
UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Myanmar’s treatment of human rights and 
obstruction of the democratic transition were condemned during the meeting. 
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Denmark even refused to take part in meetings where Myanmar was party to the 
discussions.201  
To dissipate these disagreements, member states agreed to introduce an 
explicit waiver clause in the Common Position of 26 April 2000. It was proposed 
by the Commission under Germany’s impetus. It stipulated:  
[…] the ban on the issue of an entry visa for the Foreign Minister may be waived 
where it is in the interests of the European Union.202  
Belgium granted a first exception to the visa ban in December 2000, allowing 
Myanma foreign minister Win Aung to attend the ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting 
in Brussels. The decision sparked discontent in Belgian public opinion, which 
tended to invoke a boycott policy against Myanmar.203 Indeed, ASSK had been 
temporarily put under house arrest on 23 September 2000. The EU had 
condemned the ‘obstacles to the free movement’ of ASSK and NLD members.204 
But it resisted domestic pressures to once again scale up punitive measures. 
The ASEM4 foreign ministers meeting held in Madrid on 6-7 June 2002 
agreed to take up ASEAN enlargement.205 Myanmar was also not barred from 
attending the ASEM4 summit arranged in Copenhagen from 23 to 24 September 
2002, despite Denmark’s principled stance on this issue.206 Denmark’s 
concession could partly be related to the calculation that ASEM is relatively 
immune to public scrutiny. ASEM4 did not fall into the international limelight: only 
five out of fifteen Europeans participated in the meeting at the heads of state or 
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government level, whereas ten EU states were represented at a lower political 
level.207  
Belgium reiterated this exception under the auspices of the 14th ASEAN-EU 
ministerial meeting held in Brussels in December 2003.208 Demonstrations by 
pro-democracy activists were organised by human rights groups and the 
Myanma diaspora (e.g. Euro Burma Office, Actions Birmanie, Action Birmanie 
Cohérence, Action Pétrole ou Birmanie, or Parliamentarians for Burma in 
Belgium) in front of the Council’s buildings. Belgian domestic constituencies did 
not exert much influence on their government’s position on these occasions in 
2000 and 2003.  
A new European consensus had thus emerged on the application of the 
waiver of the visa ban, which was enshrined in the common position. 
Nonetheless, waiving the visa ban did not hinder EU member states from 
continuing to censure Myanmar or shun multilateral meetings where it was a 
party. While this analysis supports the consensus hypothesis, it is noteworthy 
that the new agreement had been promoted by Germany, a large member state. 
The role of smaller member states and European institutions in forging EU 
decisions was less significant. 
 
4. The Path to Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release  
Myanmar ushered in a period of relative conciliation between 2001 and 2003, 
during which the EU sent three Troika missions to Myanmar. ASSK was 
eventually released on 6 April 2002.  
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4.1. The Troika of 2001 
On 29-31 January 2001, the EU sent a Troika to Yangon.209 The SPDC had 
delayed the visit, initially scheduled for October 2000, until Myanmar was allowed 
to participate in the 13th Asia Europe Ministerial Meeting on 11-12 December 
2000 held in Vientiane.210 The Troika (headed by Swedish diplomat Borje 
Ljunggren) met with Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt, foreign minister Win Aung, NLD 
leaders including ASSK, representatives of ethnic groups, NGOs, and the UN.211 
The Troika pointed out the need for Myanmar to invite the new Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights, Paulo Pinheiro; to re-enter in dialogue with the 
ILO over forced labour practices; and allow the ILO to be represented in the 
country.212 It also attempted to find a compromise on the issue of Myanmar’s 
participation in multilateral meetings with ASEAN.213 The Troika was able to 
confirm that ASSK had met with senior officials since October 2000, a month 
after her second arrest. Both sides had however agreed to withhold the contents 
of these talks.214 The atmosphere was described as positive.215 
Youngs contended that EU engagement was the result of a compromise 
between principled and flexible member states. The Council had tightened the 
screws in 2000, provided the European Community would increase aid and the 
EU would attempt to engage diplomatically with Myanmar.216 The European 
Community thus awarded €2 million in humanitarian aid.217  
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The Council welcomed the results of the Troika. It declared its willingness to 
send another mission.218 The EU recognised propitious developments in 
Myanmar, such as the release of 219 prisoners of conscience.219 This enticed the 
Council to identify: 
[…] a number of positive measures designed to recognise the process that has been 
set in motion in Burma/Myanmar in expectation of further positive developments.220 
As additional incentives, the Council signalled its support to the following 
initiatives: (1) the Commission launching an HIV/AIDS programme (€5 million), 
and its contribution to the UN operations in Myanmar; (2) allowing Myanmar’s 
foreign minister at the next ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting in 2002; (3) 
supporting Myanmar’s application to join the International Hydrographic 
Organisation; (4) advising Myanmar how to qualify for bilateral debt relief under 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI); (5) and the Council’s 
willingness to send another Troika mission before the end of 2001.221 This 
comparatively more flexible position is noteworthy. For twenty years, these steps 
have been the only incentives officially presented by the Council as a trade-off for 
political reforms introduced by the SPDC.  
The question should be raised as to what extent the SPDC was likely to 
respond favourably to the proposed incentives. None of the offers made were 
attractive enough to seriously entice the SPDC to compromise with EU demands. 
Participation in multilateral meetings was not a priority for Myanmar. Funds would 
be channelled only via the UN or international NGOs, and benefit HIV/AIDS 
patients (whereas HIV/AIDS at that time was still a taboo issue in the country, 
due to an ingrained tradition of narcotraffic in the Golden Triangle). No guarantee 
was given that Myanmar could actually qualify for debt relief. The explicit link 
between aid to HIV/AIDS patients and political reforms contradicted the very 
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principle that humanitarian aid be untied of political strings. It seemed to ignore 
Myanmar’s entrenched policy to refuse conditionalities. Fearful of domestic 
reprobation, the EU was cautious not to make any substantial concession to a 
pariah state.  
Around the same time, the EU attempted to coax Australia (on 6 March 2001) 
and South Korea (on 12 March 2001) into co-sponsoring ILO initiatives 
condemning Myanmar for its use of forced labour. This motion led to an ILO fact-
finding mission sent from 17 September until 13 October 2001.222 Myanmar 
responded dismissively by postponing the visit of another Troika scheduled later 
in 2001.223 
 
4.2. The Troika of March 2002 
The EU sent another Troika on 13-15 March 2002, headed by a representative 
of the Spanish Presidency.224 As tactical move, the SPDC released twenty-five 
women prisoners before the Troika’s arrival. The Troika was received only at the 
level of senior officials and made a courtesy call to the foreign minister. However, 
the arrest of General Ne Win’s family (accused of plotting a coup) in the same 
month overshadowed the visit.225 The EU reiterated its concerns on the human 
rights situation, and on the lack of reform of the state apparatus. It expected that 
Myanmar would strengthen its positive developments, notably by releasing more 
prisoners of conscience.  
Important demands of the 2001 and March 2002 Troikas were subsequently 
heeded by the SPDC, although it is difficult to establish a causal link. On 21 
March 2002, the ILO posted an Interim Liaison Officer to Yangon. At the June 
2002 meeting of the ILO, the Spanish delegate welcomed this appointment on 
                                                 
222 Hristov 2009: 132-3. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Rafel Conde, Asia Pacific Director of the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs (Soe Myint Aung 
2003: 100; EP: Resolution of 12 April 2002, point H). 
225 Soe Myint Aung 2003: 100. 
220
Chapter V 
behalf of the EU and associate members.226 On 21 November 2002, the military 
government claimed to have released a hundred and fifteen prisoners of 
conscience (numbers which were disputed by the political opposition).227 Finally, 
Human Rights Special Rapporteur Paulo Pinheiro was allowed to visit Myanmar 
from 10 to 19 February and from 17 to 28 October 2002, after the authorities had 
suspended his visits since his second trip ending on 17 October 2001.228 At the 
end of his fourth visit, the Human Rights Envoy openly questioned the soundness 
of Western demands on Myanmar: 
I don’t understand the expectation that Burma would be different, that you would 
have a brand new state apparatus, brand new people, brand new minds that will be 
able to deal with human rights issues….Don’t expect instant regime change in 
Burma.229 
 
4.3. Aung San Suu Kyi’s Second Release (2002) 
The SPDC released ASSK from detention on 6 April 2002 – allegedly owing to 
efforts by UN Secretary General Envoy Razali Ismail, bolstered by behind-the-
scene support from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.230 Her second 
release took place after she had held talks with the military government while 
under house arrest.231 In the months following her release, the regime hosted a 
series of meetings with the NLD leadership, which was also allowed to liaise with 
Western embassies. The EU greeted her release solemnly.232  
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Drawing upon the compliance hypothesis, it was to be expected that the EU 
would relax its sanctions regime in order to entice Myanmar to undertake further 
reform. Indeed, ASSK’s release took place in the context of a relatively more 
conciliatory policy carried out by Myanmar vis-à-vis Western demands. Between 
June 2002 and March 2003, ASSK, Tin Oo and other members of the NLD were 
allowed to travel to the regions of Mandalay, Bago, and to the Mon, Karen and 
Arakan states.233 With the benefit of hindsight, analysts contended that SPDC 
Secretary-1 General Khin Nyunt had chartered a policy of relative liberalisation, 
which the international community failed to recognise.234  
From the mid-nineties, the central government concluded a series of 
seventeen ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities – a historical juncture in 
the country’s history of intractable civil wars. The authorities designed policies 
against drug trafficking, which were supported by the United Nations, particularly 
by UNODC.235 The period also saw non-state actors, for example, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),236 finally granted permission to 
visit detainees and to investigate the situation of civilians affected by conflict 
along the Thai border. Amnesty International was entrusted to visit Myanmar for 
the first time in early 2003.237 In addition to the EU Troikas, General Khin Nyunt 
welcomed delegations by European MPs (e.g. two delegations by German MP 
Dietrich Marlo in 1994 and in 1998, as well as a delegation by German MP 
Köster-Loßback in 2002).238 He looked after relations with European 
ambassadors, and took part in international summits. Various independent 
                                                 
233 Egreteau 2010: 93. 
234 Zarni and Oo 2004; Haacke 2006; Egreteau and Jagan 2009. 
235 Callahan 2007: 26.  
236 The regime has forbidden the ICRC to visit prisons since October 2005, and asked the ICRC 
to close their field offices in October 2006 (European Commission 2007a: Report). 
237 Haacke 2006: 10. 
238 Revel 2008: 29. 
222
Chapter V 
sources advanced that Khin Nyunt had been more conciliatory towards ASSK.239 
According to UN Human Rights Envoy Pinheiro,  
[Khin Nyunt] recognised the necessity and value of the political opposition and its 
potentially constructive role in the transition to democracy.240 
(Such claims should however be qualified because Khin Nyunt’s Machiavellian 
openness was related to his functions as MI-chief and head of the infamous 
secret police). Finally, an ILO representative noted that a decrease in the use of 
forced labour had been witnessed between the beginning of mid-nineties and the 
mid-2000 decade.241 Such positive developments could have justified the 
temporary suspension of specific measures.  
 
4.4. The Troika of September 2002 
As a reaction to ASSK’s release, the EU sent a mid-level Troika from 8 to 10 
September 2002. The Troika was headed by Carsten Pederson, regional director 
at the Danish foreign ministry, and accompanied by two EU officials – Franz 
Eichinger and James Moran – as well as the first secretary at the Greek embassy 
in Bangkok, Sotiris Apostopolous.242 The delegation met with, amongst others, 
the deputy foreign minister, Khin Maung Win (a lower level compared to 
previously Khin Nyunt on 6 July 1999 and 29-31 January 2001), ASSK, 
representatives of ethnic minorities, the international community residing in 
Yangon, and NGOs.  
The purpose of the visit was to gather information at source concerning the 
political and human rights situation and to convey the EU’s expectations. The 
Troika called on the government to step up the reconciliation process and 
release all prisoners of conscience. It gave voice to the EU’s continued concern 
about human rights, particularly in ethnic minority areas, and the practice of 
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forced labour.243 The conclusions of the Troika visit were that the SPDC should 
strengthen its reform process.244 
The EU’s absence of reaction to Myanmar’s partial compliance with its 
demands contradicts the compliance hypothesis. The EU did not fulfil the 
incentives it had given to the SPDC after the Troika of 2001.245 This decision not 
to promptly react underscores the symbolic function of EU foreign policy. Lobby 
groups in Europe were organising campaigns for tougher sanctions: in 2002, a 
broad alliance of British domestic groups launched the ‘Burma Sanctions 
Coalition’ to press the UK and the EU to impose investment sanctions.246 Finally, 
the reform process grounded to a halt after ASSK was put under house arrest for 
a third time in May 2003.  
 
4.5. The Depayin Incident (2003) 
ASSK had begun touring the country to visit NLD offices outside Yangon. On 
30 May 2003, her convoy was met by a mob, putatively affiliated with the 
government-controlled Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). It 
attacked the motorcade of the opposition leader next to the small city of Depayin. 
ASSK managed to escape the aggression but was immediately placed under 
house arrest. The junta announced the death of four persons but opposition 
sources claimed that there had been between 50 and 80 casualties.247 The 
SPDC allowed an international investigation to take place under the aegis of UN 
Human Rights Envoy Paulo Pinheiro, whose mandate stemmed from the 
UNHCHR, but never heeded his recommendations. Newly-nominated Prime 
Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the introduction on 30 August 2003 of a 
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‘roadmap to democracy’, which formalised the transition from SPDC rule to so-
called ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’. 
 
4.5.1. The EU’s Reaction to Depayin 
As an almost mechanical consequence, the EU further entrenched its 
sanctions regime. It condemned the ‘Depayin incident’.248 It widened the visa ban 
and asset freeze on more members of the military regime and its clients on 16 
June 2003.249 Member states agreed on these restrictions as a direct response to 
the regime’s behaviour, without waiting for the annual rollover of the common 
position normally decided in April every year.250 This fairly swift reaction owed to 
the enhanced institutionalisation of EU foreign policy. EU member states’ 
interests converged to support democracy icon ASSK.  
The Council additionally introduced a prohibition on the making of financial 
loans or credits to state-owned companies.251 These measures corroborate the 
compliance hypothesis, since these sanctions were officially deemed to punish 
the junta’s behaviour.252 However, the compliance hypothesis worked only in a 
punitive sense. The EU did not revise its policy when the SPDC made 
propitiatory gestures, however limited.  
The EU policy was also supported by a context of international uproar created 
by the alleged assassination attempt. As a reaction to the Depayin incident, 
President George W. Bush signed into law the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act on 29 July 2003. Figure 8 illustrates the quasi-immediate impact 
of the US import ban on Myanmar’s terms of trade with the US.  
                                                 
248 Since it is unknown whether the raid was a deliberate attempt to assassinate the democracy 
icon, the international community referred to the events as: the ‘Depayin incident’. Despite the 
diplomatic language, which avoided explicitly calling the ambush an assassination attempt, the 
EU strengthened sanctions as a direct consequence of the skirmish.  
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Figure 8: Myanmar’s trade with the US, 1980-2010 in million $ (annual values) 
 
Source: IMF (March 2012): Direction of Trade. 
 
The Bush administration escalated its rhetoric on Myanmar, as well as the 
pressure on third states to further sever relations with the SPDC.253 Donald 
Seekins mentioned that Japan ‘halted new aid’ owing to US pressure.254 
Nevertheless, there is no indication that the US applied direct pressure on the EU 
to escalate its restrictive measures on Myanmar. While the US stance may have 
contributed to induce the EU to reinforce sanctions, there is ample evidence from 
interviews that the EU acted under its own impetus, and not because of US 
pressure.255 
 
4.5.2. Stalled Dialogue Process after 2003 
i. End to EU Troikas 
As a consequence of the Depayin incident (and in the recognition of their 
limited usefulness), the EU abandoned the dispatch of Troikas to Yangon as a 
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means to seek meaningful dialogue with Myanmar.256 In the aftermath of the 
Depayin incident, Myanmar became more unwilling to cooperate with the 
international community. The Depayin incident, too, hardened the EU’s position 
on Myanmar.  
Troikas have been waived aside as a ‘pointless exercise’ by various 
officials.257 These delegations – received at a level irrelevant for Myanmar’s 
military policy-making system – did not build mutual trust. Official visits were 
monitored closely on the Myanmar side, notably via an intricate network of 
informers. Representatives of the authorities had to ostentatiously show they did 
not compromise on the country’s national interest, not the least by fear of losing 
their position in a volatile political system. In this context, and also due to limited 
state capacity, high-level meetings could not take place frequently.258 EU Troikas 
could never meet with the top generals, except at selected occasions with the 
important but less senior General Khin Nyunt. 
As far as the EU was concerned, the level of preparation of the different 
diplomats could vary tremendously. Troikas were fact-finding missions, so that 
little political preparation was required from EU representatives. The latter were 
not mandated by the Council to ‘sit down’ and directly negotiate with their 
interlocutors. This lack of material commitment disappointed expectations on the 
Myanmar side. The Lisbon Treaty subsequently abolished the Troika system in 
December 2009. 
 
ii. Political Stasis in Myanmar 
After ASSK’s third arrest, the reconciliation process between the SPDC and 
NLD completely stalled. From the junta’s perspective, ASSK’s release had stirred 
domestic unrest – whether intended or not – and failed to assuage international 
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demands. Removing her from public view was therefore the government’s 
preferred option.  
There was a rumour of conspiracy, namely that Senior General Than Shwe 
had secretly ordered ASSK’s assassination attempt at Depayin.259 This 
conspiracy could uncover why the dialogue process between the NLD and SPDC 
never substantially resumed after 2003. Haacke concluded:  
For the present military leadership the lesson, now learned twice, is that the release 
of Aung San Suu Kyi may not only compromise domestic stability, but is also unlikely 
to bring respite from external demands for political change and no substantial 
material benefits or recognition.260 
Razali asserted that the international community might not have put enough 
efforts into securing tangible rewards for the military government in return for the 
relaxation of the political climate between 2002 and 2003.261 FCO minister of 
state Mike O’Brien told parliament in 2004: 
If I may be critical of the UK, I should say that in the early part of last year we could 
have been more encouraging of the process of reform undertaken before 30 May.262 
To sum up, EU foreign policy stalled after the Depayin incident. Scaling up 
sanctions was the result of the protracted political stalemate in Myanmar. 
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Summary 
In 1996, the EU took the crucial decision to formalise its sanctions policy in a 
common position. Common Position 1996/635/CFSP later served as a reference 
point for scaling up restrictive measures. It represented the initial European 
                                                 
259 Interview 23. Senior General Than Shwe was a patron of the USDA, which he created in 1993. 
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consensus. In the following years, no EU member state directly challenged the 
rationale that led to the adoption of this common position.  
This consensus consisted in treating Myanmar as a ‘pariah’ state. Sanctions 
were deemed a suitable instrument to promote human rights and democracy. 
Calls by ASSK and the NLD for international sanctions were relayed by domestic 
groups within several member states and by epistemic communities at the EU 
level. These calls strongly orientated the path-defining choice to reinforce 
sanctions in 1996 and in the ensuing years.263 Drawing upon Doxey’s taxonomy 
of sanctions objectives,264 the common position aimed at demonstrating 
European solidarity towards Denmark (whose consul died in In Sein prison), as 
well as towards Myanmar’s political opposition. This symbolic function explains 
why the EU later reinforced sanctions, even though Myanmar had already joined 
ASEAN in 1997. 
This foreign policy orientation owed to the norm entrepreneurial role played by 
the UK. London pursued a principled policy due to its historical relation with 
Myanmar, links between British elites and NLD representatives, and domestic 
pressures stemming from national human rights campaign groups. In 1997, the 
election of a new British government proved decisive for the forthcoming EU 
policy. Having vowed to carry out an ‘ethical foreign policy’, New Labour was 
eager to distinguish its stance from previous Conservative governments. British 
leaders – like Robin Cook but also Tony Blair – were personally involved in the 
design of a principled policy.  
The European consensus was reached via a bargaining process between the 
largest member states. France acceded to UK proposals on the condition that EU 
policy would not entail restrictions on trade or investment. Germany demanded in 
April 2000 that the common position be revised to allow for a waiver on the visa 
ban. In sum, ideational factors constituted the ‘push factors’ in EU foreign policy, 
while the logic of diversity formed the ‘brakes’ in decision-making.  
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The consensus, therefore, evolved differently according to various issue 
areas. It was most resilient in the field of assistance policy. EU member states 
and the European Commission unanimously kept their assistance at formidably 
low levels. The consensus was fairly sturdy in the field of diplomacy. Initially, all 
EU member states barred meetings with Myanma officials. After the introduction 
of a waiver on the visa ban, even principled member states applied this 
exception, like Denmark which hosted the ASEM4 summit in 2002. The 
consensus in the field of economic cooperation was fraught with challenges. 
France, supported by other flexible member states, was reluctant to enforce 
economic sanctions. This logic of diversity has been overcome by dint of 
negotiations. Flexible member states steadily agreed to targeted economic 
sanctions, while principled member states forwent sanctions on trade and 
investment. 
As a consequence, policy feedbacks exerted little influence at the EU level. 
EU policy was more shaped by bargains between large member states than by 
policy evaluations of EU member states or European institutions. The European 
Commission had not formally been asked to assess the impact of possible 
measures decided by the EU. Illustratively, intergovernmental bargains led the 
Commission to propose the exclusion of Myanmar from the GSP, although it 
could not conduct a proper enquiry into the use of forced labour. Thus, the 
adopted measure did not even hit military entities benefiting from this practice 
that infringed labour rights. 
This finding sheds new light on the sanctions paradox in the EU. Bargains 
struck among member states can lead the EU to impose sanctions that are 
unlikely to succeed. Agreeing on a common policy can prove so challenging, that 
policy effectiveness becomes less important than reaching a consensus. 
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5.2. Assessment of Hypotheses  
5.2.1. Bandwagoning Hypothesis 
The bandwagoning hypothesis is challenged in this chapter by the dearth of 
empirical evidence concerning US pressure on the EU. There is no record of 
high-level or coordinated attempts by the US administration to influence EU 
policy. Some individual policy-makers (e.g. Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, 
Congressman Dennis Kucinich, ambassador Barshefsky) may have hoped that 
Europeans would follow suit to US policy; nominal pressures, however, do not 
embody official US foreign policy.265 The UK did play a prominent role in crafting 
an EU foreign policy in line with US interests. However, the UK’s norm 
entrepreneurship could also be attributed to considerable pressure from domestic 
constituencies to punish human rights abuses in Myanmar.  
This lack of tangible empirical evidence does not necessarily falsify the 
bandwagoning hypothesis. It is noteworthy that several measures initiated by the 
UK, like the GSP withdrawal, the asset freeze or the visa ban, merely emulated 
those sanctions already enforced by the US.266 In an interview of 28 April 2003 
with the Financial Times, British PM Tony Blair explicitly stated that, in his vision, 
Europe shared a common agenda with the USA:  
[…] a strategic partnership between Europe and America and other countries too – 
Russia, China – where we are trying to ensure that we develop as I say a common 
global agenda. 
 […] I want a stronger Europe, more capable of speaking with a unified voice, but I 
don't want that Europe setting itself up in opposition to America, because I think that 
won't work, I think it will be dangerous and destabilising. 267 
From this standpoint, the US did not even need to apply direct pressures on 
the EU; New Labour adopted, by and for itself, a posture in-line with US policy. 
Other EU member states followed suit, notably owing to the common perception 
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that Myanmar lacked strategic relevance. The EU’s behaviour epitomised what 
Morgenthau dubbed ‘ideological solidarity’.268 The bandwagoning hypothesis is 
therefore confirmed despite a lack of evidence of US pressure on the UK; it is 
relevant that the EU did bandwagon with the US - whether deliberately or not is a 
less meaningful question. 
Finally, the EC’s WTO complaint against the state of Massachusetts does not 
challenge the bandwagoning hypothesis. The Massachusetts Burma Act 
remained in the realm of domestic politics since the Supreme Court of the United 
States eventually overturned it on 20 June 2000. The EU complaint did not 
effectively challenge US foreign policy, while it safeguarded European economic 
interests to trade both with Myanmar and with the state of Massachusetts. 
Consequently, this case does not contradict neo-realist predictions. 
 
5.2.2. Compliance Hypothesis 
The compliance hypothesis is falsified by the EU’s inaction following the 
relative liberalisation attempts introduced by the military government, which were 
crowned with ASSK’s second release in 2002. The EU did not reward Myanmar’s 
partial compliance with its demands, although securing ASSK’s release was one 
of its main policy objectives. Hence, the compliance hypothesis did not apply 
when it came to scaling down sanctions.  
Endogenous dynamics also led to ratcheting up sanctions now and then. 
Without explicitly reacting to specific adverse events in Myanmar, the EU 
withdrew GSP benefits in 1997; discouraged tourism in 1998; extended the 
number of individuals targeted by the visa ban and asset freeze; and adopted a 
ban on loans to state-owned companies in 2000. This policy sharply contrasts 
with the period prior to 1996, when the EU did not toughen sanctions despite 
Myanmar’s repeated clampdowns on the democratic opposition and ethnic 
insurgencies.  
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On the other hand, the compliance hypothesis was generally corroborated 
when Myanmar flouted EU demands. The EU directly ratcheted up restrictions on 
16 June 2003 as a response to ASSK’s third arrest. It decided the Common 
Position 1996/635/CFSP to condemn James Nichol’s death in prison.  
In summary, the escalation of negative measures did not only serve the 
primary objective of altering Myanmar’s behaviour. It also fulfilled the objective of 
bolstering the EU’s identity as an actor in international relations that promotes 
liberal values globally. Sanctions symbolically demonstrated solidarity with 
ASSK, an icon of democracy. Scaling up sanctions and strengthening the 
European consensus were mutually reinforcing processes. 
 
5.2.3. Large Member States Hypothesis 
The Common Position 96/635/CFSP reflected just a little more than the lowest 
common denominator preferences among the biggest member states. France 
initially rejected the Danish proposal to restrict trade and investment. It agreed to 
the common position after the UK, a large member state, submitted a proposal 
that mainly formalised the status quo. The opposition to a ban on trade and 
investment confirms the rationalist premises of the large member states 
hypothesis.  
Smaller member states, European institutions, and transnational lobby groups 
did not determine EU policy. The three largest states decided EU policy. The UK 
issued policy proposals, which were partly redefined after Germany and France 
raised objections. Large member states were eager to find a common stance and 
implement common measures. Therefore, decision-making did not reflect 
competitive bargaining, but a cooperative bargaining process among the largest 
EU states. 
EU member states did not substantially alter their initial domestic preferences. 
Although accommodating the interests of principled states, France did not alter 
its fundamental interest to eschew blanket economic sanctions. Germany 
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remained sceptical of economic sanctions throughout the period. The UK 
changed its preferences following the election of New Labour in 1997, but not as 
a result of social interaction with other EU policy-makers.  
The UK’s change of national preferences in 1997 should not only be attributed 
to ideological motivations, but also to a calculus of domestic costs and benefits 
by the new government. New Labour shifted preferences in the context of 
renewed pressures by campaign groups and Westminster to impose tougher 
sanctions. Schwebach and Morgan emphasised that maintaining sanctions 
usually results from a utilitarian calculus at the domestic level: 
[…] Sanctions can be imposed and maintained only when a sufficiently powerful 
coalition of domestic political actors within the sending state hopes to gain more on 
the issue under dispute than will be lost due to the sanctions.269 
Particularly in an EU context, foreign policy is made at home, and implemented 
abroad: 
Foreign policy needs to be “sold” to a variety of audiences in a variety of institutional 
contexts – to such an extent that the effectiveness of the “selling” is almost more 
important than the substance of the policy actions taken.270 
The only member state that compromised to some extent on its national 
preference was Denmark, when it accepted that a representative of Myanmar 
could passively attend the ASEM4 summit in Copenhagen. This event, however, 
does not substantially challenge the large member states hypothesis. The 
ASEM4 summit was poorly attended. From an intergovernmental perspective, 
moreover, the relatively weaker bargaining power of smaller member states 
normally leads them to compromise more substantially on their national 
preferences than larger member states. Despite this concession, Denmark could 
hope to benefit more from ‘politics of scale’ in an EU framework, than if it had 
imposed unilateral sanctions on Myanmar. 
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The rationalist underpinnings of the large member states hypothesis need to 
be qualified, however. Material interests did not equally drive the three big 
member states. France’s position was an isolated one due to its more salient 
economic interests. German unwillingness to adopt economic sanctions sprang 
in part from ideational motivations. This stance was based on cognitive 
scepticism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions. Berlin no longer possessed 
material interests in Myanmar, rather it was not convinced that economic 
sanctions would work and it intended to avoid a precedent in EU law. As former 
colonial power having pledged to conduct an ethical foreign policy, the UK faced 
consequent domestic pressures to act on human rights. Pushes by the UK were 
also induced by the ideological commitment to demonstrate solidarity vis-à-vis 
the NLD, as the consensus hypothesis demonstrates. 
 
5.2.4. Consensus Hypothesis 
The consensus hypothesis was partly falsified: all policy initiatives were 
introduced by a large member state, and material interests considerably 
constrained EU policy-making. Despite these flaws, the consensus hypothesis 
possesses strong explanatory power.  
The policy evolved from a relatively low common denominator in 1996 to a 
policy that reflected a vivid consensus among EU member states. Referring to 
the concept of path dependency, the implementation of Common Position 
96/635/CFSP constitutes a ‘point of departure’.271 It irreversibly engaged the EU 
in the path of restrictive measures, which were never relaxed until the end of this 
period in 2003. In the following years, the EU steadily escalated sanctions in 
response to the ‘further deterioration in the political situation […] and the 
continuing serious violations of human rights’.272 Because it provided EU policy 
with a strong normative framework, Common Position 96/635/CFSP could be 
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defined as a new structural condition, which constituted part of the acquis 
politique on Myanmar. 
Member states could reach a consensus and decide on concrete measures, 
despite diverging preferences and material interests. Principled member states 
privileged targeted restrictions within a European framework to blanket sanctions 
imposed unilaterally. Flexible member states like France became increasingly 
receptive to the normative prescriptions enunciated by principled stakeholders. In 
contrast with staunch opposition to trade and investment penalties in 1996, Paris 
steadily agreed to targeted measures with an economic component. This finding 
echoes the claim of social constructivist Ben Tonra: the interests of EU member 
states increasingly converged over time, as they were collectively making EU 
foreign policy.273  
While big EU member states clearly determined EU foreign policy, other actors 
were able to put ideas on the Council’s agenda. This argument is best illustrated 
by the GSP case. Proposals by Brussels-based non-state actors like the ICFTU 
and the ETUC were ultimately adopted by the EU. Complex dynamics of EU 
policy-making reveal multiple levels of governance, where different actors can 
influence EU foreign policy. The liberal intergovernmental understanding of EU 
policy-making as a two-level game remains a pertinent tool of analysis because 
EU states constantly promote their domestic interests vis-à-vis other EU 
governments. However, a more comprehensive analysis of EU policy-making 
gains at adding a three-level game (or a meso-level of analysis), which includes 
member states’ interactions with European institutions and transnational 
actors.274 
To conclude, the complementariness between scaling up sanctions and 
strengthening a European consensus corroborates the general claim that 
democracy promotion forms a ‘backbone of a concerted EU foreign policy’.275 
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Value promotion seeks to maintain a consensus among European states and 
institutions on the EU’s liberal identity. This link between sanctions and the 
identity of the sender is explained by the quasi exclusive focus of EU policy on 
democracy icon ASSK. The caricatural distinction between ‘savages, victims, and 
saviors’276 reflected positively on the EU’s identity. 
The next chapter now analyses the new evolution of the European consensus 
from 2004 until 2010. 
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Chapter VI 
The EU and Myanmar between 2004 and 2010:  
Strengthening the Consensus in an Intergovernmental 
Framework 
 
Chapters Four and Five showed how EU foreign policy developed from a 
nearly complete lack of a common policy to unanimous support of Myanmar’s 
pro-democracy opposition. The European consensus centred on treating 
Myanmar as a ‘pariah’ state, so that sanctions were barely scaled down, even 
when it appeared the military government might be making concessions. The 
present chapter lays out how the European consensus evolved between 2004 
and 2010. EU foreign policy entered a new phase in 2004, after which it can be 
characterised as a ‘double track approach’. The EU combined an increase in 
humanitarian aid delivery with more stringent sanctions.  
This dual strategy seems difficult to explain with the hypotheses tested so far, 
because any independent variable was supposed to produce one of two possible 
outcomes: different policy inputs would prompt the EU to either reinforce or relax 
sanctions. The explanations offered so far have not yet been considered in a 
situation where the EU tightened penalties in one policy area, while softening 
them in another. This chapter starts in 2004, when the EU decided on a new 
common position that defined its ‘double track approach’. The investigation ends 
in 2011, after Myanmar held general elections and freed Aung San Suu Kyi for 
the third time.  
This chapter is structured in six sections. The first demonstrates how the EU 
fostered a dual track approach in 2004. The second examines how, in the 
following years, the European consensus on a common policy was challenged as 
well as deepened in the diplomatic field. The third analyses the EU’s reaction to 
the 2007 mass protests. The ensuing section examines the EU’s decisions to 
scale up its aid in 2006 and 2008, and draws some conclusions with regards to 
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the bandwagoning hypothesis. The compliance hypothesis is finally tested, in 
section five, against the backdrop of the 2010 general elections and ASSK’s 
subsequent release from house arrest. The concluding section summarises the 
overall argument and assesses the suggested hypotheses for the period 
extending between 2004 and 2010. 
 
1. The ‘Dual Approach’ (2004) 
1.1. Tightening Sanctions 
1.1.1. EU Policy 
Following ASSK’s third arrest on 30 May 2003, EU foreign ministers identified, 
at the Gymnich meeting of Tullamore in April 2004, three conditions to be met 
before the EU would consider to gradually repealing sanctions: 1  
[…] the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the participation of the National League 
for Democracy and other political and ethnic groups in the National Convention and 
a genuine and open National Convention, free from harassment.2 
The Council set the deadline of the ASEM 5 summit, scheduled on 7-9 October 
2004, for Myanmar to fulfil these three conditions. The EU again raised the issue 
of Myanmar’s participation in ASEM during the sixth ASEM foreign ministers 
meeting hosted in Kildare by Ireland on 17-18 April 2004. The chairman’s 
statement ‘looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions’ on ASSK and the 
NLD.3 
Due to the ensuing lack of progress, the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) agreed on 13 September that it would tighten 
restrictive measures at its subsequent session on 11 October 2004.4 If Myanmar 
failed to comply with the demands enunciated at the April 2004 Gymnich meeting 
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in Tullamore, the EU would expand the visa ban list, proscribe EU registered 
companies from making available financing such as loans and equities available 
to named state-owned Myanma enterprises, and vote against extending loans to 
Myanmar from IFIs.5 These deadlines were essentially symbolic posturing, since 
the SPDC was unlikely to heed such substantial demands in barely a month. 
Moreover, the EU communicated this ultimatum as a late reaction to ASSK’s third 
arrest following the Depayin incident, which had happened more than a year 
earlier in May 2003. These measures were finally enforced on 25 October 2004.6 
 
1.1.2. Impact of EU Measures 
The absence of technical assistance from IFIs yielded unintended deleterious 
effects on Myanmar. Arguably, the government's macroeconomic managerial 
incompetence was primarily responsible for the parlous state of the economy.7 
The Bretton-Woods institutions had suspended their cooperation with Myanmar 
in 1987 owing to a lack of economic transparency, not human rights issues. 
Myanmar owed arrears to the tune of $300 million to the WB, which the SPDC 
had not settled since 1987. 
The absence of IFIs made the economic predicament worse. Following the 
military coup of 1988, Western states prevented the WB, IMF and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) from providing the consultancy expertise needed to 
restructure the economy. Areas in need of substantial reform were, among 
others: the lax tax system (inadequate since its inception after independence), 
the system of multiple exchange rates (a source of corruption), public finance 
management, the introduction of rational fiscal and economic policies, and land 
reform (addressing landlessness and state ownership of agricultural land). The 
annual ‘Article IV Consultations’ by the IMF do not fulfil this role, as they are far 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Council of the EU: Common Position 2004/730/CFSP of 25 October 2004; Ibid.: Regulation 
(EC) No. 1853/2004 of 25 October 2004, par. 2. 
7 Steinberg 2001a: Chapter V. 
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from inclusive and do not actually engage the government in a dialogue during 
these brief encounters. 
The impact of the 2004 prohibition on the making of loans, on offering credit, 
and acquiring or extending participation to state-owned companies was 
negligible. On the one hand, no European loans are known to have been made 
available to Myanmar since the beginning of the nineties. On the other hand, 
Myanmar had recourse to regional banks, notably in Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Dubai. Besides, the absence of interface with European financial institutions had 
counterproductive effects. It accentuated the lack of competition in the domestic 
financial market. It arguably helped to hamper the creation of welfare, job 
opportunities, and the transfer of European know-how in a financial services 
market where an autocratic state retains tight control.8 
Beyond these individual measures, European investment in Myanmar has 
generally dwindled over the past decade due the reputational stigma involved. 
Western companies represent only a small fraction of total investments, the 
majority of which are coming from East Asia and India. Companies from China, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are the top investors, 
mostly in extractive industries, infrastructure, and manufacturing. (Some of these 
companies are registered in UK overseas territories).9 Statements from Western 
leaders on the moral dubiousness of trading with (or investing in) Myanmar have 
effectively dissuaded EU companies from doing business.10 The lack of Western 
investment opened the Myanmar market for trade with the region: China, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand make up approximately 80 percent of 
Myanmar’s foreign trade. The EU, traditionally the biggest foreign investor in all 
Southeast Asian economies, was reduced to a meagre 2.66 percent share in 
Myanmar’s export destinations in 2011.11 In 2010, Myanmar received around 
$8.273 billion in FDI stock, mostly from China and Thailand. By contrast, official 
                                                 
8 Interview 5. 
9 Bowman 2006: British ambassador address. 
10 Interview 39.  
11 IMF 2010: Trade Statistics. 
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FDI stock represented only $4 million in 1988 (figure 9).12 FDI stock has 
skyrocketed since the mid-nineties, while many big European companies were 
divesting.  
 
Figure 9: Inward and outward foreign direct investment stock, annual, 1980-
2010, in million $ at current prices and exchange rates  
 
Source: UNCTAD (July 2011). 
 
Trade between the EU and Myanmar followed a similar pattern. Figure 10 
indicates that Myanmar’s trade with the EU has remained marginal despite a 
relative increase in exports between 1990 and 2004. The MFA’s expiry led 
Myanmar’s exports to the EU to fall after 2005. Total bilateral trade barely 
reached $313.62 million in 2010, which represented 1.91 percent of Myanmar’s 
total trade. By contrast, figure 11 shows that Myanmar’s trade with the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) has boomed between 1988 and 
2010, although the US (a member of APEC) has enforced a ban on all imports 
from Myanmar since 2003. Myanmar’s total trade with APEC’s twenty-one 
                                                 
12 UNCTAD 2011: FDI Stock. US Dollars are measured at current prices and current exchange 
rates (2011). 
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In the financial year 2009/2010, 78 percent of Myanmar’s exports were 
orientated towards China, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and India; and 85 
percent of its imports came from Thailand, India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
China.13 Figure 12 indicates that Myanmar has dramatically shifted its trade 
orientation away from the EU. Its imports and exports from and to the EU had 
culminated at respectively 25 and 13 percent of the total before sanctions were 
introduced, but they collapsed to respectively 1 and 3 percent in 2010. This 
declining economic influence is even more pronounced when put in the 
perspective of Myanmar’s growing trade volume. The pie became approximately 
55 times bigger over the period. Myanmar’s total exports grew from $147.433 
million in 1988 to $8.029 billion in 2011 and its total imports grew from $244 
million in 1988 to $13.5 billion in 2011.14 
 
Figure 12: Myanmar-EU trade as share of Myanmar’s total trade, 1980-2011 
 
Source: IMF (June 2012): Direction of Trade. 
 
Thus, Myanmar has largely avoided the direct impact of the penalties on trade 
imposed by the EU (and other Western countries including the US), while the EU 
progressively lost its relative economic leverage. Other sanctions were therefore 
                                                 
13 Central Statistics Office data as quoted in: Network Myanmar website (2012). 
14 IMF (June 2012): Direction of Trade. 
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less likely to bear fruit, as restrictions on trade and investment are generally 
considered more harmful than non-economic sanctions.15 Myanmar’s deeper 
integration in the regional economy will be hallmarked by the future ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) planned in 2013, 2015 and 2017 for Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia.16 More restrictions seemed to only increase the 
distance between Myanmar and the EU, with little prospect for effective 
influence.  
The economic context had changed significantly since the EU imposed 
economic sanctions in the nineties. By the time of writing, Myanmar finds itself in 
a strategic geopolitical location, embedded in a region with some of the 
consistently highest rates of economic growth. Table 6 indicates the years when 
Myanmar ranked among the world’s top 10 performers in terms of GNI growth 
per annum, and compares its performance with China. It shows that Myanmar 
outpaced China almost every single year in 1999 and between 2001 and 2010. 
This stupendous rate of growth was favoured by Myanmar’s relatively low base 
when it opened its economy in the nineties. It remains nonetheless remarkable 
that Myanmar could achieve one of the world’s constantly highest rates of 
economic growth despite Western sanctions. Western sanctions proved 
completely unable to asphyxiate the regime by economic means.  
                                                 
15 Eland 1995: 29-42. 
16 Interview 22; Morsbach, 26 May 2011. 
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Table 6: Myanmar and China among the World’s Top Ten Performers in 
Annual GNI Growth (1999; 2001-2010) 
 
Source: WB (2012): WDI. 
 
Myanmar’s income growth performance remains stupendous even if weighted 
per capita. Between 1990 and 2011, Myanmar ranked as the world’s second best 
performer behind China in terms of constant income growth as measured by 
annual GNI per capita. Between 1990 and 2000, Myanmar registered the third 
biggest GNI per capita growth (annual percentage) behind China and Guyana, 
and the third biggest GNI per capita growth behind Afghanistan and China 
between 2000 and 2011.17 Aggregate and per capita GDP data shows similar 
rates of growth, which varied between 10 and 13.6 percent between 1999 and 
2006.18 This astounding income growth shows that Western sanctions on trade 
and investment had a limited impact on Myanmar’s aggregate economic 
performance. 
This growth has been supported by massive exports of natural resources. In 
2010, primary commodities and precious stones represented 78 percent (or 
$7.535 billion) of Myanmar’s total exports; whereby fuels alone made already 33 
                                                 
17 WB 2012: WDI. 
18 Ibid. GDP data is not available after 2006. See: Chapter IV, figure 6. 
Year Myanmar's growth Myanmar's rank China's growth China's rank
1999 11.0% 9 7.6%
2001 11.3% 5 8.5%
2002 12.0% 4 8.6%
2003 13.8% 9 9.4%
2004 13.6% 5 9.8%
2005 13.5% 6 11.9% 8
2006 13.1% 5 12.1% 10
2007 12.0% 6 13.7% 4
2008 10.3% 5 9.4% 10
2009 10.6% 2 9.4% 3
2010 10.4% 7 10.0% 10
Not a top 10 
performer
246
Chapter VI 
percent (or $3.090 billion) of total exports.19 Foreign investments, concentrated in 
the domains of extractive industries and infrastructure, tend to benefit the 
investors much more than the people in the receiving country. Profits stemming 
from natural resources extraction are not significantly reinvested in sectors that 
would generate a more equitable distribution of national wealth. Revenues from 
natural resources extractions are managed as a niche sector, autonomous from 
the rest of Myanmar’s economy and with a limited multiplier effect on sustainable 
development.20 Indeed, Myanmar’s prodigious income growth contrasts sharply 
with its more modest performance as measured by the Human Development 
Index (HDI, evaluated at 0.483 in 2011), since it does not figure among the 
countries that rapidly improved their standards of human development.21 Mean 
Years of Schooling (MYS) of adults over 25 years were 4.0 years in 2011, the life 
expectancy at birth was 65.2 years, and 31.8 percent of Myanmar’s population 
was considered as poor in more than one dimension by the UNDP’s Headcount 
of Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).22 The stark contrasts between income 
growth on the one hand and education performance on the other hand indicate 
that the benefits of unprecedented income growth did not substantially trickle 
down to Myanmar’s population. To compare Myanmar with the better-known 
growth champion, China’s headcount of MPI poor was 12.5 percent of its 
population and MYS were 7.5 years in 2011.23 
The marginal economic interaction with the EU may not have hindered 
Myanmar’s annual economic growth, but it has resulted in a general denial of 
Western skills and technology and a limitation of labour-intensive employment 
opportunities. According to Richard Jones, a director of Premier Oil Plc., Asian 
companies are unlikely to match ethical employment practices provided by 
                                                 
19 UNCTAD November 2011. 
20 Interview 27. 
21 UNDP 2010. 
22 UNDP 2011. More accurate statistics on inequality, such as Myanmar’s Gini index, are not 
available. 
23 Ibid. 
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Western employers, such as ‘fair wages, company housing and health insurance, 
as well as a pension scheme’.24 The four principles for ‘good’ investment, as 
published by the NLD on 4 January 2011, or as requested by ASSK in her video 
address to the World Economic Forum, could be met by Western companies if 
they were to invest.25 The creation of economic zones (e.g. in Tavoy) has started 
to attract light manufacturing from the region. Nevertheless, EU businesses and 
investment have been generally unwilling to compete, not least because of the 
constraint of Western sanctions and reputational stigma associated with 
Myanmar. 
 
1.2. Providing Wider Room for Aid Delivery 
While tightening sanctions, the Common Position 2004/730/CFSP scaled up 
aid levels. This decision characterises the dual approach which has a 
combination of negative and positive measures.  
 
1.2.1. Summary of Previous Policies  
During the nineties, the EU had suspended development assistance to 
Myanmar. This suspension bore the perverse effect that even humanitarian aid 
was substantially reduced. From 2000 onwards, the Commission started to 
steadily scale up humanitarian assistance. In 2001, the bulk of EU aid came from 
ECHO, which pledged a still marginal €6.5 million for a LDC of about 49 million 
inhabitants.26 ECHO was the primary agency increasing humanitarian aid from 
2000 until the common position was changed in October 2004, a policy illustrated 
below.  
 
                                                 
24 Wintle 2007: 427. 
25 Htet Aung, 5 January 2011; World Economic Forum 2011. The NLD’s four principles for foreign 
investment are: ‘consideration of environmental and social impacts on the people, respect for 
labour rights, the creation of job opportunities and technically advanced investments’. 
26 European Commission, November 2006: Myanmar Leaflet. 
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Table 7: Funds Pledged by ECHO, 2001-2004, in million € 
Year Amounts 
2001 6.5 
2002 8.9 
2003 11.5 
2004 19.4 
Source: European Commission (November 2006): Myanmar Leaflet. 
 
In addition, the non-humanitarian budget lines of the Commission began to kick 
up, starting with the use of the Aid-to-Uprooted-People programme in 2001 
(€2 million) and the Development Cooperation Instrument, or DCI-Programme, 
(€5 million) to fund a UN-sponsored HIV/Aids project. The UK’s DFID pursued a 
similar trend over the same period:  
 
Table 8: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 2000/2001-2004/2005, in million £ 
Year Amounts 
2000/2001 1.4 
2001/2002 2.3 
2002/2003 7.0 
2003/2004 3.7 
2004/2005 6.0 
Source: UK Governmental Statistical Service (2010). 
 
Both the UK and the Commission were thus inclined to increase aid to 
Myanmar, while sanctions were scaled up on the financial, trade, and diplomatic 
fronts. This development is significant because it demonstrates that both a big 
member state and the Commission played the role of ‘policy entrepreneur’. A 
change in the common position was necessary in order to widen the legal space 
for aid delivery. 
 
249
Chapter VI 
1.2.2. Policy Change (2004) 
The EU revised its position on aid on 25 October 2004 with the adoption of 
Article 5, Common Position 2004/730/CFSP. This revision allowed the allocation 
of assistance for three specific purposes: promotion of democracy, health and 
education, and environmental protection. This decision was taken after having 
consulted representatives of Myanma civil society and the NLD, in-line with 
Common Positions 96/635/CFSP and 2003/297/CFSP.	
This policy change in one isolated issue-area corresponds to a second-level 
‘programme change’.27 Programme change consists in a change of instruments, 
not in a review of policy objectives, which was still focused on modifying the 
SPDC’s behaviour. Restrictions in other policy sectors were not repealed. This 
partial policy change reflects a questioning of the effects of the ban on 
assistance.28 But this partial change did not discount the sanctions policy. It was 
limited to certain areas of assistance, owing to the refusal of principled member 
states to review the sanctions regime altogether.29 Repealing penalties could 
have deprived the political opposition of the symbolic support provided by 
sanctions.30  
The 2004 policy change was part of an incremental diversification of 
objectives, whereby the EU stood behind additional goals complementary to 
democracy promotion, such as the defence of human rights. Discourse analysis 
shows that the EU shifted its policy formulation by supporting, in addition to the 
NLD, the ‘national reconciliation process’ and the ‘tripartite talks’.31 The EU 
tended to complement its support for ASSK and the NLD with support for the 
                                                 
27 C. Hermann 1990: 5. 
28 Interview 5. 
29 Interview 6.  
30 Cooper, October 2008: Address.   
31 Council of the EU: Presidency Declaration of 30 May 2006; EP: Resolution of 11 April 2002: 
point 1.2.6.  
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‘people of Burma/Myanmar’.32 This commitment implied an increase in 
development aid to ‘the most vulnerable populations of Myanmar’ instead of 
restricting the policy to sanctions as a sign of support to the NLD.33 
This incremental change took place in the context of emerging reservations 
about the NLD’s capacity to secure political change in Myanmar after ASSK’s 
third confinement to house arrest. Some analysts disparaged the NLD’s 
‘maximalist’ and ‘confrontational’ approach to the regime.34 Under SPDC-rule, the 
NLD had never rejuvenated its aging leadership. It was unable to make efficient 
use of its immense political capital.35 Early sanctions activists, like the US-based 
Free Burma Coalition (FBC), argued that responsibility for the political stalemate 
was shared between the government and the opposition.36 
 
1.2.3. Dynamics of Policy-Making 
The actors behind this revision of instruments are epistemic communities. The 
institutional actors are the European Commission, Germany, the UK, and the 
Netherlands. They worked together with epistemic communities formed by: 
academics (such as Taylor and Pederson), diplomats from other countries 
involved in the Myanmar issue (e.g. Australia, Norway), representatives of 
international organisations (e.g. the UNDP, UNODC), and NGOs (e.g. the 
International Crisis Group, Save the Children UK, Malteser). These expert 
communities were invited to policy conferences. The European Commission 
hosted ‘Burma/Myanmar Days’ in 2003, 2004, and 2008 to discuss areas for 
policy improvement. The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation held a conference on 
national reconciliation in December 2005. The EIAS organised a 
Burma/Myanmar Forum in 2006, which discussed how the international 
                                                 
32 European Commission 2008: Bull. 5: 1.35.36; Council of the EU: Declaration of 25 September 
2007. 
33 European Commission 2007c: Bull. 10: 1.34.34.  
34 Interviews 23 and 27. 
35 R. Taylor and Pedersen 2005. 
36 Zarni et al. 2004: 33-41. 
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community could promote change in the areas of human rights, democracy, and 
economic development.37 DFID co-organised a Wilton Park Conference in 2006, 
which focused on humanitarian assistance. 
The UK and the Netherlands incrementally changed their positions between 
2000 and 2004. The UK, along with the European Commission, became a 
primary European donor. As the 2006 Wilton Park conference concluded, an 
increased allocation of aid served the purpose of promoting human rights and 
democracy. The simultaneous escalation of sanctions encapsulated in the 
Common Position 2004/730/CFSP were deemed to make the exception on 
humanitarian aid more acceptable to domestic lobbies in the UK. This increase in 
humanitarian aid to Myanmar was also related to the influence of the 
Commission, which played a role as a ‘policy entrepreneur’.38 In July 2000, then 
Commissioner Chris Patten had signalled the EU’s intention to increase aid in 
parallel with sanctions.39 According to ECHO’s Global Needs Assessment (GNA), 
Myanmar was one of the world’s ‘forgotten humanitarian crises’.40 Senior 
Commission officials commended the Council’s 2004 policy change – notably 
Hervé Jouanjean,41 Eneko Landaburu,42 and the Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero Waldner.43 This recalls Bicchi’s assertion that the 
Commission cannot change EU foreign policy without the support of an important 
member state.44 
The Commission quietly attempted to persuade principled member states that 
aid complemented sanctions. The idea of regular Burma Day conferences was 
floated at the Ottawa conference on Myanmar in 2002 to enable an exchange of 
                                                 
37 Minsat 2006a. 
38 Nuttal 1993; Caporaso and Keeler 1995; Krause 2002; Bicchi 2007. 
39 BBC News, 26 July 2000. 
40 European Commission, December 2003: ECHO Aid Strategy. 
41 Jouanjean, 5 April 2005. 
42 Landaburu, 29 March 2006.  
43 Interview 6.  
44 Bicchi 2008.  
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views among policy-makers.45 Interacting with member states during (at times 
daily) meetings on policy formulation and implementation, the Commission 
presented the funding of projects inside the country as a sine qua non to 
democracy promotion.46 Promoting democracy meant not only censuring a 
dictatorship, but bolstering the growth of a ‘vibrant civil society’.47 Converging 
feedbacks by the Commission, the DFID, the FCO, and the Auswärtige Amt, had 
underlined the need to adapt the policy in order to enhance its effectiveness.48 
This evaluation encountered domestic opposition in some member states. 
Therefore, the Commission chose informal ‘case-work and complaint’49 as a 
channel to convey its recommendations. ‘Bureaucratic experience’ and 
‘systematic monitoring’ had not persuaded all member states. In 2005, the 
Commission charged two academics to produce an independent report on EU 
policy towards Myanmar. Nevertheless, the resulting Taylor-Pederson report was 
marred by criticism from ‘pro-democracy campaigners’ who had not been invited 
to the Burma Day Conference in 2005.50  
The Taylor-Pederson report underscored problems also raised by 
humanitarian organisations. UN representatives had stressed that, with around 
$3 per capita, Myanmar received a fraction of international aid provided to other 
countries in the region such as Vietnam ($33), Cambodia ($38), and Laos 
($49),51 or compared with £33 for pariah state Sudan.52 Humanitarian 
organisations emphasised that the allocated funds fell completely short of the 
country’s acute needs. They emphasised the unimpeachable essence of the 
humanitarian mission, summarised by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
                                                 
45 Hristov 2009: 162. 
46 Interview 5.  
47 R. Taylor and Pedersen 2005. 
48 Ibid. On the importance of policy feedback in EU policy-making, see: Ginsberg 2001: 277. 
49 As defined by: Kingdon 2003: 102. 
50 Kent, April 2005; Yawnghwe, April 2005. 
51 Petrie 2008: 12 (Charles J. Petrie was UN resident coordinator in Myanmar from 2003 until 
2007); UNDP 2008: 307; IRIN 2009; Weiss 2009. 
52 Bell, 12 August 2009. 
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independence.53 Humanitarian aid should not be dependent on any party’s 
endorsement – not even the NLD. The disconnection between the allocation of 
aid and compliance by the SPC with EU demands does not challenge the 
compliance hypothesis, since humanitarian aid is in principle neutral and 
unconditional. 
The European Commission typically distinguishes between two concepts: 
- Humanitarian aid: based on objective needs, delivered in an impartial and 
neutral way regardless of the political or conflictual context, hence not a 
foreign policy tool; and 
- Development aid/assistance: ideally based on a sectoral dialogue with the 
authorities (hence the term ‘development cooperation’, where funding 
decisions are policy decisions). Such assistance is considered part of the 
foreign policy toolbox.  
Lobbyists (like the Euro-Burma-Office or Burma Campaign UK), which in the 
nineties called for a complete aid boycott, could not overlook the validity of the 
EU’s doctrine. They agreed that aid should be augmented if delivered 
transparently.54 The European Parliament supported this policy change 
retrospectively.55  
 
1.2.4. Unlocking Assistance after 2004 
With the change of the common position introduced in 2004, EU aid levels 
were substantially amplified. The EU (the Commission and member states 
combined) became the main donor to Myanmar, ahead of Australia and Japan. 
On the strictly humanitarian side, in 2005, the Commission set up an ECHO 
antenna office in Yangon, in order to better coordinate the increasing number of 
humanitarian projects designed for, and funds allocated to Myanmar. As regards 
development aid, the multi-annual indicative programme for 2007-2010 allocates 
                                                 
53 Petrie April 2006a: Address; Petrie November 2006b: Address. 
54 Burma Campaign UK, July 2006. 
55 EP: Resolution of 24 April 2008. 
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€32 million to the health and education sectors.56 Its legal basis and main budget 
line is the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which is geared to 
education and health.57 While the distinction between humanitarian and 
development aid was conceptually upheld, the EU was quietly easing the ban 
placed on development aid.58 Table 9 shows that the UK boosted its funding to 
Myanmar subsequently after 2004.59 It is the only EU member state with a team 
in the field (intervening mostly in the sectors of health and education with €9.5 
million in 2006).60 
 
Table 9: DFID Assistance to Myanmar, 2005/2006-2009/2010 in million £ 
 
Year Amounts 
2005/2006 6.483 
2006/2007 7.610 
2007/2008 8.915 
2008/2009 57.601 
2009/2010 29.019 
Source: UK Governmental Statistical Service (January 2010). 
 
To conclude, the compliance hypothesis is not falsified by the exception made 
to the delivery of humanitarian aid, which happened despite lack of compliance 
by the SPDC. Delivery of humanitarian assistance was not conditional on the 
SPDC’s behaviour. It was a needs-based response, focusing on vulnerable 
populations. 
  
 
                                                 
56 European Commission 2007: Country Strategic Paper: 1. 
57 Kramer 2009: 55-6. 
58 Tonkin, 26 February 2010. 
59 The UK pledged to allocate £57 million to Myanmar in 2008/2009, which included £45 million 
for emergency relief following Cyclone Nargis, and £12 million of development and humanitarian 
assistance for non-Nargis support (FCO 2009: Country Profile; DFID 2009: Country Profile). 
60 European Commission 2007a: Report. 
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1.3. Reshuffle within the Military Government and EU Inaction (2004) 
1.3.1. Events in Myanmar 
The policy change at the end of October 2004 occurred when the junta had 
become even more reclusive after PM Khin Nyunt’s ouster. On 18 October 2004, 
Prime Minister and concurrently head of Military Intelligence (MI), General Khin 
Nyunt, was ‘permitted to retire’ by SPDC chairman Senior General Than Shwe. 
He was sentenced to forty-four years imprisonment on corruption charges in July 
2005. A wholesale purge of 1,000 to 2,000 MI officers immediately followed Khin 
Nyunt’s ouster.61 This purge established Senior General Than Shwe as the 
junta’s unrivalled chief, seconded by the SPDC vice-chairman General Maung 
Aye. Myanmar thus shifted from a ‘collective military dictatorship’ to a ‘sultanic 
regime’ with Than Shwe at its helm.62  
General Khin Nyunt’s arrest signalled the regime’s increased isolation, 
symbolised by the move of ministries from Yangon to Naypyidaw in October 
2005.63 European diplomats confessed that, after the 2004 purge, they had lost 
all direct communication channels to the new government.64 In 2005, the 
authorities promulgated guidelines impeding the work of INGOs. The ICRC office 
was ordered to reduce its expatriate staff from around forty to less than ten, and 
to suspend visits to prisoners. Dialogue with the political opposition was halted.  
 
1.3.2. The EU’s Reaction  
The EU did not specifically react to the dismantlement of the MI. The MI’s 
purge nonetheless widened the political space to some extent. Its disbandment 
allowed civil society organisations to later flourish in Myanmar, due to the 
                                                 
61 Petrie 2008: 2. 
62 Saw Myat 2008: 37 and 144ff. See also: Stephan and Linz 1996: 66-83. 
63 Egreteau and Jagan 2008; Hauswedell 2006. 
64 Interview 11. 
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diminution of military spying on civilians. It ultimately enabled street protests to 
take place in October 2007.65  
On the contrary, the EU extended the travel ban to lower ranking militaries, 
and banned financial loans and new investments on state-owned enterprises on 
25 October 2004.66 The EU’s decision was disconnected from domestic realities 
in Myanmar. This measure was decided because it figured on the Council’s 
agenda at that particular moment, as a consequence of the Council’s conclusions 
of 13 September 2004.67 Sanctions were thus motivated by the:  
[…] the failure of the military authorities to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other 
members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) as well as other political 
detainees, and the failure to allow a genuine and open National Convention, and in 
view of the continued harassment of the NLD and other organised political 
movements […].68 
In a benevolent interpretation, this statement could only be regarded as naïve. 
The military government could certainly not enter into ‘substantive discussions 
with the democratic movement’ at a time when it was going through one of its 
most significant reshuffles since 1988. The lack of connection between the EU’s 
declarations and the domestic changes that occurred in Myanmar show that the 
compliance hypothesis did not hold up in this instance. 
 
2. Strained Consensus on Myanmar’s Diplomatic Isolation 
2.1. Myanmar’s Silent Participation in International Fora 
The principled position of shunning EU-ASEAN meetings if Myanmar was 
party to the discussion became all the more awkward after the EU welcomed ten 
new member states on 1 May 2004. ASEAN felt that the EU’s official position on 
Myanmar was inconsistent with enlarging ASEAN-EU processes without prior 
                                                 
65 Interview 24.  
66 Council of the EU: Regulation (EC) No. 1853/2004 of 25 October 2004: par. 2. 
67 Council of the EU: Common Position 2004/730/CFSP of 25 October 2004: par. 2. 
68 Ibid. 
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consultation.69 Myanmar owed its participation in ASEM to a Vietnamese 
proposal that led to its joining the ASEM 5 summit in Hanoi on 7-9 October 2004. 
The EU almost cancelled the meeting over the question of Myanmar’s 
attendance.70 The Dutch Presidency’s Special Envoy, former European 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek, brokered a compromise with ASEAN+3.71 
Hence, the ‘[…] ten European accession states joined ASEM and the three post-
1996 members of ASEAN were also admitted as well as India, Mongolia and the 
ASEAN secretariat’ but on the condition that the Myanmar representative would 
be from a level lower than that of a head of government.72 The twenty-five EU 
foreign ministers then reached an internal agreement on Myanmar’s participation 
at the informal meeting at St Gerlach Castle on 3 September 2004.73 The Hanoi 
meeting has been considered a transition summit after the EU had cancelled two 
meetings of finance and economy ministers in July and September 2004.74 
The European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the Council’s 
decision to allow Myanmar to participate in the fifth ASEM summit, claiming it 
should have been conditional on the regime recognising that the NLD had won 
the 1990 election.75 The European Parliament’s Development Committee also 
objected to Myanmar’s participation in the ASEM process.76 Some MEPs 
subscribed to the view that diplomatic relations with Myanmar should be 
completely suspended, owing to the deteriorating human rights situation.77 The 
Asia-Europe Inter-parliamentary Partnership and the European Parliament have 
                                                 
69 Interview 5. 
70 Camroux 2006a: 14. 
71 Council of the EU, 13 September 2004: Meeting; Japan Center for International Exchange and 
University of Helsinki Network of European Studies 2006: 41. 
72 Camroux 2004: 28. See also: Haacke 2006: 45. 
73 EP, 15 September 2004: Joint Motion.  
74 Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network of European 
Studies 2006: 149. 
75 Khaliq 2008: 197. 
76 Council of the EU, 13 September 2004: GAERC Meeting; Japan Center for International 
Exchange and University of Helsinki Network of European Studies 2006: 126. 
77 Interview 34. 
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had limited impact on the official ASEM process.78 The fact that the European 
Parliament’s resolutions of July 1999, 2000, 2002, March 2003, and March 2004 
remained unheeded corroborates the large member states hypothesis, which 
posits that only large member states decide EU foreign policy. 
 
2.2. European Consensus Challenged by a Smaller Member State 
In contradiction with the growing trend to include Myanmar as passive 
participant, the Netherlands prevented the Myanmar minister for national 
planning, Soe Tha, from attending an ASEM economic ministers meeting held in 
the Netherlands in February 2005.79 Dissensions reached their climax in 
September of that year, when the Netherlands again refused to waive the visa 
ban on the Myanma minister attending the high-level Asia-Europe economic 
ministers’ meeting in Rotterdam.80 The Netherlands’ decision was in part 
motivated by domestic pressures from parliament and campaign groups, such as 
Burma Center Netherlands.  
ASEAN member states cancelled the ASEM economic ministers meeting 
because of the visa ban on the Myanmar delegation.81 They argued that the 
restrictions placed on Myanmar’s participation breached ASEM’s rule of mutual 
equality.82 They felt this ban contravened the earlier compromise brokered by the 
Dutch presidency in preparation to the Hanoi meeting. Moreover, Europeans had 
                                                 
78 Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network of European 
Studies 2006: 135 and 142. 
79 T. Wilson 2007: 104, footnote 18. It remains unclear to date, however, whether and how the 
negative stance of the Netherlands as hosts to the meeting had been communicated to, and 
cleared with the other EU partners; the German embassy in Yangon had refused the visa to the 
minister upon a direct request from The Hague, without prior checking the matter with the 
Auswärtige Amt in Berlin. 
80 Kivimäcki 2007. 
81 Camroux 2006a: 14. 
82 In the first ASEM meeting held in Bangkok in 1996, the EU and Asian states concluded that 
dialogue ought to be conducted on the basis of mutual respect, equality, promotion of 
fundamental rights and, in accordance with the rules of international law and obligations and non-
intervention, whether direct or indirect, in each other’s internal affairs (European Commission 
1996: Bull. 3: 2.3.1, par. 5, quoted in: Khalid 2008: 196).  
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not asked ASEAN if the ten new EU member states could join ASEM and the EU 
did not take into account the cultural differences with ASEAN (the ‘ASEAN 
way’).83  
Following pressures from other member states (e.g. Germany), the Dutch 
authorities accepted that the meeting could take place (on 16 and 17 September 
2005), but only on the condition that the Myanma representative was not higher 
than the level of ambassador accredited to the EU. It was Myanmar who 
ultimately backed down by sending the first secretary of the Myanmar embassy 
in France, Than Oo, whose name was not on the visa ban list.84  
An examination of this event invalidates the consensus hypothesis, which 
posits that EU member states would not retract their position on a consensus that 
had already been agreed upon in a common position. The Netherlands did not 
act out of a logic of appropriateness, but a logic of consequences. It did not 
internalise the consensus agreed upon in 2000. This finding corroborates the 
intergovernmental view that (even smaller) EU member states maintain their 
sovereignty and independence in matters of foreign policy. 
On 26 July 2005, foreign minister Nyan Win announced Myanmar’s decision to 
forgo its ASEAN chairmanship scheduled in 2006-2007. Since the Hanoi 
meeting, the EU had reiterated threats to boycott meetings with ASEAN if 
Myanmar was to chair the presidency.85 Myanmar’s decision was therefore hailed 
as a political victory for partisans of a punitive approach, particularly in the EU. 
According to the FTUB general secretary Maung Maung, the moratorium on high-
level contacts ultimately led Myanmar to renounce its ASEAN chair.86 Myanmar’s 
poor human rights records had put such a constant strain on EU-ASEAN 
                                                 
83 For a comprehensive study of the ‘ASEAN way’, see: Haacke 2003. 
84 Interview 32.  
85 Camroux 2008: 21. 
86 Maung Maung: Address of 29 April 2006. 
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relations that even some ASEAN states pressured Myanmar to decline its 
ASEAN chairmanship.87 
Unlike the Netherlands, however, other EU member states enforced the 
waiver on the visa ban. During the 2007 ASEM 6 summit in Helsinki, the Finnish 
Presidency eschewed a row with ASEAN by allowing the Myanma representative 
to participate in the meeting. This decision stirred up controversy among human 
rights activists, some member states, and the European Parliament.88 EU 
practice has moved towards accepting Myanmar’s passive participation, for 
instance in the 2009 Vilnius ASEM meeting and the ASEM Energy Ministers 
meeting in 2009 in Brussels.  
To conclude, the imposition of the visa ban has been fraught with 
inconsistencies. For principled stakeholders, the EU caved in to pressures from 
Asian counterparts.89 For flexible actors, the visa ban was inconsistent insofar as 
principled member states like the Netherlands refused to apply the waiver, even 
when in the interest of the EU as a whole. This lack of coherence corroborates 
the liberal intergovernmental prediction that divergences among member states 
may undermine the consistency of EU foreign policy, despite regular social 
interaction among EU policy-makers. However, a pristine interpretation of liberal 
intergovernmentalism is limited because the lowest common denominator did not 
prevail in the long term.  
An equivalent problem was posed when the Commission was mandated in 
2007 to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European 
Community and the ASEAN states.90 As ASEAN did not have a legal personality 
at that time (the ASEAN Charter entered into force only on 15 December 2008), 
such an agreement could only take the form of a ‘multi-bilateral’ treaty, where the 
European side as a block would negotiate parallel agreements with individual 
                                                 
87 Camroux 2006a: 28. 
88 Khaliq 2008: 197. 
89 Interview 41. 
90 Khaliq 2008: 189-190. 
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ASEAN countries. Nonetheless, the ASEAN countries staunchly opposed the 
exclusion of Myanmar.  
A solution was found in a ‘staggered approach’: the EU would negotiate with 
all ASEAN members, but conclude agreements only with original members. 
Finalising the talks with Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar would be put on hold. 
The LDC-status already gave Laos and Cambodia unhindered access to the EU 
market.91 
 
2.3. Germany’s Plea for Diplomatic Engagement 
Representatives of the Auswärtige Amt criticised the visa ban, seeing that it 
constrained Berlin’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre when engaging with 
Myanmar. The ban prohibited high-level meetings with Myanma officials, which 
Troika meetings could not substitute for.92 Germany, however, did not formally 
propose a change of diplomacy to the Council.  
Interviewees mentioned that suspending sanctions against Uzbekistan was a 
possible side-payment with the UK foreign office on Myanmar.93 (In 2007, 
Germany persuaded other member states to lift sanctions on relatively compliant 
Tashkent. This served the purpose of maintaining German contingents in the 
Termez base, located in Southern Uzbekistan, to operate more safely in Western 
Afghanistan). Germany therefore remained critical of the EU’s approach towards 
Myanmar, but was disinclined to propose a concrete change of policy. This 
behaviour is a typical example of ‘log-rolling’, where German and British policy-
makers agreed to support each other’s projects.  
In addition to the bargain over Uzbekistan, German diplomats mentioned that 
the secondary objective of strengthening the EU’s identity also induced Berlin to 
                                                 
91 Interview 5.  
92 Interview 10; Hauswedell 2008; Pasch 2008; on the concept of room for manoeuvre in German 
foreign policy (Handlungsspielraum), see: Haftendorn 1989: 32-49; 2001.  
93 Interview 10.  
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compromise with the principled stance of other member states.94 Germany’s 
position is a case where a big member state ‘upgraded’ its national interest, so 
as not to paralyse EU foreign policy. This policy undermines liberal 
intergovernmentalism and recalls Katzenstein’s characterisation of Germany as 
Europe’s ‘tamed power’.95  
Another reason why Germany did not propose a change of foreign policy was 
that their interests were not accurately identified at the domestic level. The 
Auswärtige Amt’s plea for engagement with Myanmar did not convince all 
German policy-makers. The Bundesministerium für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(BMZ) tended to disagree, notably because of the Development Minister’s 
(Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, 1998-2009) attachment to ASSK. Bureaucrats also 
worried that political instability in Myanmar would lead to freezing a budget line 
otherwise earmarked for more stable Asian countries.96 Despite the Auswärtige 
Amt’s case for engagement, aid pledged by Germany has been inconsequently 
low, as exhibited in table 10. Table 11 shows that non-development aid 
increased between 2005 and 2011, but this was mainly a consequence of natural 
disasters that later hit Myanmar. Until 2012, the GIZ (formerly GTZ, the German 
agency for development) had no mandate to work in Myanmar. 
 
Table 10: German Assistance to Myanmar, 2002-2005 in € 
Year Amounts 
2002 1,000,000 
2003 700,000 
2004 1,825,000 
2005 1,500,00097 
Source: Revel (2008: 57). 
 
                                                 
94 Interviews 10 and 11. 
95 Katzenstein 1997. 
96 Interview 38. 
97 Funds pledged in 2004, not disbursed. 
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Table 11: German Assistance to Myanmar, 2005-2011 in € 
Total for 2005-2011 Average per year 
€21,687,228.94 €3,098,175.56 
Source: Email Exchange 7.98 
 
The Auswärtige Amt attempted to persuade other European countries to 
engage with Myanmar. The French ministry of foreign affairs was not 
convinced.99 This unwillingness to open a dialogue with the SPDC is allegedly 
linked to the Quai d’Orsay’s reluctance to be perceived as too complacent 
towards Myanmar. French policy was beset by an inherent contradiction between 
the safeguarding of Total’s commercial interests on the one hand, and 
democracy promotion in an EU framework on the other. Diplomatic engagement 
suited neither objective.100 Berlin did not even persuade its European partners to 
re-institute military attachés in the European embassies located in Yangon.101 
Nevertheless, trust building with the junta was more likely to initially take place 
via European army officers, rather than civilian diplomats.102  
From 2005 onwards, German NGOs initiated second-track diplomacy 
independent from the government. Low profile confidence-building missions 
organised by German foundations (e.g. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung, and Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung) were explicitly endorsed by the 
Auswärtige Amt because these groups had a wider room for manoeuvre without 
affecting German diplomacy in the Council.103 An FES delegation led 
representatives of Myanmar’s foreign ministry, who toured the European 
                                                 
98 Data per annum was unavailable. This amount covers: urgent and transitory assistance, private 
contractors, churches, and political foundations (‘Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe 
(ENÜH), Private Träger, Kirchen und Politische Stiftungen’). 
99 Interview 13. 
100 Interview 30. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Egreteau 2009: 11ff. 
103 Interview 10. 
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institutions in 2006. According to Paul Pasch, who pioneered the FES 
confidence-building missions: 
Another advantage of Track Two meetings is that, given their status as private 
citizens, participants can interact in a manner that is unconstrained by national 
interests or a need to communicate official positions.104 
By comparison, an FCO representative conceded that the British civil society did 
not undertake Track Two missions, owing to a recalcitrant domestic climate.105 
Myanmar eventually opened an embassy in Brussels in 2006, which was 
accredited to the Benelux countries. However, the embassy’s activities remained 
largely limited to contacts with the Commission and the EEAS, and to consular 
issues. The embassy had no mandate to serve the purpose of brokering a formal 
dialogue with the EU. This reflects the impotence of the ministry of foreign affairs 
in the SPDC’s ‘sultanic’ political regime. 
 
3. The 2007 Uprising 
3.1. Events in Myanmar 
After seventeen years of political deadlock since the 1990 elections, the 2007 
uprising was the only significant mass protest since 8.8.88. As in 1988, flawed 
economic policies acted as a catalyst for the political protests.106 In August 2007, 
the SPDC removed fuel subsidies. This measure triggered a dramatic hike in fuel 
prices and stymied the supply chain in the country. Activists from the 88-
generation, who had been recently amnestied and freed from prison, started 
protests on 15 August 2007. The protests reached their climax when thousands 
of monks joined the demonstrators in the country’s main cities on 18 September, 
                                                 
104 Pasch 2009: 3ff., In: Kramer 2009. 
105 Interview 3.  
106 Egreteau 2007: 19. Renaud Egreteau contended that the expression ‘Saffron Revolution’ 
coined by Western media did not reflect the original aspirations of the protests, which were not 
religious and initially focused on economic empowerment. See also: Zöllner 2008. 
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and demonstrated en masse against the government’s decision. The EU 
explicitly warned the SPDC that it would:  
[…] not hesitate to reinforce and strengthen the existing sanctions, should they [the 
authorities in Naypyidaw] resort to using violence against the unarmed and peaceful 
demonstrators.107 
Despite the international community’s requests for restraint in handling the 
peaceful demonstrations, military forces started cracking down on the protests on 
26 September 2007. Credible sources reported about 31 casualties and 74 
disappearances.108 Demonstrators were imprisoned, monasteries raided, and an 
unknown number of monks who took part in the protests defrocked.109 
 
3.2. The EU’s Reaction 
The EU and the USA issued an official joint declaration condemning the SPDC 
on 26 September 2007. The two sides expressed ‘their solidarity with the people 
of Burma/Myanmar’ against the junta’s clampdown on ‘peaceful demonstrators’ 
in a ‘joint EU-US Statement on Burma/Myanmar’.110 In October 2007, the EU and 
US stepped up sanctions against the regime in reaction to the clampdown on the 
people’s mass demonstrations.  
 
3.2.1. Ban on Timber-Metals-Semi/Precious Stones (2007) 
The compliance hypothesis seems corroborated by a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship between the target’s reprehensible behaviour and sanctions. The EU 
                                                 
107 Council of the EU, 25 September 2007: Declaration. 
108 Pinheiro 2007.  
109 A conservative interpretation of Theravada Buddhism forbids monks to engage in political life. 
The government accused monks who took part in the protest of being ‘bogus monks’. It is also in 
this spirit that the junta barred the clergy (approximately 500,000 persons) from voting on the 
constitutional referendum held in May 2008 (1947 Constitution, Art. 76(4); 1974 Constitution, Art. 
178(1); 2008 Constitutional Referendum Act). 
110 Council of the EU: Statement of 26 September 2007. 
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High Representative had underlined on 3 October 2007 that sanctions had 
compliance as their objective:  
[…] [The EU’s] decision to increase the sanctions that are already on Myanmar to 
see if that way we can help to bring about a change in the position of Myanmar.111 
During its meeting on 15-16 October, the Council of the EU officially stated 
that the junta’s ‘brutal crackdown on demonstrators’ would ignite tougher 
sanctions.112 It is noteworthy that, for the first time ever, penalties were not 
explicitly supporting the NLD, whose leadership was not involved in the 2007 
demonstrations.113 The Council announced it would extend the list of persons 
subject to the visa ban and asset freeze, impose a (non-retroactive) ban on 
investment in state-owned enterprises, and proscribe EU investment in Myanma 
enterprises engaged ‘in the industries of logging, timber and mining of metals 
and minerals, precious or semi-precious stones’, as well as trade with these 
industries.114 While announcing its decision to step up sanctions, the EU re-
affirmed its commitment for dialogue with the regime:  
The EU again expresses its readiness to assist Burma/Myanmar in its process of 
transition. The EU regrets that the Burmese government has made this impossible 
so far. Should this situation improve, the EU stands ready to review the restrictive 
measures, to engage with Burma/Myanmar in its development and to find new areas 
of cooperation.115 
These sanctions were imposed on 19 November 2007 with the adoption of 
Common Position 2007/750/CFSP. Therefore, they fulfil the functions of 
‘punishment’ (i.e. punishing the junta’s behaviour), as well as ‘compliance’ (i.e. 
changing the SPDC’s domestic policy) outlined by Doxey.116 The imposition of 
                                                 
111 Solana 2007: 8. 
112 Council of the EU: Conclusions of 15-16 October 2007: point 1. 
113 Council of the EU: Common Position 2007/750/CFSP of 19 November 2007. 
114 Council of the EU: Conclusions of 15-16 October 2007: point 6.  
115 Ibid., point 10. 
116 Margaret Doxey 1996: 55. 
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economic penalties undermines hypotheses based on a rationalist explanation of 
EU foreign policy-making like liberal intergovernmentalism.  
The UK had initiated the imposition of this ban by the EU, so that the large 
member states hypothesis is not completely disconfirmed. PM Gordon Brown 
officially stated his commitment to the following course of action: ‘Securing 
tougher EU sanctions’; ‘supporting Secretary General Ban […]’; ‘maintaining the 
UN Security Council's active vigilance and engagement […]’; and ‘continuing to 
use my contacts with leaders in the region to encourage them to play their part 
with the Burmese leadership’.117 Domestic groups, like the Burma Campaign UK, 
welcomed the PM’s statement.118 In fact, the PM had personally phoned the FCO 
to ratchet up penalties. The FCO had to represent the PM’s decision in the 
Council of Ministers, although diplomats had conveyed some scepticism with 
regards to the effectiveness of yet tougher sanctions.119 
In conformity with the large member states hypothesis, France’s change of 
position also allowed the hardening of economic sanctions in reaction to the 2007 
mass protests proposed by the UK. France’s tone towards Myanmar hardened 
following Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as President in May 2007, and the 
nomination of Bernard Kouchner as foreign minister on 17 May 2007. The new 
foreign minister took the Myanmar issue on as a personal cause. In 2003, Total 
had employed the co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and then 
member of the Socialist Party as a consultant; in the post, Kouchner conducted 
an enquiry into Total’s implementation of the company’s Corporate and Social 
Responsibilities (CSR) in its Yadana operations.120 He then dismissed allegations 
of London-based NGO Earth Rights International regarding Total’s complicity in 
the use of forced labour by the Myanma regiments who ensured security for the 
                                                 
117 Brown 2007: PM Statement on Burma.  
118 BC UK, 15 October 2007. 
119 Interviews 3 and 46; House of Commons, 10 October 2007: Examination, question 403. 
120 Black 2009. 
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construction of the Yadana pipeline.121 The French government vocally 
condemned the clampdown on the peaceful protests. On 10 October 2007, 
Sarkozy and Kouchner welcomed Dr. Sein Win – the NCGUB Prime Minister – in 
the Elysée. This date marked the first official encounter between a French head 
of state and the Myanma opposition, signalling a national policy change. Sarkozy 
showed receptiveness to the issue of economic sanctions, including investment 
bans.122  
Beyond Sarkozy and Kouchner’s sympathy for the pro-democracy movement, 
this change of position was to some extent related to domestic politics. The new 
President laid more emphasis on promoting popular human rights causes than 
his more traditionally Gaullist predecessor Jacques Chirac. Civil society 
representatives met with Kouchner in October 2007 to request tougher sanctions. 
Info Birmanie organised demonstrations with other civil society groups to put 
pressure on the government to react to the repression of 2007. Classic 
intergovernmentalism thus justifies this change of French policy, as the policy 
change was instituted by a new government that shifted preferences.123 
Germany compromised with other member states so as not to paralyse EU 
foreign policy. At first glance, this adaptation does not match the expectations of 
liberal intergovernmentalism. Berlin first refused to increase economic sanctions, 
but then agreed after having formally requested that the measures would not 
have harmful repercussions on the population of Myanmar. This change of 
position owed to the interaction with other member states, in particular the UK. 
Blocking restrictive measures would have negatively impacted on Germany’s 
image in the backdrop of the SPDC’s despicable behaviour.124 Liberal 
intergovernmentalism, however, is not necessarily falsified. A possible bargain 
                                                 
121 Kouchner, 29 September 2003. For an academic assessment of Total’s CSR programme, see: 
Black’s PhD thesis (2009). 
122 Interview 43. It seems the French President was at the time unaware that the investment 
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with the UK over Uzbekistan could explain why Germany did not veto the UK’s 
initiative.125 Further, Germany compromised on its initial stance as it did not have 
material interests in Myanmar.  
Although insignificant from a macro-economic perspective, the economic costs 
of the penalties contradict the rationalist claim that EU member states focus on 
economic gains. This policy change crippled small European businesses active 
in the targeted sectors. Some had to withdraw or reduce their activities after the 
2007 sanctions were enforced.126 Policy-makers accepted to inflict economic 
damage on some European Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), in order to 
gain the symbolic prestige of condemning the SPDC’s violent repression.127 
 
3.2.2. Impact of EU Measures 
The ban on companies involved in specific industries has been criticised for 
being hastily put together.128 Of the 1,207 businesses targeted in Annex V of the 
February 2008 measures, most are family businesses with no proven affiliation to 
the state or the military junta.129 The common position neither justifies why these 
companies have been targeted, nor did it initially inform them of their placement 
on the list of targeted entities. This lack of communication deprived the targeted 
companies of legal recourse to contest the sanctions that affected them. This 
denial has been interpreted as a human rights violation.130 It was only in April 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 Interview 6.  
127 Dorussen and Mo 2001. 
128 Tonkin, 29 November 2007: 1; Tonkin, 2 February 2010; Interviews 2 and 6. 
129 Frittin and Swanström 2010a: 3; European Commission: Regulation No.385/2008 of 28 April 
2008. 
130 Tonkin 29 November 2007: 1. This case is reminiscent of the case of the Organisation des 
Modjahedines du Peuple d'Iran, whereby the Court of First Instance eventually annulled, on 12 
December 2006, the Council's Decision ordering the freezing of the funds belonging to this 
organisation (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Press Release No° 97/06 of 
12 December 2006). In Myanmar’s case, however, targeted companies did not appeal against the 
Council’s Decision. In a different case, Pye Phow Tay Za (the son of Tay Za, a billionaire actively 
supporting the Myanma junta), appealed against the visa ban and asset freeze levied against him 
by the EU in 2008 - and won the case in March 2012, when the European Court of justice 
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2008 that the EU informed them, thus giving them the opportunity to appeal 
against the EU’s decisions.131 
One of the political secretaries in the UK embassy in Yangon had identified the 
companies targeted from an edition of the Myanmar business directory 
(Myanmar Yellow Pages). This list from the Yellow Pages was forwarded to the 
Council in Brussels as a basis for political decision, which published the same list 
in the common position without substantial change.132 The blunder was 
recognised after publication of the common position. Approximately 100 duplicate 
companies have been subsequently removed from the ban in 2011.133 This faux-
pas shows that member states’ bureaucracies were unprepared for tougher 
sanctions when instructions suddenly came from London and Brussels. 
The ban’s lack of impact supports the argument that the policy was cobbled 
together. The 2007 import, export, and investment ban on timber, metals, and 
semi-precious and precious stones hardly affected Myanmar’s market, which has 
mainly local and regional coverage. Stones and timber from Myanmar are 
generally exported as raw products to Thailand, India, China, and Hong Kong, 
where they are processed. The added value in the processing legally changes 
the origin of the final product.134 As a consequence, the ban did not really affect 
Myanmar’s trade with the EU. The ban on metals, in particular, could be 
considered an ill-conceived measure. Prior to 2007, Eurostat did not record any 
trade in metals between the EU and Myanmar. In short, a non-existing sector had 
been banned.135  
                                                                                                                                                 
annulled the 2008 Decision. The European Court of Justice argued: ‘Sanctions adopted by the 
Council in relation to a third country cannot be applied to natural persons solely on the ground of 
their family connection with persons associated with the leaders of that country’ (Democratic 
Voice of Burma, March 2010). Sanctions thus face an intractable dilemma between achieving 
political objectives (hurting the target) and respecting the human rights of targeted persons.  
131 Council of the EU, 30 April 2008: Notice. 
132 Tonkin, 29 November 2007: 1; Tonkin, 2 February 2010; interviews 2 and 46.  
133 Interview 6.  
134 Tonkin, 29 November 2007; Tonkin, 2 February 2010; United States Government 
Accountability Office 2009. 
135 Interview 6. 
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Under the current system, the central government and some bodies in ethnic 
areas receive income from issuing timber harvesting permits. These exclusively 
local financial circuits are beyond the reach of international sanctions. Timber 
harvested from areas under direct or indirect control of central government is 
brought to Yangon and traded solely from there; buyers are exclusively from the 
region. Timber harvested elsewhere in the country finds its uncontrolled way into 
neighbouring countries.136 
The ban on companies engaged in logging contradicted the spirit of Common 
Position 2004/730/CFSP. This common position provided the EU with a mandate 
to engage Myanmar on the problem of ‘non-sustainable, excessive logging 
resulting in deforestation’.137 During the 2008 Cyclone Nargis crisis, the ban on 
purchasing products from local timber businesses impeded the delivery of 
assistance (i.e. wooden windows and door frames for resettlement sites), until 
the common position was amended.138 
The timber ban contradicted the goal of helping a Myanma middle class 
emerge. There is evidence of unemployment resulting from timber processing 
businesses closed down due to lack of export opportunities in Europe. The 
Commission received complaints from EU timber merchants and manufacturers 
who were forced to close their businesses in Myanmar.139 Confirmed job losses 
in these cases exceed several hundred and may well go into the thousands. 
There are credible reports of skilled workers seeking employment in Thailand 
where they have been exploited.140  
By the same token, Thai companies benefit from timber imported into Thailand 
for processing and re-exporting. WTO-compatible rules of origin legally transform 
Myanma logs into ‘Thai’ garden furniture, which then reaches Europe under the 
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GSP for Thailand. In short, EU timber sanctions punish small and medium size 
companies in Myanmar, and indirectly benefit the neighbouring country.  
The EU’s Forestry Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
programme helps timber exporting countries in certifying the legality of their 
timber harvests. It prevents deforestation and helps secure local income from 
sustainable (and thus legally) harvested timber. Myanmar, although having 
expressed interest in the system, could not become a beneficiary as long as 
there were timber sanctions in place. Although the livelihoods of thousands of 
farmers depend on forests, EU timber sanctions prevented the EU from working 
to redress this situation, despite a programme available for that purpose.  
 
3.2.3. The EU Special Envoy (2007) 
Following the 2007 uprising, Javier Solana appointed Italian MP Piero Fassino 
as ‘EU Special Envoy for Burma/Myanmar’ on 6 November 2007. This 
appointment stressed ‘the importance that the EU attaches to the improvement of 
the situation in Burma/Myanmar’.141 Sweden had initially suggested the idea of a 
high-level EU representative for Myanmar in 2005. It was raised by the Taylor-
Pedersen Report and independent political activists.142 The European Parliament 
supported it.143  
The category of an EU Special Envoy was entirely new. The Amsterdam 
Treaty foresaw the nomination of two types of representatives. A ‘Special 
Representative’ was nominated by the Council, funded by the Commission under 
the CFSP budget. A ‘Personal Representative’ was nominated by the EU High 
Representative (Solana), and funded by the Council Secretariat’s budget.144 The 
category of ’Special Envoy’, by contrast, is not mentioned in the Treaty. The 
                                                 
141 Council of the EU, 14 December 2007: Presidency Conclusions. 
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143 See: Hristov 2009: 183. 
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Special Envoy had therefore to be funded by Italy, with a small complementary 
budget line from the Council to finance his travels.145 
Other member states had not been consulted on this initiative taken by HR 
Javier Solana. Likewise, the Commission was taken by surprise.146 FCO 
representatives and MPs complained that the Foreign Office was not even 
informed prior to his appointment, a decision which primarily involved the Council 
Secretariat and the Italian government.147  
Piero Fassino’s appointment was closely linked to Italian domestic politics, as 
the position was given in order to ‘reward’ him with a prestigious assignment in 
Brussels. Fassino was national secretary of the Democrats of the Left party (DS), 
which he agreed to dismantle and merge into the Democratic Party on 14 
October 2007. In conformity with intergovernmental bargaining theories, it has 
been speculated that this nomination induced Italy not to oppose the parallel 
imposition of economic sanctions in October 2007.148 
The Envoy had a limited mandate: his main remit was to strengthen the role of 
the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, 
by articulating the EU’s common policy towards Myanmar. Since his 
appointment, Fassino has been touring European and Asian capitals, 
Washington and New York in order to coordinate the various international 
approaches towards Myanmar (the UN, the USA, China, India, Australia and the 
ASEAN member states). 
At the time of appointment, HR Solana did not notify the Myanma side of the 
nomination. This negligence has beset the Envoy’s mission.149 The Myanma 
authorities repeatedly denied Fassino an entry visa, because they had not been 
informed that the EU had appointed a Special Envoy. Furthermore, his mandate 
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was obfuscated by overlaps with the mission of the Special Representative of the 
UNSG, Ibrahim Gambari.150  
The Envoy could later take part in meetings held multilaterally (Hanoi) and 
bilaterally (Copenhagen and Phnom Penh), thanks to the mediation of then 
External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. At the ASEM summit 
in Brussels (October 2010) and at FAO meetings in Rome (2010), Piero Fassino 
could meet Myanmar’s foreign minister and the agriculture minister. Fassino has 
been able to enter Myanmar only in June 2011, a few weeks before his mandate 
expired. 
Journalists have criticised Fassino for adding limited value to the democratic 
transition process, for undermining Gambari’s mission, and for lacking an 
adequate public relations strategy towards the SPDC.151 However, a fair 
evaluation of his efforts needs to look at the contextual shortcomings: the Council 
Secretariat’s negligence of notifying his appointment to the authorities gave the 
latter an easy motive to keep Fassino at bay. More strategically, his appointment 
may be seen against the absence of a diplomatic EU presence in Myanmar, 
which undoubtedly would be of more sustained value than a Special Envoy, even 
if such a European national politician were to travel to the country from time to 
time.  
 
4. EU Assistance in Contradiction with US Policy 
4.1. The Three Diseases Fund (2005-2007) 
As part of its double track approach, the EU scaled up aid levels to Myanmar 
while reinforcing sanctions on the regime. The Commission and some member 
states launched a Three Diseases Fund (3DF) nearly two years after the decision 
to allow for increased aid had been taken. Although initiated by the European 
Commission with the support of some EU member states, the 3DF was not 
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specifically an ‘EU programme’. With financial contributions from Australia and 
Norway, it was managed by UNOPS, which acted as a neutral administrator. It 
pulled together funds from donors who were willing to increase aid given in 
Myanmar. 
A UN initiative, the Global Fund for HIV/Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, had 
dedicated $98.4 million over a period of five years (2003-2008) to address these 
three pandemics in Myanmar.152 Due to political pressure from the US Congress 
and the Bush administration, but quoting shaky cooperation with the SPDC as a 
reason, the Global Fund terminated all of its grants to Myanmar by the end of 
2005, and cancelled further aid.153 The boycotting of aid has been constantly 
upheld by the US.  
The Commission and some EU member states, all of which had been pushing 
for the Global Fund to enter Myanmar, strongly opposed US pressure on the 
Fund and the ensuing decision to terminate assistance to suffering people. As an 
answer to the decision they viewed as irresponsible, the Commission initiated the 
3DF with additional contributions from the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway 
and Australia, in order to fill in the vacuum left by the Global Fund’s 
withdrawal.154 Its objective was the same as the Global Fund, but its structure 
enabled the 3DF to rely solely on voluntary donations. Hence, it could operate 
independently from contributors reluctant to work in Myanmar. By the end of 
2006, the 3DF had gathered a total budget of $100 million for a period of five 
years (2007-2012). The UK alone contributed £20 million to the 3DF.155 On 15 
November 2009, the Global Fund announced its decision to return to Myanmar 
with $110 million.156 
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Thus, the EU did not bandwagon with the US in this instance. But from a neo-
realist perspective, this position, contradicting US action (under the initiative of 
US legislators, such as Senator John Mac Connick, Dana Rohrabacher, or Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen), was possible because the ‘humanitarian’ sector did not carry 
strategic weight for transatlantic relations. Otherwise, traditional European allies 
of the US − like the UK and the Netherlands − would have been unlikely to take 
part in this initiative without raising objections from their national parliaments. 
Thus confirming intergovernmental157 and neo-realist158 predictions, this case 
does not support the view that the EU necessarily acts as a unitary actor in 
international relations. Only the UK, the Netherlands, and the Commission first 
participated in the 3DF.159 Most EU member states decided to opt out, whereas 
non-EU states (i.e. Norway and Australia) were allowed to participate in the 
scheme.  
Rationalist approaches, however, cannot explain why the 3DF was founded in 
the absence of economic interests or domestic pressures. Domestic groups in 
the UK and Netherlands were actually revising their stance. European pressure 
groups effectively supported an increased delivery of humanitarian aid, but only if 
it respected the rules of transparency. Nevertheless, these lobby groups did not 
initiate the establishment of the fund. Rationalist approaches are also limited in 
accounting for the entrepreneurial role of the Commission.  
The constructivist model of policy-making as learning process can be 
confirmed here.160 The 3DF was created in order to enhance the policy’s 
effectiveness and in contradiction with exogenous dynamics and previous 
practices of aid suspension. This would also show that policy feedbacks are 
more likely to be taken into account in sectors which are less affected by 
domestic and exogenous pressures. Adoption of the 3DF could be perceived as 
demonstrating the role of ideas (such as promoting basic human rights on the 
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ground) ‘as sources of perceived interests’.161 Paul Sacks underscored that the 
‘politics as learning approach’ implies that elements within the policy-making 
system ‘act in pursuit of the national interest’, and thus overcome an eventual 
opposition from exogenous actors (e.g. in the present case the US Congress).162 
This perspective derived from constructivism can be coupled with insights from 
neo-functionalism in order to place emphasis on the role of the Commission in 
promoting policy change.163 The change was induced by the role of ideas (rather 
than material interests), and the combined entrepreneurship of the Commission, 
UK, and Netherlands. Unlike the technical decision to implement the 3DF, EU 
policy in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis was characterised by a dissonance of 
voices.  
 
4.2. Cyclone Nargis and Incoherent EU Policy (2008) 
4.2.1. The Natural Disaster 
On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the Myanmar coast and moved 
inland into the Ayeyawady delta to the Southern Yangon division. The death toll 
from the hurricane was officially 84,537 with 53,836 people missing and 19,359 
injured.164 International agencies estimated the number of persons displaced by 
the destructions to be 2 million.165 The government first refused to grant visas to 
most international aid workers. Following an isolationist foreign policy inherited 
from the Cold War, Myanma authorities sought to prevent an uncontrolled 
intrusion of foreign aid workers into the country.166 
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The government did not revise its plans to hold a country-wide referendum on 
the Constitution, scheduled for 10 May 2008. The vote was postponed to 24 May 
in the most affected areas of the Ayeyawady Division. Some 27,288,827 voters 
were eligible to vote in the 2008 Referendum.167 The referendum recorded a less 
than credible 92.48 percent vote in favour of the Constitution, in which the 
military would continue to dominate for the foreseeable future. This vote was 
condemned by the international media. The EU abstained from expressing very 
harsh criticisms, as the regime was already reluctant to allow foreign assistance 
in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. 
 
4.2.2. EU Diplomacy 
During the Nargis humanitarian crisis, national diplomacy of member states 
prevailed over a common European diplomacy. The Special Envoy could not 
obtain a visa to Myanmar. Big member states as well as the Commission did not 
agree on a common policy. The divergence of interests undermined the role of 
the Commission.  
On 7 May, Bernard Kouchner invoked the conventions of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP).168 The US, the UK, and France later dispatched ships to the Bay 
of Bengal, ready to send helicopters with relief materials.169 The tone soured 
when, on 16 May, Myanmar’s UN ambassador Kyaw Tint Swe accused France of 
deploying a ‘warship’ to the Myanma coast. France’s ambassador to the UN, 
Jean-Maurice Ripert, retorted that Myanmar’s refusal to allow aid into the country 
‘could lead to a true crime against humanity.’170 In the midst of the crisis, Paris 
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had acted on its own initiative without consulting its European counterparts. UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown seemed to subscribe to the French position. He 
accused the ruling junta of allowing the disaster to grow into a ‘man-made 
catastrophe’ through its failure to act.171  
France’s UN ambassador argued that RtoP regulations could justify a 
humanitarian intervention.172 But the revised draft outcome document of the 
High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly does not mention cases of 
non-assistance to populations hit by a natural disaster. It only foresees cases of 
‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.173 The 
French initiative to bring Myanmar’s situation before the UNSC was therefore 
vetoed not only by China and Russia, but also by ASEAN’s largest member, 
Indonesia.174 The European inability to secure ASEAN’s support even in the case 
of an overwhelming humanitarian disaster demonstrates the limitations of the 
EU-ASEAN dialogue, where divergent views on national sovereignty remain ‘a 
major stumbling block towards interregional cooperation’.175 
The UK distinguished its position from the one proposed by France, although 
PM Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband sympathised with the 
French initiative. Its permanent representative to the UN, John Sawers, had 
already clarified on 8 May 2008 that the 2005 agreement ‘[…] relates to acts of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and so forth, rather than 
government responses to natural disasters’.176 Further pursuing an incoherent 
debate, France and the UK were unable to coordinate their policies.177  
As a consequence, the EU Special Envoy could not represent a common 
European position internationally, in addition to being unable to enter Myanmar. 
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On 13 May, the Council of the EU rhetorically subscribed to the possibility of 
humanitarian intervention by vowing to support any UN initiative, which implicitly 
revealed the EU’s inability to offer practical solutions to the political stalemate.178 
In-line with the large member states hypothesis, EU foreign policy maintained the 
status quo.  
The EU’s reaction could also be interpreted from a realist perspective.179 A 
former UN envoy argued that in addition to legal issues, security concerns had 
dissuaded Western governments from using the RtoP framework.180 During a 
private UNSC meeting, Western countries discussed the likelihood of military 
retaliation by Myanma security forces on French, British, or American workers 
operating without permission from the national authorities, or a UNSC mandate 
for humanitarian intervention. The quandary was that humanitarian intervention 
could have ignited a confrontation with Myanma anti-aircraft forces. Escalation at 
the regional level and conflagration with China could not be excluded. PM 
Gordon Brown thus revised his position. He stated on 21 May:  
[…] food drops or other drops of aid would be counter-productive and […] military 
intervention would be counter-productive at this time. Let us hope, and let us push 
the ASEAN effort forward.181 
The consequences of a military-led humanitarian intervention were considered 
too risky, due to the fragile balance of power in a region dominated by China and 
India. 
 
4.2.3. Increase in Aid after Cyclone Nargis 
During a 13 May 2008 Council meeting on Myanmar, ECHO-Commissioner 
Louis Michel announced his intention to visit the country in order to evaluate the 
humanitarian situation. No minister objected, so that Michel left for Yangon in the 
                                                 
178 Council of the EU: Meeting of 13 May 2008, par. 1. See also: Haacke 2009: 166. 
179 Stephens, 16 May 2008. 
180 Conference address at the London School of Economics (Chatham House rule). 
181 Lunn et al. 2008: 55. 
281
Chapter VI 
following days.182 In a quasi-competition with the Commission, the UK felt its 
representative had to go to Myanmar, too. It announced its intention in the 
Council of Ministers. The FCO minister for Asia arrived in Yangon on 17-18 May 
2008. He met with Myanma line-ministers in charge of the emergency 
response.183 The development ministers of the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark also followed suit.184 The EU’s inability to project its collective power 
vis-à-vis Myanmar and ASEAN led EU members to privilege their national 
diplomacy to a more coherent defence of human rights in an EU framework. 
These successive visits demonstrate that the moratorium on high-level visits to 
Myanmar could be informally waived as long as the Council was informed and 
did not raise formal objection. This contradicted interpretations from German 
officials, who initially understood that the moratorium on high-level visits could 
not be waived.185 As a matter of fact, it could be asked whether these visits of 
member states’ national representatives were in the interest of the EU as a whole 
(reflecting an ‘upgraded European interest’), or solely of the EU member states 
who had sent their own Envoy. 
As a consequence, the EU contributed 60 percent of Myanmar’s post-cyclone 
Nargis relief.186 
The Commission funding for the initial emergency phase of Cyclone Nargis amounts 
to €17 million for 1.4 million beneficiaries in seven sectors: shelter, food, water, 
sanitation, health, nutrition, protection and logistics.187  
The UK pledged £45 million on 3 November 2008 – the biggest sum for any 
single donor.188 France allocated €2 million in humanitarian aid in the aftermath 
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of Nargis.189 Paradoxically, member states generally perceived as more lenient 
(e.g. France, Germany, Italy or Austria) did not increase assistance as 
substantially as principled ones. However, on another emergency response track 
– the Commission-led Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) – flexible states like 
Austria and Slovakia were the first and main donors to send relief items.190 
The increase in aid continued even after Cyclone Nargis. The Commission 
provided an additional €22 million to address complementary needs linked to 
food security. From 2008 to 2010, ECHO provided an emergency assistance of 
€39 million ($52.5 million).191 In 2008-2009, DFID’s total financial commitment 
exceeded £57 million. The sum was made up of £45 million for emergency relief 
following Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and £12.5 million for long-term 
humanitarian assistance programmes.192 DFID’s total financial allocation for 
2009-2010 was £25 million and £28 million for 2010-2011. Other funds were 
available since 2009, such as the agricultural multi-donor trust fund LIFT 
(Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund). The major contributors are, in 
decreasing order: the UK, the Commission, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, 
and Germany.193 
The large member states hypothesis cannot explain why the Commission and 
several member states scaled up aid levels in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. 
This increase was not motivated by direct material benefits. No bargaining 
process was needed among member states, which increased aid because of the 
acute humanitarian needs. Interaction at the EU level has therefore contributed 
to shaping national foreign policy. The consensus hypothesis accounts for 
ideational motivation and leadership. Ideational factors have featured a genuine 
motivation in the EU’s humanitarian policy since 2004. 
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5. The 2010 Elections and Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release 
5.1. Renewal of Aung San Suu Kyi’s Prison Sentence (2009) 
5.1.1. Domestic Events 
The direct link between sanctions and ASSK’s detainment was borne out 
again on 13 August 2009.194 ASSK was convicted on 11 August 2009 for 
breaking the conditions of her restricted residence by allowing an American 
citizen, John W. Yettaw, to stay uninvited at her home in May 2009. The reasons 
that led ASSK to allow an unknown intruder to stay on her premises remain 
unclear.195 
ASSK was sentenced to three years’ hard labour. At the very moment the 
verdict was read out, a Directive from SPDC Chairman Than Shwe instantly 
commuted the prison sentence to eighteen months house arrest.196 ASSK 
appealed to Myanmar’s Supreme Court against the extension of her house arrest 
sentence. The appeal was eventually rejected on 1 March 2010. It was alleged 
that this extension of her house arrest term barred her from contesting the 2010 
elections, but this assertion had never been tested by a legal challenge, i.e. by 
checking her name in the voters’ register and eventually seeking judicial remedy.  
 
5.1.2. The EU’s Reaction 
This rejection sparked yet another outcry from EU member states, the 
European Parliament, and the High Representative. They made ‘a strong plea [to 
the Myanmar authorities] to heed the appeals of the international community’.197 
The EU widened its visa ban and asset freeze to those responsible for the 
verdict.198 This immediate reaction to the 2009 sentence owes to the strong 
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convergence of interests between the member states, presumably induced by 
the enhanced institutionalisation of EU foreign policy. By contrast, the EU had not 
directly reacted to ASSK’s second confinement on 23 September 2000.  
These measures seem to corroborate the compliance hypothesis. The EU 
reacted immediately to the sentence pronounced by the Myanma authorities. 
Nevertheless, these reinforced restrictions remained mainly symbolic. Their 
impact on the SPDC’s behaviour has been limited, since ASSK was not released 
before her renewed house arrest verdict elapsed on 13 November 2010. 
Furthermore, the EU wielded penalties on persons who were not decision-
makers in the military apparatus. The ‘responsibility’ of those judges is 
questionable, given their dependence on the political authorities. Adding their 
names to the EU ban made them scapegoats for additional punitive measures, 
with little prospect for effective influence. Here again, it could be asked whether 
the symbolic function of sanctions prevailed over the goal of compliance. 
These penalties were again motivated by the interests of top European 
leaders in defending ASSK. British PM Brown wrote articles on the situation in 
Myanmar.199 He published a book entitled Courage where he lauded ASSK as a 
role model.200 Upon leaving office, then PM wrote a devoted letter to ASSK:  
Dear Aung San Suu Kyi,  
This is one of the last letters I write as Prime Minister and I want it to be to you, to 
champion your cause for democracy in Burma and to say I will do everything I can to 
support you. You are, for me, what courage is and I will fight for you to be free and 
your people [to be] free.201 
Despite the vitriolic debates it may at times spark in both Houses, the Myanmar 
issue did not give the impression that it determines the outcome of British 
                                                 
199 Brown 2007. 
200 Brown 2009.  
201 Brown 2010a. 
285
Chapter VI 
elections.202 Neither the Conservatives nor the Liberal Democrats devoted 
attention to Myanmar during the 2010 election campaign.203 Only Labour 
mentioned the Myanmar issue in their 2010 party manifesto, owing to the party’s 
commitment at the highest level to the NLD and ASSK. Despite this lack of 
significance for electoral politics – and in agreement with rationalist approaches – 
former British ambassador Tonkin felt that the UK’s principled position was 
unlikely to be changed, for it was seen ‘as politically risk free and there would 
be no domestic political incentive to consider possible new approaches’.204  
 
5.2. The General Election (2010) 
5.2.1. Disbandment of the NLD as a Political Party 
Article 25 of the Bylaws to the Political Parties Registration Act required all 
existing parties to register for competition in the general elections before the 
deadline of 6 May 2010, or be disbanded. On 29 March, NLD announced its 
decision not to participate in the 2010 general elections, following an open vote 
of its members held the same day.205 As a consequence, NLD legally ceased to 
exist as a political party after the 6 May 2010 deadline elapsed. The NLD’s 
dissolution was officially announced on 14 September 2010, when the electoral 
commission stated which parties were allowed to take part in the elections (37 
parties), which ones had been disbanded for failing to register on time (5 parties 
– including the NLD), and which ones could not compete by reason of an 
insufficient number of registered candidates (5 parties).206 
The NLD’s decision was one of principle, taken out of respect for the party 
Secretary General ASSK, and on her recommendation. It denounced the Election 
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Laws as a ploy to stifle political dissent. The Laws decreed that anyone serving a 
prison sentence could neither vote, nor stand for election, nor even be a member 
of a political party.207 This restriction excluded prisoners of conscience from the 
political arena. Speculations that ASSK would therefore be barred from 
competing in the polls contributed to the NLD’s decision to boycott the general 
elections.208  
In addition, the party rejected a series of constitutional provisions, such as the 
preservation of 25 percent of parliamentary seats for the military; a 75 percent 
approval vote required in both chambers for any constitutional change; and the 
Union Elections Commission’s lack of democratic accountability.209 It dismissed 
an election that – in its view – would legitimise the establishment’s leadership 
under the 2008 constitution, and thus seal the aborted victory of 1990. In its 
Shwegondaing declaration of 29 April 2009, the NLD persisted in calling for a 
rather unlikely ‘Recognition of the result of the Multi Party Democracy General 
Election (1990)’ by the SPDC.210 Nevertheless, the NLD leadership was broadly 
split on the issue of participation in the junta-led elections. About 25 percent of 
the NLD Central Executive Committee split from the NLD to set up the National 
Democratic Force (NDF) and contest the elections, immediately after the 6 May 
deadline had passed for the NLD’s renewed registration.211 
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5.2.2. The EU’s Reaction 
The EU initially considered the organisation of elections a window of 
opportunity for engagement, provided that the NLD could meaningfully take part 
in the process.212 In other words, the decision by the NLD leaders to boycott the 
elections shaped the EU’s views on the electoral process from its very outset. 
Had NLD decided to participate, the EU could hardly have been as severe in its 
judgement. 
On 26 April 2010, the Council had reaffirmed that sanctions were tailored to 
reach the policy’s primary objectives: ‘to bring about a peaceful transition to a 
democratic, civilian and inclusive system of government’. It also stressed its 
willingness to hold high-level talks with the military government.213 This window 
of opportunity was apparently widened by the UK’s general elections. The British 
Conservative party had campaigned on the slogan of a ‘liberal Conservative 
foreign policy’ that would be ‘hard-headed and practical’.214 Throughout the 
electoral process, only the European Parliament commended NLD’s decision not 
to participate.215 Thus, the EU’s policy could be characterised by silent 
pragmatism until the Union Elections Commission announced which parties were 
(and were not) allowed taking part in the polls. 
Principled EU member states brought their silence to an end by lambasting the 
Union Elections Commission’s statement of 15 September. Newly appointed 
British foreign secretary William Hague made his first declaration on Myanmar on 
16 September 2010. He set the Conservative policy in the path of New Labour’s 
liberal cosmopolitan rhetoric:  
These actions expose the elections in Burma for what they are – a sham process 
designed to keep the regime in power and deny the Burmese people their right to 
freely choose their leaders. The elections should have been a chance for national 
reconciliation […]. This opportunity is being squandered. These latest developments 
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should be greeted with dismay and condemnation by the international community 
and a renewed determination to support the people of Burma.216 
The British Ambassador to Myanmar, Andrew Heyn, stated that his government 
respected the decisions of those who had decided to boycott the election,217 a 
statement later reiterated by Catherine Ashton on behalf of the entire EU.218 
France shared the UK’s principled position. Incumbent foreign minister Alliot-
Marie continued Bernard Kouchner’s focus on human rights in Myanmar. The 
French foreign ministry spokesman stated on 15 September: ‘This profoundly 
shocking situation is the consequence of the implementation of the unjust 
electoral laws promulgated in March.’219 
 
5.2.3. The Elections and their Aftermath 
The Myanmar government announced on 13 August 2010 that general 
elections would be held on 7 November 2010. Competition was thus open for 
330 (out of 440) seats in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw, or People’s 
Assembly) and 168 (out of 224) seats in the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw, or 
Nationalities Assembly). The Constitution reserved 25 percent of the seats in 
both houses for the military.  
The SPDC formed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 
headed by Prime Minister Thein Sein. This party superseded the mass 
organisation USDA. The former single party BSPP had been revamped since 24 
September 1988 into the moderately pro-government National Unity Party (NUP). 
The elections saw the eclipse of 36 of the 37 parties which had registered for the 
elections and the overwhelming dominance of the USDP, which won over 75 
percent of available seats.220 Despite earlier hints by the then Prime Minister 
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Thein Sein, Myanmar turned down the offer of ASEAN to send electoral 
observers to monitor the elections.221 Prospects for an EU electoral observation 
to Myanmar were thus nonexistent.222 
 
5.2.4. The EU’s Reaction to the Elections 
In the continuity of the principled declarations of September 2010, Western 
powers denounced the elections as flawed. In addition to the polemic revolving 
around ‘unjust elections law’ and the NLD’s refusal to take part in the elections, a 
raft of allegations were expressed concerning vote rigging, notably the use of 
advance votes, vote-buying, and intimidation.223 On 7 November 2010, High 
Representative Catherine Ashton stated that she regretted that the elections fell 
short of international standards, and that ASSK remained under house arrest ‘on 
entirely spurious grounds’.224 William Hague slammed the process: ‘Holding 
flawed elections does not represent progress’.225 President Obama called the 
elections as ‘neither free nor fair’.226 
 
5.3. Release of Aung San Suu Kyi 
5.3.1. Events in Myanmar 
ASSK’s term under house arrest expired on 13 November 2010 – one week 
after the elections. The authorities did not renew her sentence, putting seven 
years of house arrest to an end. NLD vice-chairman Tin Oo had already been 
released from prison on 13 February 2010. ASSK’s release revived the sanctions 
debate, offering the West a chance to revise its restrictive strategy, which had 
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proven unable to coerce the SPDC.227 Yet, ASSK initially disagreed with this 
position: 
So far, I have not got the impression that economic sanctions have really hurt the 
public, but of course there are other voices that are perhaps still waiting to be heard, 
so we have yet to find out. I have been released just for over a month, and I haven't 
had time to go into this issue; I am waiting to read the latest report of the IMF, and 
perhaps the ADB and other economic institutions.228 
 
5.3.2. The EU’s Reaction to Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release 
In contrast with the organisation of elections, ASSK’s release was broadly 
welcomed by European heads of states as well as top EU officials – HRVP 
Catherine Ashton,229 European Council President Herman von Rompuy,230 and 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso231 all issued individual 
communiqués. This high-level commitment to ASSK highlights her vital 
importance as a democracy icon for EU policy towards Myanmar. The EU thus 
strengthened its identity as a promoter of moral values.  
On 22 November 2010, however, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) stated that 
ASSK’s third release was not enough to revise its policy.232 Asked during a press 
conference whether the lifting of sanctions had been discussed, Catherine 
Ashton answered:  
No, we're not anywhere close to discussing the lifting of sanctions, this was a 
discussion to take note of the situation.233 
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Danish foreign minister Lene Espersen separately told the press that the military 
government should not be rewarded for releasing Suu Kyi, stating: ‘there is no 
doubt that we in the EU must continue to maintain pressure.’234 
Having already proven its enhanced capacity to promptly react to exogenous 
events, the EU’s decision not to scale back sanctions could hardly be attributed 
to slow institutional dynamics. The EU’s principled stance can be best explained 
by the eagerness not to erode its support for ASSK, who had convinced the NLD 
to stay away from the 2010 elections. Maintaining sanctions in place had also the 
benefit of acceding to demands from domestic constituencies. This consistency 
could finally be explained by a reluctance to lose face by disavowing twenty 
years of common foreign policy, arguing that partially ‘lifting sanctions would 
send out the wrong message’ to the military regime.235 This inaction falsifies the 
compliance hypothesis, which would expect the EU to at least partially reward 
Myanmar for acceding one of its main demands. EU foreign policy remained 
unchanged until the SPDC was dissolved on 30 March 2011, and Thein Sein was 
sworn in as Myanmar’s first civilian President since 1988. 
 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Summary 
The present chapter showed how EU member states redefined and enhanced 
their consensus around a principled policy between 2004 and 2010. EU foreign 
policy-makers agreed on a ‘double track approach’, which implied tougher 
sanctions while scaling up aid levels. This dual strategy was justified by the 
impartiality of humanitarian aid. Strengthening this European consensus 
necessitated a commonality of purpose constitutive of EU identity. 
Notwithstanding, this consensus was not sturdy enough to dissipate the logic of 
diversity among the member states, especially in the diplomatic sector. 
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The European consensus consistently focused on unwavering support of 
Myanmar’s democratic opposition. Decisions were largely taken out of a process 
of persuasion between policy-makers where normative arguments played a large 
role. Nonetheless, ‘normative suasion’ did not exclude ‘cooperative bargaining’. 
The German acquiescence in UK policy on Myanmar was partly traded off 
against the UK’s position in the Council on the issues of sanctions on Uzbekistan 
in 2007.236 Despite the robust normative foundation of EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar, issue linkages did occur.  
The 2004 policy change shows that the EU was not path dependent, at least in 
the domain of aid delivery. This policy change was inspired by endogenous 
dynamics, namely the assessment that drastic reduction in humanitarian 
assistance contradicted the primary objective of promoting human rights. It 
recalls Goldmann’s concept of ‘negative policy feedback’,237 and David Welch’s 
hypothesis in the context of structural foreign policy change:  
[…] foreign policy change will be most likely when policy fails either repeatedly or 
catastrophically, or when leaders become convinced that it will imminently do so.238 
This policy change could be understood as an outcome of ‘policy learning’ by the 
EU. This model perceives policies not only as the product of a struggle for power, 
but of social learning by policy-makers.239 This surge in aid shows that, eleven 
years after the Maastricht Treaty came into force, the EU was able to 
incrementally adjust its policy, in order to make it more effective in achieving its 
ends. An increasing logic of convergence among decision-makers in the EU and 
the emergence of an ‘upgraded interest’ underpinned this policy change. 
                                                 
236 A similar informal bargain took place between the UK and France, when Paris pushed for a 
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The policy change of 2004, however, was the only event where feedbacks 
directly affected policy-making. The rationale for the sanctions policy was 
political. As such, technical feedbacks (in the form of external assessments by 
third parties or internal policy reviews) did not count much when reaching 
decisions. According to interviews, policy feedbacks on sanctions were 
systematically jettisoned before the ministerial level of decision-making, and 
usually even before ambassadors of EU member states would meet within the 
Political and Security Committee.240 
Finally, this chapter showed that EU sanctions mainly achieved symbolic 
posturing. The measures decided in the aftermath of the 2007 uprising 
demonstrated that the EU’s punitive strategy had not been proactively thought-
out. In many cases, the EU simply missed its target: the SPDC and its direct 
supporters. Some measures hit wrong targets – like SMEs without apparent 
connections with the junta. The EU provided little justification for targeting 
specific companies and not others. Sanctions had been decided under the 
imperatives of high-level policy-makers without comprehensive technical review. 
 
6.2. Assessment of Hypotheses 
6.2.1. Bandwagoning hypothesis 
Both the EU and the US pursued the same broad strategy of reinforcing 
sanctions on Myanmar. Restrictions decided by the EU generally followed suit to 
the ones decided by the US. EU sanctions, however, did not entail blanket 
economic sanctions, so EU policy maintained some degree of independence vis-
à-vis Washington. The EU’s approach diverged from the Bush administration’s 
policy on aid, as the EU scaled up humanitarian assistance. This divergence 
falsifies the bandwagoning hypothesis, which would expect the EU to bandwagon 
with its allies including on non-strategic foreign policy issues. Notwithstanding, 
this instance of falsification of the bandwagoning hypothesis does not imply that 
neo-realism should be dismissed as an explanation of EU foreign policy towards 
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Myanmar. Discordances between the EU and the US, especially in relatively un-
strategic fields, could reflect the EU’s agenda to preserve its autonomy in an 
anarchical system. 
The EU coordinated its policy with the US, as proven by the EU-US Statement 
on Burma/Myanmar of 26 September 2007. The UK Foreign Office also 
exchanged views with American counterparts quite frequently.241 Nevertheless, 
there is no indication that EU policies were adopted as a consequence of 
pressures exerted on EU member states by the Bush administration. This dearth 
of empirical evidence regarding exogenous pressure could point towards 
competing hypothetical explanations.  
 
6.2.2. Compliance Hypothesis 
The compliance hypothesis was corroborated whenever Myanmar flouted EU 
demands. This trigger for sanctions was exogenous, as the restrictions of 2007 
and 2009 evidenced. The EU reacted swiftly to punish adverse domestic 
developments in Myanmar. This responsiveness demonstrates that the 
bargaining process between large member states was smoother than during 
earlier periods when the European consensus was less firmly established. The 
compliance hypothesis needs to be cautiously qualified, however, as some 
negative measures were chronologically disconnected from developments on the 
ground. This is exemplified by the decision to ratchet up sanctions in October 
2004, as a late reaction to the Depayin incident of May 2003.  
The compliance hypothesis was challenged by the events of late 2010. The 
holding of a general election and ASSK’s release represented a degree of 
compliance with the EU’s demands, in place since the aborted 1990 election. 
These positive steps, however moderate, should have logically led to a partial 
and temporary removal of some restrictions (e.g. visa ban on certain government 
officials). Nonetheless, the EU’s course of action did not follow this logic: 
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sanctions remained in place. The EU was able to reinforce negative measures, 
but made no use of incentives to entice political and economic reforms. 
The NLD’s decision to boycott the 2010 election determined the EU’s decision 
not to endorse what it viewed as a flawed reconciliation process. This 
unconditional support of an opposition political party demonstrates that the 
symbolic function of EU foreign policy eventually prevailed over the achievement 
of primary policy objectives, such as influencing the SPDC’s behaviour. 
Apparently, the EU did not officially take note that some members of the 
opposition split off from the NLD to participate in the election.  
For some analysts, the hawkish rhetoric maintained by Western powers 
dispelled assumptions that the sanctions policy would be revised in the light of 
favourable developments on the ground.242 It seemed that only participation of 
the NLD in an elected government would justify a repeal of EU sanctions – 
independently from progress in other areas related to human rights (e.g. use of 
forced labour, economic, social and political reform).243 It was nonetheless 
unlikely that the NLD would officially endorse government policies. This prospect 
appeared remote given the history of twenty years of domestic stalemate, the 
NLD’s adamant focus on the 1990 election, and the unbalanced politics in 
Myanmar, where an all-powerful junta was challenged by a repressed political 
opposition.  
 
6.2.3. Large Member States Hypothesis 
The large member states hypothesis was corroborated in many instances. The 
enhanced consensus achieved by the EU was chiefly the result of the systematic 
efforts of the UK in the Council. This strong stance was in part down to the 
personal involvement of high-level British policy-makers.  
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French foreign policy was not changed as a result of the interaction with other 
policy-makers at the EU level. The change of French policy was caused by the 
election of a new President and the nomination of a new government in 2007. 
Sarkozy and Kouchner took into account demands from domestic groups in the 
context of the 2007 uprising, a finding which supports intergovernmentalism.244 
For classic intergovernmentalism, policy changes tend to occur with a change of 
government when new elites arrive to power.245  
The explanation provided by the large member states hypothesis encounters 
important limitations, however. It marginalises the ideational motivations of EU 
policy, which prevailed over economic interests. The fact that even French 
foreign policy was converted to a principled stance shows that the rationalist 
predicates of the large member states hypothesis did not reveal the real drivers 
of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar as a pariah state. These motivations were 
ideological.  
 
6.2.4. Consensus Hypothesis 
The consensus hypothesis was undermined because only big member states 
determined foreign policy decisions. The European Commission and EEAS 
contributed to stirring the European debate in the area of humanitarian aid, but 
their proposals were only implemented when they were backed by the UK, as 
was demonstrated in 2004, 2007, and 2009. European institutions and smaller 
member states did not have sufficient clout to shape EU foreign policy without 
the UK’s agreement. During the period, transnational lobby groups did not seem 
to exert direct influence on EU foreign policy. By contrast, domestic lobby groups 
within big member states may have exerted more leverage thanks to the 
bargaining power of their national government. 
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The consensus hypothesis offers a more comprehensive explanation of the 
motivations of EU foreign policy than other hypotheses, which miss out 
ideological drivers of EU foreign policy. The symbolic function of EU policy was in 
fact more important than material objectives in driving the European agenda. 
Indeed, a state interested in drawing economic benefits from interaction with 
Myanmar may have possibly used the propitiatory gestures of 2010 as a 
justification to repeal restrictions. The EU’s approach contrasted with ASEAN, 
which called upon Western powers to rescind sanctions as a result of the 
developments that took place end of 2010.246 Nevertheless, the EU did not revise 
its policy. Ideational motivations prevailed in EU foreign policy-making.  
Forging a consensus was a more strenuous process in some policy areas than 
others. In the sphere of humanitarian assistance, consensus achievement was 
quite straightforward. The UK proposed, in 2004, to abolish the boycott on 
humanitarian assistance. The proposal was backed by the Commission, and 
accepted by other EU member states. The Commission resorted to several 
persuasion strategies to strengthen the consensus even after the policy change 
on aid delivery was enacted. Dialogue, exchange of views and policy feedbacks, 
notably via the organisation of policy conferences, were used to that end. 
By contrast, the diplomatic arena was the thorniest policy field of European 
cooperation. Although the policy consensus strengthened by dint of interaction 
among the member states, divergences did sometimes loom in the area of 
diplomacy. The Netherlands’ refusal to apply the waiver on the visa ban, and the 
subsequent pressure by Germany and the Commission to impel The Hague to 
review its position, illustrate this argument. Diplomacy lies closer to national 
sovereignty, so that states were reluctant to give up their competencies in this 
area and delegate them to a supranational layer of decision-making. In the same 
vein, EU member states led their own unilateral diplomacy during the Cyclone 
Nargis crisis. Despite the added value of ‘politics of scale’, the European voice 
did not replace the one of individual member states. 
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The consensus was more easily achieved in the economic arena. This 
development debunks important predictions derived from rationalist approaches, 
which posit that divergent economic interests would pose almost insuperable 
obstacles to the imposition of economic restrictions. Between the nineties and 
2007, the evolution of the European consensus with regards to targeted 
economic sanctions seems to confirm the social constructivist claim that member 
states tend to change their positions over a period of ten or fifteen years of 
common policy-making.247 During the last decade, France did not necessarily 
veto all economic sanctions despite Total’s investments in Myanmar. It could 
therefore be argued that the process of social interaction between EU policy-
makers led to the production of some kind of ‘upgraded European interest’, 
although this ‘upgraded interest’ remained within the limits of the domestic 
agenda of national governments. Ideational motivations to promote human rights 
and democracy prevailed over economic interests. 
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Chapter VII  
Conclusions:  
Explaining the Consensus on Tougher Sanctions 
 
This thesis has provided a detailed explanation of EU foreign policy-making 
towards military-ruled Myanmar from the military coup of 1988 until the SPDC 
was dissolved in March 2011. The chronological investigation delivered a 
theoretically-informed analysis of three distinct periods of EU policy-making. This 
concluding chapter shall now bring these different parts together to present the 
key findings of this study. 
First of all, it is important to know how well the four competing hypotheses 
have been in explaining the empirical puzzle tackled in this dissertation. As the 
success of competing hypotheses varied according to the different policy 
outcomes and periods examined throughout the study, an overall theoretical 
discussion is needed to clarify the understanding of EU foreign policy-making 
towards Myanmar supported by this thesis.  
The second objective of this chapter is to outline the core empirical findings of 
the case study. In addition to delivering a theoretically-informed answer to the 
research question, it is meaningful to bring the threads that characterise EU 
foreign policy-making towards Myanmar together. Although the cut-off date of the 
empirical investigation was the dismantlement of the SPDC in March 2011, this 
conclusion shall also briefly take into account the recent developments that 
occurred during the post-SPDC period between April 2011 and September 2012, 
in order to retrospectively assess the effectiveness of European sanctions on 
Myanmar. These findings inform more general questions encountered by 
students of EU foreign policy-making towards ‘pariah’ states, or states targeted 
by diplomatic as well as economic penalties. Finally, this concluding chapter 
summarises the contributions of this thesis to the existing body of literature on 
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EU sanctions and EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. Building upon this overall 
assessment, we shall point at potential future research that could stem from this 
study.  
This chapter is framed in four sections. The first summarises the main 
arguments laid out in the previous chapters of the thesis. The second section 
explores the core findings of the study, which come down to five claims. The third 
section assesses the explanatory power of each competing hypothesis, and 
discusses the main strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical approaches 
from which hypotheses were derived. It deduces that a ‘normative’ interpretation 
of liberal intergovernmentalism, which retains basic tenets of liberal 
intergovernmentalism but also emphasises the role of norms in foreign policy, 
best unravels the puzzle of EU foreign policy-making towards Myanmar. The final 
section summarises the main contributions and sketches potential directions for 
new research.  
 
1. Review of Chapters 
The opening chapter laid out the empirical puzzle addressed in this study. It 
presented the research question: why did the EU scale up sanctions on Myanmar 
from 1991 until 2010? This question is justified by the potentially diverging 
interests of EU member states during twenty years of common policy, and the 
inability of sanctions to quickly achieve their primary objectives (especially after 
Myanmar had joined ASEAN in 1997). In this respect, key concepts addressed 
by the research question were defined. The chapter also clarified that 
characterising military-ruled Myanmar as a ‘pariah’ state encapsulates the foreign 
policy challenge encountered by the EU, although the EU does not officially use 
this concept. 
The thesis then tackled possible answers to the research question. Chapter 
Two first outlined the EU’s decision-making system with regards to sanctions 
policy. Then, four competing hypotheses were developed, which offered 
explanations for why the EU would reinforce sanctions. Throughout the two 
introductory chapters, references were made to sanctions regimes systematically 
302
Chapter VII 
presented in the annexes of this thesis, in order to illustrate how the hypotheses 
developed could be applied to the making of EU sanctions in general. 
The first hypothesis suggested that the EU would bandwagon with the US 
when a pariah state lacks strategic relevance for the EU. The second hypothesis 
posited that the targeted state persists in going against EU demands, so that the 
EU tightens punitive measures as a response. The third hypothesis interpreted 
the EU’s decisions to ratchet up penalties as the outcome of an ongoing 
bargaining process between the three largest EU member states, which seek to 
satisfy their main, and domestically-defined, preferences when deciding EU 
foreign policy. Finally, the consensus hypothesis proposed that reinforcing a 
punitive strategy reflected the EU’s attempt to maintain (or strengthen) a 
consensus on its identity as a liberal actor in international relations. These 
competing explanations all focus on different independent variables, levels of 
analysis, and key actors influencing the sanctions policy.  
Chapter Three delivered a contextual analysis of the main structural variables 
and actors that could influence EU foreign policy towards Myanmar. It 
demonstrated that, in conformity with the bandwagoning hypothesis, Myanmar is 
generally perceived in the EU as a state lacking strategic weight. Nonetheless, 
Myanmar fell into the international limelight, notably as a result of successful calls 
for international sanctions by Myanmar’s domestic and exiled political opposition. 
By and large, the objectives guiding EU foreign policy between 1991 and 2010 
were: securing ASSK’s release from house arrest, promoting the NLD’s 
participation in government decision-making, and ensuring national reconciliation 
by calling for a tripartite dialogue between the government, the NLD, and ethnic 
minorities. EU policy-makers could be distinguished between upholders of a 
principled, as opposed to a flexible approach to the SPDC. These differences of 
approaches stem from diverse material interests and ideological motivations 
among EU policy-makers. 
Chapter Four examined the evolution of EU foreign policy from its Cold War 
origins until ASSK’s first release from house arrest in 1995. During the Cold War 
era, the common foreign policy was non-existent. Only Germany and the UK had 
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noteworthy relations with Myanmar. The first measures formally decided by the 
EU (to condemn Myanmar’s decision not to honour the results of the 1990 
general election, despite controversy over the precise purpose of the elections) 
were limited in scope. The EU’s arms embargo and the ban on development aid 
had a marginal impact on the SPDC’s relations with the NLD. Germany, the 
second largest provider of development aid to Myanmar, had cancelled new 
development programmes since 1988. Furthermore, European measures were 
not formally adopted until the Council Declaration of 29 July 1991.  
Smaller member states, like the Netherlands and Greece, proposed to 
implement a more robust common foreign policy from both principled and flexible 
standpoints respectively. Their proposals were not followed by concrete 
decisions, presumably because they were not backed by large EU member 
states. As a result, a policy of ‘critical engagement’ was pursued by several 
member states without explicit EU involvement. In Chapter Four, therefore, it was 
argued that EU policy was defined by the lowest common denominator during 
this early period.  
When ASSK was released from house arrest in 1995, the EU’s decision not to 
relax restrictions was justified by a ‘wait and see’ approach, which expected 
further reforms before further concessions would be made. At the time, a spate of 
issues of concern to the EU warranted this policy, such as the high number of 
prisoners of conscience, repeated interferences with the NLD’s activities, the lack 
of constructive dialogue between the NLD and the SPDC, ASEAN’s intention to 
welcome Myanmar into the regional organisation despite its poor human rights 
record, and the imprisonment and death in prison, in 1996, of a representative of 
an EU member state. 
Chapter Five showed how a European consensus was forged during the 
period that followed from 1996 until 2003. The consensus was initially formed in 
1996; it was further deepened between 1997 and 1999; and later revised from 
1999 until 2003, particularly in the diplomatic arena. In 1996, the James Nichols’ 
case represented a watershed moment in EU foreign policy. The ensuing 
Common Position 96/635/CFSP constituted a path dependent ‘point of 
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departure’,1 whereby a normative consensus was fostered on charting a 
principled policy. This consensus was never challenged by any European 
representative during the next fourteen years of policy-making. From then on, EU 
policy was chiefly driven by normative interests.  
New Labour’s election provided fresh impetus for sanctions against Myanmar, 
which propelled EU foreign policy beyond the lowest common denominator. New 
Labour took the strategic decision to pursue an ethical foreign policy within a 
European framework, and from 1997 until 1999, even member states that 
traditionally championed the flexible approach, like Germany, were persuaded to 
boycott meetings with ASEAN if Myanmar would attend. The ensuing EU policy 
built upon the 1996 consensus and wielded further targeted measures but still 
refrained from blanket economic penalties.  
The Common Position 2000/346/CFSP of 26 April 2000 allowed for a visa ban 
waiver, to enable multilateral meetings with ASEAN to take place in EU territory 
with Myanmar’s participation. The EU sent a first Troika in 1999, and reiterated 
the initiative in 2001 and again twice in 2002. On 30 May 2003, the Depayin 
incident and ASSK’s third arrest brought this period of relative conciliation to an 
abrupt end. Consequently, the EU escalated sanctions and abandoned the 
Troikas as an instrument of dialogue with the regime.  
Chapter Six went on to demonstrate that the European consensus added a 
new dimension when the EU charted a ‘dual approach’ from 2004 until 2010. 
While further tightening sanctions in 2004, the Council simultaneously rescinded 
the restriction on humanitarian aid delivery. This ‘double track’ approach placated 
domestic criticism from campaigners and parliamentarians. As a consequence of 
this exception, aid was augmented when the Global Fund withdrew in 2007 
under US pressure, and Cyclone Nargis later struck the Ayeyawady delta in May 
2008. This policy change regarding aid delivery reveals some degree of 
independence of EU policy vis-à-vis the US, which had banned all types of aids. 
In parallel with scaling up development aid, the EU tightened sanctions to punish 
unfavourable domestic developments in 2007, in 2009, and strongly criticised the 
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2010 general elections. It did not relax negative measures despite ASSK’s third 
release a few days after the elections. The EU had not changed its policy until a 
new era was beginning with the dismantlement of the SPDC in March 2011. 
Despite this ‘double track’ approach, the European consensus was strained by 
several divergences among member states. In 2005 and 2006, the Netherlands 
refused to apply the waiver on the visa ban. By the same token, EU member 
states led their own diplomacy during the Nargis crisis. They did not spell out 
their position cohesively via European institutions or the recently nominated EU 
Special Representative for Burma/Myanmar. Building upon this review of 
chapters, the following section can now summarise the main empirical findings of 
this study.  
 
2. Main Empirical Findings  
2.1. Role of the Large EU Member States 
The first empirical finding of this thesis is that EU foreign policy was decided 
by the largest EU member states. As the EU’s principal sender of sanctions, the 
UK acted as a norm entrepreneur having strong notions about the EU’s 
appropriate behaviour towards Myanmar.2 It convinced other member states to 
consistently scale up sanctions as a suitable response to Myanmar’s human 
rights violations, which at that time was an atypical strategy for the EU. France 
and Germany bargained with the UK to defend their most important interests.  
The UK benefited from its material weight as one of the largest EU member 
states when attempting to persuade other policy-makers. Moreover, the historical 
legacies of the UK as former colonial power in Myanmar enabled the British 
leadership to plainly identify that support to the NLD was akin to the UK’s 
national interest. The formulation of highly principled preferences also owed to 
domestic pressures by British human rights campaign groups, which benefited 
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from direct access to Labour as well as to Conservative MPs, and at times to 
successive Prime Ministers themselves.  
The other big member states exhibited lower preference intensity towards 
Myanmar. France and Germany were therefore more open to the shaping 
influence of dialogue and interaction with other policy-makers at the EU level. 
Their attitude could be assimilated to the one of persuadees, whereas the UK 
played the role of persuader. Germany and France were inclined to follow the 
UK’s leadership. Their national preferences were however defined domestically, 
so that they only compromised on issues that were deemed less important for 
their domestic interests. France was keen to protect Total’s commercial interests 
in Myanmar and Germany its diplomatic relations with ASEAN. 
As a consequence of the UK’s norm entrepreneurship, ideational interests 
tended to prevail over economic interests of member states. After sanctions had 
been formally adopted within a common position in 1996, normative motivations 
consistently drove EU foreign policy. Economic interests may have been 
safeguarded, particularly by France during the second half of the nineties, but 
were never actively promoted by European policy-makers. This empirical 
paradox owes to the UK’s predominance as a big member state, Myanmar’s lack 
of strategic weight for European interests, and the emergence of a strong 
normative consensus to take sides with the democracy icon ASSK against the 
military government.  
 
2.2. Reaching a Consensus via Bargaining and Normative Suasion 
EU policies were therefore decided in two sequences. Policy-making was 
initially a process of normative suasion, or social influence, between all actors. 
The second stage was based on cooperative bargaining among the largest 
member states.  
First, the actors involved in EU policy-making argued and exchanged ideas. 
Stakeholders with the clearest preferences attempted to persuade others to 
endorse their policy proposals (or at least to abstain from exercising a veto). 
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They connected their proposals to existing norms, to moral prescriptions, and 
they tried to build coalitions with other players. This process was not limited to 
EU member states. It involved European institutions and lobbyists, whose policy 
proposals have been at times adopted by the Council, as the withdrawal of the 
GSP illustrated. This process could be characterised as normative suasion, or 
social influence: policy-makers used ethical arguments, normative prescriptions, 
and made references to the EU’s legal commitments to democracy and human 
rights, which reinforced its liberal identity. Therefore, a recalcitrant EU member 
state would risk tarnishing its reputation by rebuffing prescriptions for an ethical 
EU policy.  
Second, after policy proposals were formed following a process of normative 
suasion, the three largest EU member states had, finally, to take recourse in 
‘cooperative bargaining’ to reach a decision. Cooperative bargaining took three 
different forms. Flexible and principled member states used single issue 
bargaining when agreeing to scale up sanctions in exchange for relaxing other 
measures, and vice-versa. For instance, new restrictive measures were added in 
2000, in exchange for introducing a waiver on the visa ban.  
Large member states also bargained amongst themselves by making side-
payments and supporting each other’s projects (or log rolling). In 2007, Germany 
agreed not to obstruct the UK’s policy on Myanmar – provided the UK would not 
refuse to repeal sanctions on Uzbekistan. In 2010, a similar bargain took place 
between France and the UK over Myanmar on the one hand, and the imposition 
of blanket sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire on the other. In December 2010, the UK 
agreed with the French proposal to impose blanket EU sanctions against Laurent 
Gbagbo’s illegitimate government. As an indirect side-payment, France objected 
to the EEAS proposal of April 2011 to lift the visa ban on Myanmar’s government, 
which was supported by numerous member states including Germany, Italy, 
Austria and Scandinavian countries. As a consequence, the visa ban was only 
lifted on one third of Myanmar’s new government and despite the increased 
isolation of the UK’s position in the Council.3  
                                                 
3 Council of the EU: Decision 2011/239/CFSP of 12 April 2011. Interviews 2 and 7.  
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Log rolling was informal; it took the shape of ‘mutual compromises’ that large 
member states made to each other. Such compromises do not necessarily 
require explicit bargaining between member states. They are often struck at the 
political director or ambassador level before European ministers have an 
opportunity to meet officially in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). 
Cooperative bargaining took place as well to placate domestic pressures. This 
bargaining was obvious when the UK proposed, in 2004, that the EU reinforce 
negative measures, as well as create an exception to the ban on delivery of 
assistance to Myanmar. These negotiations gain at being interpreted as a three-
level game, rather than a traditional two-level game played by policy-makers at 
the national and intergovernmental levels.4 Transnational organisations exerted 
additional pressures on EU member states to scale up sanctions or increase aid 
levels. Thus, the ‘dual track’ approach also served the purpose of appeasing 
domestic pressures at the national (e.g. national campaigns) as well as at the 
meso-level of governance (e.g. transnational civil society groups, notably those 
active in Brussels). Many national and transnational human rights groups 
coordinated their campaigns on national governments and European institutions.  
National preferences, however, were given. They were formed domestically 
and not substantially altered during negotiations at the EU level. Member states 
made eventual concessions as an outcome of negotiations, but they rarely 
changed their initial preferences. On the one hand, principled states were hardly 
convinced by the arguments of flexible member states. The UK, in particular, was 
inclined to exert a ‘quasi-monopoly’ on EU policy initiatives towards Myanmar. 
On the other hand, preference intensities of flexible member states were 
relatively lower, so that normative arguments proved able to induce them to 
make compromises. But these compromises did not engage their core interests.  
The recurrent bargaining process among large member states thus 
demonstrates the limits of the UK’s norm entrepreneurship, because other 
member states did not substantially alter their domestic position as a result of the 
interaction at the EU level. Indeed, a domestic change of government led three 
                                                 
4 Camroux 2010: 71. 
309
Chapter VII 
member states to change their original position (as the UK in 1997, the 
Netherlands in 1998, and France in 2007). Social interaction at the EU level may 
have induced compromises, but no substantial change of preferences. 
 
2.3. Differences across Policy Areas 
As a consequence of ‘asymmetric interdependence’ related to the ‘logic of 
diversity’,5 the European consensus did not display the same level of resilience 
between 1996 and 2010 and across all policy domains: assistance, diplomacy, 
and economic policy.  
Development cooperation was the most consensual policy area throughout 
two decades of policy-making. From 1990 onwards, a consensus was fostered 
among EU member states and institutions to drastically curtail all assistance to 
Myanmar. In 2004, this consensus was revised as it pertained to humanitarian 
aid. This revision did not encounter much opposition from other EU member 
states or even the European Parliament. As a consequence, aid levels were 
substantially increased by some member states and the European Commission, 
especially in the wake of the withdrawal of the Global Fund and the natural 
disaster provoked by Cyclone Nargis.  
Economic policy was the second most consensual field. Despite early 
disagreements between 1996 and 1997 on the question of invoking a ban on 
trade and investment, EU member states quickly agreed not to impose blanket 
economic sanctions. The consensus was instead fostered on targeted sanctions 
with more or less restrained financial and economic incidence. The European 
Commission’s complaint against the Burma Massachusetts Act in 1997 
crystallised this consensus not to impose blanket economic sanctions. The 
European Parliament disagreed and was not included in this consensus. Only the 
Netherlands changed its position when a newly-elected government stated its 
support for economic sanctions in October 1998. The EU continued to ratchet up 
sanctions in targeted economic areas, which directly affected the positions of 
small European businesses in Myanmar. 
                                                 
5 Moravcsik 2005: 12; Hoffmann 1966. 
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Preferences of EU member states most diverged in the diplomatic field. 
Initially, a European agreement was quickly established on the policy to adopt: 
EU member states unanimously boycotted all meetings with ASEAN from 1997 
until 1999. In 2000, however, a waiver on the visa ban was introduced following a 
bargain between Germany and principled member states. This waiver was later 
applied by Belgium and Denmark when they hosted EU summits. Nonetheless, 
the Netherlands refused to implement this exception during the 2005-2006 
meetings of Rotterdam. Other member states did enforce the waiver when they 
hosted subsequent meetings with ASEAN. 
National diplomacy of member states contradicted EU diplomacy on several 
occasions. No member state effectively facilitated the mission of the EU Special 
Envoy after 2007 – with the notable exception of Italy, who funded the largest 
part of the Special Envoy’s budget since Fassino is an Italian national. The 
succession of diplomatic visits by the Commission and then by the member 
states in the wake of Cyclone Nargis – as well as the contradicting stances of 
France and the UK over the Responsibility to Protect – did not do much to 
enhance a united common foreign policy. Diplomacy thus represents the domain 
where it was most difficult for EU member states to reach a lasting consensus, 
despite the EU’s Treaty-reforms that aspired to make EU foreign policy more 
coherent by strengthening its institutions. The spill-over effect was limited in this 
policy area. 
 
2.4. Relevance of Policy Feedbacks in EU Policy-Making 
During the period covered in the thesis, political dynamics generally prevailed 
over feedbacks on policy effectiveness. Policy evaluations were hardly taken into 
account when it came to tightening sanctions. Restrictions were increased, 
although some ministers and policy-makers decried the common strategy as 
‘useless’ – as foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, among others, forthrightly put 
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it.6 The ideological commitment of high-level policy-makers drove UK as well as 
EU foreign policy.  
The eagerness of flexible EU member states to come up with a European 
consensus on Myanmar, in combination with their unwillingness to be discredited 
in the Council as advocates of a pariah regime, generally prevailed over 
considerations for policy effectiveness. Unlike ostracism, engagement with 
Myanmar entailed political risks in case of backlash. Some European countries 
experienced these risks during the early nineties, when NGOs condemned their 
critical engagement policy against the backdrop of heavy offensives launched by 
the Myanma army on insurgent groups. 
Policy feedbacks were nevertheless taken into account in more technical 
areas of EU foreign policy. Legal, economic, and humanitarian considerations led 
the EU to refrain from imposing blanket penalties on trade or investment. This 
preference for more or less ‘targeted sanctions’ represented a degree of 
difference between EU and US policy. Moreover, the decision to allow 
humanitarian assistance in 2004 was motivated by policy evaluations. These 
assessments underlined the moral responsibility to deliver humanitarian aid to a 
population suffering from endemic poverty in addition to gross human rights 
violations. Humanitarian aid was subsequently scaled up in conformity with this 
evaluation. 
Assessing the time-bound effectiveness of each EU policy measure enabled 
us to better understand the rationale behind the imposition of tougher sanctions. 
The main empirical finding of this impact assessment is that the EU adopted a 
series of measures that were for the most part unlikely to alter the SPDC’s 
behaviour even at the time of decision-making. Before reaching broader 
conclusions, it is important to review why EU measures were unlikely to change 
Myanmar’s behaviour as long as the SPDC was in power, and also explain why 
                                                 
6 Democratic Voice of Burma, 8 October 2009. See also: Hauswedell 2005: Keynote Speech; 
House of Lords, 22 July 1996: Question; Federal Government of Germany, 9 March 2004: 
Antwort; Assemblée Nationale, 25 April 2000: Réponse. 
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they appeared more effective in the months that followed the SPDC’s 
dismantlement. 
- The 1990 arms embargo was quickly circumvented by Myanmar. The EU 
was not a big supplier because European defence material is normally too 
expensive for Myanmar. Before 1988, the Burmese state could afford 
European equipment because defence cooperation was part of broader 
development assistance with some European countries, notably the Federal 
Republic of Germany. But after the arms embargo was imposed and 
development assistance suspended in the early nineties, Yangon found 
alternative suppliers of defence material; 
- Between 1990 and 2012, the ban on European development assistance 
amounted to more than €588 million of lost development projects in 
Myanmar, which is a conservative estimate.7 Despite considerable 
economic consequences for public finances and the country as a whole, the 
military government adamantly rejected the conditionalities attached with 
Western aid. The EU could have foreseen that aid suspension was unlikely 
to exert effective influence because the SPDC was continuing the policy of 
non-interference that Germany, the UK, and other European donors had to 
respect under the era of General Ne Win. Therefore, as long as the SPDC 
ruled Myanmar, this restrictive measure did not coerce the military 
government to include the NLD in a reconciliation process. However, this 
ban may have influenced important economic policies, such as opening 
Myanmar’s economy to foreign investment in the early nineties. Hence, the 
ban on development aid has indirectly reduced the leverage exerted by 
Europeans on Myanmar’s economy, since it contributed to trigger the 
economic liberalisation that led Myanmar to find new business partners. 
- The visa ban and asset freeze was reinforced regularly between 1996 and 
2009 by targeting new individuals and entities. Nevertheless, these 
measures targeted officials who had mostly never travelled to Europe. 
Besides, the visa ban created a rally-around-the-flag effect among ASEAN 
                                                 
7 See: Chapter IV: 148. 
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counterparts because it hampered multilateral meetings between the EU 
and ASEAN. Neither did boycotts of multilateral meetings persuade ASEAN 
to take formal restrictions against the SPDC, such as suspending 
Myanmar’s membership of the regional organisation. It is however 
noteworthy that ASEAN, as well as some of its member states, did express 
cautious criticism vis-à-vis the SPDC. Some ASEAN states promoted 
diplomatic initiatives to unlock the political stalemate between the SPDC 
and NLD. (For instance, the good offices of the UNSG’s Special Envoy to 
Myanmar, Tan Sri Ismail Razali, were actively supported by Malaysia; 
furthermore, the ASEAN Presidency and certain member states did at times 
encourage the SPDC to accelerate the process of national reconciliation).8 
Several asianists noted that ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy may have exerted 
more direct influence on the SPDC than the Western strategy of coercion.9 
In the absence of Western opprobrium, however, it is unlikely that ASEAN 
would have effectively softened its principle of non-interference and applied 
an equal level of informal pressure on the SPDC. Such indirect effects of 
intra-regional diplomacy became more tangible in the long run, after the 
SPDC was dismantled and President Thein Sein’s new government 
changed national priorities by attempting to improve Myanmar’s relations 
with the international community. 
- Bilateral diplomatic boycotts and moratorium on high-level visits created 
symbolic but modest inconveniences for the SPDC; 
- Discouraging European trade and investment between 1997 and 2012 
deprived Myanmar of substantial revenues and of positive externalities such 
as human capital development. Myanma authorities and state media had 
thus long denounced that sanctions have harmed the national economy.10 
This non-statutory boycott may have hurt the interests of domestic clients of 
the SPDC. However, it did not bring them down. In fact, European business 
                                                 
8 Haacke 2006: 55ff. 
9 Kivimäcki 2007: 1-18; Haacke 2006: 77ff.; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 73-85; Callaghan 1995: 158ff. 
10 Aung San Suu Kyi 2012. 
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partners became less and less relevant as Myanmar was increasingly 
interacting with other countries less concerned with human rights. In 1988, 
the EEC was an important partner with 19.2 percent of Burma’s total trade, 
whereas the EU’s share fell to 1.9 percent in 2010 despite Myanmar’s 
economy growing constantly at double digit rates during the last decade.11 
In 2010, Myanmar’s trade with APEC was over 40 times its trade with the 
EU. Patron-client relationships between the state and certain elements of 
the society existed long before sanctions were imposed.12 But economic 
penalties have not helped to curtail the connections between the ruling 
militaries and their business clients. On the contrary, the reduction of 
channels for wealth creation, the lack of European companies that usually 
uphold international standards of corporate and social responsibility, and 
the underdeveloped services sector and middle class, may have instead 
contributed to strengthening the hold of businessmen close to the regime 
over the national economy. The liberalisation measures implemented by 
President Thein Sein’s post-SPDC government partly aimed at improving 
economic relations with Western countries.13 But these reforms were long 
overdue: they served the complementary purpose to ‘civilianise’ and 
entrench the establishment that had been thriving under military rule; 
- The 1997 GSP withdrawal was a symbolic measure that targeted the 
problem of forced labour poorly. Officially aiming at punishing its use, it 
mainly hit private businesses instead of the army officers responsible for 
such practices. Myanma exporters to the EU, who were not necessarily 
affiliated to the junta, were comparatively disadvantaged with competitors 
from other LDCs. For instance, Myanmar’s garments exports to the EU 
collapsed after the suspension of the Multifibre Agreements in 2005, which 
may have unintendedly resulted in thousands of jobs losses; 
                                                 
11 IMF April 2012: Direction of Trade. See also: Kramer 2009: 16-17.  
12 Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2006. 
13 Thein Sein 2012. 
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- The 1998 discouragement of tourism mainly hurt private businesses, and 
did not exert tangible impact on the junta’s behaviour. The establishment 
retained possessions of several bigger hotels and tourism infrastructures 
remained under the control of the state or by ‘clients’ of the junta, whereas 
smaller businesses were hurt the most; 
- The bans on loans and equities to state-owned companies, adopted in 2000 
and reinforced in 2004, had little impact. No proof could be gathered that 
such loans or investments had ever been made since the mid-nineties. 
Nonetheless, some European entrepreneurs formed joint ventures with the 
Myanma government by using a company registered locally or in the region; 
- The denial of assistance by the IFIs (effectively enforced since 1987 but 
officially supported by the EU since 2004) and the restriction of the mandate 
for UN operations in Myanmar triggered a considerable loss of revenue and 
technical expertise. Nevertheless, this restriction did not coerce Myanmar to 
include ASSK in an institutionalised process of national reconciliation until 
the SPDC was dismantled in 2011. The SPDC did not even reimburse 
Myanmar’s arrears to the WB; 
- The 2007 ban on companies active in mining, logging, semi-precious and 
precious stones mainly harmed small- and middle-sized private businesses 
that are not related to representatives of Myanmar’s authorities. The 
targeted businesses were arbitrarily chosen from Myanma business 
directories (yellow pages); 
- In combination with sanctions, EU Troika have presumably influenced the 
military government’s decisions to release some prisoners of conscience in 
the context of diplomatic visits. The EU, however, did not take positive 
action to welcome these conciliatory measures. Besides, the SPDC did not 
pursue more substantial steps towards reforms. Since 2003, it has strictly 
followed its own road-map to ‘discipline flourishing democracy’ and ASSK’s 
house arrest sentence elapsed only after the 2010 general elections had 
been held. 
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This synthesis of the impact of all EU measures demonstrates that most 
restrictions did not quickly lead to the changes officially sought by the EU, at 
least during the military period. Penalties failed in their stated purpose to coerce 
the SPDC. They were nonetheless useful in symbolic terms to condemn the 
military regime as well as to support ASSK and the NLD. Hence, they were 
reinforced despite the ineffectiveness. Little attention was actually given on 
possibly counterproductive and unintended impact of restrictive measures, 
particularly on Myanmar’s urban populations that organised movements of social 
contestation against the military regimes in 1974, 1988, and 2007. At the behest 
of certain member states, notably the UK, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) 
failed to release an internal report assessing the effectiveness of sanctions and 
designed for presentation to the European Parliament.14 Records of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs demonstrate that the UK 
government prevaricated when confronted with sceptical questions. The 
Commission’s chairman, Lord Wakeham, stated:  
I have to say at the outset that I find the [UK] Government’s response to our report 
very disappointing. I find a mass of fudge, evasion, and bald assertion, without either 
substantiation or even any real attempt to engage with the criticism. Sanctions have 
been in place against Burma for more than ten years with no discernible impact in 
terms of progress towards democracy and respect for human rights. Indeed, in some 
ways, the situation has deteriorated. Meanwhile, little seems to be known about how 
hard the sanctions are hitting the Burmese people. The Government maintains that 
the sanctions are targeted against the military regime with little humanitarian impact. 
Important measures such as the strong discouragement of trade and tourism are 
said to be not formal sanctions. This entirely misses the point. The effect is the same 
- to hurt the Burmese people.15 
Senior interviewees conceded that the EU has never conducted a formal and 
fact-based evaluation of sanctions ex ante or ex post. Internal evaluations 
conveyed to the political director level were so scrutinised that they were 
generally uncritical towards the existing punitive approach. Making internal 
                                                 
14 Tonkin, 9 December 2009. 
15 House of Lords: Debate of 12 October 2007. 
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evaluations available to the broader public was excluded.16 The reluctance to 
publicly carry out an impact assessment stems from an unwillingness to disavow 
the EU’s sanctions policy.17 Policy-makers were keen to collectively address 
domestic audiences. Such a review would have undermined the validity of UK 
and EU policy.  
 
2.5. The Value of Sanctions  
2.5.1. A Symbolic Function 
By way of consequence, this discussion enables us to identify which of the key 
functions of sanctions prevailed in EU foreign policy-making: deterrence, 
compliance, subversion, international symbolism, or domestic symbolism?18 
Deterrence was not the objective of penalties, since Myanmar does not pose a 
threat to the EU.  
Outright subversion was not officially sought after. However, the maximalist 
interpretation of EU policy objectives led restrictions to gradually shift away from 
the function of formal compliance to subversion. The NLD’s insistence that the 
government should recognise the results of the 1990 elections was tantamount to 
subversion of military rule in the eyes of the SPDC. The SPDC was unlikely to 
comply with demands that called upon the military to relinquish power. In the 
aftermath of the 1990 election, the NLD did not give signs it would negotiate an 
amnesty for possible reformers within the junta. The sanctions’ lack of 
effectiveness is partly explained by the fact that they took sides in an intractable 
domestic stalemate. As long as the SPDC was in power, the EU could hardly 
change its foreign policy without implicitly recognising its failure to bring about 
political change. EU policy was fettered by Myanmar’s political stasis. 
The case study thus showed that punitive measures mainly served the 
purpose of domestic and international symbolism. They demonstrated solidarity 
                                                 
16 Interview 6. 
17 Tonkin, 9 December 2009. 
18 Lindsay 1986: 155ff. 
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among Europeans, with the domestic opposition in Myanmar, and with other 
Western democracies that imposed sanctions on the pariah state. The sanctions 
policy strengthened an ideological consensus in the EU on its liberal identity. It 
bolstered the international perception of the EU as a global promoter of human 
rights. EU policy towards Myanmar is a good example of the ‘something must be 
done’ syndrome, in which domestic pressures for action lead to ineffective policy, 
as the measures implemented are clearly inadequate.19 
In addition to European elites, a second group of domestic audiences were 
constituencies within the member states. European governments could bolster 
their domestic support by adopting a punitive policy that was popular at home. 
Sanctions were highly effective in warding off domestic criticism. 
On the one hand, policy-makers responded to domestic pressures to tighten 
sanctions on Myanmar. On the other hand, they could use Myanmar as a show-
case for a principled democracy promotion policy. Adopting a tough stance on a 
pariah state can mollify calls to intensify pressure on other, more strategic states 
that do not abide by liberal norms (such as China). Since sanctions draw a neat 
distinction between allies and enemies, their lack of effectiveness as a policy tool 
was overshadowed by the normative prescription to take the side of the pro-
democracy opposition led by ASSK against an odious military government. This 
political choice may seem natural, but the official perception of Myanmar’s 
political stalemate was therefore too Manichean for the EU to consider alternative 
‘benchmark’ or ‘engagement’ strategies, which could have been more influential, 
as upholders of a flexible approach argued. The sanctions policy was to send a 
forceful message to international and domestic audiences about the EU’s 
unwavering commitment to defend human rights on the global stage.  
This symbolic function made EU policy extremely cost effective domestically. 
Even if lacking in effectiveness, sanctions on the SPDC were politically risk free, 
because the democratic movement embodied by the NLD leadership had initially 
called upon the international community to ostracise the military government. 
                                                 
19 Jørgensen 1998: 89ff. 
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Moreover, modest European economic interests in Myanmar spared European 
politicians from significant opposition by domestic business groups (with the 
exception of Total in France). 
 
2.5.2. Success of Sanctions  
The symbolic function of sanctions implies that their success or failure cannot 
only be gauged by their ability to achieve the policy’s primary objectives. 
Paradoxically, and in contrast with Pape’s seminal article, it is not because 
economic sanctions do not immediately work that they should be excluded from 
the EU’s foreign policy toolbox. Drawing upon Baldwin, the success of sanctions 
hinges upon several aspects: their effectiveness, the cost to the sender, the cost 
to the target, stakes for the target, and stakes for the user.20  
First, the effectiveness of EU sanctions on the SPDC was marginal. The 
military government did not sustainably include the NLD in an effective process 
of national reconciliation, as called upon by the EU. The junta never openly 
reacted to Western demands, even when sending conciliatory signals such as 
releasing ASSK.  
Sanctions have been more effective towards Thein Sein’s nominally civilian 
government, who introduced unprecedented reforms complying with important 
European demands. These reforms culminated with ASSK’s election in 
parliament in April 2012. This success, however, should not be solely attributed 
to the sanctions regime. Myanmar’s new leadership could re-orientate the 
country’s national strategy because the 2010 general elections had secured the 
absolute majority of pro-establishment parties in parliament. This landslide 
enabled the successors of the SPDC to move towards a broader development 
strategy, which required Myanmar’s fuller integration into the international 
community. Subsequent reforms were deemed to symbolically ‘civilianise’ and 
thus entrench Myanmar’s military establishment. They were designed centrally 
                                                 
20 Baldwin 1999/2000: 90-92. 
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and decided in a top-down fashion. Reconciliation attempts with the political and 
ethnic opposition did not put at risk the USDP’s control of the parliament. It can 
also be conjectured that Myanmar’s reliance on China may have induced the 
new leadership to make concessions to the West in order to counter-balance 
Beijing’s influence.  
Second, direct costs to the sender were fairly low. From a European 
perspective, the economic interface with Myanmar has never been significant. 
Non-retroactivity of sanctions has inflicted little direct revenue loss on big 
European firms. Moreover, political costs of negative measures were minimal. 
Myanmar generally represents a low priority issue for Western governments.21 
Since sanctions had been called upon by the NLD, it was unlikely that European 
constituencies would widely criticise their governments for not being able to 
attain their primary policy objectives. 
Indirect costs may have been higher for European non-state actors operating 
in Myanmar, though. European small-medium enterprises have been more 
affected than big businesses.22 According to European and Myanma 
entrepreneurs, the quasi-absence of European businesses in Myanmar impeded 
the EU’s economic expansion in the country and (to a lesser extent) in the region 
at large. This competitive disadvantage has been increasing as Myanmar is 
further integrated in the regional economy.  
Third, the cost of sanctions inflicted on the targeted country was considerable. 
Twenty-odd years of ostracism deprived Myanmar of hundreds of millions of 
dollars in development aid (and likely well in excess of a billion dollar), in addition 
to similar amounts in lost investment and trading opportunities when compared 
with other Southeast Asian LDCs like Cambodia or Laos, or a lower-middle-
income country like Vietnam. Missing these opportunities also implied losing out 
on the multiplier effect for the whole economy. These missed opportunities, 
however, are hardly visible when examining aggregate economic growth. 
                                                 
21 Steinberg 2001a; 2011. 
22 Interview 6; interview 22. 
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Developmental costs of sanctions help to explain why the post-military 
government acceded to Western demands after the pro-establishment USDP 
had won the 2010 elections.  
Fourth, stakes for Myanmar were relatively high too. The pariah government 
conveyed plainly that it would not bow to external pressure. Openly making 
concessions would have been condemned by die-hard members of the regime. 
Moreover, the military government could eventually extract sizeable benefits from 
the status quo. Sanctions have been used as a scapegoat for economic 
dysfunctions. They have generated a rally-around-the-flag effect, at least among 
SPDC supporters. These high stakes explain why the SPDC never fully and 
openly complied with EU demands, despite the obvious costs of sanctions.  
Since April 2011, the stakes have been different for a nominally civilian 
government that seeks to legitimise its new-found authority. Strengthening the 
government’s domestic and international legitimacy was an important component 
of Senior General Than Shwe’s retirement strategy. This objective was 
mentioned in the last point of the SPDC’s roadmap to democracy – ‘Building a 
modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the 
Hluttaw […]’.23  
Finally, the stakes for the EU consisted mainly in reaping symbolic benefits at 
the domestic level. European leaders ostensibly showed their commitment to a 
norm-orientated democracy promotion policy. This policy simultaneously 
bolstered a benevolent European identity vis-à-vis an infamous pariah state. The 
costs of inaction would have, by comparison, been considerably higher.  
When policy-makers consider whether to use economic sanctions, the relevant 
status quo is not that prevailing at the time the decision is being taken, but rather the 
status quo that would prevail if no action or a different action is taken.24 
                                                 
23 Interview 27. 
24 Baldwin 1999/2000: 97. 
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Inaction towards massive human rights abuses would have disavowed the 
sanctions regime already levied. Failure to act would have also given the 
impression of abandoning the NLD. Lindsay argued with regards to Rhodesia:   
One of the most important uses of sanctions is enabling the sender to avoid creating 
negative images of itself… Had Britain not placed sanctions on Rhodesia [in 1966], 
most countries would have seen it as a sign of British approval of the Smith 
regime.25 
EU policy was therefore hamstrung. Its domestic stakes were high, plus it 
carried little domestic cost. As a consequence, changing an ineffective policy 
would have been costly, while reinforcing it yielded obvious political benefits at 
both domestic and international levels. EU sanctions policy relied on political 
developments in Myanmar. The policy could hardly be changed as long as the 
SPDC was in power.  
Generic reports of the British and French parliaments recommended that 
sanctions regimes be revised after a certain period of time (e.g. five years), so as 
to avoid the indefinite extension of protracted policies.26 However, such 
recommendations do not comprehend the wide array of stakes influencing the 
making of a sanctions policy, as the case study of EU sanctions on Myanmar 
demonstrates. An inability to alter the target’s behaviour did not provide a 
sufficient justification for repealing sanctions. Policy-makers did not solely take 
into account immediate policy effectiveness, but broader factors involved in 
policy-making. A more comprehensive evaluation of the success of sanctions 
needs to take into account their relational effects, as well as the overall 
calculation of costs and benefits by decision-makers. 
Should the success of sanctions on the post-SPDC government be attributed 
to luck rather than design? For most European measures did not directly hurt 
their intended targets. Twenty-three years of struggle have undeniably weakened 
Myanmar’s political and ethnic oppositions, whereas the junta’s political and 
                                                 
25 Lindsay 1986: 166. 
26 House of Lords, July 2007: Report; Assemblée Nationale, 27 June 2001: Commission. 
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economic protections in the region remained generally solid - despite EU 
sanctions. Therefore, Myanmar’s military leaders could have continued to 
indefinitely rule in a pariah state disconnected from the global economy. 
President Thein Sein should not be exaggeratedly depicted as a reformist: as 
PM, he implemented uncompromising policies that have drawn the opprobrium of 
the international community, especially during the 2007 uprising and the 2008 
constitutional referendum held in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. With the 
benefit of hindsight, however, a more comprehensive analysis of sanctions needs 
to take into account their intangible effects, such as psychological factors, which 
have yielded an unexpected impact on the post-SPDC government. 
Johan Galtung warned that it would be naïve to evaluate the effectiveness of 
sanctions solely in terms of their economic costs on the target.27 Sanctions 
effectiveness cannot be only assessed in terms of their ‘tangible effects’ on the 
target; non-tangible and indirect effects should also be taken into account. 
Psychological and socio-political factors can play an important role in determining 
the effectiveness of sanctions on the targeted government.28 The case of 
Myanmar before and after SPDC rule illustrates that foreign policy analysts 
should not undermine relational effects of sanctions in their policy assessments. 
Although such effects are usually non-tangible, they can be more influential than 
quantifiable ones like economic cost. Sanctions had limited psychological effects 
on the ‘security-obsessed’ SPDC, in contrast with the nominally civilian 
government eager to legitimise its authority derived from the 2010 elections. 
Moreover, it is necessary to examine sanctions in the context of their overall 
costs for policy-makers, rather than their sole effectiveness in achieving primary 
objectives. ‘[…] [A] successful policy choice is one that maximizes the utility of 
the policy-maker in a given situation.’29 The symbolic function of sanctions made 
the EU’s restrictive approach highly path dependent. As uncertainty minimisers, 
                                                 
27 Galtung 1967: 378-416. 
28 Economides and Wilson 2001: 157. 
29 Baldwin 1999/2000: 85. 
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statesmen prefer to decide further sanctions that condemn pariah states, even if 
these measures are unlikely to turn out effectively. Engagement with pariah 
regimes may easily backfire.  
Baldwin deduced that politicians have more interest in setting pusillanimous 
goals for their sanctions regimes, in order to appear more successful vis-à-vis 
their domestic constituencies, and thus minimise potential policy risks.30 
Baldwin’s conclusion on minimalist goals is disproven in the case of Myanmar. It 
is precisely the contrary that happened. Policy-makers adopted maximalist 
objectives because they derived benefits from conducting a policy driven by 
ideology, and reflecting positively on their identity. Building upon these empirical 
findings, the following section can now deliver an overall assessment of the 
validity of the hypotheses, and related theories encountered throughout the 
empirical investigation.  
 
3. Assessment of Hypotheses and Theoretical Reprise 
3.1. Bandwagoning Hypothesis 
The bandwagoning hypothesis suggested that EU policy would align with the 
US if Myanmar bore little strategic weight for the EU. Chapter Three 
demonstrated that Myanmar carried little strategic relevance, an assessment 
which has not been changed throughout the periods covered. The policy change 
of 2004, which allowed for delivering more humanitarian aid, was not caused by 
altered perceptions of Myanmar’s strategic weight, but by humanitarian concerns.  
The bandwagoning hypothesis thus rightly predicted that EU measures would 
in general follow the same pattern as those adopted by the US. During twenty 
years, EU penalties tended to follow, rather than precede, those already applied 
by Washington. An evidence of official coordination between EU and US policies 
is the expression of EU demands in a joint declaration with the US in 2007.31 In 
                                                 
30 Ibid.: 89. 
31 Council of the EU, 26 September 2007: EU-US Statement. 
325
Chapter VII 
several instances, the EU quickly emulated US measures. The symbolic function 
of EU foreign policy equally aimed at aligning EU with US policy. 
While bandwagoning with the US, EU foreign policy kept some degree of 
independence vis-à-vis its more powerful ally. Although EU restrictions 
increasingly entailed economic components, it did not officially adopt blanket 
economic sanctions. Some officials therefore contended that the absence of an 
indiscriminate ban on investment or trade with Myanmar distinguished the EU 
approach from that of the US.32 After 2004, the EU’s policy diverged from the US 
in the field of humanitarian aid when the EU decided to halt the ban on 
humanitarian aid in contradiction with US policy.  
The question of bandwagoning with US policy did not spark divergences 
between Atlanticist and independently-minded EU states. According to officials 
involved in Council meetings, bandwagoning with the US was hardly raised in 
Council discussions, because it was not perceived as an issue in the non-
strategic case of Myanmar.33 Myanmar thus differs from other, more strategic 
pariah states like Iraq, where the question of bandwagoning with the US 
paralysed EU foreign policy in 2003. 
Focusing on the structure of the international system elucidates the EU’s 
inconsistent reaction to domestic developments in Myanmar in 1988 and 1990. 
The Cold War balance of power against the Communist block clarifies why the 
EU did not enforce penalties to condemn the brutal clampdown on the 1988 
uprising. Two years later, the end of the Cold War explains why the EU did 
effectively punish SLORC for failing to honour the 1990 election. However, not 
honouring the result of elections that lacked clarity of purpose could be deemed a 
less flagrant human rights abuse than the mass murders committed in 1988. It 
could therefore be argued that the structure of the international system exerted 
more determining influence on the nature of the EU’s response, than the scale of 
human rights abuses perpetrated in Myanmar. 
                                                 
32 Interview 32; interview 6. 
33 Interview 7. 
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The bandwagoning hypothesis has been falsified in the area of assistance 
policy since 2004. The exception introduced by Article 5, Common Position 
2004/730/CFSP, allowed the subsequent decisions to found the Three Diseases 
Fund in 2007, as well as the increase in aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. 
Both decisions contradicted US policy of banning all assistance to Myanmar. The 
neo-realist lens adopted in this thesis predicted that the EU would be less 
assertive vis-à-vis the US in ‘softer’ policy areas, like humanitarian aid. This 
proposition was contradicted. 
These instances of falsification, however, do not considerably undermine the 
explanatory power of neo-realism. Discordances with the US prove that the EU 
remained an independent actor in international relations. Furthermore, such 
disagreements were not costly to the EU because they did not bear any 
consequences for the Transatlantic Alliance. In conclusion, neo-realism certainly 
proves an insightful and in many cases valid theory. A combination of three 
variables thus provides convincing explanations of EU foreign policy: Myanmar’s 
lack of strategic weight for the EU, bandwagoning with the principled US policy, 
and the structure of the international system during and after the Cold War. 
Despite these strengths, neo-realism does not propose self-sufficient 
explanations of twenty-three years of EU foreign policy-making. Neo-realism 
offers persuasive explanations of the early period of EU foreign policy until 1995, 
as long as the UK did not actively promote a principled approach. In the 
subsequent periods from 1996 until 2010, however, neo-realism misses 
important drivers of EU foreign policy. 
A significant limitation of neo-realism resides in its disregard of endogenous 
dynamics in EU policy-making. The pivotal moment surrounding the EU’s 
reaction to James Nichols’ demise was motivated by the UK’s policy 
entrepreneurship and the member states’ determination to demonstrate solidarity 
vis-à-vis Denmark and the NLD. The James Nichols’ case was a purely 
European issue, completely disconnected from the US position on Myanmar. 
New Labour’s election in 1997 represented another significant endogenous input, 
for the new British government has provided unwavering support to ASSK and 
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the NLD. Between then and 2010, the UK constantly pushed for further 
sanctions. The personal commitment of British policy-makers to ASSK, notably 
PMs Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, is well documented. In contrast with the neo-
realist emphasis on the influence of impersonal structural forces on states’ 
actions, domestic pressures and the leadership of British policy-makers did play 
a determining role in EU foreign policy. Robust empirical data thus points 
towards competing explanations of EU policy-making for the period between 
1996 and 2011.  
 
3.2. Compliance Hypothesis 
The compliance hypothesis proposed that EU policy would hinge upon 
Myanmar’s behaviour. This hypothesis was corroborated multiple times, 
especially when Myanmar refused to heed EU demands by sentencing ASSK to 
house arrest several times or clamping down on mass demonstrations in 2007. 
The compliance hypothesis is useful to pinpoint the cause-and-effect relationship 
between the target’s behaviour and the escalation of penalties. Restrictions were 
certainly tightened in the belief that they would make EU democracy promotion 
policy more effective, at least by explicitly punishing the SPDC when it 
encroached on basic human rights. The expectation that punitive measures 
represent a degree of response to the target’s behaviour is thus confirmed.  
The sanctions regime, however, displayed a one-way logic. Penalties were not 
scaled down when the SPDC partially heeded EU demands. They were 
unexpectedly reinforced when no specific events occurred in Myanmar, as a 
result of dynamics endogenous to the EU. The EU did not always scale up 
negative measures when Myanmar transgressed human rights norms and 
disregarded EU demands. Several penalties did not even hit the regime. Thus, 
the compliance hypothesis was falsified multiple times throughout the case study 
and in all three periods of EU foreign policy. In utter contradiction with this 
hypothesis, sanctions were more often driven by endogenous than by exogenous 
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inputs into EU foreign policy-making. In sum, sanctions were only partially 
determined by Myanmar’s behaviour.  
The empirical investigation demonstrates that the dynamics behind the 
imposition of EU sanctions were a lot more complex than approaches focused on 
the target’s behaviour would suggest. Penalties were not only increased to 
punish Myanmar’s behaviour, but as symbol of solidarity with Myanmar’s political 
opposition, as a result of domestic pressures in the UK, and of a bargaining 
process among large member states. Therefore, restrictive measures were 
ratcheted up and were not substantively scaled down until April 2011 – with the 
minor exceptions of the increased delivery of humanitarian aid and the visa ban 
waiver. 
This study concludes that sanctions approaches focusing on target behaviour 
do not offer holistic explanations of EU foreign policy towards Myanmar, and 
towards pariah states in general. The lack of comprehensiveness of such 
explanations shows that they cannot be used on their own. This finding echoes 
Galtung’s argument that such an approach is based on a fallacious conception of 
politics altogether.34 Sanctions policies do not always follow a mechanistic cause-
and-effect relationship between the target and sender’s behaviours, notably 
because it is often more cumbersome and less rewarding to rescind restrictions 
than to strengthen them. Theories focusing solely on the achievement of primary 
objectives proffer insightful but sketchy explanations of such policies, whether 
applied to penalties wielded by sovereign states or by international organisations 
like the EU. 
 
3.3. Consensus Hypothesis 
The consensus hypothesis suggested that EU foreign policy reflects the 
intention of policy-makers to maintain or strengthen a consensus on the liberal 
identity of the EU. A consensus does not mean that there are no divergences 
between policy-makers, but that the diverging minority of member states 
                                                 
34 Galtung 1967: 380ff. 
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eventually compromises with the views of the majority so that a common foreign 
policy can be ultimately decided. This hypothesis explains crucial events, notably 
the pivotal moment surrounding the EU’s response to the death of Denmark’s 
honorary consul. The definition of a European consensus in 1996 appeared 
necessary to develop a more cohesive foreign policy. 
After 1996, the EU did not take any decisions that would have undermined the 
European consensus to treat Myanmar as a pariah state. Officially distancing 
their policy from ASSK, a democracy icon, would have subjected flexible 
European governments to criticism by European actors, domestic constituencies, 
and a transnational network of human rights campaigners. Moralistic policy 
prescriptions generally proved more persuasive in Council discussions than 
arguments focusing on policy effectiveness. As a supranational actor 
independent from national governments, the European Commission (and later 
the EEAS) enjoyed more flexibility to advocate policy options that were less 
popular among European civil society groups, although it also faced the internal 
constraints of a multinational bureaucracy. 
The adoption of punitive measures was also a consequence of the ‘European’ 
commitment to promote democracy and human rights globally, which has been 
laid down in multifarious official documents, Treaties, Common Positions, 
Common Actions, and diplomatic declarations. Regular social interaction 
contributed to shaping a consensus, so that EU member states were reluctant to 
veto principled initiatives. The EU’s repeated decisions to escalate pressure on 
Myanmar undeniably enhanced its credentials as a global promoter of human 
rights and democracy. 
Based on the agreement to treat Myanmar as a pariah state, the consensus 
was subject to several attempts at redefinition. Various actors interpreted EU 
norms differently, as the emergence of unexpected situations opened windows of 
opportunity for new policy orientations. By all accounts, EU policy-makers had to 
engage in dialogue and attempt to persuade one another in order to reach 
decisions. The measure in 2004 to remove the ban on humanitarian aid is 
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attributable to a process of persuasive dialogue on the nature of European 
norms. 
Smaller member states, European institutions, and Brussels-based lobbyists 
did play a role in the policy, although not a decisive one when compared to the 
influence wielded by the largest EU member states. The former stakeholders 
demonstrated their ability to put ideas on the table. Principled actors, including 
the European Parliament, presumably enhanced the persuasiveness of British 
proposals by calling for blanket economic sanctions or for completely severing 
diplomatic relations with Myanmar. This maximalist stance had the effect that 
flexible member states essentially aimed at tempering the principled position in a 
cooperative way, instead of blocking proposals.  
The positions of EU member states did evolve quite considerably between 
1988 and 2010. This development does not necessarily imply that social 
interaction changed the member states’ initial interests. Other factors played a 
salient role in policy-making, such as: the changing structure of the international 
system, the nature of the events occurring in Myanmar, or gains acquired during 
bargains struck between big member states. However, this increased 
convergence around a European consensus shows that an ‘upgraded interest’ 
did emerge. This upgraded interest related to what was perceived as a European 
identity, or a peculiar conception of how the EU should behave as an actor in 
international relations. A strong consensus has grown considerably on how EU 
member states should collectively react to specific exogenous events. 
Nonetheless, while the consensus hypothesis excels at unveiling the ‘push 
factors’ in EU policy-making, its emphasis on normative drivers cannot expound 
the ‘brakes’ in cooperation. The hypothesis was of little use when no strong 
consensus prevailed in the early days of EU policy-making. Several decisions to 
tighten sanctions were underpinned by a bargaining process between large 
member states that took place in parallel with the process of dialogue between 
EU policy-makers. The Netherlands’ decision in 2005 and 2006 not to respect the 
consensus established since 2000 on the visa ban waiver demonstrated that the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ did not always prevail in policy-making, even in regards 
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to smaller member states. These impediments on cooperation mainly stem from 
the ‘logic of diversity’ in the EU, which liberal intergovernmentalism better 
captures.  
This thesis discovered that practitioners could interpret the same norm (e.g. 
democracy promotion) differently. Therefore, social constructivism cannot always 
predict which norm will eventually produce a specific policy outcome. The 
emphasis on the process of dialogue among policy-makers obscures 
fundamental questions raised in Foreign Policy Analysis, namely who are the key 
actors deciding the policy, and which main structures constrain decision-making.  
The putative prevalence of norms over other policy inputs also poses the 
question of consistency. If EU foreign policy-making is the result of a normative 
consensus, then why are authoritarian regimes with an analogously dim human 
rights record treated differently by the EU? Unlike liberal intergovernmentalism, 
social constructivism does not provide a ready-made explanation for double 
standards and hypocrisy in policy-making. The questions raised above can 
hardly be answered, without incorporating intergovernmental constraints on 
decision-making into tentative theoretical explanations. 
 
3.4. Large Member States Hypothesis 
The large member states hypothesis proposed that the calculation of material 
interests by the three big member states determines EU policy. This hypothesis 
has been validated in most instances of policy initiatives encountered throughout 
the empirical investigation. All decisions were the results of policy 
entrepreneurship by large member states (except the first penalty decided in 
1991 for which it is unknown which actor initiated the proposal). The UK was at 
the origin of almost all initiatives from 1996 until 2010 – apart from the first Troika 
of 1999 and the waiver on the visa ban adopted in 2000, which were both set up 
by Germany. Hence, only proposals initiated by one of the big member states 
were ultimately accepted by the two others. 
Proposals by smaller member states and European institutions were not 
adopted unless they were backed by a big member state. The Commission’s role 
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was marginal except in the sector of humanitarian aid, where it benefited from 
the UK’s support to promote new initiatives. The European Parliament did not 
directly influence EU foreign policy. Proposals by Denmark and the Netherlands 
were rebuffed until the UK successfully reintroduced them. This confirms the 
liberal intergovernmentalist perception of European integration as a process of 
‘bargaining among unequals’.35 Large member states played a determining role 
in reaching decisions on common measures. 
As a consequence, and despite the relevance of norms highlighted by social 
constructivist explanations, important decisions were mainly the result of a 
bargaining process during the entire period covered. Cooperative bargaining 
implied mutual concessions and log-rolling between policy-makers supporting 
each other’s projects. Setbacks and policies reflecting lowest common 
denominators occurred at times, although these outcomes became less frequent 
after a common position had been decided in 1996 and a European consensus 
to treat Myanmar as a pariah state consequently emerged. 
Preferences remained basically unaltered by the interaction at the EU level. 
Different views could be accommodated thanks to side-payments. Flexible 
member states conceded to imposing tougher restrictions after having secured 
that their main domestic interests would be unscathed by EU sanctions. A 
smaller principled member state could even refuse to apply a waiver on the visa 
ban enshrined in a common position.  
Preferences were domestically defined. During twenty years, big member 
states changed their preferences only as a result of domestic dynamics. 
Domestic pressures shifted sometimes, but only owing to a change of 
government after a national election. New governments in the UK, the 
Netherlands and France became more supportive of economic sanctions in the 
aftermath of the general elections of 1997, 1998 and 2007, respectively. By dint 
of interaction among policy-makers, it became clearer which policy options were 
viable (e.g. adopting penalties in targeted sectors), and which ones were not 
                                                 
35 Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002. 
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(e.g. imposing broad-brush economic sanctions). Among all theories, liberal 
intergovernmentalism therefore possesses the strongest explanatory power.  
The related claim, however, that policy-making would only reflect a calculus of 
material costs and benefits was contradicted in several instances after the 
adoption of Common Position 96/635/CFSP. Large member states with lower 
preference intensity compromised on their interests, notably in the field of 
bilateral economic interactions with Myanmar. The expectation that EU member 
states would behave as utility maximisers is at odds with France’s inclination to 
agree that economic relations with Myanmar be restrained, despite Total’s 
foothold in the country. In EU foreign policy towards Myanmar, ideational inputs 
have consistently outweighed material interests since 1996. 
The liberal intergovernmentalist emphasis on material interests can be 
misleading in the case of a pariah state like Myanmar. EU foreign policy was not 
really paralysed by divergences among member states. Overall, it did not reflect 
the lowest common denominator over a long period of time. Status quo outcomes 
remained possible, but the ideational drivers of EU policy enabled the member 
states to overcome divergences that had erstwhile appeared insuperable. The 
case study of EU foreign policy-making towards Myanmar as a pariah state 
underlines that policy paralysis is exceptional. Once implemented in the 
framework of a common position, EU decision-makers tended to broadly agree 
upon the consensus to maintain sanctions, independently from their 
effectiveness on the SPDC and their nuisance for European economic interests. 
Recalcitrant EU member states were unwilling to veto a policy based on 
previously-built consensuses.  
 
3.5. A ‘Normative’ Interpretation of Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
This thesis thus proposes a ‘normative’ version of liberal intergovernmentalism 
to deliver a more comprehensive explanation of EU foreign policy-making 
towards Myanmar between 1996 and 2011. This interpretation builds upon core 
tenets of liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. EU decisions are taken following a 
bargaining process among the largest states, who define their preferences 
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domestically), but it borrows insights from social constructivism to account for the 
role of norms as drivers of EU foreign policy-making. While liberal 
intergovernmentalism offers the most solid basis to analyse EU foreign policy-
making, the interpretation proposed here is ‘normative’ because it considers that 
the drivers of EU foreign policy are not material, but based on EU policy-makers’ 
moral commitment to promote human rights, which is laid down in EU legal and 
social norms. Moravcsik had envisaged that ideology could possibly play a more 
important role in EU foreign policy than in other areas of European policy-
making, but he did not deepen this consideration.36 
The spotlight laid by liberal intergovernmentalism on big EU member states 
aptly accounts for the repeated decisions to tighten sanctions. While the UK 
promoted a principled EU foreign policy, France and Germany tended to raise 
objections and bargain to reach a common stance. Smaller member states, the 
European Commission, and even lobbyists (via intermediaries having access to 
the Council), could put proposals on the table, but they did not have the power to 
shape the outcomes of negotiations. The latter were determined by the largest 
EU states. This accent on big member states also explains why policy proposals 
were occasionally rejected in the Council. A consensus among the big EU three 
is a necessary condition to decide common measures. 
As predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism, outcomes of bargains between 
the largest member states depended on their respective preference intensities. 
Large member states with stronger preferences in a given issue area tended to 
determine EU policy decisions. Other big member states with less intensive 
preferences were more inclined to agree with their policy proposals. This 
asymmetrical interdependence enabled member states to agree on a common 
foreign policy. Consequently, issue linkages and bargains between large member 
states underpinned the decision-making process. Neither Berlin nor Paris 
considered Myanmar high enough a priority to veto UK initiatives. 
                                                 
36 Moravcsik 1998: 478; Moravcsik 1993a: 494. 
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EU policy-making can be understood as a three-level game.37 Policy-makers 
played this game first in the domestic arena, then at the EU level with European 
institutions and transnational lobbyists based in Brussels, and finally at the 
intergovernmental level - essentially between the EU big three. The meso-level of 
governance is less important than the domestic and intergovernmental levels of 
policy-making, because it is where the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and transnational organisations like the Euro-Burma-Office or the 
ICFTU influenced certain policy proposals. The more influential external groups 
were national ones because they could pressure big member states, especially 
the UK. The most strategic level of decision-making was the intergovernmental 
level as the nature of EU decisions was determined by the ability of the three 
largest member states to find a common stance. The EU responded to 
exogenous dynamics only if a large member state promoted a specific EU policy. 
This also explains why the EU did not necessarily reward partial compliance by 
the pariah state. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, however, could not unveil the real drivers of EU 
foreign policy towards Myanmar. Normative motivations of EU member states 
gave impetus to EU foreign policy, not their material interests. Ideas tended to 
prevail over economic drivers, so that the interests of human rights groups 
outweighed those of economic lobbies.  
The main effect of EU policy consisted in buttressing the identity of the 
senders of sanctions domestically. Since restrictions were called for by ASSK 
and the NLD, the argument for a principled course of action proved highly 
persuasive within the EU, despite its unlikelihood of success. Flexible member 
states could hardly contravene proposals to reinforce sanctions without being 
attacked as apologists for the junta, notably by pro-democracy campaigners. 
Nevertheless, while ideas acted as the ‘push’ factors in EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar, decisions always took into account the material interests of EU 
member states, and reflected the vested interests of the largest ones. 
                                                 
37 Camroux 2010: 57 and 71. 
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Reputational issues within the Council were most acute when the SPDC 
obviously flouted human rights, thus increasing the pressure to ‘do something’ 
and punish such violations. For most policy-makers, a flexible policy would have 
undermined the commitment to promoting human rights and democracy. This 
European engagement for democracy is enshrined in multiple Treaties and 
Common Positions. A foreign policy driven by ideological prescriptions yielded 
externalities such as a liberal identity, from which the various policy-makers 
reaped domestic benefits. Social constructivism stresses that ideas, such as 
policy prescriptions or ideologies, forge the identity of the actor in question. 
Policy feedbacks bore little weight on EU sanctions policy towards Myanmar’s 
military government, because ideological arguments prevailed over utilitarian 
interest calculation, and decisions also resulted from a bargaining process 
among the largest member states. 
Negotiations thus followed a two-pronged process, which first implied arguing 
and exchanging ideas. The second stage of negotiation involved bargaining and 
side-payments, especially among the largest member states. EU foreign policy 
was the product of the lowest common denominator until a common position was 
adopted in 1996. An ‘upgraded interest’ tended to prevail thereafter. However, 
this process of convergence was not irreversible. The interests of EU member 
states did not equally converge in all areas of policy-making as the interests of 
EU member states were identified domestically. Changed preferences were 
generally the result of new functional demands at the domestic level, for instance 
following the election of a new government. EU member states could 
accommodate their diverse preferences by bargaining and making side-
payments. These bargains, however, did not imply that their interests were 
fundamentally changed. 
*** 
To conclude, the research question can be answered in three steps. First, the 
origins of EU policy were exogenous. The foreign policy took its roots in 
Myanmar. ASSK’s calls for European leaders to impose blanket sanctions 
became a powerful prescription for policy-makers eager to craft an ethical foreign 
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policy. Myanmar’s lack of compliance with EU demands did at times, although 
not always, entice the EU to scale up restrictions. This normative stance was 
strengthened by the EU’s lack of strategic interest in Myanmar and the US 
sanctions policy. Important additional triggers of EU policy were endogenous to 
the EU. 
Second, sanctions were imposed – and later reinforced – because their 
symbolic function reflected on the EU’s identity. EU member states felt compelled 
to react to the SPDC’s decision not to honour the 1990 elections, and to the 
death of Denmark’s honorary consul in Insein prison. As a European consensus 
steadily emerged, principled arguments became more influential than those 
focused on policy effectiveness, at least because the principled approach 
appealed to the emotions of policy-makers and their audiences. Adopting a tough 
stance on Myanmar, too, helped to deflect domestic criticism for cooperating with 
other authoritarian states in the region. However, economic interests of (big) 
member states clearly limited the scope of a normative policy. The EU did not 
initially impose economic penalties, despite the NLD’s calls to that end since 
1988. 
Third, the principled EU policy was chiefly advocated by a big member state 
after New Labour was elected in 1997. Policy entrepreneurship by a large state 
was the main trigger to escalate restrictions. Unlike smaller member states, the 
UK could convince other actors to adopt its policy proposals. It used ethical 
arguments persuasively, built coalitions with a wide range of actors, and 
bargained and made side-payments to other big member states reluctant to 
impose penalties. It was in the UK’s interest to act within an EU framework to 
benefit from ‘politics of scale’. 
The principled stance tended to dismiss arguments in favour of engagement 
as apologetic for the SPDC. Policy-making towards a pariah state is a politicised 
exercise. Therefore, flexible states accepted the ratcheting up of penalties 
despite evaluations that a punitive strategy was unlikely to bear fruit, and after 
having secured that the policy would not harm their core economic interests. 
Demonstrating symbolic solidarity was the prevailing rationale of EU policy-
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making. The extraordinary attributes of ASSK as an icon of democracy, and the 
UK’s unwavering support to her, help to clarify why Myanmar represents such a 
peculiar case of EU sanctions. The prominence of Myanmar’s pro-democracy 
movement in EU policy therefore contributes to explaining why Myanmar has 
been the object of one of the most comprehensive and extended sanctions 
regimes ever adopted by the EU. 
The foreign policy challenge encountered by the EU is captured by the 
treatment and implicit designation of military-ruled Myanmar as ‘pariah’ state. A 
consensus prevailed in the EU to punish the SPDC’s reprehensible treatment of 
human rights; yet sanctions were a ‘blunt instrument’ that often missed its 
primary targets.38 They bore unintended consequences, which may have 
contributed to impairing the human rights situation they aimed to redress. Making 
foreign policy towards a pariah state represented a challenge: the pariah 
apparently refused to quickly bow to outside pressures after sanctions were 
enforced, but its egregious domestic behaviour could hardly be ignored by the 
Union. The common policy therefore translated into ineffective symbolic 
posturing. Ratcheting up sanctions represented a symbolically lesser evil than 
inaction or engagement.  
The next section shall now attempt to summarise the main contributions of this 
thesis to the scholarship on EU foreign policy-making and on sanctions on 
Myanmar. It also charts potential research to stem from this study. 
 
4. Conclusions 
4.1. Contributions of the Thesis 
The first contribution of the dissertation is that it untangles an empirical puzzle. 
An in-depth study of the evolution of EU foreign policy and the respective policies 
of its member states over a twenty-three years period was necessary to expound 
such a complex case. Other studies did not systematically address the 
                                                 
38 The expression ‘blunt instrument’ is borrowed from Boutros Boutros Gali’s Agenda for Peace 
(UNSG: Report, 17 June 1992). 
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overarching question: why did the EU scale up sanctions on the SPDC. The UK’s 
influence on EU foreign policy-making was generally overlooked. This research 
gathered new empirical data thanks to substantive interviews, including on 
periods of policy-making that were not comprehensively covered by previous 
studies, like the EU’s policy between 2007 and 2010. Finally, using a single case 
study provided an opportunity to systematically ascertain the explanatory power 
of mainstream theories of International Relations and European policy-making in 
the context of EU sanctions. 
Second, the emphasis on big member states in EU foreign policy-making fills a 
gap in the literature on EU sanctions. Portela claimed that the objectives of 
autonomous EU sanctions differ according to the geographical locations of its 
targets.39 This thesis adds to her analysis that norm entrepreneurship by a large 
EU member state, particularly a former colonial power of the targeted state, and 
the ensuing bargaining process among the EU big three, are other additional 
factors that can also determine EU foreign policy-making. Wilde d’Estmael, 
Hazelzet, or Portela generally omitted endogenous inputs in their respective 
analyses of EU sanctions.40 Endogenous inputs into EU policy-making have been 
mainly incorporated by single case studies.41 But most single case studies did 
not offer comprehensive theoretical explanations of the making of EU sanctions. 
A third contribution consists in developing a mix of liberal 
intergovernmentalism and social constructivism to solve the paradox of EU 
sanctions on Myanmar. Scholars had noted this puzzle – namely, that EU 
sanctions could harm national interests of EU member states to attain common 
political objectives.42 However, they did not propose a theoretically-informed 
solution to this paradox. Thus, this thesis built upon liberal intergovernmentalism, 
but went beyond this theory to incorporate insights from social constructivism. 
                                                 
39 Portela 2005: 100ff. 
40 Wilde d’Estmael 1998; Hazelzet 2001; Portela 2005; 2010; 2011.  
41 On the EU’s arms embargo on China, see: Decerton 2009; Remond 2008; Casarini 2006: 221-
231. On EU restrictions towards the countries that broke out from the former Yugoslavia, see: 
Buchet 2003; De Vries 2002; Wilde d'Estmael 2004.  
42 M. Smith 2004b; Wilde d’Estmael 1998. 
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Liberal intergovernmentalism accounts for important shortcomings of EU foreign 
policy, notably owing to intra-state bargaining. Social constructivism explains why 
the policy was consistently principled due to a shared perception of a European 
identity.  
In-line with the mainstream literature on multilateral sanctions, this thesis 
generally supports the claim that, to gain cooperation from other member states, 
the leading sender of sanctions uses tactical issue-linkage particularly in the form 
of side-payments.43 However, this explanation is insufficient when it comes to 
analysing policy-making in a highly integrated organisation like the EU. 
Normative prescriptions, based on a common understanding of European 
identity, played a crucial role to convince all EU member states that ratcheting up 
sanctions represented a lesser evil than other policy options like inaction. Side-
payments can be regarded as a necessary, but not as a sufficient condition of EU 
policy-making. 
This dissertation retained liberal intergovernmentalism as the best explanation 
of EU foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, it highlighted important caveats of this 
theory. These lacunae cannot be remedied without incorporating ideational 
inputs into EU foreign policy-making. This thesis joins the growing body of 
studies, which blend rationalist with ideational approaches to explain EU foreign 
policy-making, such as Federica Bicchi’s ideational intergovernmentalism, or 
Daniel Thomas’ normative institutionalism.44  
Fourth, the thesis delivered new insights on the relevance of policy feedbacks 
when making EU sanctions. The case of Myanmar contradicts Ginsberg’s claims 
on the relevance of feedbacks in EU policy-making, who suggested that ignoring 
feedbacks on policy impact could risk ‘destroying over time the [EU] foreign 
policy decision-making system’.45 On the contrary, the European consensus to 
treat Myanmar as a pariah state strengthened perceptions of the EU’s identity, 
although evaluations had already pinpointed that further penalties were unlikely 
                                                 
43 Martin 1993: 406ff; ibid. 1992a. 
44 Bicchi 2002 and 2007; Thomas 2011. 
45 Ginsberg 2001: 277. 
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to immediately bear fruit on the military government. Policy evaluations were 
rarely heeded by EU policy-makers, notably owing to the prevalence of higher 
priorities set by the sender of sanctions, or due to bargains between big member 
states.  
This finding on the limited influence of policy feedback also contributes to the 
large body of literature on ethics in EU foreign policy, and in foreign policy more 
generally.46 The case of EU foreign policy towards military-ruled Myanmar 
demonstrates that implementing an ostentatiously ‘ethical’ foreign policy can be 
more important than the actual effectiveness of democracy promotion. An 
assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions should not only take into account 
their tangible (economic and diplomatic) effects, but also their intangible impacts, 
as well as broader calculations of risk, costs and benefits at the time of decision-
making.47 This insight illustrates the complexity of foreign policy-making towards 
pariah states in general as well as some operational challenges of European 
democracy promotion in authoritarian contexts.48 
A fifth contribution consists in delivering new insights to the literature on 
international sanctions on Myanmar. The study delivered a comprehensive 
impact assessment of the EU’s economic and diplomatic policies from the 
complementary perspectives of International Political Economy and Foreign 
Policy Analysis. It explained why each measure did not tangibly influence the 
SPDC’s behaviour with regards to the achievement of primary objectives. 
Previous studies had mainly focused on the impact of individual EU measures, 
without necessarily analysing the impact of EU policy in a broader international 
context.49  
This impact assessment was connected to the overall policy-making process 
in order to explain why the EU imposed each measure despite its unlikely 
                                                 
46 Ruffa 2011; Thomas 2011; Khaliq 2008; Aggestam 2008; Manners 2008 and 2002; Balfour 
2008; K. Smith 2007, 2003a and 2001; Gaskarth 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2001. 
47 Economides and Wilson 2001: 157; Baldwin 1999/2000. 
48 Youngs 2010 and 2004a; Barrios 2009; Schlumberger 2006: 33-60. 
49 Frittin and Swanström 2010; R. Taylor and Pederson 2004; Collignon 1997. 
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influence on the SPDC. Non-statutory penalties are often overlooked in the 
literature. Notwithstanding, some informal restrictions (such as the denial of 
assistance by IFIs or disincentivising European investment and trade) yielded 
more formidable effects than most statutory measures like the visa ban on 
targeted members and supporters of the junta.  
Furthermore, the empirical investigation demonstrated that the supreme 
concern of EU foreign policy consisted in supporting ASSK. It could be argued 
that sanctions imposed by the EU were directed at achieving domestic 
symbolism, as a signal of support to the NLD led by ASSK. This explanation 
could possibly be extended to other imposers of sanctions on Myanmar, like the 
US, Canada, Australia, Norway, or other Western states – notwithstanding the 
idiosyncratic process of policy-making in different states. Steinberg underscored 
the centrality of ASSK in Western policies towards Myanmar.50 Myanmar is a 
specific case because of the personalisation of Western policy around Aung San 
Suu Kyi.  
 
4.2. Potential Directions for Further Research  
To conclude, further research stemming from this study could follow four 
different avenues. New research could attempt to: (1) explain EU foreign policy 
towards Myanmar in the post-SPDC era; (2) deepen the case study of EU 
sanctions on Myanmar from the perspectives of economics, legal, and political 
science; (3) apply the theoretical framework proposed in this thesis to explain 
other cases of the making of EU sanctions; (4) and apply normative liberal 
intergovernmentalism to explain cases of sanctions decided by other 
international organisations. 
One avenue for further research would be to analyse EU foreign policy in the 
post-SPDC era. Two main questions arise after Myanmar’s new and nominally 
civilian government introduced unprecedented political and economic reforms. 
The first question asks to what extent EU foreign policy did effectively contribute 
                                                 
50 Steinberg 2011: 35ff. 
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to the introduction of the long-awaited reforms that led to the election of ASSK in 
parliament on 1 April 2012. It is indeed paradoxical that sanctions were unable to 
budge their original target - the SPDC - for more than twenty years, whereas 
Myanmar’s new government complied relatively quickly with some of the main 
objectives of EU policy. It would be interesting to know whether the new 
government consciously aimed at persuading the EU to rescind its sanctions 
regime (thus perceiving the EU as a foreign policy actor per se), or whether other 
international actors like the US, ASEAN, or China have been more influential in 
moving the domestic reforms process forward. More field research is needed to 
deliver a thorough answer.  
This question on the effectiveness of EU sanctions became more acute after 
Thein Sein’s government continued domestic reforms although the EU was 
relaxing its sanctions regime. On 12 April 2011, the EU suspended the 
application of restrictive measures for ‘12 months for new members of the 
government with no affiliation to the military […]’, and lifted the ban on high-level 
bilateral governmental visits to Myanmar until 30 April 2012.51 The EU again 
suspended the visa ban on 87 persons in January 2012.52 In April 2012, the EU 
eventually suspended all sanctions for one year with the exception of the arms 
embargo, following ASSK’s election in the parliament.53 It is meaningful to 
understand whether the EU’s repeated decisions to relax sanctions encouraged 
Myanmar’s new leadership to introduce reforms, or whether reforms would have 
been implemented even if the sanctions regime had remained in place.  
The second question is related to the EU’s historic decision to scale down 
sanctions in 2011 and 2012, for the first time in twenty years. Why did the EU so 
quickly repeal almost all its sanctions, whereas, hitherto, it had never effectively 
rewarded Myanmar during periods of partial compliance? The four hypotheses 
encountered in this thesis propose competing explanations to this paradigmatic 
policy change.  
                                                 
51 Council of the EU: Decision 2011/239/CFSP of 12 April 2011.  
52 Council of the EU: Conclusions of 23 January 2012. 
53 Council of the EU: Conclusions of 23 April 2012. 
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A second avenue for further research consists in deepening the EU-Myanmar 
case study by going beyond an analysis of EU policy-making. The study touched 
upon issues related to other disciplines of social science, which should be 
addressed to understand broader implications of EU foreign policy towards 
Myanmar. First, an economist could be interested to quantify the developmental 
costs of EU sanctions. This thesis showed that sanctions had a negative 
developmental impact, although they have not tangibly impacted on aggregate 
economic growth. The United Nations advocated that the humanitarian impact of 
sanctions should be an important concern of any sanctions policy.54 The case of 
Myanmar underlines the need to confront the humanitarian argument in favour of 
so-called ‘smart’ sanctions with more rigorous analysis. Several senior EU policy-
makers and pundits thus regretted that no independent and publicly-available 
analysis has been conducted on this important question.55 
A second question is whether EU restrictions have effectively promoted 
democracy in Myanmar. A political economist could ask whether the positive 
effect of symbolically supporting the NLD has outweighed the economic costs 
inflicted on the population. This question is all the more meaningful after the EU 
repealed almost all restrictive measures. The NLD can no longer credibly use the 
threat of European sanctions as a bargaining chip with the government. If 
Myanmar continues domestic reforms without the pressure of Western sanctions, 
it could imply to some extent that EU pressure was not a necessary condition for 
reforms to take place. 
A third element is related to the legal context of EU sanctions policy. This 
thesis identified several legal moot points related to the imposition of sanctions – 
such as the identification of targets, the notification of individuals targeted by 
sanctions, their right to appeal against the measures decided by the EU, or the 
legal rules to harmonise the coordination among the member states enforcing 
sanctions and the European institutions monitoring their implementation. 
Improving the legal framework of EU sanctions could help make them more 
                                                 
54 IASC and UNOCHA 2004. 
55 Interview 6; interview 49; interview 27. 
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effective as well as better respect the human rights of persons living in the 
targeted country. Since the EU increasingly uses sanctions in its external 
relations, it seems important to advance the research on this topic.  
Beyond the EU-Myanmar literature, a third avenue for further research could 
ascertain whether the interpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism offered in the 
conclusion of this thesis can explain the making of EU foreign policy towards 
other pariah states. The main thread of normative liberal intergovernmentalism is 
that EU foreign policy-making towards pariah states remains embedded in the 
rationalist predicates of liberal intergovernmentalism, but that the drivers of 
foreign policy-making are ideological and therefore consensus-based. Among 
various comparative research methods, ‘control cases’ allow for qualifying the 
claims of a single case study by testing them with other, although less detailed, 
case studies.56 
A comparative research could test the hypothesis that EU foreign policy is 
chiefly made by the largest member states. It seems at first sight logical that, as 
large EU member states and former colonial powers, the UK and France would 
play a predominant role in deciding EU sanctions regimes towards countries with 
which they enjoy historical and cultural ties. A possible exercise could therefore 
consist in comparing cases of EU sanctions wielded on former colonies of the 
largest EU members (e.g. Zimbabwe or South Africa for the UK; Côte d’Ivoire for 
France); former colonies of large, but not the largest, member states (e.g. Cuba 
for Spain); former colonies of smaller EU member states (e.g. Indonesia/East 
Timor for Indonesia and Portugal); and targeted states that had neither been 
colonised by a European power nor are neighbours of the EU (e.g. North Korea; 
Iran). Annex 6 indicates that this large member states hypothesis seems at first 
glance robust because EU sanctions often target former colonies of the largest 
member states. 50.8 percent (32 out of 59 cases) of EU sanctions targeted 
former British or French colonies; and 20.3 percent (12 out of 59 cases) targeted 
colonies of other EU member states like Italy, Spain, or the Netherlands. Also in 
regards to autonomous EU sanctions, 53.8 percent (21 out of 39 cases) targeted 
                                                 
56 King et al. 1994: 129 and 141. 
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former British or French colonies; and 15.4 percent (6 out of 39 cases) targeted 
colonies of other EU member states. A pertinent question is to what extent the 
three largest EU states effectively influence the making of EU sanctions on 
targets that were colonised by other EU members. 
Another criterion for comparative study would consist in looking at the 
perception of a state’s strategic weight. It would be interesting to compare the 
making of EU sanctions against targets located in the EU’s neighbourhood (e.g. 
Belarus or Serbia); important trading partners targeted by EU sanctions (e.g. 
China); states that attempt to acquire WMDs (e.g. Iran or North Korea); or states 
that provide shelter to terrorist groups (e.g. Libya until 2004, Syria from 1986 until 
2004, or Afghanistan).  
Explaining why sanctions are scaled up also raises the question of scaling 
them down. New research could investigate why the EU resumes cooperation 
with former targets of sanctions. Pariah states that have complied with EU 
demands (e.g. Libya’s compliance with Western demands in 2003 induced the 
EU to repeal sanctions in 200457), or that have undergone regime change (e.g. 
South Africa in 1994), could hence be compared to other cases where the EU 
has scaled down restrictions although its target had not fully complied with its 
demands (e.g. Uzbekistan in 2007). There is hence ample scope to test whether 
normative liberal intergovernmentalism could be applied to other cases of EU 
sanctions.  
A fourth avenue for further research would consist in examining whether a 
normative interpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism can successfully explain 
the decision of multilateral sanctions by other international organisations. There 
is potential to test whether the making of sanctions by other international 
organisations is also determined by the capacity of ‘big member states’ to 
harmonise their own domestic preferences with the social norms prevailing in this 
organisation. One of the large states could act as a ‘sender’ of sanctions, and the 
other large states would raise objections before reaching an agreement.  
                                                 
57 Council of the EU: Common Position 2004/698/CFSP of 14 October 2004. 
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In the case of the UN Security Council, it is possible that the five permanent 
members play the role of ‘largest member states’. For instance, it was noted that 
France acted as sender of sanctions on Côte d‘Ivoire in the UNSC as well as in 
the EU.58 It would be insightful to investigate whether national pressure groups of 
big member states exert more influence on UN Security Council Resolutions than 
social norms characteristic of the UNSC. Finally, a normative version of liberal 
intergovernmentalism could tentatively be applied to explain how other regional 
organisations decide sanctions, like NATO, the African Union, the European 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the Arab League. In various 
cases, diverse degrees of political integration and institutional cooperation may 
affect the importance of norms within each organisation. This study found that 
norms were the main driver of EU foreign policy-making towards Myanmar, but 
they may play a less important role in international organisations that are less 
integrated than the EU. 
                                                 
58 Interview 45. See: UNSC Resolution 1572 (2004); Council of the EU: Decision 2010/801/CFSP 
of 22 December 2010; ibid.: Regulation No. 25/2011 of 15 January 2011. 
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Annex 1: Chronology of Relations between the EU, Myanmar, and the US 
(July 1988-March 2011) 
 
23 July 1988  
General Ne Win resigns as BSPP-Chairman. 
8-10 August 1988 
Mass demonstrations quelled by the army.  
12-19 August 1988 
General Sein Lwin resigns as BSPP chairman. Former attorney general, Maung Maung, 
replaces him.  
31 August 1988 
West Germany suspends all assistance to Myanmar for violation of basic human rights.  
18 September 1988 
Army takes power in a coup d’état. General Saw Maung declares himself Prime Minister 
and announces that elections will be held after law and order is restored.  
23 September 1988 
Washington suspends all arms sales and foreign assistance except humanitarian aid. 
28 September 1988 
The European Community informally suspends development aid. 
December 1988 
Germany suspends new bilateral development assistance. 
1989 
The Bush administration decertifies Myanmar from the list of countries cooperating in 
efforts against narcotics. This measure denies Myanmar US assistance, and guarantees 
of Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The 
US also opposes aid and loans for Myanmar from multilateral development banks. 
The SLORC concludes separate cease-fire in the form of gentleman’s agreements with 
the following ethnic insurgent groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(Kokang), the Myanmar National Solidarity Party, the United Wa State Party, the 
National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan State), Shan State Army, and the New 
Democratic Army (Kachin). 
2 January 1989 
The ambassadors of the US, EC member states, and Japan leave Yangon to avoid 
attending the national celebration of Myanmar's Independence on 4 January. 
14 April 1989 
President George Bush suspends Myanmar's eligibility for benefits under Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) owing to violations of workers' rights. 
27 May 1989 
Burma’s official English name is changed to Myanmar. 
20 July 1989 
Aung San Suu Kyi is placed under house arrest; other NLD leaders are also detained. 
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8 May 1990 
US announce it will continue to withhold economic assistance ‘until a government 
broadly acceptable to the Burmese people comes into being.’ 
27 May 1990 
NLD wins landslide victory in general elections; elections disregarded by SLORC in 
controversy over their purpose. 
1990 
The European Parliament awards the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to ASSK. 
1991 
The SLORC concludes separate cease-fires in the form of gentleman’s agreements with 
the following ethnic insurgent groups: Kachin Defence Army (ex-KIO 4th brigade), Pao 
National Organisation, and Palaung State Liberation Party.  
1991 
The European Community and its member states coordinate their action and suspend all 
non-humanitarian development aid. 
22 July 1991 
President Bush refuses to renew the bilateral textile agreement that lapsed on 31 
December 1990. 
29 July 1991 
Council prohibits the sale of military equipment from Community countries to Myanmar. 
October 1991 
ASSK is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to bring democracy to Myanmar.  
1992 
The SLORC concludes a cease-fire in the form of a gentleman’s agreement with the 
Kayan National Guard ethnic insurgent groups. 
3 March 1992 
UNHCR Resolution 1992/58 institutes the role of UNHCR special rapporteur. 
Rapporteurs were: Japanese Professor Yozo Yokota (1992-1996), Mauritius Chief 
Justice Rajsoomer Lallah (1996-2000), and Brazilian Professor Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro 
(December 2000-2008). 
14 April 1992 
The Coordinating Commission of the National Convention (NC) first meets. The six 
objectives of the NC are: 1. Non-disintegration of the Union; 2. Non-disintegration of 
national unity; 3. Perpetuation of national sovereignty; 4. Promotion of a genuine 
multiparty democracy; 5. Promotion of the universal principles of justice, liberty and 
equality; 6. Participation by the Defence Services in a national political leadership role in 
the future state. The opposition retorts that a NC should not be called until the following 
conditions are met: lifting of martial law, recognition of the 1990 elections results, and 
release of all political prisoners.  
April 1992 
General Saw Maung resigns as head of state due to mental illness. 
1993 
The EU confirms the ‘suspension of all non-humanitarian aid programmes, cutting of 
defense links and a total ban on arms sales’. 
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1994 
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)’s 
armed wing, signs a written ceasefire agreement with the SLORC. This is the only 
written ceasefire agreement signed between an ethnic army and Myanmar’s national 
authorities. The SLORC concludes cease fires in the form of gentleman’s agreements 
with other armed ethnic groups: Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front, Kayan 
New Land Party, and Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation in 1994. 
EU member states sponsor a United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 
Myanmar. The EU has been ever since calling for a tripartite dialogue between SPDC, 
the NLD, and the ethnic nationalities. 
First official contacts between the next EU German presidency (Klaus Kinkel) and the 
SLORC foreign minister Own Gyaw.  
February 1994 
UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposes to the then-Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt the 
establishment of a dialogue between the SPDC and the UN, which Khin Nyunt accepts 
in August 1994.  
30 April 1994 
US Congress places Myanmar on the list of international ‘outlaw’ states, which means 
that no funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act can be used toward 
financing US shares in international organisations for programmes for Myanmar. 
1995 
The SLORC concludes cease fires in the form of gentleman’s agreements with the 
following ethnic groups: New Mon State Party, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, 
Karenni National Progressive Party, and Mongkok Peace Land Force – a splinter group 
from Kokang. 
February 1995 
The German deputy foreign minister visits Yangon, despite a recent bloody attack on the 
Karen headquarters of Mannerplaw. 
The European communities allocate about 26 million Thai Baht in form of food and 
medicines to the 75,000 ethnic Karen minority living along the border. 
10 July 1995 
First release of Aung San Suu Kyi  
28 November 1995 
The National League for Democracy requests a review of the Convention’s working 
procedures. Specifically, NLD delegates want to repeal orders which censor debate and 
allow for criminal punishment of those who speak against the military during the 
Convention. The authorities reject the request. 
29 November 1995 
The 86 delegates from the NLD boycott the National Convention. The number of MPs 
elected in 1990 now makes up less than 3 percent of all delegates. 
1996 
The SPDC concludes peacefires in the form of gentleman’s agreements with the Shan 
State National Army/Mong Tai Army and the Karenni National Defence Army. 
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30 March 1996 
NLD walks out from the Convention Hall, marking its rupture with the state-run National 
Convention. The official withdrawal is made definitive later in May 2004. 
April 1996 
James Leander Nichols, the honorary consul representing Denmark, Norway, and 
Finland, and a correspondent for Switzerland, is sentenced to three years in jail on 
charges of possessing two facsimile machines and a telephone switchboard.  
May 1996  
SLORC arrests 262 NLD elected members of parliament in their attempt to attend the 
first NLD party congress after ASSK’s release. 
22 June 1996 
James Leander Nichols dies in Insein prison. 
25 June 1996 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts passes legislation that adds a 10 percent 
premium on contracts with state agencies for companies that do business in Myanmar 
and prohibits those companies from purchasing or leasing state-owned property. 
July 1996 
Informal meeting between EU representatives and Myanmar’s foreign minister Win Aung 
at the margin of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (APMC) to seek an explanation 
of James Nichols’ demise. 
6 July 1996 
Danish beer multinational Carlsberg abandons plans to invest in Myanmar. 
7 July 1996 
Dutch brewer Heineken announces its withdrawal from a $30 million venture in 
Myanmar. In response, Myanmar bans imports of Heineken and Carlsberg. 
18 July 1996 
Suu Kyi calls for economic sanctions against Myanmar in a videotape. 
July 1996 
Danish pension fund sells its $10.45 million holding in Total SA, because of fears of an 
international boycott against Total SA. 
24 July 1996 
Canada and EU member states call for a UN ‘contact group’ to be formed to hasten 
political reform in Myanmar.  
July- August 1996 
European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Emma Bonino, meets with Aung San 
Suu Kyi and visits refugee camps along the Thai-Myanma border.  
September 1996 
SLORC arrests 537 NLD activists in order to prevent a party congress in front of ASSK’s 
house. 
30 September 1996 
President Clinton signs the FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, which bars 
US assistance to Myanmar, except for relief aid and anti-drug purposes. It also calls for 
the president to block new private American investment there in the event of ‘large-scale 
repression of or violence against’ the country's opposition. 
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3 October 1996 
President Clinton bars Myanma government leaders from entry into the United States. 
October 1996 
Troika meeting between EU representatives and Myanmar foreign minister Win Aung at 
the margins of the UN General Assembly with regards to James Nichols’ demise. 
25 October 1996 
EU announces it will impose a ban on visas for officials of Myanmar's military junta and 
place a moratorium on high-level bilateral contacts. 
28 October 1996 
Council of the EU adopts Common Position 96/635/CFSP as a response to James 
Nichols’ unexplained death. 
3 November 1996 
High-level contact between the NLD and the SPDC resumes. Police continues to close 
off the road in front of ASSK’s house to prevent supporters from attending her weekend 
speeches. 
9 November 1996 
ASSK and NLD members attacked. This attack is deplored by the Irish Presidency. 
1997 
Establishment of the Euro-Burma-Office (EBO) in Brussels, a pro-democracy advocacy 
group with Harn Yawnghwe as its director. 
The SLORC concludes cease fires in the form of gentleman’s agreements with the 
following groups: Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion), Communist Party of 
Burma – Arakan, KNU 2 Brigade Special Region Group – Thandaung, and Rakhine 
State All National Races Solidarity Party. 
2 January 1997 
The SPDC declares that ASSK’s movements will remain restricted and some universities 
will remain closed in order to preserve order.  
31 January 1997 
Total and Unocal announce that they have signed a new production-sharing contract 
with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to expand offshore natural gas 
exploitation in the Adaman Sea.  
25 February 1997. 
The European Commission, supported by Japan, complains at a WTO meeting that 
Massachusetts's selective purchasing legislation violates the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA). 
24 March 1997 
After a European Commission-sponsored study asserts the existence of 800,000 forced 
workers, the EU's foreign ministers vote to deny Myanmar's GSP benefits. The sanctions 
are estimated to affect only $30 million Myanmar’s exports annually, about 5 percent of 
the country's total exports. 
20 May 1997 
President Clinton issues an executive order that bars new investments, while allowing 
existing contracts to be fulfilled but not to be modified or expanded. 
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21 May 1997 
SLORC detains more than 300 NLD members, including 50 elected members of 
Parliament, to prevent them from attending a party gathering to mark the anniversary of 
the 1990 elections. 
30 May 1997 
Dutch Presidency condemns the arrests and urges the SPDC to release the political 
prisoners; the European Parliament proposes to increase sanctions. 
31 May 1997 
Myanmar joins ASEAN. EU blocks meetings with ASEAN in the EU-ASEAN, ASEM, and 
ARF framework if Myanmar participates; US blocks the US-ASEAN and ARF meetings. 
20 June 1997 
UK suspends trade promotion activities in Myanmar.  
5 October 1997 
The EU extends for another six months its bans on non-humanitarian aid, visas for ruling 
military leaders, and the sale of military equipment for Myanmar. 
November 1997 
EU refuses to attend the EU-ASEAN summit unless Myanmar is only a ‘passive 
observer’. 
15 November 1997 
SLORC replaced by SPDC, after several Generals are accused of corruption. The SPDC 
top four generals are the same as SLORC’s, but there are 15 new high-ranking military 
officers. 
January 1998 
EU excludes Myanmar from participating in the second Asia-Europe meeting in London.  
3-4 April 1998 
Second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM 2) in London - Myanmar representative is not 
allowed to participate. 
20 August 1998 
The ILO releases results of its investigation on forced labour, concluding that the 
practice is widespread and systematic.  
September 1998 
European Commission logs a WTO complaint against Burma Massachusetts Act. 
October 1998 
The European Union expands its travel sanctions against Myanmar to include 
restrictions on transit visas as well as tourist visas. 
6 July 1999 
EU Troika visits Yangon and meets with Aung San Suu Kyi, SPDC-first Secretary 
General Khin Nyunt and foreign minister General Win Aung. 
26 April 2000 
EU extends its visa ban on Myanma officials due to expire at the end of the month, 
imposes a freeze on assets held abroad by these officials, and bans the export of 
‘equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism’ to Myanmar. A waiver 
on the visa ban is also introduced when in the interest of the EU. This regulation is 
approved on 22 May 2000, and enters into force on 24 May 2000. 
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20 June 2000 
After several hearings, the US Supreme Court holds that the Massachusetts selective 
purchasing law is pre-empted by federal legislation and undermines the President’s 
ability to conduct foreign policy. 
23 September 2000 
Second arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
October 2000 
EU Troika cancelled by the Myanma authorities, due to ‘unfavourable circumstances’. 
December 2000 
Belgium allows Myanma foreign minister Win Aung to attend the ASEAN-EU ministerial 
meeting in Brussels. 
29-31 January 2001 
EU Troika to Yangon composed of five representatives from the European Commission, 
Council, Sweden, and Belgium. 
October 2001 
The EU decides to renew its sanctions against Myanmar but says it will relax them if the 
reconciliation talks begin to yield positive results. The EU also agrees to allocate $2 
million for HIV/AIDS assistance in Myanmar. 
13-15 March 2002. 
EU Troika to Yangon (initially planned for December 2001) headed by Rafel Conde, Asia 
Pacific director of the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs. 
6 May 2002 
Second release of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
8-10 September 2002 
EU Troika meets with Aung San Suu Kyi and deputy foreign minister U Khin Maung Win. 
23 October 2002 
The EU agrees to extend its sanctions against Myanmar. The EU welcomed some steps 
taken by the regime but said they were unhappy with further efforts. They said the arrest 
of democracy activists in September was of ‘grave concern’. 
14 April 2003 
EU extends existing sanctions for another year. The EU also threatens to widen the list 
of individuals subject to visa ban and asset freeze and to further strengthen the arms 
embargo by 29 October 2003, if no substantive progress is made. 
24 April 2003 
Aung San Suu Kyi says that military junta seems unwilling to engage in substantive talks 
on transition to democracy and that it was too early for Western governments to lift their 
sanctions. 
17 May 2003 
The US extends its ban on investment in Myanmar for another year, and refuses to lift 
the national emergency designation on Myanmar.  
30 May 2003 
Depayin incident, followed by Aung San Suu Kyi’s third arrest. All senior NLD officers 
are placed under house arrest, party offices are closed. 
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2 June 2003 
US State Department spokesperson calls on Myanmar’s government to release Suu Kyi 
and reopen the party's headquarters. EU High Representative Javier Solana states that 
the ‘repressive behavior confirms the regime's lack of interest in the return to 
democracy.’ 
16 June 2003 
EU Council of foreign ministers decides to implement immediately strengthened 
sanctions, as a response to the Depayin incident. EU expands the list of targeted 
individuals on the visa ban to include the extended families of ministers, deputy 
ministers, former ministers as well as senior army staff officers. 
25 June 2003 
EU expands travel sanctions to include senior managers of state-run enterprises and 
officials from organisations linked to the government. 
28 July 2003 
President Bush signs the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. 
30 August 2003 
General Khin Nyunt unveils Myanmar’s seven-step roadmap to democracy.  
18 October 2004 
Disbandment of Khin Nyunt and Military Intelligence apparatus. 
25 October 2004 
EU Council expands the travel ban to lower ranking members of the military and 
prohibits the granting of financial loans or credit to Myanma state-owned enterprises. It 
bans new investments in state-owned enterprises, but the ban does not affect 
arrangements already in place. EU agrees not to support loans by international financial 
institutions to Myanmar. Article 5 of the Common Position 2004/730/CFSP of 25 October 
2004 allows for provision of humanitarian aid to Myanmar in three specific sectors. 
February 2005 
The Netherlands prevents the Myanmar minister for national planning, U Soe Tha, from 
attending an ASEM Economic Ministers meeting in the Netherlands. 
July 2005 
Myanmar government cedes its turn as the chair of ASEAN. 
August 2005 
The Global Fund withdraws from Myanmar. 
September 2005  
The Netherlands refuses to grant a visa to the Myanma minister for economy to attend 
the Asia-Europe economic ministers’ meeting in Rotterdam.  
November 2005 
The Myanmar government starts to move to the new capital, Naypyidaw. 
November 2005 
Confidence-building mission by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, welcoming a delegation 
from the Myanmar ministry of foreign affairs to seminars held in Brussels and Strasbourg 
on the ‘Role and Structure of the Governmental Institutions of the European Union’.  
31 May 2006 
US State Department calls for a non-punitive UN Security Council resolution to change 
Myanmar’s human rights policies. 
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September 2006 
First ‘track-two workshop’ held by the FES with the Myanmar Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies (MISIS) on ‘Challenges and Perspectives for the Future of ASEAN 
and EU-Relations’.  
End of 2006  
Opening of a Myanma diplomatic representation in Brussels (first accredited to Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg). 
11 January 2007 
US-led UNSC Resolution, cosponsored by the UK, criticises Myanmar for its policies. 
The voting was 9 in favour, 3 against and 3 abstentions. The Resolution was defeated 
because of vetoes of China and Russia. 
March 2007 
Second ‘track-two workshop’ held by the FES with the MISIS on ‘Challenges and 
Perspectives for the Future of ASEAN and EU-Relations’.  
April 2007 
Recess in the National Convention, which finalised the Myanmar Constitution. 
September 2007 
Poorly paid workers protest against rise in bus fares resulting from 500 percent rise in 
the price of compressed natural gas used by bus companies. Some popular leaders like 
Min Ko Naing are arrested. 
3 September 2007 
Conclusion of the National Convention and publication of the Detailed Basic Principles of 
the Constitution. 
5 October 2007 
Protests by monks in Sittwe and Pakkoku repressed. Monks initiate nation-wide protests. 
October 2007 
SPDC starts to clamp down on peaceful protests known as the ‘Saffron Revolution’. 
October 2007 
Third ‘track-two workshop’ held by the FES with the MISIS.  
2-3 May 2008 
Cyclone Nargis devastates the Irrawaddy delta region in Southern Myanmar. 
7 May 2009 
France proposes to use the Responsibility to Protect in response to Nargis crisis. 
10 and 24 May 2009 
Referendum on the constitution approved by 92.4 percent of voters. 
11 August 2009 
Verdict on Aung San Suu Kyi, sentenced to three years imprisonment commuted to 18 
months house arrest by Senior General Than Shwe. 
12 August 2009 
EU condemns the verdict on Aung San Suu Kyi. 
13 August 2009 
EU extends visa ban to those involved in the prosecution of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
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15-16 August 2009 
US Congressman Jim Web meets with Senior General Than Shwe and Aung San Suu 
Kyi. 
3-4 November 2009 
US Assistant Secretary of State visits Myanmar and meets Aung San Suu Kyi and 
Myanmar’s leaders. 
17 December 2009  
Meeting between EU officials and Myanmar foreign minister on the fringe of the 
Copenhagen Summit. 
13 February 2010 
NLD vice chairman Tin Oo released from prison. 
1 March 2010 
Myanmar’s Supreme Court rejects ASSK’s appeal against the extension of her house 
arrest sentence. 
11 March 2010 
The 1990 election results are officially voided in the run-up to the 2010 general elections. 
29 March 
NLD announces its decision not to participate in the 2010 general elections, following an 
open vote held the same day.  
6 May 2010  
Deadline for political parties to register for the 2010 general elections. The NLD does not 
register (and therefore legally ceases to exist as a political party). 
13 August 2010 
Myanmar government announces that general elections will be held on 7 November 
2010. 
14 September 2010 
The electoral commission states which parties are allowed to take part in the elections 
(37 parties); which ones had been disbanded for failing to register on time (5 parties); 
and which ones could not compete because of an insufficient number of registered 
candidates (5 parties). The NLD is officially disbanded as a party. 
October 2010 
ASEM summit in Brussels. EU Special Envoy for Burma/ Myanmar Piero Fassino and 
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero Waldner meet with Myanmar’s 
foreign minister. 
7 November 2010 
Polling day. Competition is open for 330 (out of 440) seats in the Lower House (Pyithu 
Hluttaw, or People’s Assembly) and 168 (out of 224) seats in the Upper House (Amyotha 
Hluttaw, or Nationalities Assembly), since the Constitution reserved 25 percent of the 
seats in both houses for the military. 
13 November 2010 
Expiration of ASSK’s house arrest sentence. 
30 March 2011 
Swearing in of former Prime Minister Thein Sein as President of Myanmar. 
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Annex 2: Dataset of EU Sanctions Regimes, January 1956 – January 2011 
 
Target Begin End Duration EUTreaty UNsan USsan NeighCol
Afghanistan                1996 2002 6 2 1 1 2 
Algeria                        1992 1998 6 1 0 0 2 
Angola                        1993 2002 9 2 1 1 1 
Argentina                    1982 1982 1 1 0 0 2 
Armenia                      1992 2011 19 1 0 0 1 
Azerbaijan                  1992 2011 19 1 0 0 0 
Belarus                       1997 2011 14 2 0 1 1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina   1991 2011 20 1 1 1 1 
Burundi                       1993 1997 4 2 1 1 2 
Cambodia                   1992 1994 2 1 1 1 2 
Central African 
Republic I                   
1991 1997 6 1 0 0 2 
Central African 
Republic II                  
2003 2005 2 3 0 0 2 
China                          1989 2011 22 1 0 1 2 
Comoros                     2000 2001 1 3 0 .. 2 
Côte d'Ivoire I             2000 2002 2 3 0 1 2 
Côte d'Ivoire II            2004 2011 7 3 1 1 2 
Croatia I                      1991 2011 20 1 1 1 1 
Cuba                           2003 2008 5 3 0 1 1 
Djibouti                       1991 1991 1 1 0 0 1 
DR Congo /Zaire        1993 2011 18 2 1 1 1 
Eritrea I                       1999 2001 2 3 1 1 1 
Eritrea II                      2010 2011 1 4 1 1 1 
Ethiopia                      1999 2001 2 3 1 1 1 
Fiji I                             2001 2003 2 3 0 .. 2 
Fiji II                            2006 2011 5 3 0 1 2 
Former Yugoslavia / 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  
1991 2011 20 1 1 1 1 
FYR of Macedonia     1991 2001 10 1 1 1 1 
Gambia                       1994 1997 3 2 0 1 2 
Guatemala                  1993 1994 1 2 0 1 2 
Guinea-Bissau            1998 2000 2 2 0 1 2 
Guinea-Conakry I       1991 1997 6 1 0 .. 2 
Guinea-Conakry II      2009 2011 2 4 0 1 2 
Haiti                            1993 2004 11 2 1 1 2 
Indonesia                    1999 2000 1 3 0 1 2 
Iran I                           1984 1985 1 1 0 1 2 
Iran II                          2006 2011 5 3 1 1 2 
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Target Begin End Duration EUTreaty UNsan USsan NeighCol
Iraq I                           1984 1985 1 1 0 0 2 
Iraq II                          1990 2011 21 1 1 1 2 
Israel                          1982 1985 3 1 0 0 2 
Kenya                         1991 1997 6 1 0 .. 2 
Lebanon                     2006 2011 5 3 1 1 2 
Liberia                        1992 2011 19 1 1 1 2 
Libya                           1986 2004 18 1 1 1 2 
Moldova                      2003 2011 8 3 0 0 1 
Myanmar                    1988 2011 21 1 0 1 2 
Niger                           1996 1997 1 2 0 .. 2 
Nigeria                        1993 1999 6 2 0 1 2 
North Korea                1991 2011 20 1 1 1 0 
Pakistan                     1999 2000 1 1 0 1 2 
Palestinian 
Authorities                  
2006 2011 5 3 0 1 2 
Peru                            2000 2001 1 3 0 1 2 
Poland                        1982 1982 1 1 0 1 2 
Romania                     1989 1989 1 1 0 1 1 
Russia                        1999 2001 2 2 0 1 1 
Rwanda                      1994 2008 14 2 1 1 2 
Sierra Leone               1997 2010 13 2 1 1 2 
Slovenia                     1991 1998 7 1 1 1 1 
Somalia                      1992 2011 19 1 1 1 2 
South Africa                1956 1994 38 1 1 1 2 
Southern Rhodesia  1966 1979 13 1 1 1 2 
Soviet Union               1982 1983 1 1 0 1 1 
Sudan                         1992 2011 19 1 0 1 2 
Syria I                         1986 1994 8 1 0 1 2 
Syria II                        2005 2011 6 3 0 1 2 
Togo                           1992 2006 14 1 0 .. 2 
Turkey                        1981 1997 16 1 0 .. 1 
Uzbekistan                 2005 2009 4 3 0 1 0 
Zimbabwe                   2002 2011 9 3 0 1 2 
 
68 cases of sanctions regimes 
59 targeted countries 
43 autonomous EU sanctions regimes 
39 countries targeted by autonomous EU sanctions regimes 
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Definitions  
A sanctions regime is defined by its beginning (i.e. imposition of a penalty), its end (i.e. 
repeal of the restriction(s) adopted), and the nature of its demands on the target (i.e. 
primary objectives). When different sanctions regimes are imposed, a single country is 
divided into separate cases. This implies that the original sanctions regime was first 
ended, and another sanctions regime is later imposed, usually with different demands. 
Sanctions regimes include non-statutory sanctions.1 
 
Sources 
This dataset draws on information from the following sources: European 
Commission/EEAS website (2011): List of Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force; 
Official Journal of the European Communities website (2011); UN Sanctions Committee 
website (2011); UN Political Division website (2011); HM Treasury financial sanctions 
database (2011); European Foreign Policy Bulletin Online (2011); EUR-Lex Celex 
website (2011); Lexis Nexis Eurofiles (2011); Sipri Arms embargo Database (2011); US 
Department of State Website (2011): Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; US Aid 
website (2011); Hufbauer, Schott and Eliot (1985/1990); Kreutz (2005); Hazelzet (2001); 
Portela (2005 and 2010); Cronin (2008); Abler (2008); and websites of newspapers and 
news agencies last consulted in 2011 (The Economist, The Independent, The Guardian, 
Le Monde, der Spiegel, Reuther, and Agence France Presse). 
 
 
Annex 3: Average Duration of EU Sanctions Regimes 
Duration 
Total number of years for all cases of EU sanctions    581 
Frequency           68 
Average             8.54 years 
 
Total number of years for autonomous EU sanctions   277 
Frequency           43 
Average             6.44 years 
                                                 
1 The sanctions regime on South Africa therefore starts in 1956 when the International Table 
Tennis Federation severed its ties with the all-white South African Table Tennis Union. Statutory 
sanctions were introduced in 1977 when an arms embargo was imposed under the mandate of 
UNSCR 418(1977) & UNSCR 421(1977). EU states also agreed on a Code of Conduct regulating 
the employment practices of European firms with subsidiaries in South Africa. 
361
Annexes 
Annex 4: UN and Autonomous EU Sanctions  
 
UNsan 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
0 43 63.2 63.2 
1 25 36.8 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
 
Codebook:  
0:   Autonomous EU sanctions regime  
1:   UN and EU sanctions regime(s) 
 
Annex 5: EU Sanctions on Targets of US Sanctions  
 
USsan 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0 10 14.7 16.4 16.4 
1 51 75.0 83.6 100.0 
Total 61 89.7 100.0  
Missing  7 10.3   
             Total 68 100.0   
 
Codebook:  
0   Sanctions regime applied only by the EU and not by the US  
1  Sanctions regime applied only by the EU and by the US (including under 
UN mandate) 
Missing (..)  Cases where no data on US sanctions could be found. 
  
362
Annexes 
Annex 6: Frequency of sanctions related to the duration of Treaties 
 
EUTreaty 
Code Treaty 
Frequency 
of sanctions 
regimes 
Years 
Treaty was 
enforced 
Average new 
sanctions 
regimes p.a. Percent 
1 
Before and during 
the EPC (1956-
1992) 
34 36 .94 13% 
2 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1993-1998) 14 5 2.8 37% 
3 
Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999-2009) 18 10 1.8 24% 
4 
Lisbon Treaty 
(2009-2010) 2 1 2.0 27% 
 
Annex 7: Sanctions on European Neighbours and Former Colonies 
NeighCol 
  
All EU Sanctions Autonomous EU Sanctions 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 4 5.9 4 10.3 
1 13 22 8 20.5 
2 30 50.8 21 53.8 
3 12 20.3 6 15.4 
Total 59 100 39 100 
 
Codebook:  
0  Countries targeted by EU sanctions and neither a former European 
colony nor located in the European continent (nonmembership) 
1  Countries targeted by EU sanctions and located in the European 
continent 
2  Countries targeted by EU sanctions and former British or French colony 
3  Countries targeted by EU sanctions and former colony of the other EU 
member states  
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